Yamamoto's Plan; The Execution

[el cid again]

Lundstrom - in the Forward to Shattered Sword - says the Japanese naval air was far superior in 1942. He says they made many fewer mistakes than we did at Midway. He says only USS Yorktown delivered coordinated air units over the target - he says it was always our best carrier in the early war period - and the real "Miracle of Midway" is that such lousy air organization worked out for us so well.

I don't know if Lundstrom knows it - but Japanese naval air organization was wholly different from that we used. You cannot translate Japanese terminology because we have no such terms to translate them to! A Japanese carrier task force has ONE air organization - early in the war it would form up as such - later in the war it was put ashore - and would literally assign air task units to different ships of the carrier division as appropriate. In this organization, ALL the fighters form one "group" - all the "carrier bombers" form another "group" - and all the "carrier attack planes" form another "group." Each of those groups has a squadron from each carrier. [Later in the war a fourth group - a "fighter bomber" group would also form] The over all "wing" (??? is that the right word?) is commanded by the senior officer in the command plane of the carrier bomber group - and he would NOT be a pilot - but sit in the observer's chair - and give orders via the radio operator, signal light or hand signals. [At Hawaii this officer was Capt Fujida] He would be in the leading wave - and could abort the mission - or call it to go in with alternate tactics - and he would be the last to leave the area - leading the fighters (which had no navigation instruments) who had got lost home from the emergency rendezvous point back to the carriers. For this reason he had to be in the longest range type aircraft. He also could not be a pilot of any plane - or a radio operator - if he was to truly observe, think and command.

Somehow you seem to have confused things as they were later in the war with things as they were in 1941/2. The game has it right - both times. It shouldn't be possible for US carriers - not operating together - and even if they did inferior in numbers with poor aircraft - to do anything but lose. As Lundstrom writes - in the first six months - we sent carriers on raids "where we were sure the Japanese carriers were not" - because we KNEW they would not survive otherwise. Midway and Coral Sea were exceptions - due to intelligence advantages - and fought with the advantage of land based air support (particularly reconnaissance) favoring US forces.

[spence]

Somehow you seem to have confused things as they were later in the war with things as they were in 1941/2. The game has it right - both times. It shouldn't be possible for US carriers - not operating together - and even if they did inferior in numbers with poor aircraft - to do anything but lose. As Lundstrom writes - in the first six months - we sent carriers on raids "where we were sure the Japanese carriers were not" - because we KNEW they would not survive otherwise. Midway and Coral Sea were exceptions - due to intelligence advantages - and fought with the advantage of land based air support (particularly reconnaissance) favoring US forces.

Somehow you (and the game engine) have confused the KB with TF38/58.  The Japanese First Air Fleet was organized to provide a heavy offensive punch and the system you describe reflects that very well. 

There was however very little thought put in to the defense of the KB.
The fleet was defended by the CAP and there was no organization within either 1st Air Fleet or the KB devoted to providing tactical support to that CAP beyond refuelling and rearming the aircraft.

The limitations of the Japanese CAP in combat were put on display every time the CAP faced anything more challenging than a single squadron attacking the fleet.  Every single time more than one squadron attacked the KB, its successors, or derivatives one or more Japanese carriers were left afire and out of action.

The game engine provides the KB with a CAP indistinguishable from a late war US CAP.  It also provides enhanced AAA since its mechanics also assume the 'ring-formation' typical of US CVTFs from day one but actually not introduced until mid 44 by the IJN. 

Since the very real deficiencies in Japanese defensive organization are not reflected by the game engine, the engine is unsuitable for realistic testing of an early war attempt at the invasion of Hawaii.      

[witpqs]

I wonder if most of this in WITP is really due to the absence of ammunition limitations on air to air combat.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: spence

Somehow you seem to have confused things as they were later in the war with things as they were in 1941/2. The game has it right - both times. It shouldn't be possible for US carriers - not operating together - and even if they did inferior in numbers with poor aircraft - to do anything but lose. As Lundstrom writes - in the first six months - we sent carriers on raids "where we were sure the Japanese carriers were not" - because we KNEW they would not survive otherwise. Midway and Coral Sea were exceptions - due to intelligence advantages - and fought with the advantage of land based air support (particularly reconnaissance) favoring US forces.

