Ecaxtly which Aussie LCU's can be moved out of Austrailia and is there a trick to it?
In my last game I know I got an ENG and the 6th and 7th DIV out of there, but in the current game I can't load them onto ships. Perhaps they must be at a non ANZAC controlled base?
-KL
Aussie LCU's
-
Nightcrawler
- Posts: 33
- Joined: Tue Oct 17, 2000 8:00 am
- Location: Newark, NJ
Over time several divisions of ANZAC troops get transferred to other HQs (it might always be SW Pacific, I don't remember). At that point you can move them out of Austraila. I don't have the exact units or schedules for it though.
I just keep watching the Aust. and NZ LCUs. When an LCU is listed as being attached to some HQ other than ANZAC, it is free to be moved.
I just keep watching the Aust. and NZ LCUs. When an LCU is listed as being attached to some HQ other than ANZAC, it is free to be moved.
Just a quick explanationon re the oz lcu's.
Australia sent five volunteer (no conscription)divisions to the first world war gallipoli, france etc. These were unimagitively Australian 1st-5th Divisions (Australia only became a nation in 1901 so this was a mere 14 years later).This was known as the first AIF ie. Australian Imperial Force.Between the wars Australia under its constitution had no professional army per say except for a tiny body of fortress troops. In its place was a very large part time militia for all adult males. This at the time was the most comprehensive militia force in the world. It busied itself geting ready for a repeat of ww1 and constitutionally was not able to be deployed outside Australia. Unfortuately the rest of the world didnt follow this glorious disarmament and when ww2 occured the part time militia could not be deployed and a new volunteer force (2nd AIF) was created. Interestingly the divisions raised followed on the numbers from the first world war this is why the deployable (outside ANZAC units are/ should be 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th division. Militia was sent to New Guinea as it was deemed as a OZ colony to constitute Australian territory when going got really dicey at Kokoda etc. Government moved the goal posts! The whole orbat for Australia was massively overstrength in the old version and it looks like the new one is even worse. I guess it is game balance to prevent an easy jap over running of australia but the military superpower I see armed with hundreds of afv's didnt exist in reality. The militia was a large but poorly armed force that didnt have the weapons relected in the game as it now is and certainly didnt have large garrisons at places like darwin cairns broome etc. In fact OZ strategy was to abandon everywhere but Brisbane sydney melbourne hobart and adelaide!I am checking on the 10th and armoured units to see if they existed/were 2nd AIF but I dont think they were. Interestingly the 6th/7th and 9th were veterans of the middle east greece and crete and were very good units but the eight was untried and was split up two brigades in malaya with the balance in west timor, ambon and rabaul. All units fought poorly. Australia only gained a progessional army in the early fifties in time for korea vietnam somalia timor etc. I guess everyone gets it right in the end. Hope this clears things up.
Seeyah
GD
Australia sent five volunteer (no conscription)divisions to the first world war gallipoli, france etc. These were unimagitively Australian 1st-5th Divisions (Australia only became a nation in 1901 so this was a mere 14 years later).This was known as the first AIF ie. Australian Imperial Force.Between the wars Australia under its constitution had no professional army per say except for a tiny body of fortress troops. In its place was a very large part time militia for all adult males. This at the time was the most comprehensive militia force in the world. It busied itself geting ready for a repeat of ww1 and constitutionally was not able to be deployed outside Australia. Unfortuately the rest of the world didnt follow this glorious disarmament and when ww2 occured the part time militia could not be deployed and a new volunteer force (2nd AIF) was created. Interestingly the divisions raised followed on the numbers from the first world war this is why the deployable (outside ANZAC units are/ should be 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th division. Militia was sent to New Guinea as it was deemed as a OZ colony to constitute Australian territory when going got really dicey at Kokoda etc. Government moved the goal posts! The whole orbat for Australia was massively overstrength in the old version and it looks like the new one is even worse. I guess it is game balance to prevent an easy jap over running of australia but the military superpower I see armed with hundreds of afv's didnt exist in reality. The militia was a large but poorly armed force that didnt have the weapons relected in the game as it now is and certainly didnt have large garrisons at places like darwin cairns broome etc. In fact OZ strategy was to abandon everywhere but Brisbane sydney melbourne hobart and adelaide!I am checking on the 10th and armoured units to see if they existed/were 2nd AIF but I dont think they were. Interestingly the 6th/7th and 9th were veterans of the middle east greece and crete and were very good units but the eight was untried and was split up two brigades in malaya with the balance in west timor, ambon and rabaul. All units fought poorly. Australia only gained a progessional army in the early fifties in time for korea vietnam somalia timor etc. I guess everyone gets it right in the end. Hope this clears things up.
Seeyah
GD
POW & Repulse
"Great idea rotten ships"
"Great idea rotten ships"
Actually, everything that you see for the Australian OOB in 1941 was real. Of course, most of the units were only deployed in the regions that they are in the OBC41 by 1943. The reason that we deployed them in their 1943 positions was that an Allied AI will not EVER move them from the south, and will leave the northwest, northeast and west almost totally undefended throughout the game, which it wasn't. ANY Japanese player could be assured of conquering 75% of Australia without worry of a fight. If we were to order the 1941 scenario as historically accurate, all you would have to do was to move all of the Divisions from the Northwest and Northeast to Sydney and Melbourne. The actual numbers and equipment would not be changed.
