Has anyone been able to sustain a real strategic air offensive against Japan. I find that the losses are totally unrealistic and unsustainable. In particular, the losses to AAA are grossly excessive.
XXI Bomber Command began it's daylight bombing offensive on November 24, 1944 and continued until March 1945. After that, the primary attack mode shifted to low altitude incendiary attack. During this period of time, the Command lost exactly one (repeat, one)aircraft to AAA and only 22 to fighters. On the other hand, they didn't hit much either. During this period of time, they also lost 43 aircraft to unknown causes, some of which were probably flak or fighters. During the entire war, 368 aircraft were lost by XXI Bomber Command, of which only 119 were definitely attributed to enemy action. Another 115 were due to unknown causes. Losses to flak were virtually all during the low altitude incendiary phase. In short, Japanese AAA was totally ineffective at 30,000 feet. Losses per sortie were 3.5% in December 1944; 5% in January, 1945; 3.1% in February, 1945. This number includes operational losses. In no other month did they exceed 2%. Losses in the game typically are around 20%. Yes, yes, I know this includes damaged aircraft, but the overwhelming majority of these aircraft are lost.
The game should reflect the near total helplessness of the Japanese against these aircraft. The strategic offensive should be sustainable.
Paul
B-29 losses
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Paul Goodman
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mark the brit
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I also think that the allied air losses over japan are high compared to the actual losses.I think the main reason for this is that if you are playing against a computer player then it moves a lot of airgroups back to japan which were not historically there.I found in the original game that the computer would move a very large amount of the available air groups back to japan usually tokyo sometimes about 50! also escort fighters in the saipan ,tinian,guam bases do not always escort the bombers and sometimes attack indepently even when in range .This i think is a flaw in the AI .If you examine the japanese airgroups in japan you will also find many airgroups with about 5-10 aircraft when there are plenty in the pool.on the most recent game i started playing as the japanese with the HQs under operational control i found the computer moved roughly 50% of all air groups back to japan and this is on the second turn of the game.this makes me believe that the AI is programmed to play defensively even when it has the forces to attack another example of this is the CVs after attacking Pearl harbour going to Iwo jima and sitting in port for months at a time.getting back to airlosses the b-29 wings take a long time to get up to strength in the 41 campaign because of the limited production of the b-29 factories so accordingly if put into action smaller than than 40 strength they suffer higher losses and experience is slow to climb.If you try the mariannas campaign you will find the opposite the bomber wings have reasonable experience at the start massive pools of reserve aircraft and are a lot more effective.In fact every heavy bomber group can be equipped with b-29s after a short period of time,even the britsh wings which only have wellingtons in the 41 campaign start with liberators which i believe is historically accurate,within a month they to have b-29s .
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Paul Goodman
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While I agree with what you say, Japanese fighter opposition was, in fact, numerous, if not formidible. In the first two months of the XXI Bomber Command (Marianas) campaign, 300 attacks were the average for nine missions (only 7 over Japan itself) and over 500 for three missions (all over Japan). I think the fighter opposition in the game (Jp. AI) compares closely with this. My problem is not with losses due to fighter opposition. My problem is with anti-aircraft artillery defense. These losses are much higher than fighter losses, when, in fact, these losses were virtually nil during the high altitude phase of the attacks.
The most effective defense against the B-29 was not the fighters or the flak, but its own Wright R-3350 engine.
Paul
The most effective defense against the B-29 was not the fighters or the flak, but its own Wright R-3350 engine.
Paul
Hi, the AI does not move groups back. It never moves them out. When playing the AI the human should from time to time make the game both human then move excess airgroups out of Home Islands (it overloads airfields and groups won't grow), during this time also send the MCS and tankers back to pool from whereever they have amassed) then save game and put back to AI control for it's orders
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I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a differant direction!
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I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a differant direction!
I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!
Here's a thought...B-29's were completely ineffective until Feb '45 when Lemay ordered them to start low level incendiary attacks.
Edit the OBC to reflect the groups arriving at roughly that period or later so that they appear at full group AC strength, with about a 70+ experience level to reflect train-up time and "lessons learned".
