myths of the great war

[marc420]

Hi,

One reason I came out here to look at the status of this game is that I've recently been reading a book by John Mosier called "Myths of the Great War".

Kinda curious if the developers of this game have read this book?

He makes a very interesting point about the armies of 1914, mainly the French, British and German ones. Basically, the Germans had switched their philosophy over to one that was much more based on firepower. The British and French were still more geared to a more Napoleonic type war with lines of infantry. That probably over-simplifies things, but I'm trying not to rewrite a 300+ page book.

Just a couple of examples. British and French infantry doctrine still stressed infantry using bayonets as where the final struggle would be decided. They also expected Rifle fire from infantry to be the main killer of infantry.

I think everyone knows of the French 75 as a key weapon. It was developed when they learned how to control recoil hydraulically. But what didn't know was that its maximum elevation was just 16 degrees. That would appear that the French still expected this gun to be used in the midst of an infantry battle in a more Napoleonic style.

Meanwhile, the Germans had instead used the new recoil technology to develop howitzers. Which were obviously more suited for the style of warfare that WWI turned out to be.

Add machine guns to the mix, and grenades, and mortars, and the Germans had a doctrine that was much closer to the modern war of firepower than the French and the British. The Germans were worried about getting firepower onto targets, and they had already moved away from the idea of infantry formations with rifles as a way to do this.

The Germans consistently had half as many casualties (or less) than the French and the British. And this isn't just when they were on defense. When the Germans attacked, they never just lined up their infantry for slaughter in the English way. The tactics typically credited to Luddendorf and thought to appear in 1918 had really been worked out by early 1915. The Germans moved their infantry in smaller groups, utilized cover, and concentrated on how to systematically reduce a defensive position by applications of firepower. The steady gains the Germans made in the Argonne Forrest battles of 1915 show these tactics.

Its a good book to read.

I was curious if the game team had seen it. It would appear to have a big impact on how units are rated in the game. A TOE chart could probably tell you the Germans had more howitzers, mortars, machine guns in a division than the French. But it may not tell you that the Germans had a much more modern doctrine on how to use these tools. From reading this book, it would appear that German units in 1914 and 1915 should have much greater offensive capabilities than any similar French or British unit.

[Hanal]

Well, when you find the "game team" to answer this question, please ask them about the status of the game.....[;)]

[anarchyintheuk]

There's some discussion about Mosier's book in a thread on the second page entitled "Good Book". I have a lot of problems with Mosier's statement about Germans receiving lighter casualties even on offensive. The only time that I know of that the Germans inflicted disproportionate casualties on the Allies in France was during opening French offensive in 1914. Even during the Somme, considered one of the greatest slaughters of British infantry in history, both sides suffered similiar casualties by the time the offensive ended. I also think he highly overrates the AEF. Just my two cents.

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: anarchyintheuk

There's some discussion about Mosier's book in a thread on the second page entitled "Good Book". I have a lot of problems with Mosier's statement about Germans receiving lighter casualties even on offensive. The only time that I know of that the Germans inflicted disproportionate casualties on the Allies in France was during opening French offensive in 1914. Even during the Somme, considered one of the greatest slaughters of British infantry in history, both sides suffered similiar casualties by the time the offensive ended. I also think he highly overrates the AEF. Just my two cents.

The Germans inflicted proportionately more casualties than they received (all things considered) during both world wars, but most of Mosier's book is fraught with problems. I think the casualty ratio was closer to 1 to 1.5. You're absolutely right that the Somme was a graveyard for the German Army as much as it was the British. The point about infantry doctrine re the Germans though was that it was about fire and manouevre rather than just firepower. It was the British who bombarded for a week at the Somme. It was the British and Americans who came up with the idea of massed Heavy Bombers clearing the way in Normandy in WWII. The Germans stressed more innovative small unit tactics with the Stormtroopers but no one had a good doctrine for the trenches, because no one anticipated them. The Germans and British came up with uniquely differering methods of breaking the stalemate, but to say that either had a strategy ideally suited to it before hand implies foresight.

I don't really see anything wrong with reliance on the bayonet either. Infantry capable of closing with the enemy and driving them out at bayonet point are generally going to be aggressive, motivated, tough and capable, and I see nothing wrong with that.

Mosier was a bit of a fanboy when it came to the AEF. They were brave but three years behind everyone else on the western front. Pershing's insistence on keeping Americans together to fight together and spurning outside help and assistance meant they learnt the lessons of European warfare the hard way.

Regards,
IronDuke

[riley555a]

Is it true Germany emphasized greatly and put a ton into artillery? Didn't they believe their artillery was so heavy and devestating it would be almost enough to win?

Doesn't mean their stupid, I probably would have thought the same. Look at those Krupp guns. They're the very definition of devastation.

