Rifle Squad Differences?

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Curtis Lemay
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RE: Rifle Squad Differences?

Post by Curtis Lemay »

ORIGINAL: vahauser

Well, here is one way.  The area of a 5km hex is 21.65 sq. km.  The area of a 50km hex is 2165 sq. km. 

What is the 'average area' of a squad of 10 men?  If the average frontage is say, 10 meters per man (which I don't think is unbelievable), then a 10-man squad will occupy 1000 sq. meters.  1 square kilometer is 1,000,000 square meters. So, the area of a 5km hex is 21,650,000 square meters.  Thus, 21,650 10-man squads will "fill up" a hex at 10 meters frontage per man.

If the average frontage is 31.6 meters per man, then a 10-man squad will occupy 10,000 sq. meters.  And at this frontage only 2,165 10-man squads will "fill up" a 5km hex.

But, what happens when we are dealing in 'generalities' (and generic squads) and suffering density penalties when talking about only 216 squads?  At that point (100,000 sq. meters per 'squad') it doesn't matter much whether 14 men or 10 men or 8 men are filling that space (100,000 sq. meters).  The density difference of 14 men occupying 100,000 sq. meters and 10 men occupying 100,000 sq. meters is not terribly significant. 

At 5km/hex, density penalties begin at 100 peices of equipment and above. So it makes a big difference.
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RE: Rifle Squad Differences?

Post by Curtis Lemay »

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Believe that if you wish. As before, your conviction is only a comment upon yourself.

I suppose I've tormented you enough with that. But think how much grief you could have saved yourself, if you had made the effort to actually comprehend what I was saying, instead of making a knee-jerk assumption that it was about France 1944.
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RE: Rifle Squad Differences?

Post by vahauser »

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

At 5km/hex, density penalties begin at 100 peices of equipment and above. So it makes a big difference.


Exactly. So, the problem isn't with the equipment, it's with the density calculations. At 50km per hex, how may pieces of equipment before density effects kick in? 5km has 21.65 sq. km area. 50km has 2165 sq km area. Thus, density effects at 50km should kick in at 10,000 pieces of equipment. I wonder if this happens...
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RE: Rifle Squad Differences?

Post by ColinWright »

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Believe that if you wish. As before, your conviction is only a comment upon yourself.

I suppose I've tormented you enough with that. But think how much grief you could have saved yourself, if you had made the effort to actually comprehend what I was saying, instead of making a knee-jerk assumption that it was about France 1944.

God help us.
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RE: Rifle Squad Differences?

Post by Curtis Lemay »

ORIGINAL: vahauser

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

At 5km/hex, density penalties begin at 100 peices of equipment and above. So it makes a big difference.


Exactly. So, the problem isn't with the equipment, it's with the density calculations. At 50km per hex, how may pieces of equipment before density effects kick in? 5km has 21.65 sq. km area. 50km has 2165 sq km area. Thus, density effects at 50km should kick in at 10,000 pieces of equipment. I wonder if this happens...

At 50km the penalties start at 5050. There's some non-linearity to the formula.

Regardless, whatever density formula you want, the density differences of 8-man squads vs. 13-man squads can't be discounted. They're just building blocks. Suppose you have 20 battalions in that 5km hex. Still think it should not matter whether the squads are 8-man or 13-man?
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RE: Rifle Squad Differences?

Post by ColinWright »

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Believe that if you wish. As before, your conviction is only a comment upon yourself.

I suppose I've tormented you enough with that. But think how much grief you could have saved yourself, if you had made the effort to actually comprehend what I was saying, instead of making a knee-jerk assumption that it was about France 1944.

I assure you you aren't 'tormenting me.' I waver between exasperation and contempt, I recurrently realize that this conversation is pointless, I am led to suspect that all conversations with you are pointless -- but I am not 'tormented.'
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RE: Rifle Squad Differences?

Post by golden delicious »

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

Don't think of that unit as a peice of cardboard on a hexgrid. Think of it as a unit just as complicated as the division or corps, and the hex not as a hex, but as a huge tactical map. So, if the division can have its rear-areas affected, the brigade can, in a similar way - within the hex.