Somehow you (and the game engine) have confused the KB with TF38/58.  The Japanese First Air Fleet was organized to provide a heavy offensive punch and the system you describe reflects that very well. 

There was however very little thought put in to the defense of the KB.
The fleet was defended by the CAP and there was no organization within either 1st Air Fleet or the KB devoted to providing tactical support to that CAP beyond refuelling and rearming the aircraft.

The limitations of the Japanese CAP in combat were put on display every time the CAP faced anything more challenging than a single squadron attacking the fleet.  Every single time more than one squadron attacked the KB, its successors, or derivatives one or more Japanese carriers were left afire and out of action.

The game engine provides the KB with a CAP indistinguishable from a late war US CAP.  It also provides enhanced AAA since its mechanics also assume the 'ring-formation' typical of US CVTFs from day one but actually not introduced until mid 44 by the IJN. 

Since the very real deficiencies in Japanese defensive organization are not reflected by the game engine, the engine is unsuitable for realistic testing of an early war attempt at the invasion of Hawaii.      

EXCELLENT POINTS! In truth the designers gave the Japanese quite a few little "behind the scenes" bonuses. I guess they were trying to "court" the players who insist that Japan COULD have conquered the Pacific.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: spence

There was however very little thought put in to the defense of the KB.
The fleet was defended by the CAP and there was no organization within either 1st Air Fleet or the KB devoted to providing tactical support to that CAP beyond refuelling and rearming the aircraft.

The limitations of the Japanese CAP in combat were put on display every time the CAP faced anything more challenging than a single squadron attacking the fleet.  Every single time more than one squadron attacked the KB, its successors, or derivatives one or more Japanese carriers were left afire and out of action.

I'd disagree and say that the actual limitations were two fold, one of which was universal since at the time since the USN concept of Fleet Defense in terms of radar, FDO guidance and radio discipline were in embryonic stage, was that any kind of simotanious or near simotanious multi-vector approach by substantial plane elements could quickly overload a CAP protecting a fleet, and weather. Lundstrom pointed the latter out in his Vol I on the First Team. If the weather was decent the IJN CAP could intercept and intercept well an incoming strike and beat it up. Ironically, the oft maligned Japanese dispersal formation could be a critical aid in this. However if the weather was poor it was fully possible for an incoming strike to be missed completely or at least, intercepted with poor results resulting in grave danger to the KB.

The game engine provides the KB with a CAP indistinguishable from a late war US CAP.  It also provides enhanced AAA since its mechanics also assume the 'ring-formation' typical of US CVTFs from day one but actually not introduced until mid 44 by the IJN. 

Since the very real deficiencies in Japanese defensive organization are not reflected by the game engine, the engine is unsuitable for realistic testing of an early war attempt at the invasion of Hawaii.      

The game engine provides both sides early war with CAP's far more effective than they'd be in RL though not always. Its true that Japanese naval AA tends to be too strong but in balance, the game engine also provides an easy fix to getting around the already weak US coordination penalty rule. To maximize this exploit, all you have to do is create 1 CV TF's and mass them in one hex. You simotaniously negate or mostly negate the coord rule and at the same time you get a flawless CAP of 3-4 combined carriers that will batter any incoming attack as if those carriers were integrated into one TF like KB.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Lundstrom - in the Forward to Shattered Sword - says the Japanese naval air was far superior in 1942. He says they made many fewer mistakes than we did at Midway. He says only USS Yorktown delivered coordinated air units over the target - he says it was always our best carrier in the early war period - and the real "Miracle of Midway" is that such lousy air organization worked out for us so well.

What Lundstrom actually wrote was that the Japanese handled their aircraft [at Midway] far better than the USN did. Coordination above the squadron level was the USN's Achillies Heel, while Fleet Defense was the IJN's. He did not write that "Japanese naval air was far superior in 42." though you can make the argument that overall, in concetration certainly KB was without peer. (Parshall/Evans - chapter 1)

Lundstrom does credit Yorktown, but the reason her strike's were reasonably coordinated (but not on the same level that the IJN would define "coordinated") was due to the lessons learned at Coral Sea. Yorktown, unlike Lexington after all, survived her experience there with much valuable lessons having been learned.

I don't know if Lundstrom knows it - but Japanese naval air organization was wholly different from that we used. You cannot translate Japanese terminology because we have no such terms to translate them to!