Give the B29 a very low cannon value (2-4?)to reflect the removal of the guns, and increased durability (85-95?) to make them more survivable, without making them flying tanks bristling with guns.
The early B29 bomber groups for XX command should have their experience level set VERY low when they first arrive...45-50 IMO, forcing people to either eat heavy losses and eat up production, or park them somewhere for training. They were apparently used ineffectively in India, or as ad hoc transports mostly anyway.
This'll give time for the factories to spool up production, increase B29 survivability, and be a little more historical.
On a similiar note; shouldn't ALL multi-turreted/gunned hvy bomber/patrol AC have their cannon rating reduced by 50% or so? As it is, during the attack phase, they're being given credit for EVERY gun being used to engage the target...and that just ain't realistic. US heavy bombers probably should only get about 25-35% value to reflect the # of guns that could be brought to bear on any particular target.
With attack bombers the overall cannon rating shouldn't be greater than the total amount of fire power that could be directed forward, even though this still likely gives them a defensive fire "bonus".
[This message has been edited by babyseal7 (edited December 02, 2000).]
[This message has been edited by babyseal7 (edited December 02, 2000).]
Edit the OBC to reflect the groups arriving at roughly that period or later so that they appear at full group AC strength, with about a 70+ experience level to reflect train-up time and "lessons learned".
Give the B29 a very low cannon value (2-4?)to reflect the removal of the guns, and increased durability (85-95?) to make them more survivable, without making them flying tanks bristling with guns.
The early B29 bomber groups for XX command should have their experience level set VERY low when they first arrive...45-50 IMO, forcing people to either eat heavy losses and eat up production, or park them somewhere for training. They were apparently used ineffectively in India, or as ad hoc transports mostly anyway.
This'll give time for the factories to spool up production, increase B29 survivability, and be a little more historical.
On a similiar note; shouldn't ALL multi-turreted/gunned hvy bomber/patrol AC have their cannon rating reduced by 50% or so? As it is, during the attack phase, they're being given credit for EVERY gun being used to engage the target...and that just ain't realistic. US heavy bombers probably should only get about 25-35% value to reflect the # of guns that could be brought to bear on any particular target.
With attack bombers the overall cannon rating shouldn't be greater than the total amount of fire power that could be directed forward, even though this still likely gives them a defensive fire "bonus".
[This message has been edited by babyseal7 (edited December 02, 2000).]
[This message has been edited by babyseal7 (edited December 02, 2000).]
Agree. The thing is the game makes no distinction when calculating AAA losses. Low level attacks to straf airfields are treated the same as high altitude attacks on cities. AAA losses seem almost a fixed cost, you seem to lose about 1-2 planes per squadron per attack with little variation. Like you, I soon find I have to either suspend B-29 campaign for a while and rebuild the airgroups, or at least rotate the units around a lot.Originally posted by Paul Goodman:
I find that the losses are totally unrealistic and unsustainable. In particular, the losses to AAA are grossly excessive.
"It is also possible that blondes prefer gentlemen"
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Ed Cogburn
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"Waiting to commit them" isn't exactly historical either. And IIRC the bombers take flak losses whether flying day or night, and didn't strategic US bombing against Japan switch to daylight attacks at some point, and then later on even go to low altitude attacks? The flak losses are enough to prevent full strength bomber units if you use all your bombers units every turn, since bomber units almost always lose at least one bomber on every mission. So you're forced to keep a third or a quarter of your bombers on permanent station in backwater bases, taking no losses, to keep your active bomber units at or near full strength, and thats got to be unhistorical. Either more bombers need to be produced, or we've got too many bomber units, or the combat system needs to be looked at with respect to bomber losses from flak.Originally posted by sethwrkr:
If you will remember your history...strategic bombing of japan started at night. Are you flying night missions.
If you are unhappy with pool levels then wait to commit them (bombers)
Maybe some percentage of units were kept inactive, and were rotated in and out whenever a unit needed rest or refit. If this is true (can someone confirm this?) it isn't reflected accurately in the game.
