Did the Dutch resupply Java in 1942?

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: wdolson

ORIGINAL: wdolson

If the Indonesians hadn't driven the Dutch out after the war, they would probably still be there. They had no plans to set the DEI free after the war.

Bill

warspite1

ORIGINAL: warspite1
Why do you say that wdolson? Given what happened to all other colonial empires post war - either by force or by sensible management by the colonial power - I can see no possible scenario whereby the NEI would not have broken free of their Dutch rulers.

For the Dutch to remain as colonial masters of modern-day Indonesia would have meant the population - and it is a huge one - remaining completely apathetic to what was going on all around them in Malaysia/Singapore, Vietnam, India, The Philippines, Burma, Sri Lanka..... not to mention just about every corner of Africa.

As soon as the natives began to stir, the Dutch - even if they were tempted initially to refuse to let go - would have been pariahs if they maintained colonial rule by what would surely require ever increasing force.

Sorry but that comment makes no sense to me.

The Indonesians did drive out the Dutch. I didn't say there was any realistic scenario where the Indonesians didn't fight for their independence as soon as the war was over. I was trying to make the point that the idea of Indonesian independence was once sided until the Dutch realized that they couldn't hold on with military might. They initially tried to squash the rebellion like they had many times before.

Philippine independence was a two sided idea with no open conflict. The US went along with the idea of an independent Philippines. The US was actually pushing it to some degree. In the 1930s the US was freeing many of its possessions (at least the more recently acquired ones) in an attempt to get the Japanese out of China without looking like hypocrites.

Anti-colonialism was sweeping the world around that time. Pretty much all the European colonial masters were having troubles in at least some of their colonies if not all.

Bill

warspite1

Understood, but I think that just because the Dutch had no thought of relinquishing control pre-war, it is fair to say that the war changed everything. One by one, sooner or later, the colonial powers came to the only conclusion there was - that the days of Empire were drawing to a close.

[Leandros]

ORIGINAL: Anthropoid

What was the name of the plan in which the successful defense of the Philippines was considered to hinge on a retreat into Bataan? My reading of the period is
quite limited, and my memory of what little I've read is littered with the refuse of the countless other trivial but interesting topics I find myself drawn to
nibble at as an anthropologist. Hell I can barely remember how many chromosomes human beings have!

That said, I seem to recall that, it was the standing doctrine within War Plan Orange (the one for a war against Japan right?) to hightail it into Bataan and await
relief. This had been the standing "plan" for some 15 or 20 years right? And yet, what do we find when we load up turn 1 of WiTPAE? The disposition of U.S. forces,
not to mention the infrastructural preparations arrayed (which I have no reason to conclude are anything except nearly perfectly historically accurate) are
clearly NOT suited for a last stand in Bataan. No railway into Bataan? No significant level of infrastructure, and troops dispersed in some silly fashion all
around Luzon, not to mention the rest of the islands.

I have no idea who was responsible for that apparently egregious breach between "the plan" as it was written down on paper the preparations in the actual Island
and the obviously widespread knowledge in both the American military and the general public that war with Japan was a definite possibility in the near future.

As MacArthur was the supreme commander of that whole show, it seems worth considering that this lack of carrying out the sensible preparations that War Plan Orange
would seem to call for was primarily his responsbility. If that is the case, then whether or not the US air units were or were not in the air seems, as Leandros
has argued, to have been largely irrelevant to how the Battle of the Philippines actually played out.

Hi, A - the plan you are referring to was not in effect in December 1941 so what the game gives you is how it should be. The actual plan developed out of several
parameters through 1941, became official in November 1941, and basically said that all of the Philippines should be defended. While MacArthur was a driving
force in this the general situation, as it developed in 1941, made it feasible to Washington, too. The B-17 was an important factor, The Philippines weren't just
seen as something that should be defended but a bomber base to dominate the South China Sea, denying the Japanese the route to the Dutch East Indies. The other
important factor was the build-up of the Philippine Army, which was why MacArthur was in the Philippines in the first place. The first conscripts moved in for primary
training in January 1937. In December 1941 more than 100.000 men had gone through boot camp and there were 10 (small) divisions organized with bases on the larger islands.

