The War Effort

[Ranger-75]

Hello everyone, I've sbeen away for a while then I got sick as soon as I got home. At least I'm still here...

I'm having the same problem with subs as Steve and LST. It's early 1944 and I've lost about twice as many subs as the IJN, while it should be the other way around.

To the person who is not getting much luck with your subs; put the game on high display and high delay just at the end of the turn - after the last of the 2nd round of land battles, you know where you get the loss reoprt for the turn. When the next turn starts all the routine convoys will show up as a string of yellow dots (for IJN, blue dots for the USN, RN) and you can see where the convoy routes are going. Put your subs along these "tracks" and move them every 2-3 turns. I move mine every 1-2 turns, if they don't find anything their first week, they get moved. As long as you are not moving them too far, they will be "on station" at the beginning of the next turn to hopefully sink something.

Steve,
Carrier sizes: Allied CVs are 3 (including RN), IJN CVs 2, all CVLs and CVEs are 1. The best US balance is 3 CV or 2 CV + 2 or 3 CVL. that makes an 8 or 9 size TF. The rest of the TF should be filled with fast BBs, 2-3 CAs or CLAAs and Fletcher, Gleaves or Benson DDs. I have 4 of these TFs and I keep them in pairs or all together if I'm going to get close to some really strong IJN air. The TFs will send up planes at 0 or 1 hex range to help the adjacent TFs so I get 120-160 or more fighters in CAP all the time.
Also get your CVs using F6Fs they are much superior to the Wildcats. Convert all the F4F factories and maybe an army factory too. You can use F4U aslo, identical stats, but once a carrier gets a new fighter type don't switch it, too much experience loss. I'm only building 3 types of US fighters, and 2 British, F6F (65 /week), F4U 78/week), P47 (58/week), Spit (33/week) and Mosquito (20/week). Yes, I still have lots of P38 groups and even some P40 groups but they are mainly still there to use up the large pools that I accumulated. British CVs are using F4Us and TBF.

Lastly, there is a "loss" report in the util menu. divide the losses by 10 and you should get a squad count (for the JA, USA, USMC, IND). some "nationalities", like IJN Brit and Dut where they have ships and ground forces you can't really do this, but most of your fighting will be USA, USMC, AUS vs IJN. (yes their are Aaustralian ships too, but not too many).

Good luck I'm glad you took Marcus like that. I did too and the IJN didn't seem to care (of course I had taken Truk previously and they are still bent out of shape on that.)

[daniel123]

there have been some games were i never used the CV's. it's was all LBA and surface strikes. one of the best ways i have found to see what japanese formation are on a island is to send in a bonbardment group. you do need a least one BB and a good commander. i resently played a game for the fun of it with allied max and the game end in june of 42. the best solo setting for the japanese seems to be on the help setting.

[Steven Utley]

The much-battered Junyo-class flattop survived a torpedo hit in Mid-Summer 1943, but Akagi, Kaga, Ryujo, at least one of the Hiryu-, and one each of the Shokaku- and Zuiho-class ships still look healthy in comparison with Hornet and Enterprise. Perhaps looks are deceiving -- the enemy carriers may be in worse shape than they appear. Whatever the reason, the Japanese certainly seem disinclined to press their present advantage in the Central Pacific.

Nevertheless, in anticipation of further raids, all U.S. ships capable of doing so have retired from Marcus Island and Midway to the Hawaiis, while those at Wake Island maneuver deep in the Marshalls and Gilberts for the dual purpose of keeping distance between the Japanese Navy and themselves, and of performing useful tasks in the Mandates. The Marines landed unopposed at Wotje and Jaluit, where engineers promptly improved existing airfields. Now (mid-August) both islands are home to newly deployed air groups, including the first Marine unit equipped with F4Us. With little else to do for the time being, land-based aircraft from Wake Island, Bikini, Wotje, and Jaluit and both the old and the new battleships while away the hours making life unpleasant for the Kwajalein and Eniwetok garrisons.

Following the recapture of Santa Cruz Island, Marines quickly seized Rennell, and Guadalcanal has finally been secured, but the Australians at Brunei and the British and Indians at Mandalay (deadlocked since February 1942!) wear away their respective contingents of Japanese with almost geologic slowness. Amazingly, after being pushed out of Rangoon, the Indian National Army has launched three count 'em three counterattacks -- without the Japanese. Talk about determination.