Lundstrom did a pretty good job of translating and explaining Japanese air organization in his First Team volumes.

Somehow you seem to have confused things as they were later in the war with things as they were in 1941/2. The game has it right - both times. It shouldn't be possible for US carriers - not operating together - and even if they did inferior in numbers with poor aircraft - to do anything but lose.

depends on how you define "lose". Against a full strength KB, I would agree with conclusions that the IJN force would probably win most battles and the day if it came to a full mono-a-mono engaement. Such would require though a full advantage in both quanitity as well as quality. Even then, things can still go wrong.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: spence

Somehow you seem to have confused things as they were later in the war with things as they were in 1941/2. The game has it right - both times. It shouldn't be possible for US carriers - not operating together - and even if they did inferior in numbers with poor aircraft - to do anything but lose. As Lundstrom writes - in the first six months - we sent carriers on raids "where we were sure the Japanese carriers were not" - because we KNEW they would not survive otherwise. Midway and Coral Sea were exceptions - due to intelligence advantages - and fought with the advantage of land based air support (particularly reconnaissance) favoring US forces.

Somehow you (and the game engine) have confused the KB with TF38/58.  The Japanese First Air Fleet was organized to provide a heavy offensive punch and the system you describe reflects that very well.  [REPLY: Thank you]

There was however very little thought put in to the defense of the KB. [REPLY: I do not disagree. This was not unique to IJN - and indeed we had the same problem. Both navies - as well as RN - increased attention to this matter during the war. In 1942, a glaring difficulty for the Japanese was a lack of air search radar. The first such device was at sea during the Battle of Midway - but not on a carrier - and not integrated with air defense. Japan - like all the great powers- had long researched radar - but it only had got air warning going on land by that year.]

The fleet was defended by the CAP and there was no organization within either 1st Air Fleet or the KB devoted to providing tactical support to that CAP beyond refuelling and rearming the aircraft. [REPLY: My USN specialty was "electronic warfare as applied to anti-air warfare for fleet defense" - so I have some clue what "suporting organization" for fighters can be. It is hard to find this sort of thing in any Navy in 1941 or 1942. But note that the Japanese AAW destroyers - already designed and building - had an AAW plotting room immediately behind the bridge - the same place we had a bigger one on my much bigger AAW destroyer built in the 1960s. It is possible to believe the Japanese had no thought devoted to such things only if you are not reading ships drawings and other period materials. We have on the record - during the Battle of Midway - a case of Adm Nagumo sending radio orders to his fighter CAP - because - equally on the record - his air staff officer (Genda) had been told by ships company that the fighters "were off chasing enemy planes" and not on their station. In some basic sense there was some sort of AAW fleet support for the fighter force.]

The limitations of the Japanese CAP in combat were put on display every time the CAP faced anything more challenging than a single squadron attacking the fleet.  Every single time more than one squadron attacked the KB, its successors, or derivatives one or more Japanese carriers were left afire and out of action.

The game engine provides the KB with a CAP indistinguishable from a late war US CAP.  It also provides enhanced AAA since its mechanics also assume the 'ring-formation' typical of US CVTFs from day one but actually not introduced until mid 44 by the IJN. 

Since the very real deficiencies in Japanese defensive organization are not reflected by the game engine, the engine is unsuitable for realistic testing of an early war attempt at the invasion of Hawaii.      

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: spence

Somehow you seem to have confused things as they were later in the war with things as they were in 1941/2. The game has it right - both times. It shouldn't be possible for US carriers - not operating together - and even if they did inferior in numbers with poor aircraft - to do anything but lose. As Lundstrom writes - in the first six months - we sent carriers on raids "where we were sure the Japanese carriers were not" - because we KNEW they would not survive otherwise. Midway and Coral Sea were exceptions - due to intelligence advantages - and fought with the advantage of land based air support (particularly reconnaissance) favoring US forces.

Somehow you (and the game engine) have confused the KB with TF38/58.  The Japanese First Air Fleet was organized to provide a heavy offensive punch and the system you describe reflects that very well.  [REPLY: Thank you]

There was however very little thought put in to the defense of the KB. [REPLY: I do not disagree. This was not unique to IJN - and indeed we had the same problem. Both navies - as well as RN - increased attention to this matter during the war. In 1942, a glaring difficulty for the Japanese was a lack of air search radar. The first such device was at sea during the Battle of Midway - but not on a carrier - and not integrated with air defense. Japan - like all the great powers- had long researched radar - but it only had got air warning going on land by that year. The installation at sea was on a battleship, was experimental, and not trusted - and probably wisely so. The first set should be tested and details of application worked out before it is committed to battle.]