Some of these units were transferred to Luzon before the war broke out, to bolster the defense of that island. The same for Mindanao. Some of these regiments were
replaced by provisional, newly-mobilized regiments. Whether this new policy was wise or not is a matter of opinion. Both MacArthur and Washington (Marshall)
expected, hoped for, a gracing period till April 1942. That would, of course, have made a great difference.

That the Luzon force had to withdraw to Bataan to continue the fight from there resulted in the Japanese not being able to occupy the other islands untill Bataan
was defeated. With the Asiatic Fleet not only retreating but giving nil support to any relief or supply transports to the islands, except some submarine operations,
the Philippines were almost totally secluded.

The events on Mindanao are quite interresting and, it seems to me, relatively unknown. After the Japanese landed in Davao in December they tried to push inland in
well-known fashion. They were stopped in the Digos/Malalag area south of Davao by purely Philippine forces. Renewed attacks were unsuccessful and beginning of
January they had to give up because some of the troops were also earmarked for the invasion of Menado. That stalemate continued till April.

Fred

[Anthropoid]

Hmmm. Well I guess I don't understand then, as it was my recollection that it had been recognized for decades that the only reasonable hope of holding out in the PH was to retreat to Bataan. A quick search reveals, this Decision to Withdraw to Bataan document, which apparently reports on

The latest revision of these plans, completed in April 1941 and called WPO-3, was based on the joint Army-Navy ORANGE plan of 1938

Under WPO-3, American troops were not to fight anywhere but in Central Luzon. (See Map 4.) The mission of the Philippine garrison was to hold the entrance to Manila Bay and deny its use to Japanese naval forces. U.S. Army forces, constituting an Initial Protective Force, consisting of regular U.S. Army troops, had the main task of preventing enemy landings. Failing in this, they were to defeat those Japanese forces which succeeded in landing. If, despite these attempts, the enemy proved successful, the Initial Protective Force was to engage in delaying action but not at the expense of the primary mission, the defense of Manila Bay. The Americans were to make every attempt to hold back the Japanese advance while withdrawing to the Bataan Peninsula. Bataan, recognized as the key to the control of Manila Bay, was to be defended to the "last extremity."
. . .

WPO-3 divided Luzon, the principal theater of operations, into six sectors and provided a mobile reserve. Detailed plans for the defense of each sector were made by the sector commanders. The commander of the Philippine Division, the only U.S. Army division in the Philippines, in addition to conducting operations in the sector or sectors assigned to him, was to organize the defenses of Bataan and to command operations there if necessary.

The supply plan in WPO-3 was a complicated one. Provision had to be made to supply the six sectors during the initial phase of operations, to withdraw supplies into Bataan, and to establish there a supply base capable of supporting defensive operations by a force of 31,000 men for a period of six months. The supplies required for this purpose were designated the defense reserves, and except for ammunition most of these had already reached the Philippines. Some were already on Bataan, but the greatest portion by far was stored in the Manila area, which was as yet without adequate protection from air attack. Since these supplies would have to be moved to Corregidor and Bataan in the event of war, WPO-3 stipulated that the Filipino-American defenders would fight a delaying action to keep the roads open long enough to carry out this phase of the operation.

What I gather from this is that, it had long been recognized that, if the fight was going badly, a retreat to Bataan was the place to make a final stand. Given that, I would have thought that preparations to carry out that "final stand" would be well advanced by December 1941.

[Leandros]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

You seem to be saying that - whether through breakdown or some other reason - if MacArthur fell short in providing leadership and carrying out the pre-arranged
plan for the bombers on the Philippines, it doesn't matter because the Philippines were as good as lost anyway. Why does he get a free pass on dereliction of duty
(if that is what it was)?

No, that is not what I mean to say. What I mean to say is that whether the US bombers were dispatched to bomb Formosa or not would not have made any difference
in the air war - or the destiny of these bombers in the short or long term.

If you ask me, I'd say that MacArthur did show leadership by not releasing the B-17's for a raid on Formosa without any real knowledge of the enemy position
there. Members here should appreciate that way of thinking. What was decided eventually, to send reconnaissance planes, was the right thing to do. Again, just my
opinion.