Essex, Bunker Hill, and two light carriers have joined the Pacific Fleet, and the repaired Yorktown and Saratoga, with more light carriers, should soon follow. New equipment pours in: LSTs, Hellcats, Corsairs, even a few P-47s and B-29s. (The Japanese have deployed many new aircraft types of their own, souped-up Oscars, Tojos, Tonys, Helens, Judys, Jacks -- but in limited numbers.) I still have my best ground units at Marcus Island, and still have my covetous eye on certain of the enemy-held islands to the west.

P.S. How are the escort carriers best deployed?

[ January 10, 2002: Message edited by: Steven Utley ]</p>

[sw30]

Steve,

unless you can cut down on the Japanese supply there significantly you won't be able to get past Rangoon. The reason is that The INA forces will just resupply, and as long as they are above 50, will move into Rangoon, as that is one of the highest priority bases, IIRC. Same thing with Bangkok, btw. which is why the Brits rarely ever get very far. (Considering that taking out Saigon to isolate Bangkok is virtually impossible until '44 or so.)

I usually use CVEs as decoys/transport cover. I've tried them as temporary CVL replacements, and they do fine, as long as you're on the defence, on the offence, forget it. I've also tried using them to head my slow battleships, but they just sink, IMO. I find that having my CS/AP groups with CVEs help a lot against enemy subs.
Some CVE groups can also act in a CS capacity. (though that is later than where you are now.)

Jeff

[Steven Utley]

The Allies devoted September 1943 largely to the further reduction of Japanese air power and the securing of new bases, though not without a misadventure or two of the sort that inculcates respect for patience and planning. In the Gilberts, small detachments of Marines easily took Tarawa and Makin, but the first units to disembark at Nauru Island, thought to be unoccupied, ignominiously re-embarked in a hurry when it proved otherwise. Even so, by mid-September, only Kwajalein and Eniwetok among the Marshalls and Gilberts remained in Japanese hands, and the U.S. air groups based on surrounding islands routinely used them for target practice. Similarly, when the Japanese landed unopposed at Tenimbar Island, north of Darwin, Allied flyers promptly sank the enemy transports and began honing their skills on the stranded 1st Kure Regiment.

While probing enemy defenses along the Malay barrier, Lee's and Doorman's cruiser forces and the carrier Victorious repeatedly stirred up hornet's nests of enemy bombers -- all single-engined Marys and Sonias; any more, twin-engined IJAAF bombers are little seen outside of China. Victorious took so many 60kg-bomb hits, individually insignificant but cumulatively wounding, that it was dispatched to the nearest friendly repair yard. Still, in the first week of September alone, the Japanese lost 442 aircraft (to the Allies' 161).

[ January 10, 2002: Message edited by: Steven Utley ]</p>

[Steven Utley]

In October 1943, Halsey's and Sherman's fast carriers maneuvered in the Mandates both to cover preparations for a landing at Ponape and in the unfulfilled hope of luring the Japanese flattops from Tinian and Saipan. Meanwhile, General Stopford's Commonwealth forces finally ground General Katamura's 56th Infantry Division out of existence at Mandalay, ending the 20-month-long stalemate there, and troops at Rangoon repulsed yet another assault by the Indian National Army. The British 2nd Infantry Division landed unopposed at Medan, in Sumatra, just before Admiral Willis' support force was stripped of its useful old battleships and heavy cruisers.

Elsewhere in the Southern Resource Area, while land-based aircraft, Lee's and Doorman's cruisers, and a British task force comprising battleship Warspite, four heavy cruisers, and seven light cruisers kept the Japanese Army Air Force occupied in the East Indies, the U.S. 1st Marine Division moved from Bali to take Kuching, thereby completing the recapture of Borneo. Australian forces at the northern end of the island redeployed to meet any counterthrust from the Philippines. Throughout this rather impromptu campaign, however, the Japanese let their weak garrisons (comprising engineers) fend for themselves, though intelligence reports showed the presence of strong units on Sumatra and Java. Nor have the Japanese made any discernible attempt to reinforce New Guinea, where U.S. and Australian infantry recently cleared Sarmi. This has encouraged speculation that Japanese sealift capability is now minimal, if not literally nonexistent.

[ January 11, 2002: Message edited by: Steven Utley ]</p>

[Blackhorse]

After Allied ships get their flak increases for 1943, the Allies can create Task Forces with maximum flak (4000) without too much effort. These are great for patrolling hostile shores and destroying Japanese air groups by letting them hurl themselves into the teeth of your AA fire. (Someone should write an "Ode to the 5/38 DP.")

Of course, in your campaign, there doesn't seem to be much of the Japanese Air Force left to destroy.