Right. In the duration of the scenario, on how many occasions did rear area elements of a British infantry brigade enter into significant combat? Ten times? Twenty?

Now, how many does that work out to per brigade? How many times does the brigade fight in the scenario?

I'm going to estimate that rear area elements would become engaged in somewhere between 1% and 5% of actions. So in at least 95% of actions, those elements will fire and be fired at quite inappropriately.
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RE: Rifle Squad Differences?

Post by golden delicious »

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

That's why I continue to believe that, if the situation is going to get wild or desperate, you've got to model the rear-areas.

The situation got that desperate for the Germans. Not for the Allies.
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RE: Rifle Squad Differences?

Post by Curtis Lemay »

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

Don't think of that unit as a peice of cardboard on a hexgrid. Think of it as a unit just as complicated as the division or corps, and the hex not as a hex, but as a huge tactical map. So, if the division can have its rear-areas affected, the brigade can, in a similar way - within the hex.

Right. In the duration of the scenario, on how many occasions did rear area elements of a British infantry brigade enter into significant combat? Ten times? Twenty?

Now, how many does that work out to per brigade? How many times does the brigade fight in the scenario?

I'm going to estimate that rear area elements would become engaged in somewhere between 1% and 5% of actions. So in at least 95% of actions, those elements will fire and be fired at quite inappropriately.

Both sides have to be designed to the same standard, regardless. Otherwise, the Germans would have unrealistic counterattack abilities. And other factors, such as relative density and replacements would be off-kilter. As to how often they were engaged, I just think that WWII combat was messier than, say, WWI combat. Units got entangled on a regular basis due to the emphasis on penetration and exploitation. The brigade is only one step below the division. If the division's rear-areas are included, why not the brigade's? Think if the scenario had been designed at the 2.5km/hex, company scale.
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RE: Rifle Squad Differences?

Post by ColinWright »

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay
ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

Don't think of that unit as a peice of cardboard on a hexgrid. Think of it as a unit just as complicated as the division or corps, and the hex not as a hex, but as a huge tactical map. So, if the division can have its rear-areas affected, the brigade can, in a similar way - within the hex.

Right. In the duration of the scenario, on how many occasions did rear area elements of a British infantry brigade enter into significant combat? Ten times? Twenty?

Now, how many does that work out to per brigade? How many times does the brigade fight in the scenario?

I'm going to estimate that rear area elements would become engaged in somewhere between 1% and 5% of actions. So in at least 95% of actions, those elements will fire and be fired at quite inappropriately.

Both sides have to be designed to the same standard, regardless. Otherwise, the Germans would have unrealistic counterattack abilities...

I think this fails on three scores. First, it's undemonstrated that the Germans would have 'unrealistic' counterattack abilities. Faced with a German counterattack, would an Anglo-American infantry brigade of mid-1944 really have started hoicking the cooks up to the firing line? Wouldn't they just have yelled for help and fallen back? Cooks, etc were sent up to the front in the Battle of the Bulge -- at least so legend says -- but the very fact that this was seen as remarkable points to how rare the practice was. Moreover, in that situation there was no help to hand. It wasn't like Normandy, with units jammed in cheek to jowl.

Second, even if it can be demonstrated that rear-area elements need to be represented for both sides, this ignores the question about whether the gains in fidelity offset the loss in fidelity due to the skewing of density factors.

Third, when rear-area elements are put in, they don't just fight in the 0-30% or whatever of engagements they did fight in -- they fight in all of them.

You have two sides. On one side, rear area elements virtually never fought. On the other, they fought some unknowable percentage of the time. Let's be generous and say 60%.

So for both forces in combination, the percentage of the times rear area elements fought comes to around 30% -- and I wouldn't be surprised if the number could be shown to be a third of that.

That means that your approach misrepresents most of the units most of the time. Given that it misrepresents their density all the time, I don't see how you can seriously argue that it's an unalloyed good.
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RE: Rifle Squad Differences?

Post by golden delicious »

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

Think if the scenario had been designed at the 2.5km/hex, company scale.

Quite. In that situation, a British brigade HQ would never see action. Not so here. Why the difference?
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RE: Rifle Squad Differences?

Post by Curtis Lemay »

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

Think if the scenario had been designed at the 2.5km/hex, company scale.