Even better to use the B-17 force to secure the immediate archipelago, rather than a wild goose chase towards Formosa, several enemy convoys were reported.
MacArthur had a command system for his Air Force. It is noted here in an earlier posting that General Marshall contacted General Brereton to disperse his force
so that not the same thing happened on The Philippines as on Hawaii. Brereton was the person to issue detail orders to MacArthur's Air Force, whether they should
be dispersed or parked wingtip to wingtip. Which I am not sure they were. And aircraft must land to fuel from time to time. In a grand meeting with pilots and
other Army Air Force personell in the end of November Brereton briefed his men on the possibility of the oncoming war. He was very specific in his instructions to
prepare for a possible immediate war. What that meant ought to be clear to his subordinates. Could he have done more? Could MacArthur have done more?

Interesting enough, even Morrison (if I remember correctly) takes up the question of luck or bad luck. On December 8th the Americans had bad luck. Coupled with
planes, and pilots, which were inferior to the opposition's. Could MacArthur be blamed for that? He had what was sent him. The air warning system, if it was
insufficient or not well enough trained, was that MacArthur's fault or his subordinate leaders?

They believed they were good enough referred to the yardsticks of the day. But, they weren't. The P-40's could not reach up to the enemy bombers, they climbed too
slow, they had to run to save themselves from the Zeros, the pilots were, for a large part, Rookies. This was what was sent him. Any other general than
MacArthur would have had less than what was sent him.

I shall allow myself the luxury of a little retrospectiveness: If the US bombers had been dispatched towards Formosa in the morning - what would have happened?
Of course, it would depend a little on exactly when they left Clark Field. If they left early in the morning they would have found the Japanese airfields fogged
in. That is why the Japanese air attack on Luzon did not materialize untill noon. If the fog had lifted there would have been none, or very Little, enemy planes
on the airfields - they were on their way south. They may have dropped bombs from 25.000 feet, to what effect? The destruction of aircraft on the Luzon airfields
was for a large part from strafing.

They may also have met the japanese formations on their way south. The Japanese escort fighters would have massacred them. Or, on their way back south, they could
have met the Japanese formations on their way home. It is also not improbable that there was some defense fighters on Formosa.

Talking down MacArthur like it's usually done is simply - too simple. Just my opinion.

Fred

[Leandros]

ORIGINAL: Anthropoid

Hmmm. Well I guess I don't understand then, as it was my recollection that it had been recognized for decades that the only reasonable hope of holding out in the
PH was to retreat to Bataan. A quick search reveals, this Decision to Withdraw to Bataan document, which
apparently reports on,,,,

It's called changes....[;)]...

The latest revision of these plans, completed in April 1941 and called WPO-3, was based on the joint Army-Navy ORANGE plan of 1938

Again, much changed after the start of this work in 1938. The latest plan was brought to MacArthur when Brereton arrived in Manila in November 1941. At that time
MacArthur had already started implementing it. So, one can say what is stated below was out of date. The main change was that all of The Philippines should be
defended. This reflected the build-up of the Philippine Army and arrrival of "new" forces - the heavy bombers and much other equipment. That it wasn't totally
unsound is shown by the fact that the rest of the archipelago remained unoccupied till after the fall of Bataan. The Japanese offensive on Mindanao was even
stalled by purely Philippine units. However, this was not taken advantage of by the US leadership.

Under WPO-3, American troops were not to fight anywhere but in Central Luzon. (See Map 4.) The mission of the Philippine garrison was to hold the entrance
to Manila Bay and deny its use to Japanese naval forces. U.S. Army forces, constituting an Initial Protective Force, consisting of regular U.S. Army troops,
had the main task of preventing enemy landings. Failing in this, they were to defeat those Japanese forces which succeeded in landing. If, despite these attempts,
the enemy proved successful, the Initial Protective Force was to engage in delaying action but not at the expense of the primary mission, the defense of Manila Bay
. The Americans were to make every attempt to hold back the Japanese advance while withdrawing to the Bataan Peninsula. Bataan, recognized as the key to the
control of Manila Bay, was to be defended to the "last extremity."

Because the new plan didn't hold up - MacArthur had to go for plan B - withdrawal to Bataan. Yes, that was the old plan.

WPO-3 divided Luzon, the principal theater of operations, into six sectors and provided a mobile reserve. Detailed plans for the defense of each sector were made
by the sector commanders. The commander of the Philippine Division, the only U.S. Army division in the Philippines, in addition to conducting operations in the
sector or sectors assigned to him, was to organize the defenses of Bataan and to command operations there if necessary.

