Entrenchment!- A solution to soviet manpower!

[Mark_BookGuy]

Several folks in this thread have claimed that Stalin looked into surrendering in 1941.

Does anyone have a citation to a source for this information? I've examined a variety of Stalin biographies and monographs on Soviet foreign policy and have never found any mention of it.

Any help out there? Thanks.

[Montenegro]

You wouldn't find it easily since it was, as I recall, "debated" in the presence of Beria and some top aides. I remeber a mention of it in a great 3 part series the History Channel did last yr for the 60th anniversary of Barbarossa (unfortunately, the series title escapes me). It was definitely a classified pronouncement. My guess is that it was partly out of exasperation, and who could blame the Soviet high command at this point. I also think it is another reflection of how that lot could potentially bargain away the present to postpone some perceived inevitable (Non Aggression Pact 1939, Brest-Litovsk 1918).

Regards,

Montenegro

[mammoth_9]

hello

that stalin was considering surrender is also mentioned in Anthony Beevor's book Stalingrad (definitely a must read). Also, the capture of Moscow is not just about logistics (it was the main railway junction for all incoming reinforcements and supplies from Central Asia etc) nor is it only about industries and manpower. Its also symbolic, just like Stalingrad ultimately became symbolic.

The fall of Moscow would have dealt an irrecoverable blow to the Red Army IMHO and coupled with the cutting of all supplies to Leningrad during the winter (which must surely fall then) and the loss of industry and manpower .....

[Mark_BookGuy]

Originally posted by mammoth_9
hello

that stalin was considering surrender is also mentioned in Anthony Beevor's book Stalingrad (definitely a must read).

I've taken a gander at Beevor and can't find anything. Do you have a page citation? Also, Beevor uses almost no primary sources so we'd have to look at the secondary source he cites to track down the original info.

Thanks.

[Mark_BookGuy]

Originally posted by Montenegro
You wouldn't find it easily since it was, as I recall, "debated" in the presence of Beria and some top aides. I remeber a mention of it in a great 3 part series the History Channel did last yr for the 60th anniversary of Barbarossa (unfortunately, the series title escapes me). It was definitely a classified pronouncement. My guess is that it was partly out of exasperation, and who could blame the Soviet high command at this point. I also think it is another reflection of how that lot could potentially bargain away the present to postpone some perceived inevitable (Non Aggression Pact 1939, Brest-Litovsk 1918).

Regards,

Montenegro

The STAVKA and other government archives are open. Redinsky's biography of Stalin makes extensive use of them. I get the feeling that the surrender idea -- if it has any reliability -- dates from the period of de-Stalinization. The only Soviet era archives still not open are Lenin's personal papers and Stalin's official papers, although most of the latter is available elsewhere. I hope someone can pin down this episode. Perhaps it is another great story ruined by the truth! Thanks.

[Ed Cogburn]

Originally posted by Mark_BookGuy
The Red Army performance in 41 was better than it is usually given credit. It didn't fold up like the worthless French or British.

Now be nice. If the French and British had half of Western Europe to keep retreating to, they may very well have recovered themselves. We just had someone in one of these threads talking about how well some French units fought in '40. The French and British were not ready for blitzkrieg warfare, but they were far from worthless.

[Mark_BookGuy]

Originally posted by Ed Cogburn



Now be nice. If the French and British had half of Western Europe to keep retreating to, they may very well have recovered themselves. We just had someone in one of these threads talking about how well some French units fought in '40. The French and British were not ready for blitzkrieg warfare, but they were far from worthless.

Of course I was joking, and you're right in that some units, including DeGaulle's, fought well. If I recall correctly, a German infantry division was overrun by Brit armor. For a great analysis of what led to the 1940 debacle take a look at Ernest R. May's Strange Victory. But isn't the whole point for France to exist is to be a training ground for the German army?:)

[Ed Cogburn]

Originally posted by Mark_BookGuy
But isn't the whole point for France to exist is to be a training ground for the German army?:)

Ouch!

[Mark_BookGuy]

While busy getting murdered in a PBEM game, I thought I'd share a little humor (?)