[Hauberk]

Gentlemen Another book you might find of interest onthis topic is "The Pity of War" by Niall Ferguson.Some of it is rather dry reading,ie:the chapters on the economic and political conditions prevalent inthe respective countries at the outbreak of the war.However the chapters on the attitudes of the soldiers and the overal stategy and tactics involved are thought provoking. Regards,Hauberk

[Belphegor]

Mud, Blood and Poppycock is also an interesting book for addressing some of the standard thinking about the war...

[Big B]

Well, I'm late to shoot my mouth off on this one - BUT - I am reading that same book right now myself. It is a very interesting read, I haven't finished it yet so I can't comment yet. Another good read is Rod Paschalls' "Defeat of Imperial Germany 1917-918".

Something of an AEF Fanboy? Sure, why not - British historians are always BEF Fanboys.

But more to the point - if the AEF didn't show up and we Yanks minded our own business and stayed on our side of the Atlantic - the Germans would certainly have won the war. Maybe they should have...and we would never have had to meet Mr Hitler and company...who knows.

B

[Tête de Porc]

First of all thanks for the tip about the "Good book" thread. I will definitely have to check out some of the authors mentioned there, starting with Strachan.

Just a couple of examples [from Mosier's book]. British and French infantry doctrine [in 1914] still stressed infantry using bayonets as where the final struggle would be decided. They also expected Rifle fire from infantry to be the main killer of infantry.

This is absolutely wrong, at least when it comes to the British. The BEF in 1914 was probably the best prepared army of all on the tactical level. The British army had insitituted major changes after the Boer war, which led to much more emphasis on marksmanship and the tactical defensive. The Germans in 1914 still attacked in Napoleonic battalion columns.

I think everyone knows of the French 75 as a key weapon. It was developed when they learned how to control recoil hydraulically. But what didn't know was that its maximum elevation was just 16 degrees. That would appear that the French still expected this gun to be used in the midst of an infantry battle in a more Napoleonic style. Meanwhile, the Germans had instead used the new recoil technology to develop howitzers. Which were obviously more suited for the style of warfare that WWI turned out to be.

The guns were used for direct fire "in the midst of the infantry battle" in 1914, and they were devastatingly effective which is one of the reasons the trenches appeared.

The reason the Germans had howitzers and and hand grenades was that they had prepared for siege warfare against the Belgian forts, which had to be taken as part of the Schlieffen plan. Of course the same weapons were very useful in trench warfare, which was a form of siege warfare, but that wasn't because the Germans had predicted the future better than anyone else.

When the Germans attacked, they never just lined up their infantry for slaughter in the English way.

Again this is precisely what they did in 1914. The Osprey books on Mons and First Ypres have good blow-by-blow accounts of those battles, and it's quite clear that the Germans came on and were mowed down in dense masses. The losses on all sides in 1914 were absolutely horrific, which is why everyone started digging in. The (over)simplified British tactics at the Somme appeared because they had a lot of troops but little time to train them, so they settled on very simple tactics. (This was quite possibly the wrong decision, but understandable.)

Where the Germans really differed from the French and British in 1914 was in artillery, where they had more. They also had big production lines running, which meant they didn't have to wait for weapons production to ramp up like the allies. But the number of machine guns per battalion (two) was exactly the same as in the British army, which suggests they were not any more "in the know" about modern warfare than their opponents. (The British army had even requested increasing this to six per battalion before the war, but parliament refused.)

Mosier seems a little selective in his facts as well as his conclusions.

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: Tête de Porc

First of all thanks for the tip about the "Good book" thread. I will definitely have to check out some of the authors mentioned there, starting with Strachan.

Just a couple of examples [from Mosier's book]. British and French infantry doctrine [in 1914] still stressed infantry using bayonets as where the final struggle would be decided. They also expected Rifle fire from infantry to be the main killer of infantry.

This is absolutely wrong, at least when it comes to the British. The BEF in 1914 was probably the best prepared army of all on the tactical level. The British army had insitituted major changes after the Boer war, which led to much more emphasis on marksmanship and the tactical defensive. The Germans in 1914 still attacked in Napoleonic battalion columns.

I think everyone knows of the French 75 as a key weapon. It was developed when they learned how to control recoil hydraulically. But what didn't know was that its maximum elevation was just 16 degrees. That would appear that the French still expected this gun to be used in the midst of an infantry battle in a more Napoleonic style. Meanwhile, the Germans had instead used the new recoil technology to develop howitzers. Which were obviously more suited for the style of warfare that WWI turned out to be.

The guns were used for direct fire "in the midst of the infantry battle" in 1914, and they were devastatingly effective which is one of the reasons the trenches appeared.

The reason the Germans had howitzers and and hand grenades was that they had prepared for siege warfare against the Belgian forts, which had to be taken as part of the Schlieffen plan. Of course the same weapons were very useful in trench warfare, which was a form of siege warfare, but that wasn't because the Germans had predicted the future better than anyone else.