All units are historical. There were actually three Australian Armoured divisions (1st was an AIF unit, 2nd and 3rd were ex-motorized divisions). They were equipped with Australian built tanks, as well as tanks from England and America. The Australian militia seen in the game are very unequipped. Historically, until the 12th Division came north, Darwin was garrisonned by the 3rd and 23rd Militia Brigades. Later, after MacArthur got to Australia he proposed a more forward defence. Divisions were moved up north. I don't have the source handy as I am home for the holiday's.
The 30th and 7th Brigades are attached to SW Pacific, even though they are part of the
Militia, as it was OK for Australian militia to go to New Guinea/Solomans as it was seen as Australian Territory. The only restriction for Militia units was outside of Australian territory. The problem is, is that units attached to ANZAC HQ have their abilities drastically reduced, which is unfair for fighting on New Guinea where these units were under constant use. Militia units were also in New Guinea since 1941.
Militia and early AIF units in the Pacific actually fought very well. The 8th AIF in Malaya repeatedly stopped the IJA advance in a series of bloody ambushes in Malaya. If all troops in Malaya had the same determination as the 8th Division it probbly wouldn't have fallen. The Australian forces on Timor, Ambon and Rabul only fought poorly because they were massively outnumbered, and outmanuvered. In the actual fighting they fought very well.
All units are historical. There were actually three Australian Armoured divisions (1st was an AIF unit, 2nd and 3rd were ex-motorized divisions). They were equipped with Australian built tanks, as well as tanks from England and America. The Australian militia seen in the game are very unequipped. Historically, until the 12th Division came north, Darwin was garrisonned by the 3rd and 23rd Militia Brigades. Later, after MacArthur got to Australia he proposed a more forward defence. Divisions were moved up north. I don't have the source handy as I am home for the holiday's.
The 30th and 7th Brigades are attached to SW Pacific, even though they are part of the
Militia, as it was OK for Australian militia to go to New Guinea/Solomans as it was seen as Australian Territory. The only restriction for Militia units was outside of Australian territory. The problem is, is that units attached to ANZAC HQ have their abilities drastically reduced, which is unfair for fighting on New Guinea where these units were under constant use. Militia units were also in New Guinea since 1941.
Militia and early AIF units in the Pacific actually fought very well. The 8th AIF in Malaya repeatedly stopped the IJA advance in a series of bloody ambushes in Malaya. If all troops in Malaya had the same determination as the 8th Division it probbly wouldn't have fallen. The Australian forces on Timor, Ambon and Rabul only fought poorly because they were massively outnumbered, and outmanuvered. In the actual fighting they fought very well.
Dont disagree with a lot of what you have to say except that I still cant reconcile nearly 1000 AFV's in ANZAC orbat at 7 Dec 41 (regardless of where they are stationed) with reality.
In a sense 1943 dispositions from an historical point of view are interesting but by then the threat of serious invasion was long passed. The window that existed for the Japanese was post capture of west Timor/Rabaul and bombings of Darwin which emptied city of all defenders bar small numbers of Navy personnel. This opportunity existed up an until about the Midway Battle effectively reduced their 'spirit of adventure' somewhat. Interestingly post war japanese prime source documents show that they did believe they could take 75% of Australia at this time with little or no problems. And as I stated Australian forces would have accepted this in the short run so it could hold the key south east.A million square miles of dessert and crocodile infested mangroves aint that useful to an enemy! The SE had all the peoples, industry and agriculture so this was a sensible strategy not a defeatist one as some have tried to paint it. So the computer AI is right historically not to move units from the SE. The Japanese could easily outflank Northern units any way. A scorched earth policy copied from Russia was widely promulgated at this time. With the arrival of US forces it was possible to be more ambitious an extend the defence to other parts of the continent including serious efforts in New guinea.
During the window of jap opportunity australia (RAAF) only had one yes one modern fighter plan at time of the Darwin bombing(it was doing a tour of the southern states selling war bonds). Also for the record Australia produced nil opporational tanks during ww2. Orders were frequently delayed due to supply promises from o/s which never arrived. This was to have disastrous consequences for casualty levels around Buna and Gona in 42 prior to the arrival of a token number of stuart light tanks. Thus by March 42 Australia had about 46,000 2aif troops from 6th/7th divisions no tanks or significant air assets and 280,000 militia with virtually no artillery or automatic weapons.
So what saved Australia? Sheer size of the land mass! The jap Army was keen but the IJN wouldnt have a bar of it because the problem was not taking it but holding and supplying it. The IJN preferred to go after the USN and the rest is History.
