Models of Naval Combat

[tsimmonds]

but they weren't worth repairing.

Perhaps not, but they were repaired anyway[;)]

I believe that neither Bunker Hill nor Franklin were ever returned to active duty following repairs to their massive damage. Both were held in reserve until their eventual scrapping.

[Kadrin]

Franklin: Converted to AVT.8 (1949), CVS.13 (1953), AVT.8 (1959); sold Portsmouth Salvage Co., scrapped ../7/66.

Bunker Hill: Converted to CVS.17 (1953), AVT.9 (1959); stricken 1/11/66 and scrapped.

Active Duty, probably not, but they did see some service after their repairs. [:)]

Edit - That actually peaked my curiosity and I did a quick online search and found this:

Following the end of the war, Franklin was opened to the public for Navy Day celebrations and on 17 February 1947 was placed out of commission at Bayonne, New Jersey. While Franklin lay mothballed at Bayonne she was redesignated to an attack aircraft carrier CVA-13 on 1 October 1952, to an antisubmarine warfare support carrier CVS-13 on 8 August 1953 and, ultimately, to an aircraft transport AVT-8 on 15 May 1959. In the end the ship never went to sea again and was struck from the Naval Vessel Register on 1 October 1964.

So Franklin was repaired though not used again.

Bunker Hill on the otherhand seems to have had a similar fate, but infact was not scrapped until May 1973, after being used as a stationary electronics test platform in the late 60's early 70's.

Goes to show, though often the best source, books aren't always 100% correct. [:)]

[Berkut]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

2. Fighter versus bomber combat was again an exchange ratio process. The main factor was relative firepower.

This must mean an actual air battle. Something critical is missing here: the statement must be qualified by the following principle:

The victor in air air combat USUALLY is NOT DETECTED by the victim.
This is a 90% case. In air combat where both sides know it is air combat, it is almost always possible to escape UNLESS YOU DO NOT WANT TO.
Only 10% of air combat losses involve enemies that knew they were in an air battle. ONLY if the "exchange ratio" statements is limited to that 10% is it valid.

I bet the writer of the principle does not understand air combat. I bet they are looking at sortee rates, loss rates, etc and ASSUMING they know what happened, without looking at data for each sortee.

I am not sure this is accurate. I have certainly heard that in many cases pilots are shot down by someone they did not know was attacking them, but that doesn't mean they did not know they were in combat - plane A being shot down by plane B while maneuvering against plane C kind of stuff.

The same is true for attacks on bombers - it was prety hard to "surprise" a bomber, since most of them have multiple look outs and such. A early war bomber might be able to escape at the cost of abandoning the mission.

Overall, I would dispute the 90% of kills coming to those who are not aware they are in combat.

I *do* think it is generally true that it was relatively easy to avoid combat if desired, but I don't know that it was desired that often.

[Fornadan]

ORIGINAL: Iridium

One could take the number of bomb and torpedo hits to both Yamato class boats and it would lopside any other figures in terms of durability of BBs made by that nation.

Just a few thoughts...

But both were sunk

Can you be sure Yamato would have survived if she took one less hit

[Iridium]

ORIGINAL: Fornadan

But both were sunk

Can you be sure Yamato would have survived if she took one less hit

Didn't say that, I meant that the sheer amount of overkill on Japanese vessels in general would make them look too durable if you took those statistics at face value.

EDIT: Basically I don't think any ship at the time or even today could take what those ships did and survive.

"The MUSASHI sustains a total of 19 torpedo (10 port, 9 starboard) and 17 bomb hits, as well as 18 near misses."

[String]

ORIGINAL: Fornadan

ORIGINAL: Iridium

One could take the number of bomb and torpedo hits to both Yamato class boats and it would lopside any other figures in terms of durability of BBs made by that nation.

Just a few thoughts...

But both were sunk

Can you be sure Yamato would have survived if she took one less hit

I inspected the Musashi TROM a few months ago when the same question came up. I can't find the results anymore but I'll look into it again and post the results

[String]

Okay. Just rechecked the TROM's.

Musashi was struck by 8 torpedoes and 7 bombs + 5 or more near misses and still made 20 knots and was more or less operational. Her main gun director had jammed and B turret was out.