When the Germans attacked, they never just lined up their infantry for slaughter in the English way.

Again this is precisely what they did in 1914. The Osprey books on Mons and First Ypres have good blow-by-blow accounts of those battles, and it's quite clear that the Germans came on and were mowed down in dense masses. The losses on all sides in 1914 were absolutely horrific, which is why everyone started digging in. The (over)simplified British tactics at the Somme appeared because they had a lot of troops but little time to train them, so they settled on very simple tactics. (This was quite possibly the wrong decision, but understandable.)

Where the Germans really differed from the French and British in 1914 was in artillery, where they had more. They also had big production lines running, which meant they didn't have to wait for weapons production to ramp up like the allies. But the number of machine guns per battalion (two) was exactly the same as in the British army, which suggests they were not any more "in the know" about modern warfare than their opponents. (The British army had even requested increasing this to six per battalion before the war, but parliament refused.)

Mosier seems a little selective in his facts as well as his conclusions.

Agreed, I'd just change the emphasis in this bit.

The (over)simplified British tactics at the Somme appeared because they had a lot of troops but little time to train them, so they settled on very simple tactics. (This was quite possibly the wrong decision, but understandable.)

I think the tactics were largely driven by C3.

On a heavily shelled (and therefore devastated) battlefield, running into prepared positions over a wide frontage could lead to localised breakthroughs that if they succeeded and penetrated would have exposed flanks. Going might be easier in some areas etc, so to ensure units never lost touch with their flanks, everyone was ordered to walk as a standard pace. This wasn't considered stupid because a week of shelling was supposed to have destroyed the German front lines.

Regards,
IronDuke

[Big B]

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

ORIGINAL: Tête de Porc

I always love to read others opinions...it makes you think.

Does anyone dispute that if the USA didn't jump into the war with all it's might that the Gremans would have won?

[IronDuke_slith]

I do. With the Americans in the war, the Germans couldn't possibly win. Even fighting with tactics three years behind everyone else, the sheer number of Americans landing in France would have overwhelmed the Germans and overwhelmed them convincingly once they had undergone their own learning curve and figured out how to operate on a European battlefield.

However, it doesd't follow that the Germans would win without Americans getting involved. Their best chance (the Kaisers Offensive) was in part launched because there were Americans in France. Without them there is not the same imperitive and all you get is more stalemate (which in four years had not provided victory for the Germans). They themselves were unsuccessful at Verdun, they suffered horrendously on the Somme. The Germans could have won without the americans on the scene, but were far from guaranteed to win (which is what the word "would" implies).

I personally think there would have been more stalemate. Beyond that I've no idea.

Regards,
IronDuke

[Big B]

ORIGINAL: IronDuke


I do. With the Americans in the war, the Germans couldn't possibly win. Even fighting with tactics three years behind everyone else, the sheer number of Americans landing in France would have overwhelmed the Germans and overwhelmed them convincingly once they had undergone their own learning curve and figured out how to operate on a European battlefield.

However, it doesd't follow that the Germans would win without Americans getting involved. Their best chance (the Kaisers Offensive) was in part launched because there were Americans in France. Without them there is not the same imperitive and all you get is more stalemate (which in four years had not provided victory for the Germans). They themselves were unsuccessful at Verdun, they suffered horrendously on the Somme. The Germans could have won without the americans on the scene, but were far from guaranteed to win (which is what the word "would" implies).

I personally think there would have been more stalemate. Beyond that I've no idea.

Regards,
IronDuke

Hmm, yes,.... but remember that American troops played a critical role in blunting the last German offensives in May - June 1918.
As I recall the German army reinforced from Russia outnumbered the combine Allied Armies in spring 1918 (and I believe there were already about 200,000 US troops in France at the time).
If America never entered the war at all there may have been an Allied collapse by summer 1918...maybe. It is forgotten or dicounted now, but the presence of ever growing numbers of US troops was a tonic to the Allied morale at the time (oh good, someone else to stop German bullets).
As to tactical backwardness of the German Army - there seems to be many who would not agree with that.
We'll of course never know for sure now what the outcome might have been, but I think there is strong evidence that the Germans would have pulled it off had the USA stayed home.

Cheers,
B

[Fred98]

The Germans had no chance of victory at that time.

After the Russians capitulated the Germans moved their armies to the Western Front. The plan was to put in a massive assault before the Yanks arrived.

The assaults of spring 1918 failed. And the Germans lost their finest troops. At that point the Germans had no hope of winning. And the Yanks had not yet arrived.

The Germans hoped for a negotiated peace. Then came the August offensives by the Allies. The Germans realised they would ultimately be defeated.

They surrendered before the allies achieved total victory.