Quite. In that situation, a British brigade HQ would never see action. Not so here. Why the difference?

Regardless of whether that is correct or not, that HQ would be modeled - just as division HQs are modeled when you have division-sized formations. Once I made the decision to model a portion of the rear-area elements, there was nothing special about the brigade parts of the divisions. Again, don't think of it as a cardboard counter.
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RE: Rifle Squad Differences?

Post by Curtis Lemay »

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

I think this fails on three scores.

First of all, it doesn't fail on any score. The scenario works, period.
First, it's undemonstrated that the Germans would have 'unrealistic' counterattack abilities. Faced with a German counterattack, would an Anglo-American infantry brigade of mid-1944 really have started hoicking the cooks up to the firing line? Wouldn't they just have yelled for help and fallen back? Cooks, etc were sent up to the front in the Battle of the Bulge -- at least so legend says -- but the very fact that this was seen as remarkable points to how rare the practice was. Moreover, in that situation there was no help to hand. It wasn't like Normandy, with units jammed in cheek to jowl.

I'm talking about how the scenario would work under TOAW. And if German units are designed to one standard, with lots of rear-area elements included, and Allied units are designed to another, with none - the Germans will be unrealistically strong.
Second, even if it can be demonstrated that rear-area elements need to be represented for both sides, this ignores the question about whether the gains in fidelity offset the loss in fidelity due to the skewing of density factors.

Again, by designing to the same standard for both sides, the relative densities are correct. And, at least in Normandy, the absolute density is effectively adjusted by the adjustment to the Attrition Divider.
Third, when rear-area elements are put in, they don't just fight in the 0-30% or whatever of engagements they did fight in -- they fight in all of them.

I think the rationales that I've listed for the way I did it are more important.
You have two sides. On one side, rear area elements virtually never fought. On the other, they fought some unknowable percentage of the time. Let's be generous and say 60%.

The Germans sent about 500,000 men to Normandy. About 60,000 got out. The rest became casualties of one sort or other. Everybody fought.
So for both forces in combination, the percentage of the times rear area elements fought comes to around 30% -- and I wouldn't be surprised if the number could be shown to be a third of that.

15th Army didn't fight too much in this campaign, either. By this line of reasoning, I should have omitted them. The rear-area elements were on the field of battle and eventually fought. They need to be included.
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RE: Rifle Squad Differences?

Post by ColinWright »

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

I think this fails on three scores.

First of all, it doesn't fail on any score. The scenario works, period.

If by this you mean that in hot-seat matches with yourself, the forces wind up about where they did historically, that's not good enough.

The same can be said for the 'Barbarossa' segment of SPI's 'War In the East.' However, that is almost transparently not a simulation of anything.

First, it's undemonstrated that the Germans would have 'unrealistic' counterattack abilities. Faced with a German counterattack, would an Anglo-American infantry brigade of mid-1944 really have started hoicking the cooks up to the firing line? Wouldn't they just have yelled for help and fallen back? Cooks, etc were sent up to the front in the Battle of the Bulge -- at least so legend says -- but the very fact that this was seen as remarkable points to how rare the practice was. Moreover, in that situation there was no help to hand. It wasn't like Normandy, with units jammed in cheek to jowl.

I'm talking about how the scenario would work under TOAW. And if German units are designed to one standard, with lots of rear-area elements included, and Allied units are designed to another, with none - the Germans will be unrealistically strong.
Second, even if it can be demonstrated that rear-area elements need to be represented for both sides, this ignores the question about whether the gains in fidelity offset the loss in fidelity due to the skewing of density factors.

Again, by designing to the same standard for both sides, the relative densities are correct. And, at least in Normandy, the absolute density is effectively adjusted by the adjustment to the Attrition Divider.

No...not really. If we assume Norm's density factors are correct, then where he (and probably the historical combatants) could jam in four regiments, if you try it, the density light will go off and you'll pay dearly for it. What one will get is a system where the historical density of troops simply cannot be put on the line -- assuming one doesn't want to get creamed, that is.

Third, when rear-area elements are put in, they don't just fight in the 0-30% or whatever of engagements they did fight in -- they fight in all of them.