[This message has been edited by Ed Cogburn (edited December 04, 2000).]
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Ed Cogburn
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Good info babyseal, but the URL jumps to the Matterhorn operation (China), this part is more on target (Marianas):
http://www.csd.uwo.ca/~pettypi/elevon/baugher_us/b029-10.html
Well, it doesn't mention excessive losses once they switched to nightime bombing, and it doesn't mention being starved for bombers, and take a look at the OOB. This lists roughly 20 heavy bomber groups using B29 planes, whereas there are 28 heavy bomber units listed in PAC's OOB that use B17/B24/B29 planes. That doesn't include groups with A-20, B25, or B26 planes (B26 converts to B25, which later converts to A-20, right?), some of which may change to B29, I can't remember, but does include the 3 in the British area. Marianas was the primary center for heavy bombing of Japan, for most of the war after taking the Marianas islands, they were the only suitable locations for heavy bomber bases, so there were very few B29 groups based elsewhere. So, either we aren't building enough B29 planes or there really is too many bomber groups in the game. The latter looks more likely now, to me.
[This message has been edited by Ed Cogburn (edited December 05, 2000).]
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Paul Goodman
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Sethwrkr has his history a little confused, at least as far as the Marianas campaign is concerned. I will summarize the XXI Bomber Command campaign.
XXI Bomber Command
Complement: 73rd Bomb Wing
Commander: General Hansell
1 November, 1944
B29 Tokyo Rose flies single aircraft recon to Tokyo. This is the first US aircraft to fly over Tokyo since the Doolittle raid. This aircraft circled over Tokyo for two hours, took 2,000 photos and the Japanese were unable to intercept the aircraft.
24 November, 1944
After several cancellations dating from 10 November, the first attack is finally launched from the Marianas. 111 B29's were launched on a high altitude (27,000 to 33,000 ft.) precision bombing strike against the Nakajima engine plant. The raid encountered the jet stream at 100 to 130 knots and clouds over the target. The raid was a failure in that the primary target was only bombed by 24 aircraft with limited damage. 59 bombed a secondary tarket with poor results. The Japanese intercepted with 125 aircraft and launched 184 attacks. They shot down 1 B29 (by accidental ramming). There were no losses to flak. Another B29 ran out of fuel 25 miles short of Saipan.
During the next two months, the XXI BC flew a total of 14 missions. Two were against Iwo Jima, one experimental night incendiary raid (high altitude, radar bombing), one daylight experimental incendiary raid (high altitude) and ten high altitude precision bombing attacks against aircraft plants, five to Tokyo, four to Nogoya and one to Akashi. All of these raids were at 30,000 feet or so (except the last)and all were conducted by a single Bomb Wing, the 73rd. The last raid was from 27,000 feet and knocked out the Kawasaki engine plant for six months. These raids only averaged 85 aircraft each and except for the last one, were not very successful. The Kawasaki raid was the last under General Hansell and was conducted on 19 January, 1945. During this period of time, one aircraft was lost exclusively to AAA. Although these raids were a learning phase and progress was good, with Hap Arnold looking over your shoulder, 'good don't cut it.' Enter Curtis LeMay.
Curtis LeMay began high altitude operations on 23 January with a high altitude daylight raid on the Mitsubishi plant at Nogoya. This was followed by four raids against the Nakajimi plant in Tokyo. All were unsucessful due to weather forcing radar bombing (the radar operators were very poorly trained). What really stands out is the fierce fighter opposition. The Japanese launched 691 attacks on the first raid and 984 attacks on the raid of 27 January. The 497th Bomb Group (perhaps 36 aircraft) received 554 fighter attacks, claimed 36 kills, and lost three aircraft over Japan, one ditched on the way home and one crashed on landing. All told, these first two raids under LeMay lost 10 bombers and claimed 93 fighters. Repeatedly, we note that the only consistent success the Japanese fighters had against the B29's was by ramming.
