Winter problem solved?

[Augusto]

Hi

I am returning to the game after a long time. Last time (single player) the 3.3 version winter/blizzard shatered my german troops like glass. Is that problem solved?

Tanks in advance

[K62_]

ORIGINAL: Augusto
Tanks in advance

That's the spirit bro [;)]

[Morphy]

That's not a bug! That's a historic reality!

As a matter of fact the Germans were completely unprepared to winter campaign in 1941. Suffice to say they didn't have any winter uniforms at all - Operation Barbarossa was supposed to be over in a few weeks, not to prolong. Imagine Wehrmacht soldiers dressed with summer uniforms while there were temperatures as low as -40 C (- 40 F). Unfortunately for the Germans winter 1941/42 was one of the coldest.

German tanks had oil which freezed at -30 C (-22 F) so anytime soldiers wanted to use them they had to warm them up by burning a firebon under... T-34 didn't have such problems.

I'm not sure but I think Wehrmacht lost 1/4 of its manpower because of frostbites in 1941 campaign... Most of tanks were lost also - that's why in 1942 they attacked in south only - there didn't have enough armored units anywhere else to do any offensive actions.

[pyguinard]

ORIGINAL: Morphy

That's not a bug! That's a historic reality!

I don't agree.

Even in cities, entrenched level 6, strong german unit shatter and it doesn't make any sense. Ok, in the middle of nowhere, german corps could shatter but not when the level of readiness is acceptable (50% and +).

It still happens, there seams to be llittle measures to take to avoid this but I would be more than curious to see the algorythm (in the programming code) to learn how on how to take counter measures.

[Morphy]

ORIGINAL: pyguinard

ORIGINAL: Morphy

That's not a bug! That's a historic reality!

I don't agree.

Even in cities, entrenched level 6, strong german unit shatter and it doesn't make any sense. Ok, in the middle of nowhere, german corps could shatter but not when the level of readiness is acceptable (50% and +).

It still happens, there seams to be llittle measures to take to avoid this but I would be more than curious to see the algorythm (in the programming code) to learn how on how to take counter measures.

In this particular case I agree.

[JagdFlanker]

see the post i put right after this one - Soviet Units in Winter '41 - for hints on how to make a successful german winter defence. mr M39 has got it down to a science and will kill you every time as the german defender during blizzards. as mr M39 and mr K62 mention, the basic ideas to remember as germany is to entrench to level 5-6 behind the front line before the blizzards hit, entrench ONLY on rails (preferably in cities of course - don't worry about a continuous north-south line, as the soviets MUST advance along rails anyways), and on the first/any blizzard turn get your (low entrenched) front away from any soviet unit immediatly - if it's not at minimum 5 entrenchment and at high readiness it will almost certainly shatter; also soviet units lose A LOT of readiness advancing in blizzard so force them to advance at least 1 hex before they attack to greatly increase the chance of the german unit surviving. this will also greatly increase the chance of the soviet unit shattering should you immediatly counter attack (and you should! - soviet units also shatter rather easier in blizzard since they have a MUCH greater chance of low readiness after moving).

it's difficult to master until you play a few games and get the tiny details, but it can be done! if you play a lot of games and you pay attention you just MAY be able to spot when you should pull back an army just before it has the chance to shatter!

[cabron66]

ORIGINAL: Augusto

Hi

I am returning to the game after a long time. Last time (single player) the 3.3 version winter/blizzard shatered my german troops like glass. Is that problem solved?

Tanks in advance

No, it's not. Kills the game in my opinion. The German player is forced to use tactics that are so ahistorical as to be ridiculous. Plus the Soviet player is granted an offensive ability that no army has ever had in the history of warfare.

BTW, there's nothing historical about the way German corps come apart at the seems in blizzards. One of the most pervasive untruths of the war is that the Soviets had some kind of god-like mastery of winter warfare. They did not. Plain and simple.

