A Japanese invasion of Hawaii

[Curtis Lemay]

So questions here from your simulations:

- In playing out this scenario, how many (battalion strength? - please confirm) of troops are landed and at which islands?

Since the neighbor islands are undefended, it's not really critical. A couple of battalions per island should do. I would probably capture Kauai and Maui. Since the PI invasion is postponed there are plenty of battalions available.

- When are these troops landed in terms of the attack? Have these troops sailed with the KB or are these follow-up?

Sailed with them in DDs. They would land the same day as the raid.

- Presumably these units have come from the PI OOB?

Yes.

- What aircraft are earmarked for this operation? Please confirm the unit ID's and where they are based in December 1941.

Apparently it would have to be the Zeros and Bettys from the PI operation. Other air units would have to substitute for them in the PI. That may mean that neighbor islands to Luzon have to be grabbed too for range reasons. Luzon would remain postponed.

It's possible that some of the carriers might drop off their zeros as they depart. They could then take the PI zeros onboard later.

- Which specific islands have you flown them to?

Here's where my memory from doing this years ago may have slipped. It's possible the only island that Zeros could get to Hawaii from would be Midway. But, that just means Midway has to be added to the target package. Doable if the PI is postponed.

- Finally what is the timetable for them reaching HI and how do they get there? A timetable would be really useful here please.

Just as soon as Midway can be made operational.

- What provision is made for supplying, refuelling, arming, repairing and replacing these aircraft units once on the islands?

Initially, they would be resupplied by DDs, until slower cargo ships arrive. Replacement aircraft can be flown in from Midway.

[RangerJoe]

Plenty of preparations could have been made. And it wasn't just the British that should have been alerted by this. All the Allies should have been. In modern terms we would have gone to DEFCOM 2.

Preparations were made and were continuing. What is DEFCOM 2?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DEFCON was what I meant.

This is fascinating since the DEFCON system was invented by NORAD in 1957. So years would have passed for the situation to go to DEFCON 2 in case of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

2. The Pearl aircraft were detected by radar. Ignored.
The radar was new, there were no protocols on what to do in regards to anything being detected, the USA was not at war until the next day.

In other words, "inert obliviousness", as I said.

No, there were no protocols to follow. Also, the radar set was already supposed to be turned off.

You're just making excuses for WHY they were oblivious. That's irrelevant. What matters is that they WERE oblivious.

Not oblivious, no protocols. The trainee officer said that the radar contact was the B17s that were expected in while the radar operators did not state that the contact was more than 50 aircraft. That means that there was nothing like a "Spot Report" or whatever it would have been called here such as a "Radar Contact" report. This is probably due to the newness of the equipment and the higher officers not knowing the full capabilities nor problems of the equipment.

3. A mini-sub was detected at the harbor entrance and probably sunk. Ignored.
Not ignored, it was reported. Again, no protocols on what to do.

Never made it up the chain of command. (inert obliviousness).

Yes, it did go up the chain of command. But someone wanted the report verified. Otherwise, a cetacean could have caused an alert to be called. Do you realize just how many of those creatures would be in the area?

4. The Japanese ultimatum was decoded a day before Pearl - except for one part which was held for the morning. No action taken.
Action was taken but there was radio interference so a commercial telegraph was sent with no special priority.

This was the night before. It was ignored. (inert obliviousness).

It was not ignored.

5. When the final part of the ultimatum was received on the day of the attack - clearly a war warning - the opportunity to telephone Kimmel was aborted. A message via telegraph was bungled and didn't arrive till after the attack.
It did not specifically state war. Were there open telephone lines available? Was there a way to talk securely?

Ordered the embassy to destroy codes and secret docs. War was obvious. But the lines of communication were oblivious.

So? There are plenty of times to destroy codes and secret docs with no war coming. War was not obvious, at least not involving the USA. The lines of communication were not oblivious but they were not as reliable nor effective as they are now.

More irrelevant excuses. What matters is that they had all these warnings and still got taken by surprise. That is a strong sign that spotting a carrier somewhere in the middle of the Pacific isn't going to make any real difference.

While the Army and Navy in Hawaii were caught by surprise, important equipment was removed and nor replaced. Nor was the information that this equipment obtained elsewhere was sent to Oahu. There was no unified command at Hawaii, the Army was responsible to defend the Naval ships and installations in Hawaii.