High altitude operation continued against Japan through early March, 1945 with limited success. This period may be summarized as follows. Very limited success against precision bombing targets; operational losses far exceed combat losses. One aircraft lost exclusively to flak. This period also includes ever increasing numbers of bombers as more Bomb Wings became operational.
The low altitude indendiary raid phase began on 9 March, 1945. When the crews learned that they would bomb from low altitude over Tokyo with no defensive armament, most thought the end had come. Experienced officers thought the loss rate would exceed 75%. Curtis LeMay had brass balls! By now, three Wings were operational, one on each of the main islands of the Marianas. 325 aircraft were launched. The raid was successful and terrible beyond belief. 16 square miles of the city was burned and perhaps as many as 100,000 people were killed. The glow from the dying city could be seen from 100 miles away. Although 14 aircraft were lost, 12 losses were operational.
Four more night incendiary raids followed with horrible success, ending on 18 March, 1945. The crews were exhausted and were out of incendiary munitions. In summary, the largest cities of Japan had been burned to the ground in a week!
Following this, a variety of tactics were attempted including a low altitude, high explosive, precision attack which failed, a medium attitude daylight attack (again showing utter disdain for Japanese AAA) which was highly successful, tactical attacks against the Kyushu airfields to support the Okinawa operations and night mining operations.
In terms of the game, it is interesting to note that XXI BC received aircraft from January, 1945 on that exceeding aircraft attrition rates by a factor of between 2 and 4. Available aircraft increased at a rate of about 100 per month.
Beginning with April, 1945 we see a mixture of tactics. The altitudes for daylight bombing come down to below 20,000 feet, a renewal of incendiary attacks (night) as munitions arrive, increased efficiency and high levels of destruction of the Japanese aircraft industry. Of particular interest is the limited success of the P-51 flying escort from Iwo. The bottom line was that the B-29's were perfectly capable of taking care of themselves. Japan was running out of pilots and fuel.
From this period until the end of the war, opposition becomes more and more futile. No pilots, no fuel and finally, no targets for the B-29's.
Paul
XXI Bomber Command
Complement: 73rd Bomb Wing
Commander: General Hansell
1 November, 1944
B29 Tokyo Rose flies single aircraft recon to Tokyo. This is the first US aircraft to fly over Tokyo since the Doolittle raid. This aircraft circled over Tokyo for two hours, took 2,000 photos and the Japanese were unable to intercept the aircraft.
24 November, 1944
After several cancellations dating from 10 November, the first attack is finally launched from the Marianas. 111 B29's were launched on a high altitude (27,000 to 33,000 ft.) precision bombing strike against the Nakajima engine plant. The raid encountered the jet stream at 100 to 130 knots and clouds over the target. The raid was a failure in that the primary target was only bombed by 24 aircraft with limited damage. 59 bombed a secondary tarket with poor results. The Japanese intercepted with 125 aircraft and launched 184 attacks. They shot down 1 B29 (by accidental ramming). There were no losses to flak. Another B29 ran out of fuel 25 miles short of Saipan.
During the next two months, the XXI BC flew a total of 14 missions. Two were against Iwo Jima, one experimental night incendiary raid (high altitude, radar bombing), one daylight experimental incendiary raid (high altitude) and ten high altitude precision bombing attacks against aircraft plants, five to Tokyo, four to Nogoya and one to Akashi. All of these raids were at 30,000 feet or so (except the last)and all were conducted by a single Bomb Wing, the 73rd. The last raid was from 27,000 feet and knocked out the Kawasaki engine plant for six months. These raids only averaged 85 aircraft each and except for the last one, were not very successful. The Kawasaki raid was the last under General Hansell and was conducted on 19 January, 1945. During this period of time, one aircraft was lost exclusively to AAA. Although these raids were a learning phase and progress was good, with Hap Arnold looking over your shoulder, 'good don't cut it.' Enter Curtis LeMay.