[Steven Utley]

Late Fall, 1943: During the latter half of October and through November, Allied ground forces consolidated their positions from western Sumatra to the Gilberts. With the British 2nd Infantry Division firmly entrenched at Medan, General Alexander set the Royal Engineers to work improving the airfield, and land-based bombers soon made Singapore untenable for enemy merchant shipping. Similarly, Allied aircraft flying out of Borneo, Celebes, Bali, and the atolls continued to hammer at nearby Japanese bases. In New Guinea, General Griswold advanced on Manokwari with the U.S. 147th and 182nd Infantry Regiments and an Australian infantry division, while in the northern Solomons U.S. Marines easily overran the enemy's undefended seaplane bases at Green and Buka islands.

Nor was the U.S. Navy idle. In late October, Halsey's Task Force 70, comprising three fleet carriers and a light carrier, sortied from Nauru to attack Japanese shipping; west of Green Island, his flyers sank four destroyer escorts and 19 transports. By way of screening the Buka Island invasion, Lee's old battleships gave Rabaul a thorough working-over, destroying more than three dozen enemy planes on the ground.

In November, following reorganization to accomodate units newly arrived from Pearl Harbor, Halsey's Task Force 59, with carriers Saratoga, Essex, Independence, and Princeton, and Sherman's Task Force 70, with Bunker Hill, Yorktown, Belleau Wood, and Cowpens, launched a series of raids on Truk. The week of November 7th found the anchorage full of ships, of which the attackers claimed five light cruisers, three transports, and 21 Marus. Truk offered no targets the following week, but U.S. submariners on station to the north helped themselves to enemy vessels fleeing the area.

Perhaps in the belief that no U.S. commander would be so obvious as to attack the same base three weeks in a row, the Japanese then returned to Truk, which Halsey and Sherman then did, in fact, attack for the third week in a row. Halsey's flyers sank three destroyers, eight transports, and a cargo ship in port; Sherman's, seven patrol craft off Truk. Night-flying Betty bombers from the Marianas managed to drop a single 250kg bomb on one of Halsey's flattops, inflicting minor damage.

The Truk raids and the recent invasion of Ponape apparently did not sit well with Combined Fleet. The first week of December saw Admiral Inouye leading Hiyo, Junyo, Chitose, and (probably) Chiyoda down from the Marianas with the clear intention of setting matters aright. (The Junyo-class aircraft carrier previously reported sunk by submarine torpedo was revealed to have been, instead, one of the Hiryus.) Halsey duly left Nauru Island to meet this threat and, at a point about midway between Truk and Ponape, struck the first blow -- to little effect. Inouye's counterstrike, comprising 24 fighters and 48 bombers, ran into 51 Hellcats, which shot down all but six of them. The survivors scored no hits.

Next, Admiral Fujita arrived on the scene with the surviving Hiryu-class fleet carrier and the light carriers Ryujo, Ryuho, and Zuiho, and Halsey was joined by Sherman, who, like Halsey before him, got in the first strike. His 30 dive bombers and 18 torpedo bombers did even worse than Halsey's had, inflicting no damage at all on Fujita's ships. In its turn, Fujita's counterstrike fared even worse than Inouye's: not a single Japanese plane got past Sherman's combat air patrol.

Halsey's second strike on Inouye yielded much better results, demolishing Junyo and Chitose. Both ships soon went down. Sherman's second strike on Fujita battered Hiryu and Ryujo. Fujita's second strike on Sherman, with 12 fighters and 54 bombers, lost all but two fighters and five bombers -- yet one of those bored in to wound Yorktown.

Sunset found the Americans happy, to say nothing of relieved, to have come out well ahead in the day's exchanges. During the night, however, 36 Betty bombers from Guam attacked Halsey's force and scored a single, killing hit on Independence. The light carrier disappeared in a cataclysmic explosion.

The pattern of strike and counterstrike repeated itself with the coming of day. Halsey's penultimate attack damaged all four of Fujita's flattops. F6Fs on combat air patrol deflected Fujita's feeble riposte, but once again land-based bombers scored. This time, one of a dozen Bettys from Truk succeeded at putting a torpedo into Saratoga. Halsey's last strike sank Ryuho and Zuiho.

Then, as though by mutual agreement, the Japanese Navy steamed back to the Marianas, and the Americans, to Nauru Island. The only ships sunk by either side during the week were the four Japanese and one U.S. carrier. Additionally, the Japanese had lost 563 aircraft to the Allies' 235.