Yamato was probably doomed when the second bomb of the attack penetrated to the forward 6" magazine and started an uncontrollable fire there. There's a lot of debate if that hit could or could have not destroyed the ship and if the fire was uncontrollable or not. In case it could be contained, she would have taken a total of 4 torpedo and 3 bomb hits before her situation became critical.

[Iridium]

While Musashi sustained those 19 torpedo and 17 bomb hits it still took 4 hours for it to capsize. While she was beyond saving it is interesting to note that it took that much punishment and still was in one piece, let alone afloat.[:D]

EDIT: Check lower in the TROM String, Musashi's gives the total hits etc there.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

1. WWII air-to-air combat results were sensitive to (most of all) pilot quality and the aircraft characteristics. The most important aircraft characteristic was top speed. Numbers were interesting--the rate of engagement was proportional to the number of aircraft in the smaller force, but beyond that, the exchange ratio was fixed by pilot quality and aircraft characteristics. There was no advantage to numbers.

This may be false. A WWI era British aviator came up with an algorithm that says numbers matter more than you would expect. This algorithm appears to be valid into the Cold War era. I am very suspicios of a stated finding at variance with many studies over many decades.

Lanchester actually worked out a series of laws. His linear law was found to describe air combat well in WWII operational research studies. See Morse and Kimball for a discussion.

(I once found a translation of a Soviet book on operations research at UCLA. Reading through it, I found it sounded familiar. Then I noticed the authors were Morz and Kimbal. 8)

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

but they weren't worth repairing.

Perhaps not, but they were repaired anyway[;)]

I believe that neither Bunker Hill nor Franklin were ever returned to active duty following repairs to their massive damage. Both were held in reserve until their eventual scrapping.

That's the pair. They experienced serious loss of structural strength.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: Fornadan

ORIGINAL: Iridium

One could take the number of bomb and torpedo hits to both Yamato class boats and it would lopside any other figures in terms of durability of BBs made by that nation.

Just a few thoughts...

But both were sunk

Can you be sure Yamato would have survived if she took one less hit

Expected number of torpedo hits to sink ships in this class was 11, with less required if the hits were distributed evenly along the side.

[mdiehl]

Didn't say that, I meant that the sheer amount of overkill on Japanese vessels in general would make them look too durable if you took those statistics at face value.

That is what I thought that you meant. But...

"The MUSASHI sustains a total of 19 torpedo (10 port, 9 starboard) and 17 bomb hits, as well as 18 near misses."

I see you are quoting so probably you do not agree with the wording of that sentence. The Musashi didn't "sustain" them. She was sunk by them. And Yamato was basically done in by one bomb, but was sunk again by torpedoes before the work of that one bomb was finished.

Prince of Wales and Repulse also took a substantial pounding. Indeed, on a torpedo hits sustained vs displacement scale, Prince of Wales looks more durable than Yamato or Musashi. And of course Shinano 's demise demonstrates something more like the real durability of the Yamato class vs. torpedoes... in a phrase... NOT that impressive.

[herwin]

WWII American CVs didn't have armored flight decks--their strength deck was the hanger deck. The Midway class were the first American carriers with armored flight decks. The RN Ark Royal lacked an armored flight deck--the following class (Illustrious and so on) introduced them. The hangers in the RN armored flight deck carriers were very cramped, and they didn't carry very many aircraft until they set up permanent deck parks (accepting the associated salt damage to the aircraft). After the war, the Victorious was rebuilt for jet operations, but that was a massive reconstruction from the hanger deck up. The remaining ships were discarded quickly.

The Shinano could have carried an enormous airgroup (around 150), but would have been a dog to operate and would have been very vulnerable to combat damage. (One basket, many eggs.) Instead, it was given a Unryu-sized airgroup and designated a repair carrier.

[Iridium]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Prince of Wales and Repulse also took a substantial pounding. Indeed, on a torpedo hits sustained vs displacement scale, Prince of Wales looks more durable than Yamato or Musashi. And of course Shinano 's demise demonstrates something more like the real durability of the Yamato class vs. torpedoes... in a phrase... NOT that impressive.

I find Shinano to be a bad example of Yamato class' durability due to the lack of WTC doors. Any ship no matter the design will sink eventually if torpedoed and it has no effective WTCs. Might as well be a ship with only one giant void inside it.

[tsimmonds]

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

but they weren't worth repairing.