6. When the attack occurred, news of it was disbelieved. It couldn't have been Pearl!
Because of wishful thinking. That attitude has since been changed.

It clearly shows how oblivious the high command was to a sneak attack on Pearl.

Not oblivious, there was a lack of knowledge of the capabilities of the Imperial Japanese Navy. While many heavy Japanese naval units were accounted for, the carriers and other ships in the Kido Butai had exchanged call signs prior to sailing to Hawaii.

Incorrect. Admiral Ernest King (have you ever heard of him? Do you know what position he held?) wargamed such an attack.

They wargame everything. They were still in disbelief when the attack was finally confirmed.

So? You act as if such an attack should have been expected, especially since diplomatic negotiations were continuing. But there was a rotten mole in the Us system, maybe Stalin wanted Japan occupied with the USA and not being able to attack into Siberia . . .

https://www.historyonthenet.com/intelli ... dec-7-1941

7. Land AAA guns in Pearl didn't have ammo initially.
The US was at peace. Why would ammo be stored with the guns? That could be dangerous.

Clearly, they weren't at DEFCOM 2. (inert obliviousness).

How could there be a DEFCON 2 when the system had not yet been invented yet? Remember, peacetime on a Sunday morning with no actual shooting war in the foreseeable future with poorly trained new troops with inexperienced officers in command? You really want a lot of trouble! Accidents can happen like having a practice test with a live round in the chamber and someone stupidly actually firing the gun instead of stating "I am refiring the gun for the misfire procedure." The round fired could then send the shell into a storage container (possibly filled with live ammo) and/or land next to or even in a civilian community!

Again, what is DEFCOM 2? Even at higher stages of peacetime alerts, ammo is not disbursed since that can lead to things left theft and accidents.

8. Aircraft on Oahu were deployed to prevent sabotage - a disaster for the air raid.
That was because of the perceived highest risk.

(inert obliviousness).

You are fond of that phrase but what do you mean by it? Here it appears that you are ignoring the danger from the highest perceived risk to the aircraft.

More excuses. They don't matter. They were oblivious to a carrier sneak attack. That matters.

They were not oblivious but the Army commander was acting according to the best information that he had and his assessment of the risks. Even the USS Enterprise at sea was caught off guard when they send dive bombers to Oahu before the ship was to be in port.

9. The day of the attack - after news of Pearl has spread - the air forces on Luzon were caught on the ground and destroyed.
They had been in the air but the Japanese attack was delayed. The planes on Luzon landed to refuel and that is when they were caught on the ground,

They should have been on a full war footing by then. Not having any planes in the sky over the airbases is just more evidence of inert obliviousness. And this is AFTER Pearl.

You love to ignore what doesn't ft your narrative. All of the aircraft had been in the air and needed to be refueled. At that time, there was no inflight refueling capabilities. Apparently, to satisfy you, you want airplanes to run out of fuel in the air and crash.

They should have had multiple team flights staged, so that the air was never unguarded. It's like they needed a while to get into a full war footing. That was true of Pearl as well.

Multiple flight teams staged? Remember that the Philippines were and still are a separate country. The Commander in Chief hoped that the Philippines would stay neutral.

The North Pacific in December has very bad weather and high seas. Detection of the carriers would have been unlikely and even if it occured, the report would have been unlikely to have much accuracy or be interpreted to be what it actually was. This would be made worse if the Japs aborted and nothing happened. Having cried wolf once and been wrong, how would any intel officer ever be listened to again?
You can't guarantee that the weather would be acceptable for an attack in one week or whenever the Japanese decided to bother attacking. Especially with the loaded troop transports running out of food and even worse, potable water. Not to mention getting word to all of the other Japanese forces as to when the attack will finally occur without any spies notifying the targets about the attacks.

Huh? Nobody is going to be running out of supplies. Ships can be supplied at sea. Weather in the North Pacific in December is very different from weather in Hawaii in December.

Describe in detail the Japanese capabilities of the Japanese resupply at sea in all weather conditions during this time frame. If the Japanese ships are not cruising in the North Pacific where they might have been discovered by fishing vessels, are you stating that the Japanese ships are sailing around in the Hawaiian area?

The details are irrelevant. If they've been at sea so long that they run out of food, they can return to port if resupply at sea isn't available. But resupply at sea is physically possible, and the Japs could have had it setup as part of the plan if they really wanted to.