Another extremely debatable point is that the Germans were helpless in the snow. Yes, they had a shortage of winter uniforms and yes they had problems with engines freezing, but neither of those was enough to cripple them. At most, both of those problems combined were an incovenience on an operational level.

What killed them was badly overextended supply lines and the speed of Soviet mobilization. German divisions simply ran out of steam in the face of constant and increasing resistance. They simply did not have the ability to keep up with the needs of sustaining a major offensive on the scale of Barbarossa. Weather certainly did not help, but it was not the decisive factor alone. Plainly put, they badly underestimated the Russian ability to get men into the field.

Remember that the Germans were stopped cold in September at the Battle of Smolensk. In the interval before Typhoon, Russian mobilization almost doubled the size of the Red Army while the Germans only managed to partially replenish their already tired divisions.

All of the Soviet counter offensives in the early war were bloody and costly affairs for both sides. The difference of course being that the Soviets had the men to replace their losses while the Germans did not. Faced with a deteriorating manpower situation the Wehrmacht was forced to go onto the defensive and ended up riding out the winter getting hit by hundreds of divisions. Yet despite the lost ground and failed offensive on Moscow, when the weather improved in 1942 the Germans were ready.

I am hard pressed to come up with an example of a German corps being shattered outright by a frontal assault in 1941 or early 1942. The Russians still had nowhere near the offensive ability to conduct deep operations or conduct maneuver warfare. The most they could manage was to grind away at the German lines and hope the sheer weight of their numbers would take its toll.

Cheers

Paul

[Skeets]

To determine what happened to the Germans during the Winter of 1941 all one has to do is see how the German front dissolved in the face of the Soviet counterattack in front of Moscow. Cold weather, lack of reinforcements tied to an influx of Soviets troops from the Far East all added up to a German fiasco.

The Germans did stabilize the line, but only because the Soviets outran their supply lines and were not that experienced at pursuing an enemy.

For those reasons German winter fallibility in WIR is accurate.

[pyguinard]

ORIGINAL: Skeets

To determine what happened to the Germans during the Winter of 1941 all one has to do is see how the German front dissolved in the face of the Soviet counterattack in front of Moscow. Cold weather, lack of reinforcements tied to an influx of Soviets troops from the Far East all added up to a German fiasco.

The Germans did stabilize the line, but only because the Soviets outran their supply lines and were not that experienced at pursuing an enemy.

For those reasons German winter fallibility in WIR is accurate.

Many facts about "The Great Patriotic War" that were kept secret before 1991 are now available to researchers and historians thus, a lot of new analysis are starting to come out. Of course, it has already started to change dramatically the way warfare operations on the WWII Eastern Front are perceived in many respects.

As an example, many of us know about Operation Uranus that was meant to envelop German Sixth Army in Leningrad and probably of Operation Saturn. It is only recently that we learned that in the same period, two greater Soviet offensives were launched: Operation Mars (Rhzev sector) and Jupiter (Vyazma sector). They lamentably failed with enormous losses for the Soviets (1700 tanks and 400 000 men). (to learn more on it I suggest these readings (click here)

Now, to get back to the topic of the Russian '41 Winter Offensive, the principal Soviet operations drove the Germans back from the immediate approaches to Moscow, but they did not achieve their ultimate aim of destroying German Army Group Center. They did not, in part, because of failures on the flanks, which either produced no operational results and, hence, had no strategic impact, or which dissipated the striking power of the Red Army on the main (Moscow) axis. Thus, it is not true that with the Russian winter, the Soviets became an undefeatable war machine while the Germans were completely unable to withstand the onslaught (wich seems to be the case in WiR).