I think the rationales that I've listed for the way I did it are more important.
You have two sides. On one side, rear area elements virtually never fought. On the other, they fought some unknowable percentage of the time. Let's be generous and say 60%.

The Germans sent about 500,000 men to Normandy. About 60,000 got out. The rest became casualties of one sort or other. Everybody fought.

Should we apply the same logic to the French campaign of 1940? By the end of the campaign, over two million Frenchmen were casualties 'of one sort or other.' Ergo, everybody fought. Fact of the matter is, rear echelon elements can surrender. They can even fight ineffectually. They'll become casualties of 'one sort or another.' It doesn't follow that they were fighting usefully in the majority of engagements their parent formations were engaged in.
So for both forces in combination, the percentage of the times rear area elements fought comes to around 30% -- and I wouldn't be surprised if the number could be shown to be a third of that.

15th Army didn't fight too much in this campaign, either. By this line of reasoning, I should have omitted them. The rear-area elements were on the field of battle and eventually fought. They need to be included.

No...it would be nice if you could selectively include them. However, you can't. Therefore, you don't 'need to include them.' You need to decide which leads to a better simulation -- including them and having them fight in all battles (and drive up the density past what Norm intended), or not including them and have them not fight ever.

I also note that you didn't address my query about why it is appropriate to include Allied rear-echelon elements when it is quite improbable that they would have fought under any circumstances likely to arise in your scenario.

You asserted a while back that this had to be done because German rear-echelon elements were always fighting -- but this seems to be going at it the wrong way. Having included rear-echelon elements from one side because they sometimes fought, you find yourself including them from the other side even though they never fought.

It seems fairly obvious that simulation would be better served if the rear-echelon elements from neither side were included. Perhaps up the German rifle squad replacement rates.
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RE: Rifle Squad Differences?

Post by golden delicious »

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

It seems fairly obvious that simulation would be better served if the rear-echelon elements from neither side were included. Perhaps up the German rifle squad replacement rates.

That's probably best. The unit will never have both its full first line strength and its full rear echelon strength in action at the same time- yet this is what the Allies will face on the beaches in this scenario.

So boost replacement rates and replacement priorities. Cut the equivalent equipment from the units. The only problem is if the unit evaporates before it can receive replacements- but you could argue that in this situation the unit has been so thoroughly shocked by the attack that it needs to withdraw and reconstitute.
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RE: Rifle Squad Differences?

Post by Curtis Lemay »

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

If by this you mean that in hot-seat matches with yourself, the forces wind up about where they did historically, that's not good enough.

Multiple hot-seat matches with myself, the PO, PO vs. PO, and useage in a TOAW tournament. And it performs far better than just matching the end positions. Multiple waypoints are met (given historical command choices), losses are realistic, and the historical choices of the commanders tend to be well justified for the historical reasons. The scenario speaks for itself. The AAR I posted speaks for itself. Of course, you can't even be bothered to read the AAR, much less play the scenario. As I've said before, total ignorance is not a very lofty vantage point.
No...not really. If we assume Norm's density factors are correct, then where he (and probably the historical combatants) could jam in four regiments, if you try it, the density light will go off and you'll pay dearly for it. What one will get is a system where the historical density of troops simply cannot be put on the line -- assuming one doesn't want to get creamed, that is.

How dearly depends upon both the density and the Attrition Divider. Since the AD was set based upon trial runs, only the relative density matters. That's correct, provided both sides are designed to the same standard. They were.
Should we apply the same logic to the French campaign of 1940? By the end of the campaign, over two million Frenchmen were casualties 'of one sort or other.' Ergo, everybody fought. Fact of the matter is, rear echelon elements can surrender. They can even fight ineffectually. They'll become casualties of 'one sort or another.' It doesn't follow that they were fighting usefully in the majority of engagements their parent formations were engaged in.

Normandy wasn't remotely like that. The French Army as a whole surrendered in 1940. There weren't even many real pockets formed in Normandy. It's safe to assume the vast majority of Germans were being engaged in action.
No...it would be nice if you could selectively include them. However, you can't. Therefore, you don't 'need to include them.' You need to decide which leads to a better simulation -- including them and having them fight in all battles (and drive up the density past what Norm intended), or not including them and have them not fight ever.