The fleet was defended by the CAP and there was no organization within either 1st Air Fleet or the KB devoted to providing tactical support to that CAP beyond refuelling and rearming the aircraft. [REPLY: My USN specialty was "electronic warfare as applied to anti-air warfare for fleet defense" - so I have some clue what "suporting organization" for fighters can be. It is hard to find this sort of thing in any Navy in 1941 or 1942. But note that the Japanese AAW destroyers - already designed and building - had an AAW plotting room immediately behind the bridge - the same place we had a bigger one on my much bigger AAW destroyer built in the 1960s. It is possible to believe the Japanese had no thought devoted to such things only if you are not reading ships drawings and other period materials. We have on the record - during the Battle of Midway - a case of Adm Nagumo sending radio orders to his fighter CAP - because - equally on the record - his air staff officer (Genda) had been told by ships company that the fighters "were off chasing enemy planes" and not on their station. In some basic sense there was some sort of AAW fleet support for the fighter force.]

The limitations of the Japanese CAP in combat were put on display every time the CAP faced anything more challenging than a single squadron attacking the fleet.  Every single time more than one squadron attacked the KB, its successors, or derivatives one or more Japanese carriers were left afire and out of action. [REPLY: OK - I think this is correct. What is your point? Yorktown was badly damaged - and it ended up being fatal in the sense that without that damage she would have survived the battle - by less than a full strength squadron. Were we any better at Midway? And remember - the idea originally was to do this in 1941: you keep complaining that the US carriers are underrated in the game - but they are not. Things were horrible in 1941. Pilots of attack planes often could not hit a slow, steady target sled, with no fighter or AAA opposition. The US carriers in 1941 were still flying obsolescent aircraft - and were anything but well organized - able to deliver their squadrons in a coordinated sense over the target. Do you think their fighter defense would have been great? If so - why?]

The game engine provides the KB with a CAP indistinguishable from a late war US CAP.  It also provides enhanced AAA since its mechanics also assume the 'ring-formation' typical of US CVTFs from day one but actually not introduced until mid 44 by the IJN.  [REPLY: I think these both are assumptions on your part. How do you know this? Are you playing RHS? I have addressed "uber" CAP effectively - and even a lone US carrier - challenging KB supported by some CVLs - was able to put a bomb in a big CV - in spite of the fact 9 squadrons of zeros were on 50% cap setting. Playtesters report that "leakers" from modest air strikes are a common occurrance. This was mainy a function of the way data was handled - not the code itself. The AAA model is abstract - and I don't think we know how it works? But it is pretty clear that there is a modifier for Japan that is worse than for the US or UK. It is unreasonable to think Matrix would write a wholly different routine - routines = programmer time plus debug time = money. Using an abstract model and giving Japan a worse modifier is a typical GG sort of thing to do - and in a crude sense it is a good system.]

Since the very real deficiencies in Japanese defensive organization are not reflected by the game engine, the engine is unsuitable for realistic testing of an early war attempt at the invasion of Hawaii.      

A gamer for decades, a programmer, and a developer of games, who is now working on a high level language just for military game programming - says "the air model of UV/WITP is amazing, possibly the very best ever done, even counting the most expensive of models." I myself once worked at a USAF SIL (Software Integration Laboratory) as the "resident computer engineer" - and while I will not say anything about what we did - I will say I know about air war modeling and I agree with my friend from Seattle quoted above. If you have ever worked with RAND stuff - or other things done by major contractors for official use - big cost stuff - you might have a better opinion of Matrix. It is remarkably good for its simple level of approach. I would have said it was impossible to get so much out of a system that is structurally so simple - that ignores so many factors I myself always put in. But it works very much better than I thought it could do. This is not to say it is right, perfect, or what I want. But what I want is not something you can buy - or we can work on. And - as I said above - the system DOES account for "the very real deficiencies in Japanese defensive organization" - and by late way I think it is too much that way. I once said "Japan should just quit. If it flies, it dies" after a 1945 test. I put a major US TF at Osaka/Kobe - and flew the entire JAAF and JNAF at it. They scored a single hit on USS New Jersey! And would not fly again tomorrow - both air forces were virtually wiped out. But even a modest strike by US planes always sank ships.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: spence

The point I was trying to make with all that manipulation was that the game engine is not going to allow the Japanese to get hurt even if they F@%& up by the numbers and get hit square in the puss with the biggest hammer the Allies can throw.

