The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII

[EricGuitarJames]

Waffen SS soldiers were trained to have a 'healthy' disregard for death. They could therefore be deployed in situations where ordinary Heer formations would be more likely to crack. As ID points out, this meant they would take more casualties as well as inflicting more. It did lead to some of their worst atrocities too.

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: KGV

Do you not think the sherman suffered from the same kind of doctrinal emphasis as the british cruiser and infantry tanks? Would the US army not have been better served if they had a MBT that could go head to head with other tanks and use the lighter armoured vehicles in the infantry support role. The Germans employed this kind of thinking well (when they could get their designs to work) with the Panther, STuG, STuH and Marder series of vehicles.

I have yet to have my doubts about the M 36 and wolverine dispelled

I think you're right. If the Americans struggled tank to tank, it was because they had no weapon to do the job. The Tank destroyers are fine defensively. High calibres, long combat ranges, better manouevrability than the towed platforms. However, they are not offensive weapons, The Germans realised this and optimised their Tank destroyers for the defence, removing the turret to reduce visibility (although the Stug tank killers were more by necessity than design) and giving them the armour necessary to survive. Say the Hetzer or Jagdpanther.

The Americans gave their Tank destroyers the more useful turret (easier traverse etc) but it wasn't more useful on the defence, because defenders usually get the first shot and prepared fields of fire to use. Giving them turrets, but open roofs and armour not up to the job made them more vulnerabl;e and easier to see. How anyone would have seen a camouflaged Hetzer, or penetrated the thick frontal slope of the Jagdpanther is hard to imagine.

I think what the Americans missed as that they would encounter most German armour requiring killing whilst they on the offensive. This meant a heavy MBT was a minimum requirement to cope. Defensive Tank destroyers could not survive on the attack at the speahead of the assault, and the Sherman was too underpowered and underarmoured to take on any of the best German designs of either Tanks of Tank Destroyers.

The contrary was also true. The combat performance of the best German Tank destroyers on the attack in the Ardennes was not all that good. Heavily armed and armoured, their lack of turret was hugely debilitating when on the attack.

Regards,
IronDuke

[Dragoon 45]

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

ORIGINAL: KGV

Do you not think the sherman suffered from the same kind of doctrinal emphasis as the british cruiser and infantry tanks? Would the US army not have been better served if they had a MBT that could go head to head with other tanks and use the lighter armoured vehicles in the infantry support role. The Germans employed this kind of thinking well (when they could get their designs to work) with the Panther, STuG, STuH and Marder series of vehicles.

I have yet to have my doubts about the M 36 and wolverine dispelled

I think you're right. If the Americans struggled tank to tank, it was because they had no weapon to do the job. The Tank destroyers are fine defensively. High calibres, long combat ranges, better manouevrability than the towed platforms. However, they are not offensive weapons, The Germans realised this and optimised their Tank destroyers for the defence, removing the turret to reduce visibility (although the Stug tank killers were more by necessity than design) and giving them the armour necessary to survive. Say the Hetzer or Jagdpanther.

The Americans gave their Tank destroyers the more useful turret (easier traverse etc) but it wasn't more useful on the defence, because defenders usually get the first shot and prepared fields of fire to use. Giving them turrets, but open roofs and armour not up to the job made them more vulnerabl;e and easier to see. How anyone would have seen a camouflaged Hetzer, or penetrated the thick frontal slope of the Jagdpanther is hard to imagine.

I think what the Americans missed as that they would encounter most German armour requiring killing whilst they on the offensive. This meant a heavy MBT was a minimum requirement to cope. Defensive Tank destroyers could not survive on the attack at the speahead of the assault, and the Sherman was too underpowered and underarmoured to take on any of the best German designs of either Tanks of Tank Destroyers.

The contrary was also true. The combat performance of the best German Tank destroyers on the attack in the Ardennes was not all that good. Heavily armed and armoured, their lack of turret was hugely debilitating when on the attack.

Regards,
IronDuke

Previously I stated the Sherman was designed as an Infantry support tank. Part of the rationale behind the infantry support tank was assisting the infantry in attacks and defence, but also under this concept the U.S. Army envisioned an exploitation role also. I used the term Infantry Support tank for this concept, probably a more well-known term is the medium tank concept. The U.S. Army had its armor advocates (Chaffee, Patton, Harmon, etc.) but these advocates were not as well positioned as the armor advocates in other armies were. J.F.C. Fuller was almost revered as a saint in Europe in the pre-war years. Guderian was in a position to make effective changes in the training and doctrine of the German Armored Force. In the USSR, there were a lot of good armor theorists who disappeared during Stalin's purges. I bring this up to remind everyone that the U.S. Armor was an Infantry dominated force. There was no Armor Corps prior to 1940, tank development fell under the responsibility of the Infantry Branch. Due to U.S. Law, if the Cavalry wanted a light tank in the 20's and 30's, it had to be called a combat car to get around the law. This was part and parcel to the muddled doctrine in the U.S. Army prior to the war.

I have researched the development of the tank destroyer concept in the U.S. Army over the years. Unfortunately very little is available about how the concept was developed. I do not know if the concept was an outgrowth of Fuller's theories or something uniquely American. Yes the TD's were largely a defensive weapon in nature. Although there were successful employments of TD's in the attack. Doctrine had the TD's employed on the flanks to cover high speed armor avenues of approach towards advancing American Forces. Their employment doctrinally was much the same as Soviet Anti-tank Battalions and Regiments later in the war and post war. TD's could also be used as assault guns or artillery also.

How effective were they? In the several developmental histories of the American TD's there is mention of the M-36 and M-18 performing quite well. 4:1 and 5:1 kill ratios are mentioned but the actual loss figures are not given. I recently reread the official U.S. Army History of the Battle of the Bulge. There are a number of examples that attest to the effectiveness of the TD's given. One or two Jackson's or Hellcats would wander into a battle destroy a few German tanks thereby stalling the attack and then wander back off the battlefield. Agreed these are not the hard concrete examples needed to determine how effective they were. But examples suggest that the TD's were far from being useless on the battlefield. Many historians believe the M-18 was the best Tank Destroyer of the war for any side. In regards to the turreted vs fixed mount gun for a tank destroyer argument, there are cases for each side. A turret-less design can not use hull defilade and was limited in a lot of cases by the limited traverse of the mounting. A turreted design is easier to spot due to height in some conditions, but can use hull defilade there by exposing a very small target to return fire. Some models of the M-36 (M-36B2) did have a roof for the turret and crews improvised roofs for the TD's in the field. In the case of the M-18, it was the fastest tracked vehicle of the war for any side. American tracked TD's were optimized for hit and run tactics. Engage with one or two shots, move to a new firing position and repeat the process all over again. German Panzer Jagers were optimized to stand up to incoming fire with heavy frontal armor, they were for the most part relatively slow compared to U.S. models, and double as infantry support vehicles when necessary. Also turret-less designs were far easier, quicker, and cheaper to build due to the lack of a turret. I am sure economic reason also factored into the German decision to go without turrets on their tank destroyers.

Now, how did the German concept of the Panzer Jager evolve? The Germans did not start the war with Panzer Jagers. They started to develop them after the successful invasion of Poland. Initially obsolete tank chassis's were used which mounted any spare gun with a decent anti-armor capacity in a number of different mountings. The STuG's were not designed as an anti-tank weapon but as an infantry support weapon, being initially fielded with a low velocity 75mm gun and no secondary armorment. The STuG's were entirely dependent on friendly infantry for protection from enemy infantry. Only when the STuG-III aufst F appeared armed with the long barrel 7.5cm Kwk L43/48 did the stug's obtain a decent anti-tank capability. Also when this version of the STuG appeared the difference between an assault gun and a tank destroyer in German service became blurred. The Germans built panzer jagers as a response to tanks after the war started not as a prewar doctrinal approach to killing tanks.