As far as the eigth division is concerned I wouldnt place too much reliance on sources pre 1995 as an unofficial policy which has suited both Australia and great Britten well has hushed up most of what happened in malaya/Singapore. With the 50 year rule in place for many of the archives much good stuff is now coming out. I reccomend the "pregnable fortress" by Elphick to get a balanced account of the conflict in Malaya and the collapse of the eigth div in west singapore.Explains many of the 'mysteries' about why among other things the jurong line was not defended at all and the causeway was also given up. (All by the eighth) Widespread desertion was a key reason but I will let you read it for yourself. This is not to blaim the troops many of the replacements had had only 7 days training.
As for Ambon, West Timor rabaul? Compare with the efforts of a much smaller force in East Timor as to what was possible but I think stats say it all. Ambon no preparation of lines of retreat (A universal problem with 8 division) CO sacked 2 weeks prior to invasion for defeatism, total kia after 4 days fighting 15. yes 15 out of a force of 1100! Then surrender when not surrounded. Says it all I think. Then 700 die in captivity. A common stat accross whole eighth division led by a part time general who never received another operational command and retired from the army in mid war.
GD
In a sense 1943 dispositions from an historical point of view are interesting but by then the threat of serious invasion was long passed. The window that existed for the Japanese was post capture of west Timor/Rabaul and bombings of Darwin which emptied city of all defenders bar small numbers of Navy personnel. This opportunity existed up an until about the Midway Battle effectively reduced their 'spirit of adventure' somewhat. Interestingly post war japanese prime source documents show that they did believe they could take 75% of Australia at this time with little or no problems. And as I stated Australian forces would have accepted this in the short run so it could hold the key south east.A million square miles of dessert and crocodile infested mangroves aint that useful to an enemy! The SE had all the peoples, industry and agriculture so this was a sensible strategy not a defeatist one as some have tried to paint it. So the computer AI is right historically not to move units from the SE. The Japanese could easily outflank Northern units any way. A scorched earth policy copied from Russia was widely promulgated at this time. With the arrival of US forces it was possible to be more ambitious an extend the defence to other parts of the continent including serious efforts in New guinea.
During the window of jap opportunity australia (RAAF) only had one yes one modern fighter plan at time of the Darwin bombing(it was doing a tour of the southern states selling war bonds). Also for the record Australia produced nil opporational tanks during ww2. Orders were frequently delayed due to supply promises from o/s which never arrived. This was to have disastrous consequences for casualty levels around Buna and Gona in 42 prior to the arrival of a token number of stuart light tanks. Thus by March 42 Australia had about 46,000 2aif troops from 6th/7th divisions no tanks or significant air assets and 280,000 militia with virtually no artillery or automatic weapons.
So what saved Australia? Sheer size of the land mass! The jap Army was keen but the IJN wouldnt have a bar of it because the problem was not taking it but holding and supplying it. The IJN preferred to go after the USN and the rest is History.
As far as the eigth division is concerned I wouldnt place too much reliance on sources pre 1995 as an unofficial policy which has suited both Australia and great Britten well has hushed up most of what happened in malaya/Singapore. With the 50 year rule in place for many of the archives much good stuff is now coming out. I reccomend the "pregnable fortress" by Elphick to get a balanced account of the conflict in Malaya and the collapse of the eigth div in west singapore.Explains many of the 'mysteries' about why among other things the jurong line was not defended at all and the causeway was also given up. (All by the eighth) Widespread desertion was a key reason but I will let you read it for yourself. This is not to blaim the troops many of the replacements had had only 7 days training.
As for Ambon, West Timor rabaul? Compare with the efforts of a much smaller force in East Timor as to what was possible but I think stats say it all. Ambon no preparation of lines of retreat (A universal problem with 8 division) CO sacked 2 weeks prior to invasion for defeatism, total kia after 4 days fighting 15. yes 15 out of a force of 1100! Then surrender when not surrounded. Says it all I think. Then 700 die in captivity. A common stat accross whole eighth division led by a part time general who never received another operational command and retired from the army in mid war.
GD
POW & Repulse
"Great idea rotten ships"
"Great idea rotten ships"
Actually, the Australians did produce some AC1 and AC2 Sentinal tanks, around 200 of them. However, most of their tanks were British/American. The reason that all of their armoured divisions/brigades have full numbers of tanks is that they can only be reinforced up to 42/Division, 21/Brigade. You will also notice that NO Australian Tank unit is movable until 1943, so, they cannot take part in offensive operations until then.
The problem is that Australia NEVER moves forces far from the South, even in 1943. This leaves the Japanese player able to invade Australia fairly late in the war. The vast size of Australia cannot be measured in PacWar. You can move from Broome to Darwin as fast as moving from Sydney to Melbourne.
I have read "Pregnable Fortress" and don't buy into its proposals. It stated that any European with wearing an Australian-like hat was Australian. There were many reports of deserters wearing these hats and 'Pregnable Fortress' states that these were only Australians. HOWEVER, this hat was issued to the many British battalions in the defence of Malaya. Also, Major General Bennett (the commander of the 8th Division) never received a command after the battle purely on the basis that he was shunned for disobeying orders and escaping to Australia instead of surrendering with his troops, not because of his record (he enacted the only successful actions against the Japanese in the entire campaign). I have found 'Pregnable Fortress' to be just another one of those books explaining British failures by laying all of the blame on their Commonwealth forces (Dieppe was also blames on us Canadians instead of a poorly planned and executed British operation). I have read MANY other sources, new and old, and they place most of the determined resistence during Malaya campaign on the Australians. The reason that they did so poorly on Singapore Island was predominantly due to the fact that every unit of this two Brigade Division was weary and understrength and they had to face a concentrated attack by two full IJA Divisions.