Curtis LeMay began high altitude operations on 23 January with a high altitude daylight raid on the Mitsubishi plant at Nogoya. This was followed by four raids against the Nakajimi plant in Tokyo. All were unsucessful due to weather forcing radar bombing (the radar operators were very poorly trained). What really stands out is the fierce fighter opposition. The Japanese launched 691 attacks on the first raid and 984 attacks on the raid of 27 January. The 497th Bomb Group (perhaps 36 aircraft) received 554 fighter attacks, claimed 36 kills, and lost three aircraft over Japan, one ditched on the way home and one crashed on landing. All told, these first two raids under LeMay lost 10 bombers and claimed 93 fighters. Repeatedly, we note that the only consistent success the Japanese fighters had against the B29's was by ramming.
High altitude operation continued against Japan through early March, 1945 with limited success. This period may be summarized as follows. Very limited success against precision bombing targets; operational losses far exceed combat losses. One aircraft lost exclusively to flak. This period also includes ever increasing numbers of bombers as more Bomb Wings became operational.
The low altitude indendiary raid phase began on 9 March, 1945. When the crews learned that they would bomb from low altitude over Tokyo with no defensive armament, most thought the end had come. Experienced officers thought the loss rate would exceed 75%. Curtis LeMay had brass balls! By now, three Wings were operational, one on each of the main islands of the Marianas. 325 aircraft were launched. The raid was successful and terrible beyond belief. 16 square miles of the city was burned and perhaps as many as 100,000 people were killed. The glow from the dying city could be seen from 100 miles away. Although 14 aircraft were lost, 12 losses were operational.
Four more night incendiary raids followed with horrible success, ending on 18 March, 1945. The crews were exhausted and were out of incendiary munitions. In summary, the largest cities of Japan had been burned to the ground in a week!
Following this, a variety of tactics were attempted including a low altitude, high explosive, precision attack which failed, a medium attitude daylight attack (again showing utter disdain for Japanese AAA) which was highly successful, tactical attacks against the Kyushu airfields to support the Okinawa operations and night mining operations.
In terms of the game, it is interesting to note that XXI BC received aircraft from January, 1945 on that exceeding aircraft attrition rates by a factor of between 2 and 4. Available aircraft increased at a rate of about 100 per month.
Beginning with April, 1945 we see a mixture of tactics. The altitudes for daylight bombing come down to below 20,000 feet, a renewal of incendiary attacks (night) as munitions arrive, increased efficiency and high levels of destruction of the Japanese aircraft industry. Of particular interest is the limited success of the P-51 flying escort from Iwo. The bottom line was that the B-29's were perfectly capable of taking care of themselves. Japan was running out of pilots and fuel.
From this period until the end of the war, opposition becomes more and more futile. No pilots, no fuel and finally, no targets for the B-29's.
Paul
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Doug Olenick
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From my readings on the subject, the strategic air war against Japan, which started with daytime strikes flown out of China, faced several odd contradictions.
The B-29 daylight raids were more or less impervias to Japanese fighter attacks due to the fact that they flew above the ceiling of the fighters, the fighters had relatively light weapons and the pilot skill level was low. In addition, few Japanese AA guns could reach above 30,000 feet.
The problem was that from 30k plus feet the bombers could not hit anything with accuracy. The flight levels were then lowered which brought the planes in the flak and fighter envelope, thus increasing losses.
LeMay decision to strike at night, but not at specific targets, worked but was extremely controvercial at the time. Targeting civilians, like the British in Europe, left a bad taste in the mouths of the commanders and crews conducting the raids. LeMay did not care as long as the cities burned. He may have been right. When you burn down an entire city its factories tend to burn right along with the homes.
Personally, I never start a strategic campaign against the Home Islands until I control Iwo and all the islands around Okinawa. This way the bombers have fighter cover and the B-24's can join in.
Whether its my humanitarian nature or something else, I prefer starving the islands by sinking every ship that attempts to find its home port.
The B-29 daylight raids were more or less impervias to Japanese fighter attacks due to the fact that they flew above the ceiling of the fighters, the fighters had relatively light weapons and the pilot skill level was low. In addition, few Japanese AA guns could reach above 30,000 feet.
The problem was that from 30k plus feet the bombers could not hit anything with accuracy. The flight levels were then lowered which brought the planes in the flak and fighter envelope, thus increasing losses.