As of December 12, 1943, totals of ships lost were:

Japan
1 x CV, 6 x CVL, 3 x CVE
12 x CL, 4 x CS
44 x DD, 18 x DE, 70 x PC
6 x AO, 177 x AP, 618 x MCS, 37 x TK
20 x SS

Allies
4 x CV, 2 x CVL, 1 x CVE
4 x BB, 1 x BC, 1 x CA, 3 x CL, 1 x CLAA
19 x DD, 1 x DE, 20 x PC
1 x APD, 5 x AO, 10 x AP, 71 x MCS, 3 x TK
32 x SS

[ February 05, 2002: Message edited by: Steven Utley ]</p>

[Steven Utley]

Nineteen forty-four should see the Japanese war machine reduced to impotence. Tellingly, the enemy's big flattops, Akagi, Kaga, Shokaku, and Zuikaku, did not participate in early December's Central Pacific carrier duel, though they were based in the Marianas with Inouye's and Fujita's divisions. They may still be badly banged up, or fuel shortages keep them on a short tether. In consequence of Allied operations in the Southern Resource Area, the Japanese approach the new year with dramatically diminished oil reserves. In less than a month's time, the reserve has plummeted from approximately 4600 to 2300 units.

With western Sumatra, Borneo, and all of New Guinea except Sorong and some islands back in Allied hands, the Southern Resource Area has effectively become a holding pen for a number of Japanese divisions and regiments. I see no reason to go in after them; the enemy's merchant fleet has cleared out of the area, and land-based air groups get hit so hard so often from so many different directions they can't rebuild to strength.

Still, as the December battle showed, the Japanese can draw blood. Those pesky night-bombers must be dealt with. Will it suffice simply to assign one CV's or two CVLs' fighter groups to night-combat duty, or is a period of special training required? My Swordfish and Albacores, remember, just sat on their flight decks rather than conduct night attacks. Port Blair-based Wellington bombers likewise declined to go on night missions.

It is pleasant, anyway, to have, finally, enough aircraft carriers to do pretty much whatever requires doing. Saratoga and Yorktown have retired to Pearl Harbor for repairs, but Enterprise is ready to return to service, Hornet nearly so, and new flattops seem to arrive every week. Halsey and company actually end 1943 with more seaborne airpower at their disposal than they had before the Central Pacific set-to.

[Nightcrawler]

I think you will find that putting one or two fighter squadrons on night operations as you suggested will fend off those annoying minor night attacks. I usually put my least experienced fighters on night duty. But then again, you may want the less experienced guys conducting daytime attacks to gain experience.

[wflarry]

Air groups will not perform night strike missions unless their experience is above 80. Or they might fly, but they will not find their targets.

Night fighters will fly with lower experience. But again, they are much more effective at higher experience levels.

My experience has been that japanese night attack air groups lose experience quickly in combat due to normal attrition. Once they get below 80 experience you don't have to worry about them, unless the AI cheats in this regard.

I have played against human opponents that have held back betty units and trained them exclusively for night attacks. When they are unleashed in numbers, they can be quite a nuisance even though they have little staying power.

[Steven Utley]

The Japanese introduced a terrible new weapon in January 1944, the kamikaze. Suicide bombers sold their lives dearly off Sumatra, sinking in a single week the only four Allied oilers operating west of the Gilbert Islands. More conventional tactics also yielded results: a submarine torpedo set a Casablanca-class escort carrier ablaze off Makin Island, and a 250kg bomb sent one of the oft-dented U.S. battleships back to the repair yard. Moreover, three Japanese divisions joined the 1st Indian National Army's attempt to retake Rangoon, and in China the Japanese 22nd and 23rd Armies gave signs that they meant to break the two-year stalemate at Nanning.

Local successes, though, did not delay in the least the general Allied offensive. Combined Fleet's only response to Marine landings at Emirau Island was to withdraw its carrier and battle divisions from the Marianas to the Home Islands. Borneo-based B-24s pounded targets on the Asian mainland, and medium bombers, long-range fighters, cruisers, and even the venerable Warspite blasted enemy airfields throughout the Indies and the lower Philippines. The Australian 7th Infantry Division easily took Morotai, and between that and General Griswold's forces mopping up at Manokwari, the Japanese contingents at Sorong, Amboin, and Tenimbar Island found themselves excised from the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

[ January 15, 2002: Message edited by: Steven Utley ]</p>

[daniel123]

i know you can put the betty bomber on night missions and they will attack allied shipping. the allies do not have such a aircraft unless you can set the dautless dive bomber on such a mission. if you sent the dautless group to a night mission will it try to attack a japaness bombardment group which seems to attack at night? this will only happen if the group is above 80 in experience ?