[JJKettunen]

ORIGINAL: KG Erwin

This is a welcome change from some of the attitudes I see on forums relating to the German forces. Some of the more serious researchers are doing their best to dash the long-held notions of the Germans as being inherently superior soldiers... [snip]

...As for the alleged German combat superiority, this image was greatly influenced by the studies of the late Col. Trevor N. Dupuy, most notably in his book "A Genius for War". The statistical studies he based his opinions on were flawed, and he picked the examples that best supported his viewpoint. Unfortunately, many subsequent historians (and wargame designers) took this as gospel, and it has taken years to re-evaluate and refute these assumptions.

Sorry KG, no serious researcher have been able to refute Dupuy's work so far, only fiction writers like Ambrose, Mansoore and J.S. Brown. These writers, not Dupuy(!), have picked examples to support their opinions and viewpoints, with several errors in their basic data, and with no sound methodology at all.

Since Dupuy's Quantified Judgement Model (QJM) is the single most analyzed combat model ever designed, throughly documented, valitated to historical data, and succesfully used to forecast battle results, I tend to agree with it more than fiction...which is to say that German formations in Italy and Ardennes on average were more combat effective than the Allied counterparts. (Btw, Dupuy's most influentical books are "Numbers , Predictions & War" and "Understanding War".)

[Dragoon 45]

ORIGINAL: Keke

ORIGINAL: KG Erwin

This is a welcome change from some of the attitudes I see on forums relating to the German forces. Some of the more serious researchers are doing their best to dash the long-held notions of the Germans as being inherently superior soldiers... [snip]

...As for the alleged German combat superiority, this image was greatly influenced by the studies of the late Col. Trevor N. Dupuy, most notably in his book "A Genius for War". The statistical studies he based his opinions on were flawed, and he picked the examples that best supported his viewpoint. Unfortunately, many subsequent historians (and wargame designers) took this as gospel, and it has taken years to re-evaluate and refute these assumptions.

Sorry KG, no serious researcher have been able to refute Dupuy's work so far, only fiction writers like Ambrose, Mansoore and J.S. Brown. These writers, not Dupuy(!), have picked examples to support their opinions and viewpoints, with several errors in their basic data, and with no sound methodology at all.

Since Dupuy's Quantified Judgement Model (QJM) is the single most analyzed combat model ever designed, throughly documented, valitated to historical data, and succesfully used to forecast battle results, I tend to agree with it more than fiction...which is to say that German formations in Italy and Ardennes on average were more combat effective than the Allied counterparts. (Btw, Dupuy's most influentical books are "Numbers , Predictions & War" and "Understanding War".)

Some people accept Dupuy's work as gospel and others don't. I believe that is a very safe assumption. While it has been a few years for me since I read Dupuy I still have some questions about his methodalogy that have not been answered. It does seem to me that Dupuy was careful to choose engagements that supported his conclusions. I find no engagements involving Volks Grenadier Formations in his tables as reprinted in "Fighting Power" by Van Crevald. Also I find that some American Divisions consistently performed better than German Formations, such as the 45th ID and 4th Armored, neither would be considered as elite but rather as veteran formations.

BG S.L.A. Marshall was probably the best known of the historians employed by the U.S. Army in WW II. I can not remember the book in which his findings were published but in his research he found that only 1/3 of the U.S. Infantry ever engaged the enemy with their weapons in WW II. Yes there were some men that didn't engage out of fear, but most were performing other essential tasks at the time, ammo resupply, call for fire, evac of wounded, etc. LTC Grossman wrote a book a few years back "ON KILLING" about this subject and the steps the Army has used over the years to correct the problem. Currently in the U.S. Army I would venture to say over 95% of the infantry engage the enemy today. But the training methods used to gain this increased combat effectiveness has also probably increased the incidence of PTSD and other mental problems in veterans. I offer this little theory in support of why German units may have been more effective in selected engagements than American units. Less firepower equals less combat effectiveness.

This thread started out as the American combat soldier was just as effective as a German soldier, a theory put forth by KG Erwin. Col Dupuy's theory is that the German units were more effective than the American units. Most people who believe this theory take that to mean that the German soldier therefore is more effective than the American soldier, but this in not necessarily the case. Unit effectiveness depends on a lot of factors, such as morale, leadership, quality of the troops, logistical support, doctrine, level of training, weather, health, availability of supporting arms, the environment they came from, how they are equipped, etc. Throughout this thread we have conceded that in some areas the Germans were better and that in some areas the Americans were better. Having served in combat as an infantryman, I know better than to take a one over the world statement and believe it at face value. There always more causes and effects than are factored into a question and its answer. Some have little bearing on the question and others have a large bearing. Some are used and others are not in formulating the answer. Unfortunately, over time a theory if supported by enough people becomes regarded as fact. The flat earth theory comes immediately to mind. I do not suggest that this is the case with Col Dupuy's work, but I would suggest that too many people have taken his work at face value and have not questioned it enough. Did Col Dupuy cover all the factors involved and take them into account in the engagements cited? Most importantly did he start the research with the conclusion already formed in his mind? I for one will never believe that the study of history, especially military history, can be form-fitted into a mathmatical equation that will produce the correct answer every time. There is always someone somewhere who will screw the question and its answer up.

[JJKettunen]

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
Some people accept Dupuy's work as gospel and others don't. I believe that is a very safe assumption. While it has been a few years for me since I read Dupuy I still have some questions about his methodalogy that have not been answered. It does seem to me that Dupuy was careful to choose engagements that supported his conclusions. I find no engagements involving Volks Grenadier Formations in his tables as reprinted in "Fighting Power" by Van Crevald. Also I find that some American Divisions consistently performed better than German Formations, such as the 45th ID and 4th Armored, neither would be considered as elite but rather as veteran formations.

Dupuy's work is no gospel and it doesn't present the absolute truth. However it presents a quite well working mathematical formula to assess combat efficiency of various formations, and it is valitated to historical data. When QJM was applied to Ardennes database, there's was no cherry picking of formations. It included all the Volks Grenadier units involved (Bastogne anyone?). Still on an average German formations had higher combat efficiency both in attack and defense.

Care to elaborate your criticism against Dupuy's methodology? I've found out that most critics are not at all familiar with the formulae, but just criticize them because they don't agree with the conclusions.

Regarding some American units fighting better than Germans...that's absolutelly true! As explained in the two books of Dupuy, mentioned above, for example the 88th Division had the fifth best Combat Effectiveness Value (CEV) of all frontline units in Italy, leaving FE the 16th Pz Division behind.

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
BG S.L.A. Marshall was probably the best known of the historians employed by the U.S. Army in WW II. I can not remember the book in which his findings were published but in his research he found that only 1/3 of the U.S. Infantry ever engaged the enemy with their weapons in WW II. Yes there were some men that didn't engage out of fear, but most were performing other essential tasks at the time, ammo resupply, call for fire, evac of wounded, etc. LTC Grossman wrote a book a few years back "ON KILLING" about this subject and the steps the Army has used over the years to correct the problem. Currently in the U.S. Army I would venture to say over 95% of the infantry engage the enemy today. But the training methods used to gain this increased combat effectiveness has also probably increased the incidence of PTSD and other mental problems in veterans. I offer this little theory in support of why German units may have been more effective in selected engagements than American units. Less firepower equals less combat effectiveness.

So you are claiming that German soldiers didn't perform other essential tasks like ammo resupply, call for fire, evac of wounded etc., and that's why they were more combat effective?...