3 repititions of the experiment produced very similar results: although in one test 2 IJN CVs were rendered incapable of airops by the Dec 7th air, sub and surface attacks. On a single test of the Dec 8th turn with 5 IJN CVs air capable the Allies lost Lexington and a BB sunk and two BBs likely to sink before making PH while managing only a single bomb hit on one of the IJN CVs (Enterprise hid under a cloud all day and neither launched nor received any strikes).

And the point you seem to be missing is that - in 1941 - these are very reasonable results. The USN should not attempt what Halsey did on Pearl Harbor day - seek out the enemy. As some major historians have observed, we are lucky he didn't find them.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

I wonder if most of this in WITP is really due to the absence of ammunition limitations on air to air combat.

This is a problem.

And note this is OUR fault!! I mean the FORUM's fault.

A bit of Matrix history is in order. When the engine was done for UV, there WERE ammunition limits on planes!
Players objected - I was as usual a voice in the dark saying "you won't like it if they take it out" - and Matrix listened to the din.

The good news is the code exists - and can easily be reenabled. It probably is still there in every copy. The bad news is - I don't think we look very good complaining that they gave us what we asked for. [Note here I consider myself a member of the Forum - and even though I dissented from this request - is still include myself in the "we" who are to blame. Had I been more skilled at communication - I would have persuaded the Forum to withdraw the request - and having failed - I share the blame.]

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: spence

Somehow you seem to have confused things as they were later in the war with things as they were in 1941/2. The game has it right - both times. It shouldn't be possible for US carriers - not operating together - and even if they did inferior in numbers with poor aircraft - to do anything but lose. As Lundstrom writes - in the first six months - we sent carriers on raids "where we were sure the Japanese carriers were not" - because we KNEW they would not survive otherwise. Midway and Coral Sea were exceptions - due to intelligence advantages - and fought with the advantage of land based air support (particularly reconnaissance) favoring US forces.

Somehow you (and the game engine) have confused the KB with TF38/58.  The Japanese First Air Fleet was organized to provide a heavy offensive punch and the system you describe reflects that very well. 

There was however very little thought put in to the defense of the KB.
The fleet was defended by the CAP and there was no organization within either 1st Air Fleet or the KB devoted to providing tactical support to that CAP beyond refuelling and rearming the aircraft.

The limitations of the Japanese CAP in combat were put on display every time the CAP faced anything more challenging than a single squadron attacking the fleet.  Every single time more than one squadron attacked the KB, its successors, or derivatives one or more Japanese carriers were left afire and out of action.

The game engine provides the KB with a CAP indistinguishable from a late war US CAP.  It also provides enhanced AAA since its mechanics also assume the 'ring-formation' typical of US CVTFs from day one but actually not introduced until mid 44 by the IJN. 

Since the very real deficiencies in Japanese defensive organization are not reflected by the game engine, the engine is unsuitable for realistic testing of an early war attempt at the invasion of Hawaii.      

EXCELLENT POINTS! In truth the designers gave the Japanese quite a few little "behind the scenes" bonuses. I guess they were trying to "court" the players who insist that Japan COULD have conquered the Pacific.

In truth, the designers loaded the game with lots of "bonuses" - on both sides. The vast majority of them say the ALLIES are better. A really big one is the Japanese attrition: Japan is doomed to lose more aircraft than the Allies do - never mind it does not have as many to lose - in this game system. Normally the biggest category of loss is attrition - even if they win the other categories in a military sense. Mike Wood disclosed to the Forum the Japanese have less chance of rescue of a pilot when his plane goes down. The game is loaded with this sort of modifiers - and that vast majority favor the Allies.