1. What do you call a Russian pilot who gets off the ground? Alone

2. You are a Polish soldier. Coming towards you is a German and a Russian. Who do you shoot first? The German - business before pleasure.

3. Late war actual Berlin saying: Better a Russian on your belly than a British bomb on your head.

Enjoy.

[czerpak]

Originally posted by Mark_BookGuy
2. You are a Polish soldier. Coming towards you is a German and a Russian. Who do you shoot first? The German - business before pleasure.

LOL

[dgaad]

The Germans were just as capable of entrenching and creating fortified defended lines as other armies.

Fortified and entrenched lines were a critical part of the course of the war, especially for the Germans in 1943-45.

The main reason these lines failed to hold were as follows :

1. Space. There was simply too much front line to hold. The force to space ratio in Russia and Eastern Europe was much lower than in, say, North Africa, France, or Italy. Exceptions were focussed battles such as at Kursk, Stalingrad, Leningrad and so forth.

2. Failure to permit retreats to defensive lines - over and over again throughout the war Hitler refused adjustment of the line to lines more suited to defensive tactics. When he did concede permission to retreat to better lines, it was usually only after the reason for wanting to do so was gone (the enemy had already broken through).

3. Failure to arrange defensive line consonant with mobile warfare - If you read Guderian's biography, you will find a striking example of the stupidity that pervaded the OKW, which Hitler himself admitted to Guderian after disaster had struck. In early January, 1945, the Germans had had a "respite" of sorts that had lasted several months as the Red Army paused in front of Warsaw. Guderian was at this time Chief of the Army General Staff. He built up a strong reserve of something like 16 panzer divisions deployed along the front in special battlegroups. Hitler himself, before the storm broke said : "The Eastern Front has never had such a strong line or powerful reserve as it does now. This is in thanks to you (Guderian)".

However, when setting out the defensive line for the winter, Hitler had insisted that guns and other local reserves (not the panzer battlegroups mind you) be allowed to be stationed NO MORE than 2 miles from the front line. This was what HITLER was used to from World War I. Any further back, he thought, would be encouraging the front line troops to run at the first sign of enemy attack. Guderian protested this at the time (October), and asked that local reserves be stationed 12-25 miles out. Hitler refused to listen.

When the storm broke, Soviet artillery pounded the front line as well as the local reserves, and entire divisions were overrun in a matter of hours. The line cracked and opened up gaping holes dozens and hundreds of miles wide that the panzer battlegroups could not hope to plug because nearly all the front line forces had been "consumed" by the enemy's first push.

Hitler then complained to Guderian : "Who was the idiot who put the local reserves so close to the front?" Naturally, Hitler did not believe that it was he himself who had done that. Guderian even had the audacity to recall the OKH stenographer who read back the transcript of the meeting which clearly showed who was responsible for the idiocy. Hitler then said : "You were right. Unfortunately I did not listen to you." It had taken Guderian 3 hours to make this point over Hitler's obstinacy.

The bottom line here is that the Germans units entrenched strongly, but executed deployment poorly at times, due to Hitler whose attitude pervaded a number of Wehrmacht officers in OKW and even along the front.

The better solution here would be that when the soviets launch an attack in the game against a German entrenched position, the later in the war it is the more likely it is that Hitler is the rated local commander (rating 3). This will negate entrenchment value, just like it did historically.

[Mark_BookGuy]

Originally posted by dgaad
If you read Guderian's biography, you will find a striking example of the stupidity that pervaded the OKW, which Hitler himself admitted to Guderian after disaster had struck.

The points are all well taken, albeit with a couple of caveats. First, the well-known memoirs by Guderian, Manstein, and von Mellenthin (sic?) have serious problems. All must be read with a very careful and critical eye. Guderian and Manstein's are extremely self-serving and have been successfully taken apart by professional historians. These memoirs have been fodder in historiography classes for a number of years now.