Ambon and Timor fell because the Australains and Dutch were vastly outnumbered (5:1 in Infantry) and unsupported. They were outmanuvered and further resistance (except for some indpendent companies in Timor) was deemed to be not worth the lives. They had no knowledge of what life would be in a POW camp, so that cannot be considered a practicle concern for them to think about.
Yes, look at the OBC41 schedule and Australia has no Modern fighters (the Wirraway is not considered to be modern), they DID however have a lot of Hudson I bombers.
The problem with Pacific War, is that some things are too abstracted. Leaving the Order of Battles exactly as history has them in 1941 will not result in the progression of history beinga ble to follow a correct path.
The problem is that Australia NEVER moves forces far from the South, even in 1943. This leaves the Japanese player able to invade Australia fairly late in the war. The vast size of Australia cannot be measured in PacWar. You can move from Broome to Darwin as fast as moving from Sydney to Melbourne.
I have read "Pregnable Fortress" and don't buy into its proposals. It stated that any European with wearing an Australian-like hat was Australian. There were many reports of deserters wearing these hats and 'Pregnable Fortress' states that these were only Australians. HOWEVER, this hat was issued to the many British battalions in the defence of Malaya. Also, Major General Bennett (the commander of the 8th Division) never received a command after the battle purely on the basis that he was shunned for disobeying orders and escaping to Australia instead of surrendering with his troops, not because of his record (he enacted the only successful actions against the Japanese in the entire campaign). I have found 'Pregnable Fortress' to be just another one of those books explaining British failures by laying all of the blame on their Commonwealth forces (Dieppe was also blames on us Canadians instead of a poorly planned and executed British operation). I have read MANY other sources, new and old, and they place most of the determined resistence during Malaya campaign on the Australians. The reason that they did so poorly on Singapore Island was predominantly due to the fact that every unit of this two Brigade Division was weary and understrength and they had to face a concentrated attack by two full IJA Divisions.
Ambon and Timor fell because the Australains and Dutch were vastly outnumbered (5:1 in Infantry) and unsupported. They were outmanuvered and further resistance (except for some indpendent companies in Timor) was deemed to be not worth the lives. They had no knowledge of what life would be in a POW camp, so that cannot be considered a practicle concern for them to think about.
Yes, look at the OBC41 schedule and Australia has no Modern fighters (the Wirraway is not considered to be modern), they DID however have a lot of Hudson I bombers.
The problem with Pacific War, is that some things are too abstracted. Leaving the Order of Battles exactly as history has them in 1941 will not result in the progression of history beinga ble to follow a correct path.
Just for the record I stand by my statement that Australia produced nil OPERATIONAL tanks in ww2. Whilst it is true the AC Sentinel series existed these totalled as follows AC 1 - 66 tanks. Never proved mechanically reliable enough to enter service production ceased July 42.
AC -2 Abandoned
AC-3 Small number of trials vehicles
AC-4 3 only built great tank, first to carry 17pdr AT gun which provided basis for firefly development. Like I said no thousand afv's in dec41.
great ref on Australian tank and aircraft production short of the official history is a book called 'armed and ready' put out by the Australian War Memorial(AWM). Highly reccomended.
As for the performance of the eighth. Its shortcomings as I have identified are now widely acknowledged and with the large scale upgrade of the AWM in 1999 the Pacific Theatre Gallery acknowledges much of the Elphick case and the contemporary documents from the period largely support his view. These include transcripts of interview with the key captured 8th commanders post war.
Thats not to say they did not do better than many other Indian units for example, its just from an educated, trained and all volunteer force a lot more was expected.
Much of the eigth's reputation in Malaya is based around some very succesful small unit ambushes. With very little good news to publish these actions have grown out of all proportion to their significance. As for the British trying to blame the Malaya debacle on others their is some truth in that. No doubt the absence of tanks and decent fighters from Malaya was a huge risk that blew up in Churchills face and he must take the blame. However, the shipments that would have gone to Malaya probably ended up in Russia. (you can never be really sure what would have happened if Hitler didnt attack Russia) and this was deemed to be the priority. Interestingly the US made much the same mistake in the Phillipines and they were not at war! The truth is the West fatally underestimated an asian enemy. As we have done ever since and continue to do. And the in theatre leadership was poor. Wavells view is interestig he alsways maintained that the whole Malaya, Burma, NEI debacle was lost by about two weeks aircraft re-inforcements.
GD
AC -2 Abandoned
AC-3 Small number of trials vehicles
AC-4 3 only built great tank, first to carry 17pdr AT gun which provided basis for firefly development. Like I said no thousand afv's in dec41.
great ref on Australian tank and aircraft production short of the official history is a book called 'armed and ready' put out by the Australian War Memorial(AWM). Highly reccomended.