[Big B]

ORIGINAL: Joe 98

The Germans had no chance of victory at that time.

After the Russians capitulated the Germans moved their armies to the Western Front. The plan was to put in a massive assault before the Yanks arrived.

The assaults of spring 1918 failed. And the Germans lost their finest troops. At that point the Germans had no hope of winning. And the Yanks had not yet arrived.

The Germans hoped for a negotiated peace. Then came the August offensives by the Allies. The Germans realised they would ultimately be defeated.

They surrendered before the allies achieved total victory.

Anyone from Germany want to weigh in on this?

[anarchyintheuk]

Adding to what IronDuke said, I think there was pressure for a 1918 Spring offensive due to the effects of the blockade, a recogonization of the Allies increased offensive capabilities (tanks, air superiority, etc.) as well as increased US involvement. The Central Powers (in particular Germany) had more to deal with than just success or defeat on the Western Front. I don't know about AH, but Germany was certainly feeling the pressure of the blockade. Off topic but does anyone know if Germany was expecting that the recently captured Russian territory would make them self-sufficient in foodstuffs (kind of a precursor to the Lebensraum idea) or was it irrelevant because of transport problems?

Back to the topic: IMO US troops didn't have enough of an impact in stopping the 1918 Spring offensive that there absence would have meant Allied defeat. It's a great what if in history. What would the Central Powers have done in 1918 if the US was not involved?

[oi_you_nutter]

IMHO the Western Allies were closer to defeat by the Central Powers in 1917 than 1918

the spring 1918 German offensive was tacticaly good yet strategicaly it was weak, it was a last gasp before the AEF sealed their fate. The German did not have the reserves and supplies to keep up the momentum to force a strategic victory, and just like the Battle of the Bulge it may have just hastened their defeat.

[Big B]

ORIGINAL: oi_you_nutter

IMHO the Western Allies were closer to defeat by the Central Powers in 1917 than 1918

the spring 1918 German offensive was tacticaly good yet strategicaly it was weak, it was a last gasp before the AEF sealed their fate. The German did not have the reserves and supplies to keep up the momentum to force a strategic victory, and just like the Battle of the Bulge it may have just hastened their defeat.

I love a lively debate[;)]

Let us not forget that by 1917:
A) The French army suffered a collapse and mutinied,
B) Russia was knocked out of the war,
C) Italy was as good as knocked out of the war after Caperetto,
D) After Paschendale the British army wasn't in good shape either.
E) Serbia had been crushed, and Bulgaria had joined the Central Powers opening direct communications with Turkey.
F) The Allies had been expelled from Gallipoli,
G) Not ONE Central Power State had been forced out of the war.
H) By 1918 the Germans finally outnumbered the Allies on the Western Front.
I) It's true that German manpower reserves were getting quite low, but so were those of Britian and France.

In summary - the war had not gone the Allies way.

Then in 1918 the Germans launched "Michael", and though the first drives of Michael were stopped (after tremendous territorial gain by western front standards) - The drive which panicked the French Gov was the last one which went all the way down to the Marne, which the Americans were instrumental in stopping. I really don't know why so many British historians think that after their sector calmed down from first phases of the German Spring Offensive - nothing really important happened afterward.

The fortunes of war certainly took a dramatic change to the Allies favor in 1918, but it seems no one wants to acknowledge that the only ingredient that changed in the Allies favor was the entry in large numbers of US forces into the war. The comentators of that era certainly noticed.

So it seems to me that the Western Allies would never have beaten nor even held out against Germany without American aid.

[One last note on the tactical capability of the AEF. I do not agree that they were poorly trained or three years behind the French and British:
A) I have a copy of the US Army 1917 Infantry Manual, at the company to squad level - the concepts are still valid, and do not differ signifgantly with modern infantry basics (accepting of course the weapons available today). The use of cover, patrolling concepts, suppresive fire, etc.
B) The AEF was largely trained by French and (some)British officers and NCOs in France - they wouldn't teach them outdated tactics by their own standards.
C) Where the AEF suffered was in consisting of mostly green troops, that can only be overcome with practical experience.]

B

[Big B]

[&:]
oops! ignore this!

[oi_you_nutter]

IF the Germans had attacked the French in 1917 while the French Army was mutinous and fragile I believe they could have forced a political solution. The BEF could not have covered the amount of front line required, frankly the Western Allies were lucky. Other than that time, the chance of anyone forcing a strategic military reverse on their opponents was just not possible, a bloody war of attrition was the only method. the arrival of the AEF and the subsequant allies attacks and continuing naval blockade proved that Germany was out of options.

one of the advantages of the AEF was that it was green and eager, it took somewhat higher casulties because it was not as jaded as the Brits & French who had already seen three hard years of fighting and massive losses. No amount of training could fully prepare the doughboys for what they had to experience.