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
This thread started out as the American combat soldier was just as effective as a German soldier, a theory put forth by KG Erwin. Col Dupuy's theory is that the German units were more effective than the American units. Most people who believe this theory take that to mean that the German soldier therefore is more effective than the American soldier, but this in not necessarily the case. Unit effectiveness depends on a lot of factors, such as morale, leadership, quality of the troops, logistical support, doctrine, level of training, weather, health, availability of supporting arms, the environment they came from, how they are equipped, etc. Throughout this thread we have conceded that in some areas the Germans were better and that in some areas the Americans were better. Having served in combat as an infantryman, I know better than to take a one over the world statement and believe it at face value. There always more causes and effects than are factored into a question and its answer. Some have little bearing on the question and others have a large bearing. Some are used and others are not in formulating the answer. Unfortunately, over time a theory if supported by enough people becomes regarded as fact. The flat earth theory comes immediately to mind. I do not suggest that this is the case with Col Dupuy's work, but I would suggest that too many people have taken his work at face value and have not questioned it enough. Did Col Dupuy cover all the factors involved and take them into account in the engagements cited? Most importantly did he start the research with the conclusion already formed in his mind? I for one will never believe that the study of history, especially military history, can be form-fitted into a mathmatical equation that will produce the correct answer every time. There is always someone somewhere who will screw the question and its answer up.

KG Erwin didn't exactly present a theory, but his opinion, one that could be expected from any red blooded American. There are two types of arguments that one hears when considering an issue. One is objective analysis, which is an opinion developed as a result of research and the analysis of data, and the other is a "legal argument" in which one uses data to establish a viewpoint that one already believes in. Dupuy's work falls into the former category. It can, and should be criticized but not with "legal arguments", but with better research and analysis (like with the revision of QJM called Tactical Numerical Deterministic Model (TNDM)).

Dupuy's theory is not that German soldiers are more effective than the American units, but his QJM-model. When it is used for Italian campaign and the Bulge it appears that the German formations on an average were more combat effective than the Allied.

[Dragoon 45]

ORIGINAL: Keke

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
Some people accept Dupuy's work as gospel and others don't. I believe that is a very safe assumption. While it has been a few years for me since I read Dupuy I still have some questions about his methodalogy that have not been answered. It does seem to me that Dupuy was careful to choose engagements that supported his conclusions. I find no engagements involving Volks Grenadier Formations in his tables as reprinted in "Fighting Power" by Van Crevald. Also I find that some American Divisions consistently performed better than German Formations, such as the 45th ID and 4th Armored, neither would be considered as elite but rather as veteran formations.

Dupuy's work is no gospel and it doesn't present the absolute truth. However it presents a quite well working mathematical formula to assess combat efficiency of various formations, and it is valitated to historical data. When QJM was applied to Ardennes database, there's was no cherry picking of formations. It included all the Volks Grenadier units involved (Bastogne anyone?). Still on an average German formations had higher combat efficiency both in attack and defense.

Care to elaborate your criticism against Dupuy's methodology? I've found out that most critics are not at all familiar with the formulae, but just criticize them because they don't agree with the conclusions.

Regarding some American units fighting better than Germans...that's absolutelly true! As explained in the two books of Dupuy, mentioned above, for example the 88th Division had the fifth best Combat Effectiveness Value (CEV) of all frontline units in Italy, leaving FE the 16th Pz Division behind.

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
BG S.L.A. Marshall was probably the best known of the historians employed by the U.S. Army in WW II. I can not remember the book in which his findings were published but in his research he found that only 1/3 of the U.S. Infantry ever engaged the enemy with their weapons in WW II. Yes there were some men that didn't engage out of fear, but most were performing other essential tasks at the time, ammo resupply, call for fire, evac of wounded, etc. LTC Grossman wrote a book a few years back "ON KILLING" about this subject and the steps the Army has used over the years to correct the problem. Currently in the U.S. Army I would venture to say over 95% of the infantry engage the enemy today. But the training methods used to gain this increased combat effectiveness has also probably increased the incidence of PTSD and other mental problems in veterans. I offer this little theory in support of why German units may have been more effective in selected engagements than American units. Less firepower equals less combat effectiveness.

So you are claiming that German soldiers didn't perform other essential tasks like ammo resupply, call for fire, evac of wounded etc., and that's why they were more combat effective?...

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
This thread started out as the American combat soldier was just as effective as a German soldier, a theory put forth by KG Erwin. Col Dupuy's theory is that the German units were more effective than the American units. Most people who believe this theory take that to mean that the German soldier therefore is more effective than the American soldier, but this in not necessarily the case. Unit effectiveness depends on a lot of factors, such as morale, leadership, quality of the troops, logistical support, doctrine, level of training, weather, health, availability of supporting arms, the environment they came from, how they are equipped, etc. Throughout this thread we have conceded that in some areas the Germans were better and that in some areas the Americans were better. Having served in combat as an infantryman, I know better than to take a one over the world statement and believe it at face value. There always more causes and effects than are factored into a question and its answer. Some have little bearing on the question and others have a large bearing. Some are used and others are not in formulating the answer. Unfortunately, over time a theory if supported by enough people becomes regarded as fact. The flat earth theory comes immediately to mind. I do not suggest that this is the case with Col Dupuy's work, but I would suggest that too many people have taken his work at face value and have not questioned it enough. Did Col Dupuy cover all the factors involved and take them into account in the engagements cited? Most importantly did he start the research with the conclusion already formed in his mind? I for one will never believe that the study of history, especially military history, can be form-fitted into a mathmatical equation that will produce the correct answer every time. There is always someone somewhere who will screw the question and its answer up.

KG Erwin didn't exactly present a theory, but his opinion, one that could be expected from any red blooded American. There are two types of arguments that one hears when considering an issue. One is objective analysis, which is an opinion developed as a result of research and the analysis of data, and the other is a "legal argument" in which one uses data to establish a viewpoint that one already believes in. Dupuy's work falls into the former category. It can, and should be criticized but not with "legal arguments", but with better research and analysis (like with the revision of QJM called Tactical Numerical Deterministic Model (TNDM)).

Dupuy's theory is not that German soldiers are more effective than the American units, but his QJM-model. When it is used for Italian campaign and the Bulge it appears that the German formations on an average were more combat effective than the Allied.

If I could just figure out this quote thing a little better. I presented S.L.A. Marshall's and Grossman's theories for the purpose of illustrating a point. I know of no similiar study done on Germans soldiers. If 50% of the Germans soldiers were actively engaging the enemy with weapons vs 33% for the Americans that would equate into a difference in combat effectiveness. Also because formations appear to be more effective does not necessarily equate to the individual soldier being more effective. Poor equipment can make the most effective soldier on the planet totally ineffective as can a host of other things. If you can not fire your rifle due to being out of ammo, you are combat-ineffective. The same goes for if your rifle is jammed because you were issued the wrong cleaning supplies for the climate or your tank is out of fuel or ammo, your radio's are dead and you can't call for fire etc..

In regards to Dupuy's methodology, my concern is how do you apply a mathmatical value to uniquely human values and thoughts? I spent 30 years in the military and a good portion of that time working in Military Intelligence at the tactical level. The U.S. Military spends a great deal of time and money trying to assign mathmatical values to the enemies it may face. Sometimes these values correspond to reality and other times they do not. For every operation the U.S. Military conducts at Battalion Level or higher, a wargame is conducted. It is part and parcel of the Deliberate Decision Making Process. In the course of the wargame numerical values are assigned to both friendly and enemy units based on for example a U.S. Rifle Plt is a 1 and a T-72 tank plt is a 3.2. The point values for each side is totaled up and then the ratio's are determined (i.e. 3:1 for a deliberate attack, etc.). If the ratio's do not meet the requirements that are deemed needed for a successful operation, the scheme of maneuver is redone or supporting arms are added to the force structure, etc. But it is understood during the entire process that this is only an approximation. There are a lot of factors that can not be factored into the projected results. The Red Army was a great believer in the use of Norms and mathmatical values to determine the outcome of any given combat action also. This led the Red Army in my opinion to drastically overestimating their capabilities throughout the 70's through the early 90's. The Russian Army still uses most of these same methods and look at some of the results the use of these methods have produced in Grozny. I am not familiar enough with how Dupuy developed his formula to state categorically that the formula is wrong mathmatically. What I am stating is that I do not believe that some of the intrinsic humans values portrayed in the formula can actually be assigned a numerical value. Courage is not something a value can be assigned to, it is too situationally dependent. The same also goes for morale, leadership, and other military traits. Look at the shall we say "bipolar nature" of a lot of the formations of the Red Army in WW II. One day a rifle battalion would run at the first shot fired, but on the following day it would die to the last man rather than give an inch of ground. How do you fit that into a mathmatical model or formula? While I applaude Dupuy for attemping to explain the difference between the performance of U.S. and German Units. I just do not believe that a mathmatical formula will do it.