Perhaps not, but they were repaired anyway[;)]

I believe that neither Bunker Hill nor Franklin were ever returned to active duty following repairs to their massive damage. Both were held in reserve until their eventual scrapping.

That's the pair. They experienced serious loss of structural strength.

No so sure about this. Almost all of the damage suffered by these ships was at and above hangar deck level. In US CVs the hangar deck was the armored deck, which was also the upper member of the ships girder. But the USN considered these two to be the most suitable candidates to receive the "ultimate" Essex conversion, which conversions were never carried out. This would certainly not have been the case had their structural integrity been in any way compromised. Had they been British CVs (armored flight decks, hangars carried within the ship's girder) they would certainly have lost structural strength as you describe. OTOH, had they been British CVS, their armor might have spared them much of the damage they actually suffered.[;)]

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Didn't say that, I meant that the sheer amount of overkill on Japanese vessels in general would make them look too durable if you took those statistics at face value.

That is what I thought that you meant. But...

"The MUSASHI sustains a total of 19 torpedo (10 port, 9 starboard) and 17 bomb hits, as well as 18 near misses."

I see you are quoting so probably you do not agree with the wording of that sentence. The Musashi didn't "sustain" them. She was sunk by them. And Yamato was basically done in by one bomb, but was sunk again by torpedoes before the work of that one bomb was finished.

Prince of Wales and Repulse also took a substantial pounding. Indeed, on a torpedo hits sustained vs displacement scale, Prince of Wales looks more durable than Yamato or Musashi. And of course Shinano 's demise demonstrates something more like the real durability of the Yamato class vs. torpedoes... in a phrase... NOT that impressive.

Mean hits to sink the PoW would have be seven, like the 27-knot US battleships. Iowas were nine and the Yamatos were eleven. The Repulse was elderly, and only could take four or five, like an American late CA. The treaty cruisers were three or four. American DDs were 1.5-2. Basically torpedo hits that penetrated beyond the underwater defense system (and almost all did in the event) took out a cross-section of the ship. How long a cross-section reflected the blast radius of the torpedo charge, the ship's resistance to that blast, and how thoroughly the ship was subdivided to limit the flooding.

The USN expected the mean number of torpedo hits to sink an Essex was five, or four on one side, but the subdivision could not be as fine as that in a gunship. I estimate the Alaska class (built on the same hull) to require seven on the average.

In their post-war analyses, the Soviets thought the best underwater protection systems were those in the Italian fast battleships. That's the only place I've seen an open-source discussion of the issues (and I don't think the Soviets intended it to be open-source). That's also the place I found my info on German battle damage.

[tsimmonds]

The treaty cruisers were three or four.

Northampton, Indianapolis, and Helena all succumbed to two.

[mdiehl]

Well, judging by the "number of hits sustained" again look at the ratio of displacement to hits absorbed. Prince of Wales took min six likely eleven torpedo hits and from substantially larger torps than the USN used in killing Yamato.

My point isnt' "what did anyone think a ship could absorb" (and I regard such estimates, even USN ones, as spurious at best). My point is this. When people write of Yamato's or Musashi's demise it is common to see people add up the number of hits and say something like "Well, look what it took to sink her." As someone else noted, these were instances of overkill. In Yamato's case, hyper-overkill, since the fire in her aft 6" magazine would likely have sunk her without the need for the subsequent barrage of torpedoes.

So if one "writes anecdotal history about Allied warships as it seems to be written about Japanese warships" (in effect using the same "methods") then the Prince of Wales comes off looking far more robust, ton for ton, than the Yamato or Musashi.

I don't dispute that the two Japanese ships "all other things being equal" required more damage to be sunk but in my opinion that is primarily due to differences in displacement. Considering the amount of armor lavished on the Japanese ships, I think their apparent vulnerability to bombs and shallow-running torpedoes does not reflect well on their designers.

[Iridium]

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

The treaty cruisers were three or four.

Northampton, Indianapolis, and Helena all succumbed to two.

Probably large warheads on those torpedos. Ships were designed for certain torpedos too. Something like 4 x 500 kg warhead torpedos or 2 x 800 kg warhead torpedos. (Not real statistics just an example)

[Speedysteve]

Uh oh. A lot of this stuff (Yamato/Musashi and what they succumbed to) has been thrown about before and we know how that ended up guys............