The supply plan in WPO-3 was a complicated one. Provision had to be made to supply the six sectors during the initial phase of operations, to withdraw supplies
into Bataan, and to establish there a supply base capable of supporting defensive operations by a force of 31,000 men for a period of six months. The supplies
required for this purpose were designated the defense reserves, and except for ammunition most of these had already reached the Philippines. Some were already
on Bataan, but the greatest portion by far was stored in the Manila area, which was as yet without adequate protection from air attack. Since these supplies would
have to be moved to Corregidor and Bataan in the event of war, WPO-3 stipulated that the Filipino-American defenders would fight a delaying action to keep the
roads open long enough to carry out this phase of the operation.

What I gather from this is that, it had long been recognized that, if the fight was going badly, a retreat to Bataan was the place to make a final stand. Given
that, I would have thought that preparations to carry out that "final stand" would be well advanced by December 1941.

They were, but all that had changed in December '41. A little remark to above. At the end of the withdrawal to Bataan the number of people to be accommodated and
supplied there had risen to about 100.000 people. This reflects both the large number of refugees as well as the increased size of the defense forces with the new
Philippine divisions. This necessitated the immediate decision of reduced rations.

I'm rather surprised that the final plan, with the changes outlined by me here, is never referred to. While MacArthur was a proponent for it, how could he not be
with the expansion of the Philippine Army and the Philippine defense in general, it was eventually confirmed and supported by Washington.

Fred

[robinsa]

Slightly OT but..

ORIGINAL: Leandros

Take it as a free gift from me to further your knowledge.

This was unnecessary and a good way to ruin a perfectly civil discussion. That being said, it's easy to take an unintended tone when writing in a foreign language. Something that wouldn't sound as harsh or bad when said in your own language can come across as very rude when said in another language. I don't know whether that's the case here tho.

[Leandros]

ORIGINAL: robinsa

Slightly OT but..

ORIGINAL: Leandros

Take it as a free gift from me to further your knowledge.

This was unnecessary and a good way to ruin a perfectly civil discussion. That being said, it's easy to take an unintended tone when writing in a foreign language. Something that wouldn't sound as harsh or bad when said in your own language can come across as very rude when said in another language. I don't know whether that's the case here tho.

Point taken, Robinsa....[;)]....Warspite:....do you read me....apologies!

Fred

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Leandros

ORIGINAL: robinsa

Slightly OT but..

ORIGINAL: Leandros

Take it as a free gift from me to further your knowledge.

This was unnecessary and a good way to ruin a perfectly civil discussion. That being said, it's easy to take an unintended tone when writing in a foreign language. Something that wouldn't sound as harsh or bad when said in your own language can come across as very rude when said in another language. I don't know whether that's the case here tho.

Point taken, Robinsa....[;)]....Warspite:....do you read me....apologies!

Fred

warspite1

Apology accepted.

[Anthropoid]

Interesting stuff Leandros. My naive view of it is this:

1. For years a withdrawal to Bataan was considered an integral part of any war plan for the area.
2. Even in the most recent version of "the plan," to defend everywhere, a withdrawal to Bataan was regarded as the fall-back, last-ditch resort.
3. In real history, the concept of defending "everywhere" proved to be impossible and a full scale withdrawal to Bataan was implemented.
4. As you point out, the number of people in the peninsula once that withdrawal was complete far exceeded the available supplies.
5. Rationing was necessarily imposed, and eventually the garrison surrendered because they were quite simply running out of supplies, and in the final week, subjected to withering bombardment and ferocious assualt.

The heroism of the defenders is it seems unquestionable, but the foresight of the administrators and leaders (whoever they might have been) in the months if not years preceding the war strike me as being negligent at best.

If Bataan was recognized as the last ditch place from which to deny the enemy "the best port in the Far East" and prolong the fight until relief might arrive, then why, oh why, was Bataan not 100% prepared with ample supplies, fuel, and defensive preparations?

I don't know what role MacArthur played in the failure to properly prepare Bataan for the eventuality of it serving as a last ditch defensive position, but it seems to me that as the supreme commander of the area, it was ultimately his responsibility from the time he took command until the time he ran away to Australia.