The details are relevant, how would the Japanese done the resupply? How would they know how much to bring? If the ships return to port, then that fuel used was wasted plus the attack can't occur until the ships then get back on station. While the troops are on the ships, their physical fitness will deteriorate, their skill sets will not continue to be worked on, illness and injuries would occur also reducing their effectiveness, and may other problems would happen.

A couple of interesting links:

https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/a ... l-warnings

https://www.military.com/off-duty/books ... arbor.html

[warspite1]

So questions here from your simulations:

- In playing out this scenario, how many (battalion strength? - please confirm) of troops are landed and at which islands?

Since the neighbor islands are undefended, it's not really critical. A couple of battalions per island should do. I would probably capture Kauai and Maui. Since the PI invasion is postponed there are plenty of battalions available.

- When are these troops landed in terms of the attack? Have these troops sailed with the KB or are these follow-up?

Sailed with them in DDs. They would land the same day as the raid.

- Presumably these units have come from the PI OOB?

Yes.

- What aircraft are earmarked for this operation? Please confirm the unit ID's and where they are based in December 1941.

Apparently it would have to be the Zeros and Bettys from the PI operation. Other air units would have to substitute for them in the PI. That may mean that neighbor islands to Luzon have to be grabbed too for range reasons. Luzon would remain postponed.

It's possible that some of the carriers might drop off their zeros as they depart. They could then take the PI zeros onboard later.

- Which specific islands have you flown them to?

Here's where my memory from doing this years ago may have slipped. It's possible the only island that Zeros could get to Hawaii from would be Midway. But, that just means Midway has to be added to the target package. Doable if the PI is postponed.

- Finally what is the timetable for them reaching HI and how do they get there? A timetable would be really useful here please.

Just as soon as Midway can be made operational.

- What provision is made for supplying, refuelling, arming, repairing and replacing these aircraft units once on the islands?

Initially, they would be resupplied by DDs, until slower cargo ships arrive. Replacement aircraft can be flown in from Midway.

warspite1

Sorry, can you clarify please? You said you've successfully made these attacks. Can you confirm which islands? Which airfields? Which aircraft did you use? When did you take Midway? Using what units?

You seem to be answering as though you haven't actually done this?

[Torplexed]

The details are relevant, how would the Japanese done the resupply? How would they know how much to bring? If the ships return to port, then that fuel used was wasted plus the attack can't occur until the ships then get back on station. While the troops are on the ships, their physical fitness will deteriorate, their skill sets will not continue to be worked on, illness and injuries would occur also reducing their effectiveness, and may other problems would happen.

Excellent points. Carriers do not carry unlimited supplies of ordnance, fuel, aircraft, and pilots. Nagumo's operation was a raid, so it didn't matter too much. In this invasion scenario we must assume the Japanese to have the fleet train to replenish the CVs, and supporting transports with food, water and spare aircraft like the US eventually had when they loitered off Japan in 1945. However, the IJN did not have anything remotely like that sort of fleet train in 1941, and that is what makes the invasion op moot. Given the IJN's obsession with the construction of warships and "decisive battle", they were doctrinally blind to the need for more and better logistical support vessels in the years before the war. Of course, this is also the same reason the Japanese never seriously included hitting the oil farms, ship tenders and naval yards in their planning for the PH raid. That was logistical stuff and therefore unimportant to a warrior.

Another factor nixing any third attack wave on December 7th was that 1/4 of the aircraft that the Japanese started out the day with were deadlined by that evening. Too shot up to fly right away. And that was from whatever flak the USN was able to throw up on short notice. The US Army AA batteries that were locked and stowed on Sunday, December 7th, consisted of 26 fixed and 60 mobile 3" guns, 20 mobile 37mm guns, and 107 fixed and mobile .50 caliber machineguns. They're back in the game by the 8th and they're gonna take a heavy toll on the Kido Butai's remaining pilots or whatever pilots are over Oahu.

Kido Butai was certainly capable of doing one thing at a time. But in this scenario, it has to conduct a port raid, provide air cover for a corps-sized invasion fleet, prepare for a possible naval battle, and an invasion of multiple islands? At the very least, I think you'd have to double the number of IJN fleet carriers to pull all those missions off simultaneously. Carriers that don't exist. At Midway, the Kido Butai famously tried to do multiple tasks at once and failed miserably.