As for the performance of the eighth. Its shortcomings as I have identified are now widely acknowledged and with the large scale upgrade of the AWM in 1999 the Pacific Theatre Gallery acknowledges much of the Elphick case and the contemporary documents from the period largely support his view. These include transcripts of interview with the key captured 8th commanders post war.
Thats not to say they did not do better than many other Indian units for example, its just from an educated, trained and all volunteer force a lot more was expected.
Much of the eigth's reputation in Malaya is based around some very succesful small unit ambushes. With very little good news to publish these actions have grown out of all proportion to their significance. As for the British trying to blame the Malaya debacle on others their is some truth in that. No doubt the absence of tanks and decent fighters from Malaya was a huge risk that blew up in Churchills face and he must take the blame. However, the shipments that would have gone to Malaya probably ended up in Russia. (you can never be really sure what would have happened if Hitler didnt attack Russia) and this was deemed to be the priority. Interestingly the US made much the same mistake in the Phillipines and they were not at war! The truth is the West fatally underestimated an asian enemy. As we have done ever since and continue to do. And the in theatre leadership was poor. Wavells view is interestig he alsways maintained that the whole Malaya, Burma, NEI debacle was lost by about two weeks aircraft re-inforcements.
GD
POW & Repulse
"Great idea rotten ships"
"Great idea rotten ships"
Gavin, I pretty much agree with what you are saying.
The disaster of the Western Allied defense in Asia was caused not so much by a lack of resources as a lack of understanding of how the Japanese planned to exploit their strengths and minimize their weaknesses. An example of this was the widespread British view that Buffalos were good enough to face Japan, and therefor the faster planes should be retained for use against Germany, or given to Russia for them to use against Germany. I don't agree with Wavell that a few extra aircraft, or a different type of aircraft, would have sufficed to stem the Japanese invasion. It was an entire mindset that was at fault. In fact, try replacing via editor all Buffalos with Hurricanes, and you will see that it makes no diference (because the Buffalo, in fact, is not much inferior to the Hurricane).
The massive Oz army in the latest version of the game disturbs me, because it implies that the game system cannot, in fact, handle history as it was. Japan's lack of invasion attempts on Australia (and Hawaii, for that matter) was due to the lack of infrastructure and shipping to support such an effort.
As a Japanese player, I can easily afford to commit a dozen infantry divisions to the South Pacific, plus all the SNLF and odds and ends units that I want to. In fact, it is only the committment of aircraft (which the Japanese moved forward with great abandon) that causes grief in terms of logistic support and HQ PPs.
The Eighth performed poorly in Malaya, along with everyone else, because they never recovered from the shock of having all their prewar expectations burst. They were off-balance the entire time (the Americans and Dutch suffered similar shocks).
Rather like the French, British, Belgians and Dutch when faced with the Blitzkrieg. They were expecting one thing, and got another. That's hard on even the flexible mind, and the militaries of the period were not noted for flexible minds!
The disaster of the Western Allied defense in Asia was caused not so much by a lack of resources as a lack of understanding of how the Japanese planned to exploit their strengths and minimize their weaknesses. An example of this was the widespread British view that Buffalos were good enough to face Japan, and therefor the faster planes should be retained for use against Germany, or given to Russia for them to use against Germany. I don't agree with Wavell that a few extra aircraft, or a different type of aircraft, would have sufficed to stem the Japanese invasion. It was an entire mindset that was at fault. In fact, try replacing via editor all Buffalos with Hurricanes, and you will see that it makes no diference (because the Buffalo, in fact, is not much inferior to the Hurricane).
The massive Oz army in the latest version of the game disturbs me, because it implies that the game system cannot, in fact, handle history as it was. Japan's lack of invasion attempts on Australia (and Hawaii, for that matter) was due to the lack of infrastructure and shipping to support such an effort.
As a Japanese player, I can easily afford to commit a dozen infantry divisions to the South Pacific, plus all the SNLF and odds and ends units that I want to. In fact, it is only the committment of aircraft (which the Japanese moved forward with great abandon) that causes grief in terms of logistic support and HQ PPs.
The Eighth performed poorly in Malaya, along with everyone else, because they never recovered from the shock of having all their prewar expectations burst. They were off-balance the entire time (the Americans and Dutch suffered similar shocks).
Rather like the French, British, Belgians and Dutch when faced with the Blitzkrieg. They were expecting one thing, and got another. That's hard on even the flexible mind, and the militaries of the period were not noted for flexible minds!
I thing "grumbler" has stated his case very well. I particularly note the statement:
The massive Oz army in the latest version of the game disturbs me, because it implies that the game system cannot, in fact, handle history as it was. Japan's lack of invasion attempts on Australia (and Hawaii, for that matter) was due to the lack of infrastructure and shipping to support such an effort.
as well as Major Tom's:
The problem with Pacific War, is that some things are too abstracted. Leaving the Order of Battles exactly as history has them in 1941 will not result in the progression of history beinga ble to follow a correct path.