Maybe I'm wrong to assume that a well-prepared Bataan would have held out any longer or ultimately made any difference; what is it Napoleon is supposed to have said "there is no fortress that cannot be breached with enough money?" But what if Bataan had held out for 6 months instead of only 3? What if it had held out for 9!?

[rockmedic109]

ORIGINAL: Anthropoid

Interesting stuff Leandros. My naive view of it is this:

1. For years a withdrawal to Bataan was considered an integral part of any war plan for the area.
2. Even in the most recent version of "the plan," to defend everywhere, a withdrawal to Bataan was regarded as the fall-back, last-ditch resort.
3. In real history, the concept of defending "everywhere" proved to be impossible and a full scale withdrawal to Bataan was implemented.
4. As you point out, the number of people in the peninsula once that withdrawal was complete far exceeded the available supplies.
5. Rationing was necessarily imposed, and eventually the garrison surrendered because they were quite simply running out of supplies, and in the final week, subjected to withering bombardment and ferocious assualt.

The heroism of the defenders is it seems unquestionable, but the foresight of the administrators and leaders (whoever they might have been) in the months if not years preceding the war strike me as being negligent at best.

If Bataan was recognized as the last ditch place from which to deny the enemy "the best port in the Far East" and prolong the fight until relief might arrive, then why, oh why, was Bataan not 100% prepared with ample supplies, fuel, and defensive preparations?

I don't know what role MacArthur played in the failure to properly prepare Bataan for the eventuality of it serving as a last ditch defensive position, but it seems to me that as the supreme commander of the area, it was ultimately his responsibility from the time he took command until the time he ran away to Australia.

Maybe I'm wrong to assume that a well-prepared Bataan would have held out any longer or ultimately made any difference; what is it Napoleon is supposed to have said "there is no fortress that cannot be breached with enough money?" But what if Bataan had held out for 6 months instead of only 3? What if it had held out for 9!?

I agree that supplies and forces should have been centralized prior to the invasion. However, I do not think
the end result would have changed other than extending the drama by a month or two. This would have been a
hindrance to the Japanese but not much else.

As the CO, MacA has to shoulder the blame for this and for the fiasco of having his air force effectively
wiped out in the opening {and delayed} Japanese attack. But I do not think that the outcome would have been
much different. Not much more that costing the Japanese a couple of planes. He simply did not have the
air force to do much.

[Jorge_Stanbury]

Under the original war plan orange, the US battleship fleet was supposed to arrive relatively soon; so the idea was to hold on Bataan for few months max. Relief would arrive after the USN Battleships win a decisive battle, likely in the Philippine sea.

Problem is also that the PI is impossible to defend once you lost naval superiority; simply too many places where you can disembark in force.

[m10bob]

ORIGINAL: Anthropoid

Interesting stuff Leandros. My naive view of it is this:

1. For years a withdrawal to Bataan was considered an integral part of any war plan for the area.
2. Even in the most recent version of "the plan," to defend everywhere, a withdrawal to Bataan was regarded as the fall-back, last-ditch resort.
3. In real history, the concept of defending "everywhere" proved to be impossible and a full scale withdrawal to Bataan was implemented.
4. As you point out, the number of people in the peninsula once that withdrawal was complete far exceeded the available supplies.
5. Rationing was necessarily imposed, and eventually the garrison surrendered because they were quite simply running out of supplies, and in the final week, subjected to withering bombardment and ferocious assault.

The heroism of the defenders is it seems unquestionable, but the foresight of the administrators and leaders (whoever they might have been) in the months if not years preceding the war strike me as being negligent at best.

If Bataan was recognized as the last ditch place from which to deny the enemy "the best port in the Far East" and prolong the fight until relief might arrive, then why, oh why, was Bataan not 100% prepared with ample supplies, fuel, and defensive preparations?

I don't know what role MacArthur played in the failure to properly prepare Bataan for the eventuality of it serving as a last ditch defensive position, but it seems to me that as the supreme commander of the area, it was ultimately his responsibility from the time he took command until the time he ran away to Australia.