People saying that Germans were at disadvantage because their oil froze in engines while Russian Oil did not are mistaking. Russian tankists had just the very same problems as germans including weak batteries etc. (for more good readings click here). If german tank casualties increased so much during that period of time is simply because since they were retreating in many areas, they were not able to salvage damaged tanks from the battlefields anymore!!

edited to add this quote:

From a Russian tankist in WWIII
My feet in boots and leg-wrappings were frozen to a degree of total
insensitivity. My right shoulder was hot; the left one was cold, neighboring the
gas tank with 400 litres of B-70 petrol. Antifreeze was used in the cooling
system, and the most dangerous thing was to miss the moment when temperature
(after the engines had been turned off) drops below minus 35 degrees Celsius -
if the temperature was lower, one could have problems with starting the engine.

One of the few shortcomings of the vehicle were its weak two 6 V 6ST-140
accumulators. If the driver missed or slept through the moment of critical
temperature drop, there was still a hope of electrical start. For this procedure
the electrical network was rearranged in a way so that one of the starters was
receiving twice as much power and could rotate the crankshafts with greater
momentum. If this procedure didn’t work, there was a hope to start the engine
with help of a huge crank, which needed strength of two or even three people.
The last hope was to start the engine through towing the vehicle with another
SU-76. However, this was the most barbarian thing you could do because of the
transmission overload.

On the other hand, the defensive tactics that our friend Flanker Leader describes are, from my point of view, as historical as could be. In fact, in many cases (if not all cases), Germans entrenched in strong points would ignore the ennemies that were able to get through the front line but would fill the gaps afterwards with their reserves to prevent further breakthrough and trap the ennemy behind the lines. Remember also that it is probably Hitler's directive to his generals to stand their ground that probably saved the Wermacht from a major catastrophy.

What bothers me a lot from my short experience of the game is that the german level of casualty is far too high when they are forced to retreat from a hex and that is is far too low for the Russian to win that same hex. Historically, especially before the Battle of Stalingrad, the Russian tactics were not efficient and very costy in terms of manpower and material. This is not well depicted in WiR and the winner of an onslaugh gets, most of the time, less losses than the defeated unit. This wasn't true on the Eastern Front, especially in 1941-42! The other thing that doesn't make sense is, like Augusto was mentionning, the tendency of german units to shatter too easily considering all the facts mentionned above. This simply not historically accurate!

[cabron66]

ORIGINAL: pyguinard
People saying that Germans were at disadvantage because their oil froze in engines while Russian Oil did not are mistaking. Russian tankists had just the very same problems as germans including weak batteries etc. (for more good readings click here). If german tank casualties increased so much during that period of time is simply because since they were retreating in many areas, they were not able to salvage damaged tanks from the battlefields anymore!!

That sounds about right. Winter operations are tough for everyone. The Russians had the edge in 1941 and early 1942, but not because of their equipment.

On the other hand, the defensive tactics that our friend Flanker Leader describes are, from my point of view, as historical as could be. In fact, in many cases (if not all cases), Germans entrenched in strong points would ignore the ennemies that were able to get through the front line but would fill the gaps afterwards with their reserves to prevent further breakthrough and trap the ennemy behind the lines. Remember also that it is probably Hitler's directive to his generals to stand their ground that probably saved the Wermacht from a major catastrophy.

The tactics described by Flanker Leader would be fine if they were not used "before" they were called for. In other words, if they are not used before there was historically any need or possibility to do so. I'm talking about players performing a kind of mass bivouac that only a psychic general would have had the option to use.

What bothers me a lot from my short experience of the game is that the german level of casualty is far too high...

Agreed.

Cheers

Paul

[cabron66]

ORIGINAL: Skeets

To determine what happened to the Germans during the Winter of 1941 all one has to do is see how the German front dissolved in the face of the Soviet counterattack in front of Moscow. Cold weather, lack of reinforcements tied to an influx of Soviets troops from the Far East all added up to a German fiasco.

The Germans did stabilize the line, but only because the Soviets outran their supply lines and were not that experienced at pursuing an enemy.

For those reasons German winter fallibility in WIR is accurate.

The German front line did not "dissolve". Please provide the names of the German corps that were hopelessly shattered by Russian attacks.