Hopefully the game engine problems can be corrected in PacWar's successor War in The Pacific. It is most desirable, I think, to have a game that is capable of properly handling historical dispositions.
And my appreciation to all that have contributed to this post. An interesting topic supported by good research.
As is now generally admitted, the performance of the 8th AIF was rather poor. The 22nd and 27th Brigades performed spottily (as did all British units in Malaya). The 23rd Brigade's units did little better. 2/22 Battalion at Rabaul was fragmented by an amphibious attack. The best that can be said for 2/40 on Timor was that it retired in good order until surrounded (Note: 2/40 was badly depleted by malaria). Units of 2/21 Battalion on Ambon almost certainly made a great fight at Laha Airfield (Japanese records state the defense was "not to be despised" but the Japanese murdured most of the 150 survivors and few of the Japanese participants survived the war).
The Independent Companies (Commandos) performed universally well and Australians later earned a reputation as feared jungle fighters in New Guinea and beyond. Particularly noteworthy was the early fight by 39th Bn (of 30th Brigade).
I think most of what needs to be said has been (yet to see anything from MAJ thomas on the recent stuff) would only qualify the eight's performance in South East Asia by making the obvious comparison with their mission ie 'to hold up the japanese and make time.(non malaya units)" Independant companies which came from the same volunteer stock as the eigth showed how it could be done. When you talk to the trained troops of the eigth their view is they would never have surrendered if given a choice. In fact by the last day of hostilities in Singapore Island eigth reliable troops had dug inn and repulsed all JAP attacks. With a small front an fixed lines Jap flank tactics were useless. What would have happened is a big what if. I suspect a similar conclusion to Battaan but this could/would have saved Burma.
Definately all would have fought much longer if led well and achieved aim ie delay.
Re the ambon, e. timor, rabaul fiascos and the argument that they didnt know that surrendering was bad!!!!!!!
Trust me the modern Australian army (and the First AIF) and the latter WW2 army just doesnt surrender. Common sense is now applied. Dont become a prisoner to torturers and thugs.
Evidence for this is:
Milne Bay
Kokoda
Kapyong, Korea
Long Tan Vietnam
E.Timor Small unit actions X 100
in all these cases 5:1 was looking pretty damn good. War is NOT a CRT table. 5:1 shouldnt say :
1 SR
2 SR
3 SR
4 SR
5 SR
6 SR
in any army!!. A good army will summ up the odds and fight on anyway. Shoot me down in flames when the first oz grunt hands over his weapon to the et militia and says "I hope you guys respect the Geneva convention"
Definately all would have fought much longer if led well and achieved aim ie delay.
Re the ambon, e. timor, rabaul fiascos and the argument that they didnt know that surrendering was bad!!!!!!!
Trust me the modern Australian army (and the First AIF) and the latter WW2 army just doesnt surrender. Common sense is now applied. Dont become a prisoner to torturers and thugs.
Evidence for this is:
Milne Bay
Kokoda
Kapyong, Korea
Long Tan Vietnam
E.Timor Small unit actions X 100
in all these cases 5:1 was looking pretty damn good. War is NOT a CRT table. 5:1 shouldnt say :
1 SR
2 SR
3 SR
4 SR
5 SR
6 SR
in any army!!. A good army will summ up the odds and fight on anyway. Shoot me down in flames when the first oz grunt hands over his weapon to the et militia and says "I hope you guys respect the Geneva convention"
POW & Repulse
"Great idea rotten ships"
"Great idea rotten ships"
Gavin,
I am not sure where all that came from!
No one is arguing that the 8th surrendered a Singapore due to poor morals, just do to poor morale! Saying that they could have. alone, held out any meaningful time is, IMO, wishful thinking. What would they drink?
Certainly the Oz forces played a significant role in the war (which is underestimated in many minds due to a persistant campaign by their CinC, MacArthur, to redirect attention his way, IMO). The 8th would have been better deployed elsewhere, clearly. I agree with H.P Wilmott that Churchill's crime was not do abandon Singapore in favor of the Med, but rather to reinforce it with inadequate forces after the fact. Once the decision to abandon Singapore had been made in 1940, WSC should have had the courage to stick by his decision and concentrate on saving what could be saved (maybe Burma?)
I have always found it interesting that, in the game, I can save Timor if the first movement of US forces is an engineeer to that site. The airfield needs single level of improvement to make it Tac Bomber capable. Once that happens, the Japanses computer player seems to lose interest, and the island can be held. This is always disasterous to the Japanese cause, as it forces them to defend (against HB in Timor) a wide range of petroleum sites.
Do you think this is historical?
Doug
I am not sure where all that came from!
No one is arguing that the 8th surrendered a Singapore due to poor morals, just do to poor morale! Saying that they could have. alone, held out any meaningful time is, IMO, wishful thinking. What would they drink?