[JJKettunen]

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45

If I could just figure out this quote thing a little better. I presented S.L.A. Marshall's and Grossman's theories for the purpose of illustrating a point. I know of no similiar study done on Germans soldiers. If 50% of the Germans soldiers were actively engaging the enemy with weapons vs 33% for the Americans that would equate into a difference in combat effectiveness. Also because formations appear to be more effective does not necessarily equate to the individual soldier being more effective. Poor equipment can make the most effective soldier on the planet totally ineffective as can a host of other things. If you can not fire your rifle due to being out of ammo, you are combat-ineffective. The same goes for if your rifle is jammed because you were issued the wrong cleaning supplies for the climate or your tank is out of fuel or ammo, your radio's are dead and you can't call for fire etc..

I don't know if Germans had higher % in actively engaging the enemy, but if it made their divisions more effective, then they were doing something right. Combat is a group effort, and how individual soldiers work together is the key to the efficiency. Do note that greater efficiency doesn't mean victory (just pointing ut the obvious here, hehe). Btw, Dupuy's formulae do take into account the combat value of individual weapons (Operational Lethality Index, OLI).

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
In regards to Dupuy's methodology, my concern is how do you apply a mathmatical value to uniquely human values and thoughts? I spent 30 years in the military and a good portion of that time working in Military Intelligence at the tactical level. The U.S. Military spends a great deal of time and money trying to assign mathmatical values to the enemies it may face. Sometimes these values correspond to reality and other times they do not. For every operation the U.S. Military conducts at Battalion Level or higher, a wargame is conducted. It is part and parcel of the Deliberate Decision Making Process. In the course of the wargame numerical values are assigned to both friendly and enemy units based on for example a U.S. Rifle Plt is a 1 and a T-72 tank plt is a 3.2. The point values for each side is totaled up and then the ratio's are determined (i.e. 3:1 for a deliberate attack, etc.). If the ratio's do not meet the requirements that are deemed needed for a successful operation, the scheme of maneuver is redone or supporting arms are added to the force structure, etc. But it is understood during the entire process that this is only an approximation. There are a lot of factors that can not be factored into the projected results. The Red Army was a great believer in the use of Norms and mathmatical values to determine the outcome of any given combat action also. This led the Red Army in my opinion to drastically overestimating their capabilities throughout the 70's through the early 90's. The Russian Army still uses most of these same methods and look at some of the results the use of these methods have produced in Grozny. I am not familiar enough with how Dupuy developed his formula to state categorically that the formula is wrong mathmatically. What I am stating is that I do not believe that some of the intrinsic humans values portrayed in the formula can actually be assigned a numerical value. Courage is not something a value can be assigned to, it is too situationally dependent. The same also goes for morale, leadership, and other military traits. Look at the shall we say "bipolar nature" of a lot of the formations of the Red Army in WW II. One day a rifle battalion would run at the first shot fired, but on the following day it would die to the last man rather than give an inch of ground. How do you fit that into a mathmatical model or formula? While I applaude Dupuy for attemping to explain the difference between the performance of U.S. and German Units. I just do not believe that a mathmatical formula will do it.

I have no idea what kind of formulae Russians use or have been using, but it wouldn't suprise me a bit if it gave drastic overestimations of their capabilities. It would be ín line with their former ideology...

Anyway, the combat efficiency is really a quantative problem. The outcome in combat is strongly affected by factors such as numbers of men, tanks and guns and ammunition supply. The results of combat, such as advances made and casualties inflicted, are quantative data also. So, to make a through analysis it is necessary to resort to mathematics. Without going too much into details, Dupuy's QJM take into account terrain, weather, posture, strength and odds, suprise, sophistication (technology) etc. Non-technological factors are squeezed into CEV (combat effectiveness value), but that is usually the unknown to be calculated. What is very important, and sorry about repeating myself here, is that QJM is the only model (excluding TNDM here) that has been succesfully valitated to historical data, so it can't be all wrong.

[KG Erwin]

Hmm, I'm surprised that Paul Vebber hasn't weighed in on this discussion. Paul, where are you?

[Dragoon 45]

ORIGINAL: Keke

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45

If I could just figure out this quote thing a little better. I presented S.L.A. Marshall's and Grossman's theories for the purpose of illustrating a point. I know of no similiar study done on Germans soldiers. If 50% of the Germans soldiers were actively engaging the enemy with weapons vs 33% for the Americans that would equate into a difference in combat effectiveness. Also because formations appear to be more effective does not necessarily equate to the individual soldier being more effective. Poor equipment can make the most effective soldier on the planet totally ineffective as can a host of other things. If you can not fire your rifle due to being out of ammo, you are combat-ineffective. The same goes for if your rifle is jammed because you were issued the wrong cleaning supplies for the climate or your tank is out of fuel or ammo, your radio's are dead and you can't call for fire etc..

I don't know if Germans had higher % in actively engaging the enemy, but if it made their divisions more effective, then they were doing something right. Combat is a group effort, and how individual soldiers work together is the key to the efficiency. Do note that greater efficiency doesn't mean victory (just pointing ut the obvious here, hehe). Btw, Dupuy's formulae do take into account the combat value of individual weapons (Operational Lethality Index, OLI).

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
In regards to Dupuy's methodology, my concern is how do you apply a mathmatical value to uniquely human values and thoughts? I spent 30 years in the military and a good portion of that time working in Military Intelligence at the tactical level. The U.S. Military spends a great deal of time and money trying to assign mathmatical values to the enemies it may face. Sometimes these values correspond to reality and other times they do not. For every operation the U.S. Military conducts at Battalion Level or higher, a wargame is conducted. It is part and parcel of the Deliberate Decision Making Process. In the course of the wargame numerical values are assigned to both friendly and enemy units based on for example a U.S. Rifle Plt is a 1 and a T-72 tank plt is a 3.2. The point values for each side is totaled up and then the ratio's are determined (i.e. 3:1 for a deliberate attack, etc.). If the ratio's do not meet the requirements that are deemed needed for a successful operation, the scheme of maneuver is redone or supporting arms are added to the force structure, etc. But it is understood during the entire process that this is only an approximation. There are a lot of factors that can not be factored into the projected results. The Red Army was a great believer in the use of Norms and mathmatical values to determine the outcome of any given combat action also. This led the Red Army in my opinion to drastically overestimating their capabilities throughout the 70's through the early 90's. The Russian Army still uses most of these same methods and look at some of the results the use of these methods have produced in Grozny. I am not familiar enough with how Dupuy developed his formula to state categorically that the formula is wrong mathmatically. What I am stating is that I do not believe that some of the intrinsic humans values portrayed in the formula can actually be assigned a numerical value. Courage is not something a value can be assigned to, it is too situationally dependent. The same also goes for morale, leadership, and other military traits. Look at the shall we say "bipolar nature" of a lot of the formations of the Red Army in WW II. One day a rifle battalion would run at the first shot fired, but on the following day it would die to the last man rather than give an inch of ground. How do you fit that into a mathmatical model or formula? While I applaude Dupuy for attemping to explain the difference between the performance of U.S. and German Units. I just do not believe that a mathmatical formula will do it.