Otherwise, I suggest doing a bit more reading on the subject. Start with John Erickson and David Glantz.

Cheers

Paul

[pyguinard]

ORIGINAL: cabron66
The tactics described by Flanker Leader would be fine if they were not used "before" they were called for. In other words, if they are not used before there was historically any need or possibility to do so. I'm talking about players performing a kind of mass bivouac that only a psychic general would have had the option to use.

Paul, there is no need to put "large" amount of troops in cities before there is a need to defend against Soviets in blizzard. In fact, you could use what I would call a minor "programming glitch" that allows many troops tu use entrenchment dug by only a very small amount of soldiers (10 squads, let's say).

In theory, the small garrison troops would be used to counter partisan action in cities or on railways. In practice, they dig in and their defensive factor can be used by further reinforcements! [8D]

[JagdFlanker]

to be honest before i saw m39's brilliant german winter defence i thought it impossible for germany to hold on to it's gains without massive casualties, but now not only do i think it's possible, it's completely historically accurate as to how it's done! i will agree that the bottom line is that this game is VERY unforgiving if you don't know EXACTLY what you are doing during the 1941/42 winter as germany - perhaps too unforgiving - but if you take the time to figure out what you can and can't get away with during the blizzards you will eventually be able to make germany a very tough nut to crack during the 1941/42 winter in 3.3.

now as to what i mean by historically accurate:

"Soviet counteroffensives tumbled back the exhausted Germans, lapped around their flanks, and produced a critical situation. From generals downward, the invaders were filled with ghastly thoughts of Napoleon's retreat from Moscow. In that emergency Hitler forbade any retreat beyond the shortest possible local withdrawals. His decision exposed his troops to awful sufferings in their advanced positions facing Moscow, for they had neither the clothing nor the equipment for a Russian winter campaign; but if they had once started a general retreat it might easily have degenerated into a panic-stricken rout.

The Red Army's winter counteroffensive continued for more than three months after its December launching, though with diminishing progress. By March 1942 it had advanced more than 150 miles in some
sectors. But the Germans maintained their hold on the main bastions of their winter front despite the fact that the Soviets had often advanced many miles beyond these bastions, which were in effect cut off. In retrospect it became clear that Hitler's objection to any major withdrawals worked out in such a way as to restore the confidence of the German troops and probably saved them from a widespread collapse. Nevertheless, they paid a heavy price indirectly for that rigid defense. The tremendous strain of that winter campaign, on armies that had not been prepared for it, had other serious effects. Before the winter ended, many German divisions were reduced to barely a third of their original strength, and they were never fully built up again."
http://www.cyberessays.com/History/68.htm

to clarify about the bastions, what the german army ended up doing was retreating into cities, towns and villages near their lines and defending these places of shelter - out in the open they were as good as dead, and they wern't allowed to retreat so this was really their only solution. as the article mentions the soviets managed to get far past these bastions into the german rear, often surrounding the germans completly, but the germans barely held on in these little fortresses because that was their only hope. since the germans held mostly all the towns and villages and therefore most rail and road crossroads it was very difficult for the soviets to go much farther than they did - it's hard to keep anyone supplied when the snow is waist deep!

so if you combine that knowledge with the german defense plan i outlined above, i don't think that this game is too far off!




btw, if you want corrected and updated aircraft and tank ikons for WiR, email me (click on my name on the left) and i will send them to you! they are backwards compatable with your current games, but you have to start a new game to get all the right ikons pointed to the right equipment (25 aircraft ikons were pointed wrong/doubled up!)

[cabron66]

ORIGINAL: Flanker Leader
lots of stuff

Still waiting for an answer to my question. Which German corps were shattered?

The standard set by the game is that a corps must be heavily entrenched in order to avoid a hopeless defeat (smashed out of existence). I fail to see how this is even remotely historical.