LeMay decision to strike at night, but not at specific targets, worked but was extremely controvercial at the time. Targeting civilians, like the British in Europe, left a bad taste in the mouths of the commanders and crews conducting the raids. LeMay did not care as long as the cities burned. He may have been right. When you burn down an entire city its factories tend to burn right along with the homes.
Personally, I never start a strategic campaign against the Home Islands until I control Iwo and all the islands around Okinawa. This way the bombers have fighter cover and the B-24's can join in.
Whether its my humanitarian nature or something else, I prefer starving the islands by sinking every ship that attempts to find its home port.
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Supervisor
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Just to add my thoughts..
I just went through this phase in a game. B-29's were being produced at 7 per turn, 3 from one factory and 2 from each of 2 others. I could muster about 150 B-29's for raids starting in Jan 45 and was losing 5-9 per turn to AA fire alone. At that rate it was simply impossible to build up to historical numbers of bombers unless I never used them at all until May 45.
-kl
I just went through this phase in a game. B-29's were being produced at 7 per turn, 3 from one factory and 2 from each of 2 others. I could muster about 150 B-29's for raids starting in Jan 45 and was losing 5-9 per turn to AA fire alone. At that rate it was simply impossible to build up to historical numbers of bombers unless I never used them at all until May 45.
-kl
Thanks for the URL, babyseal7. The tail end of the section on the Marianas campaign says that 371 B29s were lost from 25,500 sorties. Thats one per 68 flights, or under 1 aircraft lost per attack from a squadron of 50, as typically used in the game. My pacwar experience has been much higher than this, as I think most others have also.
"It is also possible that blondes prefer gentlemen"
No way of accurately modeling flak or fighter coverage on the "strategic level". The best you can do is try to balance the variables of cost/durability/cannon rating to the point where the B-29 isn't either a flying tank, to expensive to use, or so cheap that you can convert all your bombers to B-29's. As the B-29A configuration was historically "useless", I'm going to try changing it to the stripped down B-29B configuration (5/4/70/10/85).
Ed brought out a good point, and that's the overall number of heavy bomber units in game...29. If it's tough for a player to have enough heavy bombers to go around, think of the poor AI with a hardwired auto-upgrade path of B17-B24-B29.
In addition to tweaking the B29 stats, I'm thinking of hacking out the last 3 "pure" B-29 groups arriving, and changing the 3 RAF Hvy groups flying B-24's to Wellingtons. This'd leave 4 B17 groups, 5 B-24, and 18 B-29 groups. This wouldn't be strictly "historical", but hey, after the first mouse click history goes out the window anyway.
How many B-29 groups can you realistically squeeze (and supply) onto Guam 9/Tinian 8/Saipan 8 anyway, with a combined max AC capacity of 25? 18 leaves you with 7 AC slots for local air defense "just in case".
Ed brought out a good point, and that's the overall number of heavy bomber units in game...29. If it's tough for a player to have enough heavy bombers to go around, think of the poor AI with a hardwired auto-upgrade path of B17-B24-B29.
In addition to tweaking the B29 stats, I'm thinking of hacking out the last 3 "pure" B-29 groups arriving, and changing the 3 RAF Hvy groups flying B-24's to Wellingtons. This'd leave 4 B17 groups, 5 B-24, and 18 B-29 groups. This wouldn't be strictly "historical", but hey, after the first mouse click history goes out the window anyway.
How many B-29 groups can you realistically squeeze (and supply) onto Guam 9/Tinian 8/Saipan 8 anyway, with a combined max AC capacity of 25? 18 leaves you with 7 AC slots for local air defense "just in case".
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Ed Cogburn
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Originally posted by sethwrkr:
paul,
I pretty much agree with your post and do not see how I am mixed up. I just feel like I said all that stuff in a sentence or 2 instead of cuting pages of text out on the internet. Thank you for the effort though.