I would also note that the Japanese 48th Division slated for the Philippine Invasion was due to be transferred later to the control of the IJA 16th Army in eastern Java after Manila was captured. It was assigned the capture of Surabaya and its strategic oil fields in March 1942. If it's now in this Hawaii op, you have to juggle another Japanese division out of your sleeve to take its place.

However, I must confess I find the idea of stuffing whole Japanese divisions into destroyers for a cross ocean trek rather amusing. That might have worked as an expedient in the short and calmer distances of the Solomons, but not in the stormy North Pacific. Especially if you are loitering around waiting for a perfect Sunday morning where word arrives that the US carriers are at Pearl.

[warspite1]

However, I must confess I find the idea of stuffing whole Japanese divisions into destroyers for a cross ocean trek rather amusing. That might have worked as an expedient in the short and calmer distances of the Solomons, but not in the stormy North Pacific. Especially if you are loitering around to wait until word arrives that the US carriers are at Pearl.

warspite1

You should read (if you haven't already) about the German troops heading to the most northerly targets during the Norwegian Campaign. They were aboard for a few days..... The Japanese troops would have been aboard these destroyers for over two weeks by the time the attack happens.... Mmmmm

But this is something you can't really wargame using any game I know (it's too detailed) - so for the purposes of this scenario we are assuming a lot of things - and this is one of them.

But what CAN be done do is try and wargame the attack that Curtis Lemay is saying was achievable, in other ways. And I don't understand why he won't just tell us what he did in the various games he's played. I quote:

"As for invading Hawaii, it can be pulled off successfully in every sim I've ever played. It's not necessary to invade Oahu right off. Just take the surrounding (largely undefended) islands, fly in land-based bombers and go from there. The carriers can then be released for the other operations".

So give us the detail please?

As for the KB sticking around Curtis Lemay has previously confirmed in a previous post that the KB would not hang around:

"Initially, the troops (a few battalions, as I said) and supplies are landed via destroyers (as the Japs used frequently for small invasions). Most of the neighboring islands had ports and airfields. The carriers are long gone and are not being worn down or risked".

So please Curtis Lemay, can you answer the questions from my post (the third post from the bottom of Page 5)?

[Torplexed]

As for the KB sticking around Curtis Lemay has previously confirmed in a previous post that the KB would not hang around:

"Initially, the troops (a few battalions, as I said) and supplies are landed via destroyers (as the Japs used frequently for small invasions). Most of the neighboring islands had ports and airfields. The carriers are long gone and are not being worn down or risked".

That's interesting. If the Japanese carriers and fleet depart the area what prevents those still intact USN cruisers and destroyers from sortieing every night from Pearl Harbor to bombard and harass these new Japanese airfields, interfering with any attempt to keep them supplied? PT boats as well. The army airfield at Barking Sands in Kauai is literally on the beach and would be right under the guns. Plus, I don't think it was of the size yet to accommodate two-engine bombers in 1941. You can bring in engineers to lengthen it, but that is not going to happen overnight.

I suppose you can leave some Japanese cruisers and DDs behind, but without a port in the surrounding islands on a par with Pearl Harbor in which to replenish torpedoes, ammo, fuel, and effect repairs they are going to lose in a battle of logistics. Major naval depots don't get set up overnight either and the US West Coast is a lot closer than Japan.

[warspite1]

As for the KB sticking around Curtis Lemay has previously confirmed in a previous post that the KB would not hang around:

"Initially, the troops (a few battalions, as I said) and supplies are landed via destroyers (as the Japs used frequently for small invasions). Most of the neighboring islands had ports and airfields. The carriers are long gone and are not being worn down or risked".

That's interesting. If the Japanese carriers and fleet depart the area what prevents those still intact USN cruisers and destroyers from sortieing every night from Pearl Harbor to bombard and harass these new Japanese airfields, interfering with any attempt to keep them supplied? PT boats as well. The army airfield at Barking Sands in Kauai is literally on the beach and would be right under the guns. Plus, I don't think it was of the size yet to accommodate two-engine bombers in 1941. You can bring in engineers to lengthen it, but that is not going to happen overnight.