According to your passage, the Soviet counteroffensive began immediately after the end of the German offensive on Moscow. The Germans were therefore put in the position of conducting a fighting withdrawal. In the end they managed to stop the bleeding and the Russian forces wore themselves out, but this is completely different from what you are suggesting.

They had no prepared positions to fall back on. They fought until they hit ground they could hold against a weakening enemy. Read the rest of the passage you are quoting from:

The Red Army was well equipped for winter warfare and
was much more mobile than their enemy. But, as Zhukov admits, they
were still poorly trained, and their Field Commanders were still
hesitant to attack gaps in the German line, as they still feared
encirclement. Stalin, at the time, was convinced that the Germans
were still benumbed by the cold, and that the entire front was ripe
for the taking. However, Zhukov knew that the only vulnerable front
was the Army Group Center; their other positions in Valdai, Volkov, or
the Ukraine were unlikely to yield any further successes. However,
Stalin hastily attacked the flanks of the Army Group Center, which
would give Zhukov's army a fierce fight, and casualties and delays
were high. Stalin's mistake, in the end, was overestimating Russian
strength, and underestimating German resilience - especially under the
Fürhrer's strict command not to fall back.

This does not sound like the thinking of men commanding an all powerful army.

You are fairly selective in your choice of highlights. You will also notice that your selected passage reads, "Before the winter ended, many German divisions were reduced to barely a third of their original strength, and they were never fully built up again."

A third of their strength, although dramatic, is a far cry from shattered. In fact, most of the Soviet reserve divisions entered the war at 30-40% strength. After 1941, most divisions from either side would never get past 70 or 80%. In reality, 50-60% would have been normal fighting strength.

Cheers

Paul

[pyguinard]

ORIGINAL: cabron66

Still waiting for an answer to my question. Which German corps were shattered?

The standard set by the game is that a corps must be heavily entrenched in order to avoid a hopeless defeat (smashed out of existence). I fail to see how this is even remotely historical.

(...)

Paul,

Nobody (except Skeets) told you that the way some German corps come apart on blizzards turns is totally historically accurate. What FL and I are saying is that this anomaly is not "killing" the game since there are ways to defend in a way that ressembles to what has been done in 1941-42.

Why do in WiR, german units shatter instead of retreating? It looks like this was meant to illustrate Hitler's objection to any withdrawals.

ORIGINAL: cabron66

According to your passage, (...) the Germans were therefore put in the position of conducting a fighting withdrawal. In the end they managed to stop the bleeding and the Russian forces wore themselves out, but this is completely different from what you are suggesting

I am no military specialist hence, I could not tell if not "retreat(ing) beyond the shortest possible local withdrawals" (i.e. falling back into towns to defend while letting the ennemy advance past those defensive positions) could be called a "fighting withdrawal". but I don't think so.

In addition, attempting a major German withdrawal in WiR may lead to a disastrous situation, exactly like it could have happenned in 41-42 (just think of attrition losses as an example).

Isn't the game is better than you thought? [:D]

[pyguinard]

... and if someone is still questionning on on why german units were less mobile than their Soviet counterparts, here is why. [;)]

[Rasputitsa]

Paul,

You are quite right that there is no list of German Korps that were shattered in the way that Russian Armies were shattered and ceased to exist. The two armies were in totally different situations. Russian troops were in their own country and in most cases with little training, it is not surprising that units dissolved in defeat, as they took to the forests of their homeland. This was not an option for German troops as they had a huge incentive to stay together and escape encirclement at any cost, whilst also being better trained and more cohesive. German Companys, Regiments and Divisions would still exist even if there was only a handful of men left. What WIR is simulating is that these units were unable to carry out any meaningful operations, cannot block an advancing enemy and in a military sense have been shattered.