Also in truth - the Japanese COULD have conquered the Pacific - in terms of forces, geography, economics. But they had flaws in politics, institutional cooperation, and certain cultural attitudes that almost guarantee these basics would never work out that way. Japan - as is the usual case for the loser of a war - defeated itself. You can search pretty much in vein for brilliant US/Allied strategy in the Pacific War. This is a nasty battle of attrition - one we would not do today - fought with frontal assaults on fortified positions - even those not essential to take (see Palau). After Guadalcanal Japanese intel was 100% perfect in identifying the next objective. Not perhaps because it was so good - but because our strategy was so poor and obvious.

IRL Japan could have won - if we had defeated ourselves even worse than we did. Had we not learned to do better than we did early on - maybe even the odds might be close to even (who will defeat themselves in the more meaningful sense?) A war game should not impose on players the same things real leaders did wrong. If you are uncomfortable that players might change choices with effect, you should read history, and not do true simulation - which permits diviation from history.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: spence

The point I was trying to make with all that manipulation was that the game engine is not going to allow the Japanese to get hurt even if they F@%& up by the numbers and get hit square in the puss with the biggest hammer the Allies can throw.

3 repititions of the experiment produced very similar results: although in one test 2 IJN CVs were rendered incapable of airops by the Dec 7th air, sub and surface attacks. On a single test of the Dec 8th turn with 5 IJN CVs air capable the Allies lost Lexington and a BB sunk and two BBs likely to sink before making PH while managing only a single bomb hit on one of the IJN CVs (Enterprise hid under a cloud all day and neither launched nor received any strikes).

And the point you seem to be missing is that - in 1941 - these are very reasonable results. The USN should not attempt what Halsey did on Pearl Harbor day - seek out the enemy. As some major historians have observed, we are lucky he didn't find them.

I beg to differ. The early war data are fairly clear. If the KB surprised the American carriers, it would win without loss. No surprise--even exchange. If the American carriers had gotten surprise, they would have died eventually, but had a chance of taking more than one KB carrier with each American loss.

[el cid again]

You cannot sink - or even damage - a ship you cannot hit. Halsey - a few days before PH - watching bomber practice - lamented to a captain "they can see the target, I suppose?" One of our big carriers still flew biplane bombers - and the fliers believed they had almost no chance of survival - even without knowing about Zeros.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

You cannot sink - or even damage - a ship you cannot hit. Halsey - a few days before PH - watching bomber practice - lamented to a captain "they can see the target, I suppose?" One of our big carriers still flew biplane bombers - and the fliers believed they had almost no chance of survival - even without knowing about Zeros.

You might read T. Wildenberg, Destined for Glory, Naval Institute Press, 1998.

In bombing exercises against manoeuvring targets in 1939-41, the carrier VB and VS squadrons were up to their early-war performance.

[DuckofTindalos]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

The good news is the code exists - and can easily be reenabled.

The even better news is that you've never seen the code, and thus have no idea what you're talking about.

[DuckofTindalos]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Also in truth - the Japanese COULD have conquered the Pacific - in terms of forces, geography, economics. But they had flaws in politics, institutional cooperation, and certain cultural attitudes that almost guarantee these basics would never work out that way. Japan - as is the usual case for the loser of a war - defeated itself. You can search pretty much in vein for brilliant US/Allied strategy in the Pacific War. This is a nasty battle of attrition - one we would not do today - fought with frontal assaults on fortified positions - even those not essential to take (see Palau). After Guadalcanal Japanese intel was 100% perfect in identifying the next objective. Not perhaps because it was so good - but because our strategy was so poor and obvious.

Oh My God, can you hear yourself?

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: el cid again
In truth, the designers loaded the game with lots of "bonuses" - on both sides. The vast majority of them say the ALLIES are better. A really big one is the Japanese attrition: Japan is doomed to lose more aircraft than the Allies do - never mind it does not have as many to lose - in this game system. Normally the biggest category of loss is attrition - even if they win the other categories in a military sense. Mike Wood disclosed to the Forum the Japanese have less chance of rescue of a pilot when his plane goes down. The game is loaded with this sort of modifiers - and that vast majority favor the Allies.

The difference being in what types of "bonuses" were earned historically, and what are "gifts from the Gods" (designers). The Allies made strenuous efforts to recover thier downed pilots..., the Japanese virtually none. Can you show me where EVEN ONE of the Japanese subs sent to PH was tasked as a "ditching point" for damaged A/C coming back from the raid?

Comparing the Japanese recieving 1944 US Fleet defensive doctrine and Combat Air Centers in 1941, with the Allies having an advantage in pilot recovery, is a "red herring" of the first magnitude. Come on, Sid..., you are better than that.