Certainly the Oz forces played a significant role in the war (which is underestimated in many minds due to a persistant campaign by their CinC, MacArthur, to redirect attention his way, IMO). The 8th would have been better deployed elsewhere, clearly. I agree with H.P Wilmott that Churchill's crime was not do abandon Singapore in favor of the Med, but rather to reinforce it with inadequate forces after the fact. Once the decision to abandon Singapore had been made in 1940, WSC should have had the courage to stick by his decision and concentrate on saving what could be saved (maybe Burma?)
I have always found it interesting that, in the game, I can save Timor if the first movement of US forces is an engineeer to that site. The airfield needs single level of improvement to make it Tac Bomber capable. Once that happens, the Japanses computer player seems to lose interest, and the island can be held. This is always disasterous to the Japanese cause, as it forces them to defend (against HB in Timor) a wide range of petroleum sites.
Do you think this is historical?
Doug
>>No one is arguing that the 8th surrendered a Singapore due to poor morals, just do to poor morale! Saying that they could have. alone, held out any meaningful time is, IMO, wishful thinking. What would they drink?<<
Actually they could have held. Yasashita was in desperate straights by the 15th. His logistics were stretched to breaking point, his lead elements were down to less than a weeks supply. His surrender demand was a massive bluff, if Percival had refused he would have to launched an assault on the city itself, which he himself admitted would have failed. He was planning to pull back if he hadn't taken the city with a few days.
>>Certainly the Oz forces played a significant role in the war (which is underestimated in many minds due to a persistant campaign by their CinC, MacArthur, to redirect attention his way, IMO).<<
MacArthur almost positively hated the Australians. He was furious that he had to appoint an Australian to overall command of the land forces. Its why they played no effective role after the liberation of PNG.
Actually they could have held. Yasashita was in desperate straights by the 15th. His logistics were stretched to breaking point, his lead elements were down to less than a weeks supply. His surrender demand was a massive bluff, if Percival had refused he would have to launched an assault on the city itself, which he himself admitted would have failed. He was planning to pull back if he hadn't taken the city with a few days.
>>Certainly the Oz forces played a significant role in the war (which is underestimated in many minds due to a persistant campaign by their CinC, MacArthur, to redirect attention his way, IMO).<<
MacArthur almost positively hated the Australians. He was furious that he had to appoint an Australian to overall command of the land forces. Its why they played no effective role after the liberation of PNG.
Andrewmv has hit the nail on the head. Most of the Jap ops in Malaya ran on a shoe string largely living off captured logistics abandoned by panicky troops. Like Java it could have gone the other way quite easily if the troops had held on that little bit extra that intestinal fortitude would have provided. In reasonably open country like Jahore (as was proven in Burma) the Japanese had no answer to modern western mechanised warfare. This was confirmed in 44 when the US broke into open country in the Phillipines and was a key element in invasion of Japan plans (kanto plain etc).
After two years of war the defenders in Malaya should have done a whole lot better. To argue otherwise may be good for the soul but aint good history. Dont start me on the air forces!! They were even worse!! Of course despite their results the RN/RAN were the only ones to come out with their courage intact. Hope this leads to POW/Repulse debate.
Yours in 'stir the pot' mode.
GD
After two years of war the defenders in Malaya should have done a whole lot better. To argue otherwise may be good for the soul but aint good history. Dont start me on the air forces!! They were even worse!! Of course despite their results the RN/RAN were the only ones to come out with their courage intact. Hope this leads to POW/Repulse debate.
Yours in 'stir the pot' mode.
GD
POW & Repulse
"Great idea rotten ships"
"Great idea rotten ships"
The situation on Java and Singapore were virtually decided. Sure, Yamashita would probably have to pull off the Island of Singapore, but, with total air and sea superiority it was only a matter of time before the Garrison succumbed. With the Eastern Fleet being inneffective (through numbers) they could not have done much. The other naval fronts for the RN were hard pressed for ships, so, massive reinforcement wasn't deemed as possible.
Put ANY Allied unit, no matter what their combat experience, in completely foreign terrain and they will probably fail. Only one UK Battalion actually bothered to use infiltration tactics, which, if used on a large scale would definitely have slowed the advancement of the IJA.
Put ANY Allied unit, no matter what their combat experience, in completely foreign terrain and they will probably fail. Only one UK Battalion actually bothered to use infiltration tactics, which, if used on a large scale would definitely have slowed the advancement of the IJA.
Gavin,
It is true that the Japanese were running their operations on a logistical shoestring (at least by Western standards) but it is not true that they relied on captured material. They USED the material, for sure and gratefully, but this was a pretty thoroughly planned campaign and they had the logistical support they needed (though often just in time: a convoy on the 21st arrived at Endau with the ammo needed for any assault on the city).
You could certainly argue that the defense of Singapore may have been more prolonged, particulalry if the units had been bettwe deployed. However, I think it was impossible for the 8th to continue the fight on their own. The city's water works were in Japanese hands, and the 8th wasn't strong enough to retake it. Aussies might be tough, but they gotta drink!
As for the KNIL holding Java, I think this a pipedream. These native troops mostly didn't WANT to help the Dutch hold out. It wasn't in their interests. There weren't enough Dutch to do the job, either.