In the early stages of Barbarossa, the Germans could go practically anywhere they chose, up to the limits of their logistics. It wasn't so much that they were stopped at Smolensk, it was more a case that they chose to go somewhere else (Kiev). When they chose to attack again on the Smolensk front, even though the Russians had weeks to prepare and reinforce, the Germans where able to push past with ease. In winter conditions the Russians have a similar situation in that they are limited in how far they can advance more by the conditions and their own supply limitations. The Germans could hold where they were entrenched and supplied, but not much more. The game has to reproduce the actions of two completely different military machines, with the same set of rules. It is not perfect, but I think it is still one of the best representations of war on the Eastern Front.

The anomoly of units with a small number of squads creating entrenchments that other bigger units can occupy can be seen as construction teams, or (for the Russians) the civilian population and even POWs being put to work. The Unit itself merely represents a command structure to get the work done at that site.[:)]

[cabron66]

ORIGINAL: Rasputitsa

Paul,

You are quite right that there is no list of German Korps that were shattered in the way that Russian Armies were shattered and ceased to exist. The two armies were in totally different situations. Russian troops were in their own country and in most cases with little training, it is not surprising that units dissolved in defeat, as they took to the forests of their homeland. This was not an option for German troops as they had a huge incentive to stay together and escape encirclement at any cost, whilst also being better trained and more cohesive. German Companys, Regiments and Divisions would still exist even if there was only a handful of men left. What WIR is simulating is that these units were unable to carry out any meaningful operations, cannot block an advancing enemy and in a military sense have been shattered.

In the early stages of Barbarossa, the Germans could go practically anywhere they chose, up to the limits of their logistics. It wasn't so much that they were stopped at Smolensk, it was more a case that they chose to go somewhere else (Kiev). When they chose to attack again on the Smolensk front, even though the Russians had weeks to prepare and reinforce, the Germans where able to push past with ease. In winter conditions the Russians have a similar situation in that they are limited in how far they can advance more by the conditions and their own supply limitations. The Germans could hold where they were entrenched and supplied, but not much more. The game has to reproduce the actions of two completely different military machines, with the same set of rules. It is not perfect, but I think it is still one of the best representations of war on the Eastern Front.

The anomoly of units with a small number of squads creating entrenchments that other bigger units can occupy can be seen as construction teams, or (for the Russians) the civilian population and even POWs being put to work. The Unit itself merely represents a command structure to get the work done at that site.[:)]

Wow, so many straw men in one place. Where to start?

On the drive for Moscow, the Germans made the decision to stop their drive along the Moscow axis for a few reasons. Hitler laid them out in his 34th Directive:

The course of events in recent days, the appearance of large enemy forces before the front, the supply situation, and the necessity of giving the Second and Third Panzer Groups 10 days to restore and refill their formations has forced a temporary postponement of the fullfillment of aims and missions set forth in Directive Nr. 33 of 19 July and the addendum to it of 23 July.

The Battle for Smolensk cost Army Group Center dearly in infantry. Guderian had managed to maintain a fairly strong presence, but virtually everyone else was exhausted. Remember, the combined might of 2 Panzer Groups had not been enough to close the Smolensk encirclement. In fact, the intense Soviet counterattacks were starting to tell on the Wehrmacht (according to David Glantz).

OKH recorded the effects of Hitler's subsequent directive in their official journal:

Thus, the enemy received a month to organize a defense west of Moscow while simultaneously repelling an offensive conducted with insufficient forces in August. At the same time, in the last analysis, he achieved what was very important for him. He destroyed the unity of our forces by constant threats to their flanks. Simultaneously, he succeeded in eliminating the immediate threat to Moscow for several weeks and, by doing so, achieved a great political success.

What this entry describes is the results of the precipitous German drive on and past Smolensk. They had succeeded in approaching Moscow, but in so doing had allowed the front to grow long and to expose their flanks to increasing threats. They had no choice but to do something about the Northern and Southern axes. A further advance towards Moscow would not have done anything except aggravate the situation.

Having said all that, it is also important to remember that the Soviets did not take advantage of the opportunity being offered them. Instead of shoring up the Moscow defence, Stalin replaced Zhukov with Shaposhnikov and ordered him to plan a whole slew of fresh counterstrokes. Over the next month or so, the RKKA unwisely spent a large part of its strength on useless attacks. When the Germans resumed their advance on Moscow, the Western Front was battered and bruised from its operations in September and October.