[spence]

Comparing the Japanese recieving 1944 US Fleet defensive doctrine and Combat Air Centers in 1941, with the Allies having an advantage in pilot recovery, is a "red herring" of the first magnitude.

IRL the deficiencies of Japan fleet (CV) defense doctrine were demonstrated in every 1942 carrier battle. The deficiencies in USN fleet (CV) doctrine were also demonstrated. The doctrines were different in 1942 with the US having a large lead in the conceptualization of fleet defense and a smaller lead in the technology needed to implement the concepts. By 1944 the IJN had advanced their technology and changed their tactical defense doctrine but had yet to concretely advance towards the idea of a Fighter Direction Center. Once aloft their CAP was essentially the same CAP as in 1942 dependent entirely upon the individual skills of its pilots and subject to the same vagaries of weather, enemy attacks and loss of situational awareness as occurred in those battles.

The USN had acted on demonstrated deficiencies and in large part corrected them. The KB CAP's massacre of a single squadron of unsupported and obsolete torpedo bombers (its most notable claim to fame) is not in the same league or in any way comparable to the TF 58 CAP's massacre of multiple combined arms strikes from Japanese carriers and land bases on different threat axes at the Philippine Sea (the Marianas Turkey Shoot). USN fleet defense doctrine as practiced in that battle was superior to anything ever even envisioned by the IJN (except for a few otherwise unemployed ship captains studying solutions to fleet defense problems of a non-existent fleet in 1945).

[spence]

A war game should not impose on players the same things real leaders did wrong. If you are uncomfortable that players might change choices with effect, you should read history, and not do true simulation - which permits diviation from history.

A simulation should pose the same problems for the Leader/Player as in IRL but should not allow that Leader/Player to function as each individual on that leader/player's side: That is that all the cyber-PVT Tanakas should behave as a real life PVT Tanaka would have and follow the rules, training and doctrine for privates in the Imperial Japanese Army in 1941 as they were, not as the leader/player might wish it to be. The same goes for the KB. Everything of their prewar experience, training and doctrine was devoted to the offensive use of carrier air and virtually no thought was given to defense other than to trust to the skill of their pilots.

Likewise, though the Japanese planned a neccessarily amphibious offensive they made little provision for making assault landings trusting rather to finding undefended beaches to land on (not that hard in the near military vacuum that existed throughout most of their contemplated conquests). Their Khota Bharu landing was an exception and a successful one but even there the defense was stretched exceedingly thinly. Their other assault landing on Wake was hardly a clear demonstration of amphibious assault prowess. Beyond possessing an armored landing barge the Japanese made no effort to equip troops proposing to make an opposed assault with any of the type of equipment the US later developed to assist the assault troops (amphib tanks, LVTs, etc).
They made no effort to develop ship-shore or air-shore comms to allow the assault force to call in NGFS or air strikes on identified targets. Instead both the IJN ships and planes more or less followed the procedure: "there's an island over there... shoot at it and try not to hit our guys too much".

Further, it is the consensus of virtually every historian that the Japanese Merchant Marine was horribly stretched by Japan's imperial designs right from the start. One of the assault divisions mentioned as receiving orders to prepare to invade Hawaii went to Guadalcanal instead IRL. The distances from Tokyo are within 100 miles or so of each other. The Division was ravaged by starvation and disease on G-canal because it received such inadequate support. There were no "orders of magnitude" of the shipping required to support Yamamoto's Plan for an early invasion. There was a deficit and a diversion to his "plan" could only have led inadequate logistical support for other important operations. As it was Yamashita's army almost ran out of supply before it could complete the conquest of Malaya/Singapore even without any diversion of shipping resources (and at the end of a relatively short supply line at that).

Realistic conditions for a realistic test of the plan. The IJA/IJN as they actually existed with all the warts.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: witpqs

I wonder if most of this in WITP is really due to the absence of ammunition limitations on air to air combat.

This is a problem.

And note this is OUR fault!! I mean the FORUM's fault.

A bit of Matrix history is in order. When the engine was done for UV, there WERE ammunition limits on planes!
Players objected - I was as usual a voice in the dark saying "you won't like it if they take it out" - and Matrix listened to the din.

This is incorrect....and you were nowhere around at the time.