I have no idea what kind of formulae Russians use or have been using, but it wouldn't suprise me a bit if it gave drastic overestimations of their capabilities. It would be ín line with their former ideology...

Anyway, the combat efficiency is really a quantative problem. The outcome in combat is strongly affected by factors such as numbers of men, tanks and guns and ammunition supply. The results of combat, such as advances made and casualties inflicted, are quantative data also. So, to make a through analysis it is necessary to resort to mathematics. Without going too much into details, Dupuy's QJM take into account terrain, weather, posture, strength and odds, suprise, sophistication (technology) etc. Non-technological factors are squeezed into CEV (combat effectiveness value), but that is usually the unknown to be calculated. What is very important, and sorry about repeating myself here, is that QJM is the only model (excluding TNDM here) that has been succesfully valitated to historical data, so it can't be all wrong.

I will grant the the numbers of men, tanks, artillery pieces, and supply status can be quantified. What I still have a major problem with is the CEV (combat effectiveness value). I presume this takes into account such things as training (a human judgement call), morale (situationally dependent), health of the troops, individual courage (entirely situationally dependent), fatigue level of the troops, and other factors. Too many of the factors that make up this value are judgement calls made by a human being.
I do not believe that these factors can all be accurately factored into a mathmatical equation. You state that Dupuy's data, equations, and results have been successfully validated by history, I am afraid that I do not accept that yet. The accurate keeping of unit journals was problematic at best by U.S. Divisions during the war. Some divisions kept very good journals and others kept very poor ones. These journals are the official record of all actions these divisions took while in combat or on a training exercise. Generally green divisions kept poor journals and veteran divisions kept better journals. From personal experience I know for a fact that troops who do not accomplish their mission will give a host of reasons for why that mission failed, true or not. Soldiers have a natural tendency to exaggerate the effectiveness of any enemy they face. This provides the soldier if he lost a reason for the loss, and if he won a reason to make his deeds on the battlefield look that much better. A lot of these exaggerations I maintain made it into the official records kept by the Divisions. The U.S. Army in training exercises makes extensive use of O/C's (observer/controllers) to make sure all training exercises are evaluated by the facts at hand with no embellishments. I bring this up to once again place emphasis on the human factor. The keeping of journals is done by a human who is prone to error or ommission. I believe that it is a soldiers nature to exaggerate the effectiveness of his enemy, and it is also a survival trait that also limits over-estimation of the enemy. For these reason I suspect the validity of the Combat Effectiveness Factor that Dupuy used. Like I said earlier it has been a few years since I read Dupuy, but at the time I had misgivings about his conclusions and I still do. With the factors as he defined them the formula is accurate. I maintain he did not adequately take all factors into account. He could not in my opinion accurately assign a numerical value for the human factors.

[IronDuke_slith]

Some people accept Dupuy's work as gospel and others don't. I believe that is a very safe assumption. While it has been a few years for me since I read Dupuy I still have some questions about his methodalogy that have not been answered. It does seem to me that Dupuy was careful to choose engagements that supported his conclusions. I find no engagements involving Volks Grenadier Formations in his tables as reprinted in "Fighting Power" by Van Crevald.

Dragoon,

I think critics of Dupuy fail for a couple of reasons.

Firstly, the initial set of engagements we've all referred to have been augmented since his initial work with other engagements, that give the same opinions. So, yes, whilst his initial set may have been slanted towards better German formations, the model used has been tested with many others since. It has been tested in Arab/Israeli conflicts as well, and is more tested and used than any other combat model out there. If it was skewed, I feel it would have been discovered by now.

Secondly, It has been said that certain factors are wrong within the model. For example, that defensive factors are not correctly weighted. However, since German combat effectiveness comes out better whether they are attacking or defending, any correction of this would not help the Allied cause.

One of the major critics, John Sloan Brown, used as part of his argument against Dupuy's work an analysis of the 88th Infantry Division. Brown had studied this American division and came to the conclusion it was very combat effective.

When this unit was analysed using Colonel Dupuy's model, it scored very highly, being ranked one of the top American divisions (amongst those tested) and better than many British and German ones as well. In other words, an American formation believed to have performed well from anecdotal and other sorts of evidence was also proved to be a good one using Dupuy's work.

Finally, I can't find any other model used that proves American divisions were better. Most critiques don't provide much statistical evidence to back up their point. There are hundreds of engagements analysed by Dupuy's model. If some one has something better, lets see it, but in the absence of that, Dupuy's conclusions are difficult to challenge.

As for the lack of Volksgrenadier formations, these were poorly armed and poorly trained. I don't think anyone would dispute that they were generally poor formations. Germany had five years worth of casualties behind them when they started to field these formations, and they lacked much of the heavier weaponry most standard german formations had. I'm sure some data must exist for them, but if to find engagements showing the American Divisions were better we have to compare them to units that were only one or two steps above the Volkstuurm, it suggests Dupuy is close to the truth.

Also I find that some American Divisions consistently performed better than German Formations, such as the 45th ID and 4th Armored, neither would be considered as elite but rather as veteran formations.

I don't know whether Dupuy's model has been used to test the 4th Armoured, although my own reading suggests this was one of the better performing American formations. I understood the 45th didn't do so well when analysed, though.

BG S.L.A. Marshall was probably the best known of the historians employed by the U.S. Army in WW II. I can not remember the book in which his findings were published but in his research he found that only 1/3 of the U.S. Infantry ever engaged the enemy with their weapons in WW II. Yes there were some men that didn't engage out of fear, but most were performing other essential tasks at the time, ammo resupply, call for fire, evac of wounded, etc.

It depends on what he was looking. If he was looking at American soldiers as a whole, then this is not surprising. The American tail was larger than most, and many US Soldiers would not have engaged in combat as a result.

If, however, he was looking at the men in the rifle battalions, then this offers some further explanation for Dupuy's findings. Two thirds of men in a rifle battalion should not go missing on evac etc. I thought SOP when on the attack was to press on and ignore wounded men, as there were stretcher bearers and medics behind the attack who would tend to these.

LTC Grossman wrote a book a few years back "ON KILLING" about this subject and the steps the Army has used over the years to correct the problem. Currently in the U.S. Army I would venture to say over 95% of the infantry engage the enemy today. But the training methods used to gain this increased combat effectiveness has also probably increased the incidence of PTSD and other mental problems in veterans. I offer this little theory in support of why German units may have been more effective in selected engagements than American units. Less firepower equals less combat effectiveness.

But the findings you present were general and not tied to certain engagements. This really suggests that Dupuy's model is correct, and that Marshall may have come up with one reason for the lesser combat efficiency of American units. Certainly, Van Creveld suggests several factors were involved.

This thread started out as the American combat soldier was just as effective as a German soldier, a theory put forth by KG Erwin. Col Dupuy's theory is that the German units were more effective than the American units. Most people who believe this theory take that to mean that the German soldier therefore is more effective than the American soldier, but this in not necessarily the case. Unit effectiveness depends on a lot of factors, such as morale, leadership, quality of the troops, logistical support, doctrine, level of training, weather, health, availability of supporting arms, the environment they came from, how they are equipped, etc.

Dragoon 45,
I think the problem you have is trying to reconcile all this. Dupuy was showing that German units had higher combat effectiveness. All of the things you mention can go into this. Van Creveld certainly lists several factors he thought played a part in higher German effectiveness. I don't believe the average German civilian was somehow intrinsically better than the average American civilian during the war. However, when all the relevant factors were added, the average German civilian became a soldier with a higher combat effectiveness than his American (or British) counterpart. Some of this was down to doctrine, some down to training, some down to tactics, some down to small unit leadership and some down to the intangible morale factor. Weaponry may have played some part, although the average American came armed with a better rifle so it can't be taken too far. Some of the factors you mention abouve like supporting arms and weather are built into Dupuy's model, so these are already accounted for.