Doug
It is true that the Japanese were running their operations on a logistical shoestring (at least by Western standards) but it is not true that they relied on captured material. They USED the material, for sure and gratefully, but this was a pretty thoroughly planned campaign and they had the logistical support they needed (though often just in time: a convoy on the 21st arrived at Endau with the ammo needed for any assault on the city).
You could certainly argue that the defense of Singapore may have been more prolonged, particulalry if the units had been bettwe deployed. However, I think it was impossible for the 8th to continue the fight on their own. The city's water works were in Japanese hands, and the 8th wasn't strong enough to retake it. Aussies might be tough, but they gotta drink!
As for the KNIL holding Java, I think this a pipedream. These native troops mostly didn't WANT to help the Dutch hold out. It wasn't in their interests. There weren't enough Dutch to do the job, either.
Doug
>>The situation on Java and Singapore were virtually decided. Sure, Yamashita would probably have to pull off the Island of Singapore, but, with total air and sea superiority it was only a matter of time before the Garrison succumbed. With the Eastern Fleet being inneffective (through numbers) they could not have done much. The other naval fronts for the RN were hard pressed for ships, so, massive reinforcement wasn't deemed as possible.<<
Yep, Singapore would have fallen sooner or later (probably sooner). But any prolonged resistance in Singapore would have had major flow on effects in Burma. Singapore holding would have delayed the Japanese until after the moonson, probably allowing at least northern Burma to be held. This would have kept the Burma road open and probably have allowed the British to retake Malaya in 44-45
Yep, Singapore would have fallen sooner or later (probably sooner). But any prolonged resistance in Singapore would have had major flow on effects in Burma. Singapore holding would have delayed the Japanese until after the moonson, probably allowing at least northern Burma to be held. This would have kept the Burma road open and probably have allowed the British to retake Malaya in 44-45
The Japanese allowed for 100 days to take Singapore and still redeploy units. They took 70 days. That leaves a lot of slop, and I doubt it would have meant much difference in Burma. I will look to my sources, however.
According to HP Wilmott (my bible on this stuff) only the 18th Infantry division was transferred from Yamashita (Malaya) to Iida (Burma) before the British were driven from Burma. Iida already had portions of 55th division (less South Seas Regiment), 33rd Division, and 56th Division. Would Iida have been able to drive the British from Burma without the 18th? It seems from my reading that the 18th played little role in Burma other than to confirm defeat. I will keep looking for British excuses, however.
Singapore, it seems to me, meant far more in mythology than it meant in reality. The Brits and Aussies lost a round, but as predicted before the war it was not the decisive round because the fleet it was supposed to support did not exist.
Doug
According to HP Wilmott (my bible on this stuff) only the 18th Infantry division was transferred from Yamashita (Malaya) to Iida (Burma) before the British were driven from Burma. Iida already had portions of 55th division (less South Seas Regiment), 33rd Division, and 56th Division. Would Iida have been able to drive the British from Burma without the 18th? It seems from my reading that the 18th played little role in Burma other than to confirm defeat. I will keep looking for British excuses, however.
Singapore, it seems to me, meant far more in mythology than it meant in reality. The Brits and Aussies lost a round, but as predicted before the war it was not the decisive round because the fleet it was supposed to support did not exist.
Doug
Burma was lost because the British were numerically outnumbered. The Japanese had more aircraft (only 1 Sqn of Buffalo's and 1-2 of USAAC P-40's, vs. 300 then 600 IJAAF aircraft), as well as more Divisions (33rd and 55th, followed by 56th and 18th). The 17th Indian Division was very green, and the 1st Burma Division very unloyal. The only 'real' formation worth much in the fighting was the 7th Armoured. The 17th Division was virtually destroyed twice (once East of Burma, and once south of Mandalay). The Japanese ALWAYS had local superiority, even though numerically the British/Chinese had more troops.
It was the 18th that took Lashio on the 29th March. It was this that exposed Alexander's left flank and forced him to withdraw from his line south of Mandalay and retreat over the Irrawaddy and Chindwin.Originally posted by grumbler:
According to HP Wilmott (my bible on this stuff) only the 18th Infantry division was transferred from Yamashita (Malaya) to Iida (Burma) before the British were driven from Burma. Iida already had portions of 55th division (less South Seas Regiment), 33rd Division, and 56th Division. Would Iida have been able to drive the British from Burma without the 18th? It seems from my reading that the 18th played little role in Burma other than to confirm defeat. I will keep looking for British excuses, however.
Also with Singapore holding, would the 56th have been sent to Burma? or would it have been used to reinforce Malaya? I personally think it would have been used in Malaya in preference to Burma, which after all did have a higher priority for the Japanese.
If the troops involved had of known what awaited them, they would probably have never surrendered, at least not en masse.
The results would have been the same, but many more assets would have been tied up in rooting out these men (eg the independent company on Timor).
But they didn't so they were outthought, outled and sacrificed.
The results would have been the same, but many more assets would have been tied up in rooting out these men (eg the independent company on Timor).
But they didn't so they were outthought, outled and sacrificed.
Robert Lee