If they fought then they need to be included, same as the 15th Army - for the reasons I've listed. It was a desperate situation, and the breakout will be wild.
I also note that you didn't address my query about why it is appropriate to include Allied rear-echelon elements when it is quite improbable that they would have fought under any circumstances likely to arise in your scenario.

Of course I did. The forces have to be designed to the same standard. If the Germans are designed to one and the Allies to another, nothing will work right. The Germans will have counteroffensive abilities beyond their historical means. This will especially threaten the Allies while they are attempting to establish a lodgement in the early turns. And that threat will last far longer than historically. The Germans wanted to drive the Allies into the sea. It never developed for the good reason that each Allied division's 4,000-5,000 frontline elements had another 12,000-14,000 men behind them that would have had to have been destroyed too, if the counteroffensive was to succeed.

Nor have I conceded that the Allied rear-area elements were never engaged. For such a condition to be true, 100% of all Allied losses must have been suffered by the frontline elements only. Being in the Allied rear should have been as safe as being state-side. Yet we know that at least one American Lt. Gen was killed.
You asserted a while back that this had to be done because German rear-echelon elements were always fighting...

?? When?
... -- but this seems to be going at it the wrong way. Having included rear-echelon elements from one side because they sometimes fought, you find yourself including them from the other side even though they never fought.

It seems fairly obvious that simulation would be better served if the rear-echelon elements from neither side were included. Perhaps up the German rifle squad replacement rates.

Here we go again. The theory trumps the evidence. I've actually built the scenario, tested it extensively, while you've done nothing more than a thought experiment - but you're the expert.
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RE: Rifle Squad Differences?

Post by vahauser »

Here is a summary of a German infantry division TOE from 1939-41. Based on numbers of LMGs, can you derive ballpark estimates of the number of combat squads (rifle, heavy rifle, engineer, assault, etc.) in the division?

Of interest to me, the number of motorcycles does not seem to correspond to combat personnel. My estimate is that the vast majority of those motorcycles are being used (unarmed) as messengers, communications. My guess is that of the 450+ motorcycles in the division, perhaps only 120 or so (~12 squads) are actually armed combat machines.

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RE: Rifle Squad Differences?

Post by golden delicious »

ORIGINAL: vahauser

Here is a summary of a German infantry division TOE from 1939-41. Based on numbers of LMGs, can you derive ballpark estimates of the number of combat squads (rifle, heavy rifle, engineer, assault, etc.) in the division?

A first wave infantry division as of about 1940 would be about as follows (by my standards);

324 Rifle Squads
18 Mounted Rifle squads (3 per regiment, 9 in the recon battalion)
9 Bicycle squads (up to you what you do with these)
36 Engineer squads (3 per regiment, 27 in the engineer battalion)

As the squads only have 12 MGs each, I would have no heavy rifle squads, but Colin would probably disagree. Assault rifle squads don't factor in at all until the closing months of the war.
Of interest to me, the number of motorcycles does not seem to correspond to combat personnel. My estimate is that the vast majority of those motorcycles are being used (unarmed) as messengers, communications. My guess is that of the 450+ motorcycles in the division, perhaps only 120 or so (~12 squads) are actually armed combat machines.

I don't believe any of the motorcycles are in combat units. They're in dribs and drabs throughout the division with a platoon under the HQ;

http://niehorster.orbat.com/011_germany ... welle.html
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RE: Rifle Squad Differences?

Post by vahauser »

Golden_Delicious,
 
That summary I posted above is probably a generic amalgamation of the first 5 waves (and perhaps more), not just the first wave.  However, the real question is can any useful information regarding combat-squad totals (total number of squads) and strengths (light rifle, heavy rifle, etc.) be estimated just by looking at a divisional summary such as the one I provided above?
 
[P.S.  I'm guessing that some of the motorcycles in each of the combat units (infantry regiments, recon battalion, engineer battalion, antitank battalion) were combat-trained and used regularly in combat (I'm guessing usually as recon/spotting/intel gathering).]
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RE: Rifle Squad Differences?

Post by secadegas »

ORIGINAL: golden delicious



As the squads only have 12 MGs each (...)

I think you mean "as the companies only have 12 MG's each"...
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