The two armies were in totally different situations. Russian troops were in their own country and in most cases with little training, it is not surprising that units dissolved in defeat, as they took to the forests of their homeland. This was not an option for German troops as they had a huge incentive to stay together and escape encirclement at any cost, whilst also being better trained and more cohesive.

This is absolutely ridiculous.

The anomoly of units with a small number of squads creating entrenchments that other bigger units can occupy can be seen as construction teams, or (for the Russians) the civilian population and even POWs being put to work. The Unit itself merely represents a command structure to get the work done at that site.

Or maybe they could be helped by technology gifted upon them by other worldly lifeforms? POWs and civilians? Are you serious? Do you have any idea of the size of the project you are proposing the Wehrmacht undertake? We're not talking about a single city here (i.e. Mogilev), but three army groups! How many labourers do you suppose would need to be mobilized to complete such a project? How long would it take to gather that kind of work force? How would you support it when you are having trouble getting supplies to your own troops? Who would force these people to work? How would you get all of the equipment from Germany?

Cheers

Paul

[cabron66]

ORIGINAL: pyguinard
Nobody (except Skeets) told you that the way some German corps come apart on blizzards turns is totally historically accurate. What FL and I are saying is that this anomaly is not "killing" the game since there are ways to defend in a way that ressembles to what has been done in 1941-42.

Therein lies the rub. Your suggestion does not resemble what was done in 41, 42 or any other year. The Germans had not the equipment, the manpower or the time to engage in the construction of massive defensive positions while being hammered by Soviet counterattacks in the worst weather imaginable. Nor did the RKKA have the ability to smash the Germans. Nothing of what you are describing occurred in 1941 or 1942.

I respect that you have perservered and found a way to make the game playable on your own terms, but please do not pretend to tell me that your methods are historical.

I am no military specialist hence, I could not tell if not "retreat(ing) beyond the shortest possible local withdrawals" (i.e. falling back into towns to defend while letting the ennemy advance past those defensive positions) could be called a "fighting withdrawal". but I don't think so.

You are guessing and you are wrong.

Were the Germans encircled and destroyed? Where were the breakthroughs and the exploitations? How do you suppose they saved themselves from their little bastions? The answer is they did not. They held on where the could and fought until the Soviets ran out of steam and the lines stabilized. Some of them held strongpoints, but they fought flexibly and gave where they were forced to (standard German doctrine). The end result was the Rzhev salient. Not a collection of strongpoints, but a line of divisions unbroken from one extreme to the other.

In addition, attempting a major German withdrawal in WiR may lead to a disastrous situation, exactly like it could have happened in 41-42 (just think of attrition losses as an example).

Possibly true. We will never know what would have happened. In any case the point is irrelevant. The Germans did not need to conduct a major withdrawal. They were forced to go on the defensive and were sorely tested, but were not helpless.

You will remember that Stalin did not even entertain the possibility of attacking the Germans anywhere else but in front of Moscow. He knew, as well as everyone else did, that such a move was impossible and absurd. The Stavka was forced to throw everything against Army Group Center where they knew the Germans were still weak from their failed offensive. Everywhere else the Wehrmacht was still capable of conducting much more than a fighting withdrawal.

For reading, I suggest John Erickson's "The Road to Stalingrad" and David Glantz' "When Titans Clashed".

Cheers

Paul

[K62_]

On the drive for Moscow, the Germans made the decision to stop their drive along the Moscow axis for a few reasons. The Battle for Smolensk cost Army Group Center dearly in infantry. In fact, the intense Soviet counterattacks were starting to tell on the Wehrmacht (according to David Glantz).

Quite true. Quite true. Here's an excellent in depth reference
http://militera.lib.ru/h/fugate/05.html