Throughout this thread we have conceded that in some areas the Germans were better and that in some areas the Americans were better.

The only concession towards American superiority was in the area of logisitics, I think, although we also conceded their naval forces and air forces were bigger and better. These are harder to work out, though. In terms of the air force, the USAAF had better aircraft models for the most part, and far more flight and combat training than their AXIS counterparts. These areas are much harder to quantify on the personal level.

Having served in combat as an infantryman, I know better than to take a one over the world statement and believe it at face value. There always more causes and effects than are factored into a question and its answer. Some have little bearing on the question and others have a large bearing. Some are used and others are not in formulating the answer.

True, however Dupuy's model has factored in all the relevant factors. It is not individual results that most effectively prove Dupuy for me, but the consistent trend of results. Some factors may be more important in some engagements than they are in others, but unless every anomaly within the engagements studied somehow favoured the Germans, then it is hard to explain his fairly consistent results.

Unfortunately, over time a theory if supported by enough people becomes regarded as fact.

Yes, but Dupuy has a model, it is a well known combat model, the most scrutinised and critiqued ever invented. this theory is supported because the model has survived its critics and no one disagreeing with it has come up with explanations as to why it is wrong.

The flat earth theory comes immediately to mind. I do not suggest that this is the case with Col Dupuy's work, but I would suggest that too many people have taken his work at face value and have not questioned it enough. Did Col Dupuy cover all the factors involved and take them into account in the engagements cited?

As I mentioned above, this model had been extensively critiqued and used to successfully predict (I believe) as well as study previous engagements. I would also say that if Colonel Dupuy has something wrong, say a defensive or offensive value, why would it make too much difference if the Germans are consistently better? It could surely make the Germans rate even higher in some cases.

Most importantly did he start the research with the conclusion already formed in his mind? I for one will never believe that the study of history, especially military history, can be form-fitted into a mathmatical equation that will produce the correct answer every time. There is always someone somewhere who will screw the question and its answer up.

Yes, but is this a danger just for Colonel Dupuy. With respect, are you as an ex (I presume American) Serviceman (my apologies if I have assumed wrong) searching to discredit Dupuy's work because it is hard for you to accept that the average American soldier was less combat effective? Dupuy was an American soldier. He had no reason to want to discredit his own. I am happy to consider any evidence he is wrong, but so far, no other combat models have been cited, or no other evidence produced. Some of the critiques of the work that has recently questioned Dupuy have been quite damning. I'm thinking here about Brown's work and the more recent book by Mansoor.

Regards,
IronDuke

[IronDuke_slith]

I started writing my last post this afternoon, and had to finish it later, and have noticed that Keke has made several of the points as well, (usually better than me!), in the interim. So my apologies if anything I have said has already been mentioned.

Regards,
IronDuke

[IronDuke_slith]

I presented S.L.A. Marshall's and Grossman's theories for the purpose of illustrating a point. I know of no similiar study done on Germans soldiers. If 50% of the Germans soldiers were actively engaging the enemy with weapons vs 33% for the Americans that would equate into a difference in combat effectiveness.

Yes, it would, but if you could prove this, you'd show that German units were more effective in bringing available fire to bear. This is one reason someone may have higher combat effectiveness.

Also because formations appear to be more effective does not necessarily equate to the individual soldier being more effective. Poor equipment can make the most effective soldier on the planet totally ineffective as can a host of other things. If you can not fire your rifle due to being out of ammo, you are combat-ineffective. The same goes for if your rifle is jammed because you were issued the wrong cleaning supplies for the climate or your tank is out of fuel or ammo, your radio's are dead and you can't call for fire etc..

Yes, but again, all these factors can apply to German formations as well as American ones. Unless you assume that every time something skews the statiustics for a battle, it skews them in favour of the Germans, then all the factors above would just randomly skew a few results each way. I would argue that some of the above reasons were much more likely to apply to German units than American so bringing them up could just as easily mean the Germans got even higher values, not that the americans got higher values.

In regards to Dupuy's methodology, my concern is how do you apply a mathmatical value to uniquely human values and thoughts?

He isn't analysing this. He is analysing outcomes.

I spent 30 years in the military and a good portion of that time working in Military Intelligence at the tactical level. The U.S. Military spends a great deal of time and money trying to assign mathmatical values to the enemies it may face. Sometimes these values correspond to reality and other times they do not. For every operation the U.S. Military conducts at Battalion Level or higher, a wargame is conducted. It is part and parcel of the Deliberate Decision Making Process. In the course of the wargame numerical values are assigned to both friendly and enemy units based on for example a U.S. Rifle Plt is a 1 and a T-72 tank plt is a 3.2. The point values for each side is totaled up and then the ratio's are determined (i.e. 3:1 for a deliberate attack, etc.). If the ratio's do not meet the requirements that are deemed needed for a successful operation, the scheme of maneuver is redone or supporting arms are added to the force structure, etc. But it is understood during the entire process that this is only an approximation. There are a lot of factors that can not be factored into the projected results. The Red Army was a great believer in the use of Norms and mathmatical values to determine the outcome of any given combat action also. This led the Red Army in my opinion to drastically overestimating their capabilities throughout the 70's through the early 90's. The Russian Army still uses most of these same methods and look at some of the results the use of these methods have produced in Grozny. I am not familiar enough with how Dupuy developed his formula to state categorically that the formula is wrong mathmatically. What I am stating is that I do not believe that some of the intrinsic humans values portrayed in the formula can actually be assigned a numerical value. Courage is not something a value can be assigned to, it is too situationally dependent. The same also goes for morale, leadership, and other military traits. Look at the shall we say "bipolar nature" of a lot of the formations of the Red Army in WW II. One day a rifle battalion would run at the first shot fired, but on the following day it would die to the last man rather than give an inch of ground. How do you fit that into a mathmatical model or formula? While I applaude Dupuy for attemping to explain the difference between the performance of U.S. and German Units. I just do not believe that a mathmatical formula will do it.

Yes, but I can only repeat that if there was something he was missing, we would expect it to affect everybody. I can't see why something he was missing, or assigning an incorrect value too, should only result in one side suddenly becoming more effective.

Regards,
IronDuke

[Koper]

ORIGINAL: Golf33
Depends on who you look at. Omer Bartov's Hitler's Army takes an unconventional and deeply unpopular look at Wehrmacht motivation and combat performance and concludes that brutalisation and fanatical Nazi ideology were the main components of both by the end of the war. His work is still quite controversial though!

Regards
33

True, but Bartov's work focuses on the Eastern Front combat reality, so I don't think it can be fully used when it comes to France/Italy...

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: Koper

ORIGINAL: Golf33
Depends on who you look at. Omer Bartov's Hitler's Army takes an unconventional and deeply unpopular look at Wehrmacht motivation and combat performance and concludes that brutalisation and fanatical Nazi ideology were the main components of both by the end of the war. His work is still quite controversial though!

Regards
33

True, but Bartov's work focuses on the Eastern Front combat reality, so I don't think it can be fully used when it comes to France/Italy...

Koper,

You're right to some extent, but some elements have attracted comment. For example, Zetterling has criticised Bartov's supposition that the Eastern Armies suffered uniformly higher casualty rates than the units in the west. Bartov thought this bred hatred and frustration which led to greater brutality. It may not be a uniquely Eastern phenomena.

Regards,
IronDuke

[Koper]

Koper,

You're right to some extent, but some elements have attracted comment. For example, Zetterling has criticised Bartov's supposition that the Eastern Armies suffered uniformly higher casualty rates than the units in the west. Bartov thought this bred hatred and frustration which led to greater brutality. It may not be a uniquely Eastern phenomena.

Regards,
IronDuke

Of course Bartov's point can be challenged - after all, his examples focus on 3 divisions (although they are representative in a way - infantry, panzerwaffe and elite - Grossdeutchland) and the statistical part of the book is definetly the weakest (while letters of soldiers are probably the best to catch the feeling of those times).