Second, the hold-fast decision in the winter 41 was the right decision. There is no doubt that many of the later war decisions were disasterous, but they must be taken in context. As the war progressed Hitler had to keep the Rumanians and Hungarians appeased. They wanted the Russians kept as far away as possible, and Polesti oil was bait. David Irving (before making a complete *** of himself) addressed this problem in detail. And of course, the vast majority of the Heer was literally horse powered and increasingly immobile. Manuever warfare is difficult when the troops and panje horses walk no faster than 3mph. With the scale of the Eastern Front the attacker had the luxery of massing forces against very thin lines (true for either side). WIR makes it far too easy to shift forces around, which in reality was very difficult and time-consuming.

On the other hand, I'm getting beaten in a PBEM game right now (so long Leningrad!), so what do I know??

For those looking for great primary sources ask your local academic library to get via inter-library loan the Donald Detwiler series World War II German Military Studies. There are 5 volumes on the OKW war diaries alone, and 2 volumes on the eastern front. There are 24 volumes in the set, so get volume 1 first which provides a good index. I've looked for several years for a set for sale without luck.

For better or worse, most of the postwar German studies done for the US focus on the western front, but there are a number of them still unpublished (many in German) and all are available from the US Military History Institute and the National Archives. I picked one up on Panzer Lehr at Normandy and it's a scream.

BTW, does anyone have a copy of I.A. Korotkov's Istoria sovetskoi voennoi mysli they'd be willing to lend?? It was published in Moscow in 1980 by Nauka.

Thanks.

[dgaad]

Historiographic or not, they are primary sources.

I don't doubt that there are a few ideas or concepts in Guderian's book can be pointed to as self-serving, and these have been "taken apart". Guderian's main flaw, in my opinion, is his cover-up of his own Nazism. The very reason that Hitler appointed Guderian to his various posts, including the ultimate post in the Army of OKH Chief of Staff, was because Guderian was a member of the Nazi party, and had promoted Nazi officers and generally supported Nazi initiatives. Reading his book you will find hardly any mention of these things. He also puffs up his role in the July Plot to a bit more than it was.

But the vast majority of what Guderian talks about is actually totally undisputed, and if something is "disputed" Guderian has some records and transcripts to back him up. His record is mostly of events and personal observations, and these are totally legit. Where he talks about motives, either his own or those of others, he is not the best source.

There were/are a large number of German officers who considered Guderian's post-war work was itself treasonous, and that Guderian himself was a traitor. The people who make these kinds of criticisms should be views as what they are, apologists for Nazis. Guderian like most officers in the army became disillusioned with the ideas and, most particularly, the results, of Nazism. Guderian was a studied, reasonable and systematic man, he could see the flaws in any organization rather quickly.

I guess my point is that people too easily dismiss Manstein and Guderian's works, without actually reading them. I think this is dangerous.

Manstein and Guderian blamed the magnitude of the defeats on Hitler and his toadys in OKW. Hitler's stand fast decision in 1941 was his automatic response to ANY setback, and had been a pattern since early on in his life. If he happened to be right at that time, that only made him less willing or able to listen to reason when it was most needed, later on. His stand fast order wasn't some magical inspiration, in fact it was a completely uninspiring predictable response by his unflexible mind that just happened under the circumstances to work.

Manstein and Guderian, and other Memoir-Generals, have taken heat for trying to "Blame Hitler" for defeat. To some historians, this looks like them trying to escape their own responsibility for the encroaching disasters and personal responsibility for the monstrosity that was Hitler. But, lets not forget that they might be right. Hitler, by 1941 certainly, had predictable inflexible responses to almost any crisis. Personally I can't think of a single example where Hitler allowed a strategic reordering of the line to enable first rate mobile defense operations or, when the enemy broke through, that Hitler's first response was to allow mobile defense operations. He controlled events, and it was he who caused massive attrition by his stupid attitudes. I believe Manstein when he says, basically, that had he been given charge of the eastern front in 1943 and allowed unfettered movements, that he could have fought the Russians to a standstill.