[Steven Utley]

Notwithstanding the Allies' unflagging efforts to suppress Japanese land-based air power, the kamikazes proliferate. During the first week of February 1944, they hit half a dozen Allied ships, sending light cruisers to the bottom and everything from battleships to merchantmen to the repair yard. In just two weeks, just two "special attack" units, one at Palembang, the other at Palau, have inflicted more damage on more Allied ships than bombers using conventional tactics did in two months.

I can tell already that ports close to the action are going to be swamped with wounded vessels. I shall be most grateful if anyone cares to make suggestions for achieving optimum turnaround at repair facilities.

[Major Tom]

Bases with Port Facilities repair ships the fastest, then those with a high port rating and so on.

What you need to do now is to use your CVE groups (those that have and do not have air groups).

Put CVE's in every Transport TF going into enemy territory, even create CVE Air groups to cover surface forces. Using empty CVE's is good, as in they can be good decoys.

*However, this tactic will slightly change in version 2.3... I will not go any further to wreck the suprise...

[Blackhorse]

Originally posted by Steven Utley:
. . .I can tell already that ports close to the action are going to be swamped with wounded vessels. I shall be most grateful if anyone cares to make suggestions for achieving optimum turnaround at repair facilities.

---

DISCLAIMER! The following repair suggestions come with the caveat that they are only true if the manual is accurate. Attempt at your own risk. Kids, don't try this at home.

Ship repairs are determined in three steps.

First, any ship in a port (regardless of port size) automatically repairs one point of damage.

Second, a port will make one additional repair to a ship, if the port has enough "repair capacity." Repair capacity equals Port size + Shipyard size. Pearl Harbor, for example, has a shipyard of 20, and a port of 8, for 28 repair points. A repair of a capital ship absorbs multiple repair points; a repair removes 1-3 additional points of damage, depending on the size of the ship.

Ship type. . . .Repair Points . .Damage Removed
BB/BC . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . .1
CV/CVL . . . . . . . .3 . . . . . . . .2
CA/CL . . . . . . . . 3 . . . . . . . .1
most others . . . . . 1 . . . . . . . .3

Pearl Harbor could repair up to 7 Battleships (7x4 repair points = 28) at any one time, if no other damaged ships were there. Each BB would remove 2 points of damage per turn; one automatically from "being in a port," and another one from the repair.

From the above we can see that a BB can be repaired at its maximum rate in any port of 4 (if it is the only damaged ship in the port) or greater. CAs and CVs can get maximum repairs in any port size 3 or greater (and CV repairs remove an additional 2 points of damage, or 3 total per turn).

A third repair is "accelerated repairs." There is a possibility of one extra point of damage being removed if the unused port repair points are greater than (random)xship durability. That won't happen too often with your big ships.

The other allied shipyards are the U.S. cities on the west coast. . . hope this helps. Keep those AARs coming!

[ January 17, 2002: Message edited by: Blackhorse ]</p>

[Steven Utley]

Throughout February 1944, a dark star shone balefully on the Empire of Japan.

The month opened with General Scoones' forces at Rangoon again throwing General Watanabe's back to Bangkok. This latest repulse cost the Japanese 31st, 49th, and 55th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Indian National Army almost a thousand men and two dozen artillery pieces, against the Allies' loss of 83 men and a single armored fighting vehicle.

General Ushijima's 22nd and 23rd Armies in China suffered relatively fewer casualties, but undoubtedly received a greater shock, when the inexperienced 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 9th, 10th, and 13th KMT Armies blocked a push intended to break the perennial stalemate at Nanning.

In New Guinea, General Moreshead's forces first drove the Japanese from Manokwari, then invested, captured, and cleared Sorong -- the final enemy bastion on the great island. Concurrently, the U.S. 41st Infantry Division and the Australian 1st Infantry Division and 11th Infantry Brigade took Halmahera from a tough detachment of the IJA's 38th Infantry.

In the Central Pacific, too, the Japanese reeled from disaster to disaster. After proper softening-up by bombs and naval guns, Truk fell to the U.S. 4th Marine Division (reinforced), and the 3rd Marine Division, fresh from its capture of Emirau, took Admiralty Island.