BTW, regarding letters - a while ago I was reading a book about AK (polish resistance) intel operation focused on intercepting German soldiers letters from the Eastern Front. Very interesting material, quite similar to the one presented in Bartov's book (some of those letters were even worse), but a bit more balanced (some soldiers were not really comfortable with their actions).

But we are probably drifting off topic now...

[Marc von Martial]

ORIGINAL: KG Erwin

Hmm, I'm surprised that Paul Vebber hasn't weighed in on this discussion. Paul, where are you?

Are you crying for help?`[;)]

[Dragoon 45]

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

Some people accept Dupuy's work as gospel and others don't. I believe that is a very safe assumption. While it has been a few years for me since I read Dupuy I still have some questions about his methodalogy that have not been answered. It does seem to me that Dupuy was careful to choose engagements that supported his conclusions. I find no engagements involving Volks Grenadier Formations in his tables as reprinted in "Fighting Power" by Van Crevald.

Dragoon,

I think critics of Dupuy fail for a couple of reasons.

Firstly, the initial set of engagements we've all referred to have been augmented since his initial work with other engagements, that give the same opinions. So, yes, whilst his initial set may have been slanted towards better German formations, the model used has been tested with many others since. It has been tested in Arab/Israeli conflicts as well, and is more tested and used than any other combat model out there. If it was skewed, I feel it would have been discovered by now.

Secondly, It has been said that certain factors are wrong within the model. For example, that defensive factors are not correctly weighted. However, since German combat effectiveness comes out better whether they are attacking or defending, any correction of this would not help the Allied cause.

One of the major critics, John Sloan Brown, used as part of his argument against Dupuy's work an analysis of the 88th Infantry Division. Brown had studied this American division and came to the conclusion it was very combat effective.

When this unit was analysed using Colonel Dupuy's model, it scored very highly, being ranked one of the top American divisions (amongst those tested) and better than many British and German ones as well. In other words, an American formation believed to have performed well from anecdotal and other sorts of evidence was also proved to be a good one using Dupuy's work.

Finally, I can't find any other model used that proves American divisions were better. Most critiques don't provide much statistical evidence to back up their point. There are hundreds of engagements analysed by Dupuy's model. If some one has something better, lets see it, but in the absence of that, Dupuy's conclusions are difficult to challenge.

As for the lack of Volksgrenadier formations, these were poorly armed and poorly trained. I don't think anyone would dispute that they were generally poor formations. Germany had five years worth of casualties behind them when they started to field these formations, and they lacked much of the heavier weaponry most standard german formations had. I'm sure some data must exist for them, but if to find engagements showing the American Divisions were better we have to compare them to units that were only one or two steps above the Volkstuurm, it suggests Dupuy is close to the truth.

Also I find that some American Divisions consistently performed better than German Formations, such as the 45th ID and 4th Armored, neither would be considered as elite but rather as veteran formations.

I don't know whether Dupuy's model has been used to test the 4th Armoured, although my own reading suggests this was one of the better performing American formations. I understood the 45th didn't do so well when analysed, though.

BG S.L.A. Marshall was probably the best known of the historians employed by the U.S. Army in WW II. I can not remember the book in which his findings were published but in his research he found that only 1/3 of the U.S. Infantry ever engaged the enemy with their weapons in WW II. Yes there were some men that didn't engage out of fear, but most were performing other essential tasks at the time, ammo resupply, call for fire, evac of wounded, etc.

It depends on what he was looking. If he was looking at American soldiers as a whole, then this is not surprising. The American tail was larger than most, and many US Soldiers would not have engaged in combat as a result.

If, however, he was looking at the men in the rifle battalions, then this offers some further explanation for Dupuy's findings. Two thirds of men in a rifle battalion should not go missing on evac etc. I thought SOP when on the attack was to press on and ignore wounded men, as there were stretcher bearers and medics behind the attack who would tend to these.

LTC Grossman wrote a book a few years back "ON KILLING" about this subject and the steps the Army has used over the years to correct the problem. Currently in the U.S. Army I would venture to say over 95% of the infantry engage the enemy today. But the training methods used to gain this increased combat effectiveness has also probably increased the incidence of PTSD and other mental problems in veterans. I offer this little theory in support of why German units may have been more effective in selected engagements than American units. Less firepower equals less combat effectiveness.

But the findings you present were general and not tied to certain engagements. This really suggests that Dupuy's model is correct, and that Marshall may have come up with one reason for the lesser combat efficiency of American units. Certainly, Van Creveld suggests several factors were involved.

This thread started out as the American combat soldier was just as effective as a German soldier, a theory put forth by KG Erwin. Col Dupuy's theory is that the German units were more effective than the American units. Most people who believe this theory take that to mean that the German soldier therefore is more effective than the American soldier, but this in not necessarily the case. Unit effectiveness depends on a lot of factors, such as morale, leadership, quality of the troops, logistical support, doctrine, level of training, weather, health, availability of supporting arms, the environment they came from, how they are equipped, etc.

Dragoon 45,
I think the problem you have is trying to reconcile all this. Dupuy was showing that German units had higher combat effectiveness. All of the things you mention can go into this. Van Creveld certainly lists several factors he thought played a part in higher German effectiveness. I don't believe the average German civilian was somehow intrinsically better than the average American civilian during the war. However, when all the relevant factors were added, the average German civilian became a soldier with a higher combat effectiveness than his American (or British) counterpart. Some of this was down to doctrine, some down to training, some down to tactics, some down to small unit leadership and some down to the intangible morale factor. Weaponry may have played some part, although the average American came armed with a better rifle so it can't be taken too far. Some of the factors you mention abouve like supporting arms and weather are built into Dupuy's model, so these are already accounted for.

Throughout this thread we have conceded that in some areas the Germans were better and that in some areas the Americans were better.

The only concession towards American superiority was in the area of logisitics, I think, although we also conceded their naval forces and air forces were bigger and better. These are harder to work out, though. In terms of the air force, the USAAF had better aircraft models for the most part, and far more flight and combat training than their AXIS counterparts. These areas are much harder to quantify on the personal level.

Having served in combat as an infantryman, I know better than to take a one over the world statement and believe it at face value. There always more causes and effects than are factored into a question and its answer. Some have little bearing on the question and others have a large bearing. Some are used and others are not in formulating the answer.

True, however Dupuy's model has factored in all the relevant factors. It is not individual results that most effectively prove Dupuy for me, but the consistent trend of results. Some factors may be more important in some engagements than they are in others, but unless every anomaly within the engagements studied somehow favoured the Germans, then it is hard to explain his fairly consistent results.

Unfortunately, over time a theory if supported by enough people becomes regarded as fact.

Yes, but Dupuy has a model, it is a well known combat model, the most scrutinised and critiqued ever invented. this theory is supported because the model has survived its critics and no one disagreeing with it has come up with explanations as to why it is wrong.

The flat earth theory comes immediately to mind. I do not suggest that this is the case with Col Dupuy's work, but I would suggest that too many people have taken his work at face value and have not questioned it enough. Did Col Dupuy cover all the factors involved and take them into account in the engagements cited?

As I mentioned above, this model had been extensively critiqued and used to successfully predict (I believe) as well as study previous engagements. I would also say that if Colonel Dupuy has something wrong, say a defensive or offensive value, why would it make too much difference if the Germans are consistently better? It could surely make the Germans rate even higher in some cases.

Most importantly did he start the research with the conclusion already formed in his mind? I for one will never believe that the study of history, especially military history, can be form-fitted into a mathmatical equation that will produce the correct answer every time. There is always someone somewhere who will screw the question and its answer up.

