The Iron Dream : An Impossible AAR

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As the mud approaches we are conducting more counter-attacks than the Fascists, and they are far more successful. Our attriting of the German units has borne fruit - a Panzer Division now contains barely half of the tanks of a Soviet Tank Brigade.

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With the attrition of his units in the South the Fascists left an incomplete line in the quiet Northern sector. We have prepared for the last several weeks to conduct an offensive in the mud, and the enemy attempt to block the threatened pockets with security detachments rather than withdraw.

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Mile by mile we force columns forward into the mire, threatening to create several pockets, but the Germans stubbornly refuse to withdraw from their fortresses.

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The snow arrives in the North and we get a mixed bag of results. One successful envelopment, with a Tank Corps holding ground against relief efforts, the prospect of a further pocket developing, and a complete disaster on the final pocket with the leading forces pocketed themselves. We face the prospect of losing our first full formations since 1941 in exchange for a fairly equivalent number of German divisions.

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One guard division and two infantry divisions are destroyed. The two German divisions threaten to break free as four more fail to break their own fresh encirclement.

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The cut and thrust continues as we begin to withdraw the participiating Tank Corps. The offensive is a failure in any significant terms, but has achieved its main objective - testing the enemy reserves and counter-offensive abilities in the winter of 42-43. Undoubtedly he can still hit back, but not in any overwhelming fashion. Our offensives in the South and the Crimea that will open on the 1st of December will be on a far larger scale, and should be able to absorb the counter-punches with we have seen thrown here.

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In the first week of our attempt to break out of the Crimea we drive the Romanians back twenty miles, only for a Hungarian Army to drive us back ten, demonstrating again that our Tank Corps continue to find holding ground difficult. However we have enough reserves to continuously attack, allowing damaged Tank Corps to recover and re-enter the battle without slowing the offensive.

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There is a great bulge in the line, created by the failed drive on Stalingrad. The enemy staffed a great length of the northern shoulder with an Italian Army which we promptly drove in at the beginning of December. We are thrown back in part, but again the enemy line is weak, and many of his reserve panzer formations are exposed, rather than hitting and retreating. Our tank losses are heavy, but only a fraction of what we produce each week. His are constantly reducing.

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With no depth of reserve to draw on, the Fascist resistance in the Crimea collapses after only three weeks. We aim to pocket and destroy any forces in the East of the peninsula, and seek to exploit into the interior if the Fascists fail to get a strategic reserve in place to close the landbridge.

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The offensive outside Saratov has been a war of attrition, with the 1st and 3rd Shock Armies backed by the 4th Tank Army trading blows with an array of local Fascist reserves. However those reserves are now also at their limit - all attempts to force our troops back fail.

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The Stalingrad Bulge is too huge to reduce into a single pocket, but we decide to drive a second column into the Southern shoulder using the 4th Shock and 1st Tank Armies. Our leading units are forced back once again by hiis local reserves, but experience suggests they will run out strength within two or three weeks.

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The column driven into the Northern shoulder begins to yield genuine possibilities for exploitation. The failed attack conducted against the head of the column is conducted by a panzer division without a single tank.

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The Southern column beats off three weak attacks as the Fascists make yet another doomed attempt on Stalingrad.

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The only response to the threat posed by our northern column are a series of failed attacks at the flank. A mixed bag of infantry divisions are ready to be pocketed.

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The breakout from the Crimea is successful, with 3 armies, 1 Shock Army and 1 Tank Army facing a handful of Rumanian, Hungarian and Security divisions.

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Eight enemy divisions are pocketed in front of Stalingrad. Our largest success since the winter of '41, and a measure of the enemy's relative weakness and failure to withdraw from hopeless positions.

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By the end of February we are in the position that the Rifle and Tank Corps in our Shock and Tank Armies can make slow but steady progress wherever they are employed. This is insufficient - the Russian people demand that we bring this war to a conclusion before 1945. If we are to throw the invader back onto his own soil we must be able to open offensives hundreds of miles wide.

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The first serious response to our breakout from the Crimea, and the first sight of full strength German Panzer Divisions since the winter began. The 2nd SS Panzer Korps arrive, but fail to make an immediate attacks. Appearently the mere sight of them is meant to unnerve us.

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The strongest divisions in the enemy order of battle are pocketed and destroyed in a matter of only two weeks. To seal the victory the commanding general, Hausser, is killed as he attempts to flee the field.

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The frontline in front of Rostov at the beginning of the thaw. The entire line from Rostov to Stalingrad is staffed by Rifle Corps. Shock and Tank Armies are held in reserve to exploit the results of a 200 mile wide rent in the enemy line.

We will use the internittent good weather to our advantage. Until now we have steadily attrited the enemy units - in this campaign season we will concentrate on unit destruction. The occasional bouts of mud will merely ensure pockets cerated in the good weather will hold against counter-attacks.