These operations provided employment for literally hundreds of Allied ships and aircraft. Marines splashed ashore at Admiralty under the protection of nine Casablanca-class escort carriers. The fleet carriers Bunker Hill, Enterprise (with its Hellcat squadron assigned to night operations), Essex, Hornet, Intrepid, Saratoga, and Yorktown, and the light carriers Belleau Wood, Cabot, Cowpens, Langley, Monterey, and Princeton formed three raiding groups, commanded by Halsey, Sherman, and Mitscher (later replaced by Davison), with Spruance's battleships, Indiana, Iowa, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Dakota, and Washington, held in reserve. Between the 13th and the 27th of the month, the fast carriers simply pulverized everything they found in the Marianas.

Among the enemy ships sunk during the first week's attacks on Guam, Tinian, and Saipan were 70 cargo ships, two transports, and a Kongo-class battleship -- the only major IJN unit to show itself. The second week's results were an incredible 121 Japanese vessels destroyed, virtually all of them cargo ships, virtually all of them victims of carrier planes.

Not that this "Great Marianas Maru Massacre" was a complete walkover. During the first round of raids, 36 Bettys escorted by a lone brave Zero pilot attacked Sherman's Task Force 52. The combat air patrol, 103 fighters strong, shot down or turned back all save four planes, but those four, determined on suicide, caused anxious moments before anti-aircraft fire splashed them. The following week, off Saipan, 42 torpedo-armed Bettys launched themselves at Davison's carriers. Again, combat air patrol wreaked havoc -- and, again, the few survivors pressed home their attacks. This time, they scored, maiming Yorktown. The burning carrier limped homeward at the best speed she could make, six knots.

Nevertheless, these Central Pacific operations must be judged a huge success. Capture of Truk and Admiralty Island completed the encirclement and isolation of Japan's South Seas forces in the Bismarcks and Solomons. Japanese seapower for practical purposes ceased to exist in the greater Pacific area. The little the U.S. carriers overlooked in the Marianas was taken care of by P-38s and P-47s from Truk and by the "silent service," which contributed to the carnage by sinking a Kamikawa-class seaplane tender off Saipan. And a long hiatus in the bombing campaign against the Home Islands ended simultaneously with the combat debut of the formidable new Boeing B-29 Superfortress. Flying from Marcus Island, 72 Superforts and B-24s dumped 421,600 pounds of bombs on Tokyo, damaging an aircraft factory, at a cost to themselves of 15 planes.

At this juncture, I may be forgiven, surely, for bursting into song.

"I'm a cranky old Yank
In a clanky old tank
From the shores of Yokohama
With my Honolulu mama
Doin' those beat-o beat-o
Flat on my seat-o
Hirohito blues."

[ January 17, 2002: Message edited by: Steven Utley ]</p>

[Blackhorse]

Originally posted by Steven Utley:
At this juncture, I may be forgiven, surely, for bursting into song.

"I'm a cranky old Yank
In a clanky old tank
From the shores of Yokohama
With my Honolulu mama
Doin' those beat-o beat-o
Flat on my seat-o
Hirohito blues."

---

Well it ain't the Battle Hymn of the Republic, or even the Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy of Company B, but you are forgiven . . .

When's the next installment? Has a kamikaze put paid to Allied HQ?

[Steven Utley]

Spring 1944: Between February and June, U.S. and Australian troops captured the islands of Mindanao, Palawan, Halmahera, Waigen, Wolei, Palau -- wiping out, in the process, almost 1300 Japanese troops, two generals, and 16th Army Headquarters -- Ulithi, Yap, and Ambon. As well, General Scoones' British and Indian divisions laid siege to Palembang, and U.S. aircraft carriers (joined by HMS Victorious) went on yet another rampage in the Central Pacific. During the week of May 29th alone, Allied bombers and submarines sank 39 Japanese ships, including the 1000th Maru lost since the commencement of hostilities. Nor were the Home Islands, scourged by long-range bombers from Marcus Island and now from Chengtu as well, any haven.

Yet the Japanese demonstrated that they could still hit back, and hit hard. From Singapore to Iwo Jima, enemy air groups, though often below strength, mounted several tactically successful attacks in response to Allied operations. While pounding Tinian, Pownall's old battleships roused four dozen Betty bombers from neighboring Saipan; anti-aircraft fire accounted for 35 of these, but one that got through sank an Omaha-class light cruiser. Then twenty-two Betty bombers flew all the way from Osaka to Yap to have at Admiral Sprague's Task Force 61, comprising carriers Enterprise, Belleau Wood, Cowpens, and Princeton, cruisers Chicago, Portland, Salt Lake City, and Juneau, and eight destroyers. One of just two Bettys not shot down or turned back crashed into Salt Lake City, sinking it. Similarly, F6Fs from escort carriers covering the Palau landings trimmed ten of 18 Bettys attacking from Manila, but one determined enemy flyer smashed into and blew up a baby flattop. Kamikaze pilots also damaged the cruisers Leander, Louisville, Marblehead, and Shropshire. During this same period, as if to show that the CVE designator really stood for "Combustible, Vulnerable, Expendable," Japanese submariners sank two more baby flattops.