Yes, but is this a danger just for Colonel Dupuy. With respect, are you as an ex (I presume American) Serviceman (my apologies if I have assumed wrong) searching to discredit Dupuy's work because it is hard for you to accept that the average American soldier was less combat effective? Dupuy was an American soldier. He had no reason to want to discredit his own. I am happy to consider any evidence he is wrong, but so far, no other combat models have been cited, or no other evidence produced. Some of the critiques of the work that has recently questioned Dupuy have been quite damning. I'm thinking here about Brown's work and the more recent book by Mansoor.

Regards,
IronDuke

I am a retired U.S. Army MSG. I do not particularly want to discredit Dupuy's work. In all fairness to him he did some masterful work on his models. What I am saying through all my comments is that I do not believe that he took all factors into account. I will maintain that some of the human factors can not be accurately modeled. Take morale of instance, the loss of one key leader can have an immense effect on morale, totally out of proportion of the effect of the loss of one individual in a let's say a 200 man unit. This effect can take place in the blink of an eye. I do not believe that this effect can be accurately modeled.

There are dangers in overestimating your enemy although most of the time not as severe as underestimating him. Col Dupuy's model as I have seen variations of it used in modern military planning tend to produce either underestimation or overestimation of the enemy's capabilities. While overestimation is not nearly as bad as underestimation, it can cause the misuse of forces that produce needless casaulities. Underestimation of the enemy normally will cost the forces involved a significant defeat if not the outright loss of the war. All modern military wargaming used in the Military Decision Making Process is based in a large part on Col Dupuy's work. Numerical values are assigned to the enemy in all areas, then values are assigned to friendly units, and then a ratio is calculated on the totals of each side's forces. If the ratio fits within the predetermined force ratio needed for the type of operation, the planners assume success for the operation. Because of the cumbersome nature in assigning these numerical values, essentially using human judgement calls in assigning the value, a true value is never quite achieved for either friendly or enemy units. Not getting an accurate value thus will either lead to underestimation of the enemy's capabilities or overestimation of his capabilities, with the dangers inherent to either course.

For almost 30 years I watched Col Dupuy's model being used in ongoing military operations. True the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) was only formally committed to doctrine a little bit over 15 years ago. But a variation of it was in use prior to that. Yes his model was modified to work in MDMP and possibly parts of it were ommitted. But from past experience, I have seldom seen it work correctly. There is always some factor left out of the equation. Weither that factor was the unknown and unknowable beforehand influence of a leader at the right place at the right time or was the mis-evaluation of an enemy capability, these types of problems occur quite frequently. Having practical experience using the model with the results I have seen, I do not believe that the model is near as accurate as most people believe. Yes it is a step in the right direction, but it still is not the end all and do all that it has been portrayed to be. All the failings I have seen have been Human failings. Misrepresentation of the effectiveness of intrinsic human qualities. With practical experience as my guide I therefore have misgivings on the results that Col Dupuy orginally published.

BTW in two engagements on the table attributed to Dupuy in Van Crevald's Fighting Power the 45th ID had as good as if not better rating than the 88th. According to this table the 45th outperformed the Germans in all but one engagement.

[IronDuke_slith]

I am a retired U.S. Army MSG. I do not particularly want to discredit Dupuy's work. In all fairness to him he did some masterful work on his models. What I am saying through all my comments is that I do not believe that he took all factors into account. I will maintain that some of the human factors can not be accurately modeled. Take morale of instance, the loss of one key leader can have an immense effect on morale, totally out of proportion of the effect of the loss of one individual in a let's say a 200 man unit. This effect can take place in the blink of an eye. I do not believe that this effect can be accurately modeled.

Dragoon 45,
I agree with you. I just don't see this as a factor that would affect only Allied forces. Some AXIS units will have suffered this as well, so if we were able to model it we would see improvements in the performances of both sides which might cancel each other out. Some German units might score even higher if this could be modelled. As I said earlier, I think it is the consistency of Dupuy's findings which require explanation. Any single one of the human factors might be thought to affect both sides, so it would not affect a consistently higher German score.

There are dangers in overestimating your enemy although most of the time not as severe as underestimating him. Col Dupuy's model as I have seen variations of it used in modern military planning tend to produce either underestimation or overestimation of the enemy's capabilities. While overestimation is not nearly as bad as underestimation, it can cause the misuse of forces that produce needless casaulities. Underestimation of the enemy normally will cost the forces involved a significant defeat if not the outright loss of the war. All modern military wargaming used in the Military Decision Making Process is based in a large part on Col Dupuy's work. Numerical values are assigned to the enemy in all areas, then values are assigned to friendly units, and then a ratio is calculated on the totals of each side's forces. If the ratio fits within the predetermined force ratio needed for the type of operation, the planners assume success for the operation. Because of the cumbersome nature in assigning these numerical values, essentially using human judgement calls in assigning the value, a true value is never quite achieved for either friendly or enemy units. Not getting an accurate value thus will either lead to underestimation of the enemy's capabilities or overestimation of his capabilities, with the dangers inherent to either course.

For almost 30 years I watched Col Dupuy's model being used in ongoing military operations. True the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) was only formally committed to doctrine a little bit over 15 years ago. But a variation of it was in use prior to that. Yes his model was modified to work in MDMP and possibly parts of it were ommitted. But from past experience, I have seldom seen it work correctly. There is always some factor left out of the equation. Weither that factor was the unknown and unknowable beforehand influence of a leader at the right place at the right time or was the mis-evaluation of an enemy capability, these types of problems occur quite frequently. Having practical experience using the model with the results I have seen, I do not believe that the model is near as accurate as most people believe. Yes it is a step in the right direction, but it still is not the end all and do all that it has been portrayed to be. All the failings I have seen have been Human failings. Misrepresentation of the effectiveness of intrinsic human qualities. With practical experience as my guide I therefore have misgivings on the results that Col Dupuy orginally published.

The fact that the Military use it to predict suggests to me it is abut as good as we are going to get. Likewise, Dupuy's model has been used in many additional analyses to those he originally did (which were from the Italian theatre, I believe). Those who do not find him believable don't seem to have any evidence, though, to prove him wrong. I haven't seen another model offered, or a critique of his model which shows a consistent weakness. As I have said, he is using hard data. Any of the intangibles you have come up with should be as likely to affect either side, therefore annulling any effect. The model itself does not have to be ultra accurate in prediction because there are many intangibles we don't know, however, in historial engagements we can find the intangibles out and factor them in.

You mentioned yourself earlier that you felt Dupuy may have started with a conclusion and worked his way back. Dupuy was an American soldier, I don't think he found his conclusions particularly uplifting. It seems to me this charge is best levelled at his opponents, who seem unable to accept the American GI was less combat effective and disparage Dupuy without being able to put their finger on exactly why. As I've said, I don't think this is anything to do with the Germans being some sort of supermen, but a combination of factors that all added up.

BTW in two engagements on the table attributed to Dupuy in Van Crevald's Fighting Power the 45th ID had as good as if not better rating than the 88th. According to this table the 45th outperformed the Germans in all but one engagement.

I understood from an article written by the Executive Director of the Dupuy institute that the US 45th Division finished with a CEV of .72, which was the lowest of the 6 US divisions tested. The 88th finished top of the US divisions.

Reghards,
IronDuke

[tanker4145]

I don't think you can ever truly quantify the combat effeciency of any forces in combat. There are too many variables which there is absolutely no way to quantify. Usually one side is defending which gives them an advantage on a man to man level (usually). Talking about the Hurtgen, Italy, and other dug in defenses as examples just doesn't cut it since you're talking about well dug in forces in good defensive terrain, of course the attacker will take more casualties. In the Bulge, the failure of intelligence, surprise, and a lack of forces (and green ones at that) faced the Germans initially. While I'd love to say the US was man for man the best, I don't think these arguments can ever go anywhere conclusive.

At the same time though, keep it up because it is quite interesting to read and a lot of good points are being made.