Maybe I'm wrong to assume that a well-prepared Bataan would have held out any longer or ultimately made any difference; what is it Napoleon is supposed to have said "there is no fortress that cannot be breached with enough money?" But what if Bataan had held out for 6 months instead of only 3? What if it had held out for 9!?

It is a myth Mac "ran off"..He was ordered out because FDR knew his true value for propaganda purposes elsewhere. It would not look good for such a high ranking and much respected American military leader to be captured right off the bat.
"Holding out" was not prepared for because from the time Mac got to the Philippines, he really did acquire a huge amount of units and equipment, a vast improvement over what had been little more than a barefoot militia.
The intent was for the entire area to be one massive OFFENSIVE area for his air force.
Had MacArthur been thinking clearly, it would have struck Formosan airfields when the Japanese planes were being fueled and loaded, rather than the exact opposite.
Once his air force was obliterated on the ground..all plans for the Philippines offensives were out the window, and unexpectedly the army became a purely defensive force, sum totem.

To the troops left to an un-necessary surrender,(had the air force survived), Mac became "Dugout Doug".

This whole ordeal humiliated Mac, a lifer brat whose father had won the Medal Of Honor, (the hard way.)
MacArthur grew up on one of those western forts in "Indian Territory" and as a child encountered his first taste of danger when he was bitten by a rattlesnake.
He adored his hero father, and always had envisioned a similar fate.

This is why Mac HAD to be ordered off the Philippines, he would have died there, (and likely forced his men to do likewise.
During the whole war he unjustly hated his second, Gen Wainwright for doing the humane thing of surrendering the starving army who could no longer continue to fight, after at least 6 long months into the war, with little help from any quarter.

[Lecivius]

Also, while the PLAN was there, the operational ability was not. Defensive infrastructure was still being built. The local army was still getting organized, let alone trained or equipped. Stockpiles were a dream. Maps, geological surveys, and other information was almost unheard of.

[m10bob]

ORIGINAL: Lecivius

Also, while the PLAN was there, the operational ability was not. Defensive infrastructure was still being built. The local army was still getting organized, let alone trained or equipped. Stockpiles were a dream. Maps, geological surveys, and other information was almost unheard of.

+1

[Leandros]

The heroism of the defenders is it seems unquestionable…

This, at least, is not a matter of discussion.

…but the foresight of the administrators and leaders (whoever they might have been) in the months if not years preceding the war strike me as being negligent at best.

Dear A, at least members of this forum should understand the real background for your allegation. It is called economy, resources. Nothing comes out of the air. This is not a perfect world, and it wasn’t at that time, either. Superiors (administrators and leaders) may plan and issue instructions as much as they like but they need to be paid for. If not, they are in vain. The Philippines had nothing like priority in Washington until MacArthur stepped up on the stage, five months before the thunderbolt struck. That is a whisper in the wind as far as serious military strategic planning goes. If anybody was to blame for the strategic outcome it was the superiors in Washington, not those on site. Just my opinion. Nobody could have done more than MacArthur did to speed up the militarization of The Philippines.

If Bataan was recognized as the last ditch place from which to deny the enemy "the best port in the Far East" and prolong the fight until relief might arrive, then why, oh why, was Bataan not 100% prepared with ample supplies, fuel, and defensive preparations?

MacArthur saw, with the growth of the Philippine Army and the increased material support from the States, the possibility of defending The Philippines in a more active way than the old forlorn strategy of just being locked up on Bataan. This coincided with Washington’s own change of mind, they also wanted to use The Philippines more offensively - that was not possible with the old strategy. If the army should fight outside Bataan they couldn’t put all their resources there. This had become Washington’s new strategy in December 1941 never mind if MacArthur was of the same opinion!

Nevertheless, there were enormous amounts of supplies and munitions stored at Bataan. But, apart from the fact that the number of mouths to be fed was tripled compared with what was expected, there are many stories of the half-panic that developed among the US forces when the orders to start the withdrawal to Bataan was issued. There are also many heroic stories of officers and men that returned to their departure points to scrounge for important items and supplies when they understood that time wasn’t as sparse as they first thought. But many of those not involved directly in fighting the advancing enemy high-tailed as fast as they could. Large numbers of rail wagons filled with stores never left for Bataan. MacArthur’s fault? Yes, about as much as it was his fault that planes were parked wingtip to wingtip. If they were?