Combined Fleet, meanwhile, had been holed up at Osaka ever since December's carrier duel, presumably licking its wounds, conserving its fuel, and waiting for Admiral Yamamoto to conceive some cunning and subtle plan. Whatever the plan, the great number of U.S., Dutch, and British submarines on patrol in Japanese waters seemed to preclude the enemy's sneaking out of port to make mischief.

Imagine the shock, then, during the last week of May, when air reconnaissance discovered Manila Bay to be full of enemy aircraft carriers, including the new Taiho. This information had scarcely been received when the Japanese flattops sent the first of what was to be nine fighter sweeps over Jolo. That the swarms of Zeroes eventually depleted defending air groups cannot be denied. The P-38s and P-40s gave a good account of themselves, however, and nearby Allied airfields, all well-stocked with aircraft, remained untouched. Thus, the Allied losses in Borneo could be quickly made good. That the Japanese carrier air groups would be able to do likewise remained to be seen.

Similarly, painful though the Allies' naval losses were, replacements, and reinforcements, became available faster than they could be organized into task forces. The scores of ships working up on the U.S. West Coast included three additions to the Essex line, Hancock and the new Lexington and Wasp.

As of June 5, 1944, totals of ships lost by the combatants were:

Japan
1 x CV, 6 x CVL, 3 x CVE
1 x BB, 15 x CL, 6 x CS
46 x DD, 24 x DE, 104 x PC
6 x AO, 235 x AP, 1006 x MCS, 48 x TK
23 x SS

Allies
4 x CV, 2 x CVL, 5 x CVE
4 x BB, 1 x BC, 2 x CA, 6 x CL, 1 x CLAA
22 x DD, 6 x DE, 20 x PC
1 x APD, 9 x AO, 12 x AP, 1 x LST, 77 x MCS, 3 x TK
37 x SS

[ January 20, 2002: Message edited by: Steven Utley ]</p>

[Steven Utley]

The question posed itself in June 1944: were the Japanese Army and Navy air arms actually, literally running out of planes? It seemed so. At least, it was increasingly clear that their circumstances had become straitened. Despite the development of new aircraft types, many frontline IJAAF squadrons -- not that there seemed to be many any more -- still flew pre-war designs such as Nates and Sallys. (By contrast, the first P-51 fighters went into service this month and memorably introduced themselves by flying from Kweilen, in China, to attack shipping at Lingayen, in the Philippines.) B-29s attacking Sasebo from China continued to have to fend off Nates and Oscars over the Home Islands, but by the end of the month bomber crews based at Marcus Island encountered no Japanese fighters whatever over Tokyo. The skies over Palembang, Bangkok, and the interior of China were also untroubled by the presence of Japanese Army planes. Significantly, or so it seemed, kamikaze attacks fell off sharply in mid-June.

Meanwhile, IJNAF bombers remained conspicuously absent from formations sent against Jolo, and the formations themselves grew ever smaller. In one typical mid-June fighter sweep, 17 carrier-based Zeroes, including some old A6M2 models, tangled with 59 P-40s and Spitfires; each side lost 13 planes, but the arithmetic favored the Allies. During the week of June 5th alone, the Japanese lost 408 aircraft (and 24 ships) to the Allies' 373.

In June the Allies directed their main effort at rooting the Japanese Navy out of the Philippines. Although U.S. and Australian troops had yet to clear Cagayan of enemy ground units, the more than 100 B-25s based there flew missions against shipping in Manila harbor, and the U.S. flattops sortied from Ulithi. At first, as on so many previous occasions, the opposing navies failed to close with each other, but U.S. Navy aircrews made good use of their time, attacking airfields throughout the Philippines and, upon finding themselves at one point in the midst of many enemy cargo ships and escorts, behaving like dogs among sheep. The order of battle for these operations was as follows:

Task Force 50 (Mitscher), from Truk
carriers Franklin, Cabot, Cowpens
cruisers Pensacola, Northampton, Miami, Mobile, Reno
six destroyers