You stated the bombing runs started out at night, the evidence from Paul's text, regardless of where he got it, and the URL provided by babyseal says the attacks began as high altitude daylight raids. Later, the attacks used mixed tactics. So we were both mixed up, as I didn't know the attacks were not exclusively night attacks later on.
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Paul Goodman
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I have read numerous material on the subject. The immediate source of my data is "Blankets of Fire" by Kenneth P. Werrell, Smithsonian Institution Press. I strongly recommend this source to anyone interested in the subject. I was stationed on Guam in the early 60's (3rd Air Division, SAC) where I availed myself of the records from XX Air Force. I also flew on a WB-50 which was a weather reconnaisance aircraft based on the B-50. The B-50 was basically a B-29 with reliable Pratt & Whitney engines. I have flown many times from Guam to Japan. The standard route took you over the Jima's. The first thing you see of Japan is Mt. Fuji literally glowing on the horizon. After countless hours (well, actually they were counted, very closely) of flying over the ocean, I can well imagine the emotions of the attacking crews on seeing that sight. Maybe the gods really do live there.
In any event, the question comes up about the number of available aircraft. Something needs to be done to make the aircraft tougher in the game, production should be increased. The largest attack of the war was 786 aircraft. Although many more aircraft were stationed in the Marianas than possible in the game (for Guam, what's there is probably fine for North Field (later Anderson AFB), but the Navy had their own NAS at Nimitz Hill (CinCPac relocated to Guam from Pearl, with the HQ located high on a hill known everafter as Nimitz Hill). The actual facility is NAS Agana. I understand the limitations of the game, so while P-51 escort out of the MI is preposterous, in terms of the game engine, it makes good sense. So, if you figure 6 bomb groups and 3 P-51 groups with the bombers at max. strength, that would yield about 720 B-29's possible. Close enough! So the only real problem I see is realistic production and make the Superforts tougher. Many, you know, survived multiple ramming by Japanese fighters and got back! They really were tough birds, damn tough! What would be really good would be (if possible)to include an if statement so that if Iwo Jima is in US possession, the B-29 durability increases.
The other problem is that, although the B-29 was nearly impervious to Japanese defenses at high altitude, it couldn't hit anything from up there, either. Perhaps the B-29 should receive a bonus for night attack, rather than a penalty.
Finally, mines are not addressed at all in this game. The B-29's achievements as an minelaying aircraft are not much discussed. They were marvelous, laying high density mine fields at night by radar at low altitude in well known choke points. Japanese shipping was totally shut down for weeks at a time (ok, submariners, I admit there wasn't much left to shut down). It would be neat to model this in the next game.
Paul
In any event, the question comes up about the number of available aircraft. Something needs to be done to make the aircraft tougher in the game, production should be increased. The largest attack of the war was 786 aircraft. Although many more aircraft were stationed in the Marianas than possible in the game (for Guam, what's there is probably fine for North Field (later Anderson AFB), but the Navy had their own NAS at Nimitz Hill (CinCPac relocated to Guam from Pearl, with the HQ located high on a hill known everafter as Nimitz Hill). The actual facility is NAS Agana. I understand the limitations of the game, so while P-51 escort out of the MI is preposterous, in terms of the game engine, it makes good sense. So, if you figure 6 bomb groups and 3 P-51 groups with the bombers at max. strength, that would yield about 720 B-29's possible. Close enough! So the only real problem I see is realistic production and make the Superforts tougher. Many, you know, survived multiple ramming by Japanese fighters and got back! They really were tough birds, damn tough! What would be really good would be (if possible)to include an if statement so that if Iwo Jima is in US possession, the B-29 durability increases.
The other problem is that, although the B-29 was nearly impervious to Japanese defenses at high altitude, it couldn't hit anything from up there, either. Perhaps the B-29 should receive a bonus for night attack, rather than a penalty.
Finally, mines are not addressed at all in this game. The B-29's achievements as an minelaying aircraft are not much discussed. They were marvelous, laying high density mine fields at night by radar at low altitude in well known choke points. Japanese shipping was totally shut down for weeks at a time (ok, submariners, I admit there wasn't much left to shut down). It would be neat to model this in the next game.
Paul