I don't know what role MacArthur played in the failure to properly prepare Bataan for the eventuality of it serving as a last ditch defensive position, but it seems to me that as the supreme commander of the area, it was ultimately his responsibility from the time he took command until the time he ran away to Australia.

General MacArthur was appointed chief of the USAFFE in the end of July 1941. Till then, from 1935, he had worked as an advisor for the development of the Philippine Army. This started in earnest beginning of 1937 and was financed by the meagre budget of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, at that time it had been promised its independence in 1945. As such he had little influence on US strategy and planning on the defense of the archipelago. His frequent requests for support to the budding Philippine Army was largely neglected. He had a lot of work to do when he was installed in his new position. Nobody could have done it better.

Maybe I'm wrong to assume that a well-prepared Bataan would have held out any longer or ultimately made any difference; what is it Napoleon is supposed to have said "there is no fortress that cannot be breached with enough money?" But what if Bataan had held out for 6 months instead of only 3? What if it had held out for 9!

MacArthur’s, and Washington’s, new strategy was not unsound, which is proven by the fact that while the fight for Bataan was going on the Japanese had no resources available to occupy the rest of the islands
My answer to your question is that it would not have mattered. Not because the fight for Bataan did not matter but because the outside leadership did not take advantage of it! The greatest mystery in all this is the role of the US Navy.

Consider this – only three months after the surrender of Corregidor, on August 7th, the US started a powerful offensive in the Solomons. At that time the great potential of the forces in The Philippines, 100.000 men, many already blooded in battle, was lost.

Fred

[Lecivius]

ORIGINAL: Leandros

Consider this – only three months after the surrender of Corregidor, on August 7th, the US started a powerful offensive in the Solomons. At that time the great potential of the forces in The Philippines, 100.000 men, many already blooded in battle, was lost.

Fred

I for one, am glad they did not try. The Solomon campaign was almost a year ahead of planning, it was done on s shoestring budget, it had no planning, took advantage of a miracle that occurred a few months previously, had very little in support, and was on the extended range of Japans LOC, while being close to Allied support at Noumea and Espirito. The Philippines were a LONG way behind front lines. Any support effort would have been very bloody, very painful, and totally fruitless.

[Leandros]

ORIGINAL: Lecivius

Also, while the PLAN was there, the operational ability was not. Defensive infrastructure was still being built. The local army was still getting
organized, let alone trained or equipped. Stockpiles were a dream. Maps, geological surveys, and other information was almost unheard of.

Nevertheless, that Luzon army, without operational ability, organization, defensive infrastructure, training, equipment and stockpiles performed double successful
fighting withdrawals and wore down the operationally able, well organized enemy with infrastructure, training and good equipment untill it needed to be replaced
by own fresh forces...[;)]

The same occured on Mindanao.

Fred

[Anthropoid]

Good points Fred. You've satisfied my skepticism!

I guess a good overarching take-home message is: no matter how brilliant the commanders nor how brave and hardy the troops it is ultimate nations which fight and win wars, and if neither political leaders nor the public are willing to pay to prepare then you cannot expect miracles. Pretty much the point in that old aphorism by Vegetius, "If you seek peace, prepare for war."

Hope your book is a great success and source of satisfaction!

[Yaab]

A very interesting discussion, though it veered somewhat off-topic.

It seems to me that the greatest asset of the Dutch in the Pacific is the Dutch merchant navy and subs. You get very little in terms of Dutch devices, aircraft, pilots and supply, so there is no point in saving them from Java - let Java be their last stand. But the navy is definitely worth preserving.

One more thing, the Dutch mines are produced until 12/1942. Where would they be produced historically - UK or USA?

[HansBolter]

ORIGINAL: Yaab

A very interesting discussion, though it veered somewhat off-topic.

It seems to me that the greatest asset of the Dutch in the Pacific is the Dutch merchant navy and subs. You get very little in terms of Dutch devices, aircraft, pilots and supply, so there is no point in saving them from Java - let Java be their last stand. But the navy is definitely worth preserving.

One more thing, the Dutch mines are produced until 12/1942. Where would they be produced historically - UK or USA?

Couldn't disagree more Yaab (in a friendly way of course).

Any item that is worth victory points to the opponent to destroy is always worth saving from destruction.