I personally have found the absolute and most reliable record of the war to be comprised in 7 books :

Shirer - Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. A sweeping work that covers all aspects of the rise of Nazism and the conduct of World War 2

John Toland - in depth study of Hitler
Joachim Fest "Hitler" - another in depth study of Hitler, written by a German containing some intriguing insights and new historical evidence,

Guderian "Panzer General" - as discussed

Speer "Inside the Third Reich" - a personal memoir by Hitler's only "friend".

Manstein "Lost Victories" - personal memoir of the man who was the author of the plan that defeated France, and who later became one of Germany's greatest generals

Hans Von Luck "Panzer Commander" - battalion commander for Rommel, containing insights and first hand descriptions of life at the Front (he also served in Russia in 1941, and in the West during 1944 as a recon battalion commander).

[Mark_BookGuy]

A book is not "historiographical." Historiography is the study of the process of historical writing. For a brief overview of Eastern Front historiography see David Glantz's "American Perspectives on Eastern Front Operations in World War II," which is available online at http://call.army.mil/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/e-front.htm from the Foreign Military Studies Office.

The seven books listed would make for a nice bibliography for a freshman level term paper, but serious researchers of course go far beyond these items.

One of the key elements in historical research is learning to evaluate sources. For example, the whole genre of memoir writing is a field unto itself. Basing a comprehenion of the Eastern Front on abridged English versions of German autobiographies is the equivalent of using only the "Lost Cause" literature in the German-language Reader's Digest to explain the Civil War.

The German autobiographies became popular in the US largely because of the Cold War. It was pc to demonize the Russians as a faceless mass of brutes; scream that it was all the fault of Hitler and the Nazis; and that we'll all be nice, democratic Germans now. (And a job in the new army wouldn't hurt either.)

For a recent, brief slap at Guderian take a look at Geoffrey Megargee's Inside Hitler's Command : "Guderian presented himself after the war as a military genius and a staunch opponent of Hitler; he was perhaps the most successful of the Wehrmacht's former leaders at creating an anti-Nazi image for himself... In fact the new Chief of Staff was one of the Fuhrer's most ardent admirers, even if the two did not always agree on military matters. Furthermore, Guderian shared the same strategic myopia, the same callous deterimination to fight to the last, as other memebers of the high command." Please taken a good look at Megargee's preface as well.

Guderian et al did NOT have access to official archives (the story of what happened to the German government records after the war is a book in itself -- in fact, I think there is a book on it!). In addition, many officers wrote the German Military Studies only because the US Army paid them; not bad when jobs were impossible to find, and one doesn't bite the hand that feeds it. Both issues are the major problem with using the GMS, as the US Army itself was careful to note. It's not until John Erickson and Earl Ziemke were good, scholarly English language works available using archival resources. Hannes Heer's (editor) new War of Extermination makes excellent uses of German archival resources to expose the very bloody hands of the Heer. [Example: von Reichnau ordering the murder of 90 children under 7 years of age]. Niklas Zetterling, Anders Frankson, and David Glantz have written recent, well-researched accounts of Kursk to deflate many of the myths (largely created by Soviet wartime propaganda) about the battle.

Relatively good Russian accounts were not available until the mid 1960s, and again, one needs to be very careful in using any Soviet-era source. It's not until the 1990's, when the Soviet archives opened up and made available to scholars that good research was possible. Take a gander a Radzinsky's biography of Zhukov using these sources (and he takes major swipes at Zhukov's autobiography as well), or the works by Glantz. Right now, the best English-language work on the Russians is coming out in the Journal of Slavic Military Studies. Have a need for info on good old, fashioned Red Army discipline? Take a look at Maslov's How Were Soviet Blocking Detachment Employed? available at http://call.army.mil/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/blockdet.htm

Guderian et al are worth reading, if only for better understanding of the war's historiography. von Kluck's description of carpet bombing at Caen is unreal. BUT use any monograph carefully and always use a very critical eye. Personally, I find one of the few German memoirs worth reading is Keitel's. He wrote them while awaiting his hanging, and while they need just as careful a look as anyone else's, at least he admits to being a toady and lapdog.