Task Force 62 (Davison), in reserve at Truk
three Casablanca-class escort carriers
cruisers Biloxi, Birmingham, Santa Fe
eight destroyers

Task Force 51 (Halsey), from Ulithi
carriers Essex, Saratoga, Monterey
cruisers Astoria, Minneapolis, New Orleans, Atlanta
nine destroyers

Task Force 61 (Sprague), from Ulithi
carriers Enterprise, Belleau Wood, Princeton
cruisers Chicago, Portland, Cleveland, Montpelier, Juneau
twelve destroyers

Task Force 52 (Spruance), initially from Marcus Island
carriers Bunker Hill, Intrepid, Langley
battleships Iowa, New Jersey, South Dakota
cruisers Quincey, Vincennes, Wichita, San Diego
twelve destroyers

Task Force 55 (Sherman), initially from Marcus Island
carriers Hornet, Bataan, San Jacinto
battleships Alabama, Indiana, North Carolina, Washington
cruisers Baltimore, Boston, Indianapolis, Nashville, San Juan
six destroyers

Additionally, Marcus Island was home to Stump's Task Force 63, comprising 13 escort carriers with an aggregate air group of 237 F6Fs and 92 TBMs, and Ainsworth's Task Force 67, comprising six old battleships. While the fast carriers kept the Japanese Navy occupied in Philippine waters, these two groups remained in the Central Pacific and softened up Iwo Jima.

The week of June 19th got off to a bad start for the Japanese. An Allied submarine set an escort carrier ablaze north of Luzon, and B-25s from Cagayan caught Fujita's three flattops with their combat air patrol down. The Mitchell pilots wasted no time in sinking the small carrier Chitose and wrecking another. They also sent a destroyer to the bottom and, on their next visit to Manila Bay, added an Aoba-class heavy cruiser to their tally.

The week's main event, however, was another carrier duel. That the enemy had been holding back air groups became immediately evident when seven fighters and 144 bombers from Nagumo's carriers attacked Halsey's Task Force 51. Three Japanese bombers got past a 75-plane combat air patrol and through heavy anti-aircraft fire, and two crash-dived into Monterey. Miraculously, the light carrier sustained only minor damage.

Then it was the Americans' turn. No combat air patrol protected Nagumo's carriers, and a perfect cloudburst of 500- and 1000-bombs soon put Akagi and Shokaku under water. Nagumo hadn't finished, however: his second strike, 84 bombers escorted by seven Zeroes, also lost heavily to Hellcats and flak, but also scored another kamikaze hit on Monterey and sank Saratoga. Honor satisfied, the Japanese Navy then retired, and the Americans had no choice but to do likewise.

The pattern repeated itself during the week of the 26th. Again keeping the Philippine archipelago between themselves, the Japanese to the north and west and the Americans to the south and east flew off their strikes and counterstrikes. Luck almost ran out for Zuikaku and did run out for Ryujo when more than 100 U.S. carrier planes arrived overhead, brushed aside the token combat air patrol -- two Zeroes -- and dropped their bombs. Admiral Sprague's luck almost ran out as well when 51 planes from Manila attacked. These were Army light bombers, Sonias, and defending F6Fs handled them roughly. Even so, a few got through. One dived into Enterprise, another into Belleau Wood, a third into Princeton, sinking it. Next, 15 twin-engined bombers arrived from Lagaspi, then nine from Clark Field. Sprague's ships managed not to take any more hits, but Task Force 61 definitely had a dog-pile-on-rabbit sort of day.

At this juncture, the Japanese carriers absented themselves, leaving land-based bombers to deal with the Americans and the Americans free to go after ships in various nearby ports. Four night-flying F6Fs failed to catch six night-flying Betty bombers which then failed to find Task Force 55 in the dark. Come daylight, Sherman's pilots netted eight cargo ships in an attack on Lingayen, and another Aoba-class heavy cruiser and five destroyers were sunk at Bataan.

Then everyone who could went home.

June's operations in the Philippines and elsewhere cost the Allies a fleet carrier, a light carrier, two destroyers, a destroyer escort, an oiler, three cargo ships, and two submarines. During the same period, the Japanese lost more than 1000 aircraft, two fleet and three light carriers, an escort carrier, two heavy cruisers, 12 destroyers, two destroyer escorts, ten patrol vessels, an oiler, 64 merchant ships, two tankers, and a submarine. The arithmetic favored the Allies.

[ January 22, 2002: Message edited by: Steven Utley ]</p>