Ciao

[Montenegro]

I tend to fall on the side of opinion that the hold fast order---aka hedgehog defense---was necessary, and to a large degree, successful. Germany invaded Russia with the express purpose of defeating her. An all out retreat back to the June '41 line as many of Hitler's officers were propositioning would have compromised quite a lot it seems. As far as Hitler's "command," I once again re state that politicians and madmen make terrible tacticians. If he would have left the war in the East to the Guderians, the Bocks, et al, vodka would have more than likely been replaced by beer as the national drink of choice. (it's Friday, please excuse my overt joy at a work week ending!). In all seriousness, Hitler, like many leaders throughout history, foolishly meddled where he shouldn't have. In my book, I'm glad he did.

As far as WIR goes, I agree that their should be a Hitler factor from '43 onwards in matters of defense. I also agree that movment in this game is a bit generous. My suggestion to add more flavor would be to somehow institute more partisan action with actual success, lessen the ability to transport units great distances sans partisan free rail lines, and try to institute some degree of history into the campaign. An example: Kiev shouldn't fall in July '41. The only way I can see how to do the latter is to give a little entrechment value to the Soviets in the areas where they fought tooth and nail. Perhaps a higher city fortification factor?

Regards,

Montenegro

[dgaad]

Originally posted by Mark_BookGuy
A book is not "historiographical." Historiography is the study of the process of historical writing. For a brief overview of Eastern Front historiography see David Glantz's "American Perspectives on Eastern Front Operations in World War II," which is available online at http://call.army.mil/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/e-front.htm from the Foreign Military Studies Office.

The seven books listed would make for a nice bibliography for a freshman level term paper, but serious researchers of course go far beyond these items.

... snip ...

Ciao

I can't help feeling insulted by what you just wrote, but you really have no idea who I am or what I have done in studying history myself, so couldn't possbily be doing that except by assuming that I'm your normal "serious wargamer-casual historian" type and that what you wrote was your attempt to "teach".

My sources are a good "bibiliography" for a "freshman term paper"?

Side Note : Are you kidding me? Most college graduates, even history graduates these days, don't even know these books exist, unless of course they studied WW2 history as at least a minor. Maybe its been several years since you've been to college. Its been 14 years since I graduated, but I took graduate level courses when I was there.

Anyway, I agree that to a real historian the sources I listed are mere starting points. The list was in fact directed at young people who read this forum, not serious historians of the conflict who would have read those books years ago.

There are hundreds upons hundreds of "books" that are primary sources and literally billions of documents and photos. The best one can do with that kind of material is find a few good references that list what they are, where they are, who wrote or produced them, and what they are about, and then go find the things that you have and interest in.

On my shelf, for example, I have the US Army Manual on Tactics produced just before the D-Day invasion. I have seen on microfilm the translated OKW sessions that were recorded. I've read about 20 divisional histories, not cover to cover but 20 different divisions from both sides in the war. I made a point to read the divisional history of the German division that was the unit of the soldier who snapped the famous photo of the Kremlin from Khemki. I've read all of Churchill's books, most of the memoirs produced by the primary players such as Eisenhower, Bradley, the Germans I mentioned earlier - and, yes, von Mellinthin, Gobbels diaries (what a fascinating mind that guy had -- wrong, but fascinating)), etc etc etc. I won't get into a p*ssing contest here, no need. Needless to say, I've also read dozens of compilations of primary sources and hundreds secondary sources. And finally, I know all about the period after the war and all of the work done by military historians, investigators, spymasters, politicos, etc. So, I don't need a lesson in how to be a good historian or evaluate sources.

I guess my point about Guderian's work is this : I've read a number of autobiographies and memoirs. From the period of World War Two, most of them are chock full of misrepresentations, failures to mention, excuses that are totally unbelievable, etc. Even in British or US ones. The Russian works, particularly those written prior to 1985, are probably the worst. Allegedly authoritative works by the Russians on their Great Patriotic War occasionally accept at face value the casualty reports of Stavka and the Kremlin! But Guderian's work is not of this character. The misrepresentations and omissions are at once obvious, understandable, and insignificant compared to the undisputable information that he does in fact give. In other works, the misrepresentations are insidious and significant, the omissions are gaping, and overall they do positive harm to the task of finding the truth.

I haven't read Keitel's work, sounds interesting. Did the impending gallows bring a sense of truth to the man, or was he attempting to cravenly protect what he knew would be his rather shoddy image and justify Nazi ideals for posterity? Guderian says that in the last days of the war both Jodl and Keitel seemed to realize the truth, and began in their own small ways to stand up for objectivity and rationality (though they were far too soiled and blooded to really make up for anything). I also liked the other sources you mentioned and may check them out.

[dgaad]

Originally posted by Montenegro
I tend to fall on the side of opinion that the hold fast order---aka hedgehog defense---was necessary, and to a large degree, successful. Germany invaded Russia with the express purpose of defeating her. An all out retreat back to the June '41 line as many of Hitler's officers were propositioning would have compromised quite a lot it seems. As far as Hitler's "command," I once again re state that politicians and madmen make terrible tacticians. If he would have left the war in the East to the Guderians, the Bocks, et al, vodka would have more than likely been replaced by beer as the national drink of choice. (it's Friday, please excuse my overt joy at a work week ending!). In all seriousness, Hitler, like many leaders throughout history, foolishly meddled where he shouldn't have. In my book, I'm glad he did.


Regards,

Montenegro

In fact, if we want to get a little deeper into it, the "Stand-Fast" order has a bit of mythology to it.

In the first place, while such an order was issued by Hitler, the reality at the front played out a little differently. A fair number of small units completely ignored the orders. Lines were in fact adjusted, retreats did happen without orders, and in many places in the front in fact a strategic hedgehog was the tactic actually used. What Hitler prevented by his order was an immediate strategic retreat to the Smolensk/Kharkov line. The Germans were eventually pushed back to that line during the winter, but not immediately. Hitler's apparent reasoning was that if he had allowed entire divisions or corps to pull back to more defensible positions on December 7th (the day it became clear to OKW that a major Soviet counter-offensive was in progress) that the units would begin to panic and disintegrate without fighting, and the entire army in Russia, particularly Center Army Group, would not be able to take the offensive in 1942.

In other words, it was a decision based on Hitler's knowledge of human psychology, not his knowledge of tactics. If the German troops were not at all human or subject to panic en masse, the General's idea of a strategic retreat to Smolensk as soon as the Soviets intention became clear, they probably would have saved lives and resources and been in a better position for 1942. However, the Generals are very poor at detecting impending mass panic. If they were, it wouldn't have happened so much to armies in the field throughout history.

The fact is that the line bent but did not break, the army did not disintegrate, and the Germans were able to resume the offensive in 1942 and still in that year had a reasonable chance to win the war. Had the Generals had their way, reasoning leads us to conclude that its possible but not certain the outcome would have been much much worse for the Germans.

[czerpak]

Originally posted by Mark_BookGuy

One of the key elements in historical research is learning to evaluate sources.

Thats something I spent 80 % of time while studying history at Uni. IMHO evaluating sources is most important difference beetwen amoteur and profi in history resaerching.

Maciej

BTW. Guderian and Speer are very good read, but I would hardly call them "sources"

[czerpak]

Originally posted by dgaad


I know all about the period after the war and all of the work done by military historians, investigators, spymasters, politicos, etc.

very dangerous thing to say for someone who is ( or considers himself to be - whichever is your case) a profi.

[dgaad]

Originally posted by czerpak


BTW. Guderian and Speer are very good read, but I would hardly call them "sources"

Memoirs by people who have personally participated in events that are considered significant are by definition in and of themselves "primary sources". They are sources not because of what they say about past events in those memoirs, but because it is a record of their thoughts, feelings, ideas and so forth at the time they wrote the said memoir. This record is then relevant for determining the character and nature of the historical actor, which then in turn has an impact on how we view other relevant sources in determining the truth.

I'm sure we could have a very long debate about what is primary source material and what is considered secondary or tertiary source material, but lets not.