I suppose you can leave some Japanese cruisers and DDs behind, but without a port in the surrounding islands on a par with Pearl Harbor in which to replenish torpedoes, ammo, fuel, and effect repairs they are going to lose in a battle of logistics. Major naval depots don't get set up overnight either and the US West Coast is a lot closer than Japan.

warspite1

Indeed - this is why we need detail and to help Curtis Lemay I've tried to break this down into bitesize chunks. In the wargames Curtis Lemay was running, what exactly was the Japanese timeframe, what did the US forces have available on 14 December once the raid had ended?

[Platoonist]

Especially if you are loitering around waiting for a perfect Sunday morning where word arrives that the US carriers are at Pearl.

That does conjure up a fun mental map. Especially if the Japanese were to strike out on Sunday after Sunday after Sunday.

Operation Z for Zilch.jpg (231.24 KiB) Viewed 1129 times

[Orm]

As for the KB sticking around Curtis Lemay has previously confirmed in a previous post that the KB would not hang around:

"Initially, the troops (a few battalions, as I said) and supplies are landed via destroyers (as the Japs used frequently for small invasions). Most of the neighboring islands had ports and airfields. The carriers are long gone and are not being worn down or risked".

That's interesting. If the Japanese carriers and fleet depart the area what prevents those still intact USN cruisers and destroyers from sortieing every night from Pearl Harbor to bombard and harass these new Japanese airfields, interfering with any attempt to keep them supplied? PT boats as well. The army airfield at Barking Sands in Kauai is literally on the beach and would be right under the guns. Plus, I don't think it was of the size yet to accommodate two-engine bombers in 1941. You can bring in engineers to lengthen it, but that is not going to happen overnight.

I suppose you can leave some Japanese cruisers and DDs behind, but without a port in the surrounding islands on a par with Pearl Harbor in which to replenish torpedoes, ammo, fuel, and effect repairs they are going to lose in a battle of logistics. Major naval depots don't get set up overnight either and the US West Coast is a lot closer than Japan.

And probably backed up by a couple of battleships.

[Orm]

Especially if you are loitering around waiting for a perfect Sunday morning where word arrives that the US carriers are at Pearl.

That does conjure up a fun mental map. Especially if the Japanese were to strike out on Sunday after Sunday after Sunday.


Operation Z for Zilch.jpg

Thank you,

[Aurelian]

So questions here from your simulations:

- In playing out this scenario, how many (battalion strength? - please confirm) of troops are landed and at which islands?

Since the neighbor islands are undefended, it's not really critical. A couple of battalions per island should do. I would probably capture Kauai and Maui. Since the PI invasion is postponed there are plenty of battalions available.

- When are these troops landed in terms of the attack? Have these troops sailed with the KB or are these follow-up?

Sailed with them in DDs. They would land the same day as the raid.

- Presumably these units have come from the PI OOB?

Yes.

- What aircraft are earmarked for this operation? Please confirm the unit ID's and where they are based in December 1941.

Apparently it would have to be the Zeros and Bettys from the PI operation. Other air units would have to substitute for them in the PI. That may mean that neighbor islands to Luzon have to be grabbed too for range reasons. Luzon would remain postponed.

It's possible that some of the carriers might drop off their zeros as they depart. They could then take the PI zeros onboard later.

- Which specific islands have you flown them to?

Here's where my memory from doing this years ago may have slipped. It's possible the only island that Zeros could get to Hawaii from would be Midway. But, that just means Midway has to be added to the target package. Doable if the PI is postponed.

- Finally what is the timetable for them reaching HI and how do they get there? A timetable would be really useful here please.

Just as soon as Midway can be made operational.

- What provision is made for supplying, refuelling, arming, repairing and replacing these aircraft units once on the islands?

Initially, they would be resupplied by DDs, until slower cargo ships arrive. Replacement aircraft can be flown in from Midway.

warspite1

Sorry, can you clarify please? You said you've successfully made these attacks. Can you confirm which islands? Which airfields? Which aircraft did you use? When did you take Midway? Using what units?

You seem to be answering as though you haven't actually done this?

I'm curious as to where these cargo ships unload with no proper port facilities. Are they going to sit off shore and use boats? Where will they refuel and or do maintenence?

Let's look at Truk. Miminal shore repair facilities. A total storage capacity oy 77,000+ of fuel. Rather than providing piers, the fleet anchored the in the lagoon. Supplies were delivered by lighter. No shore services, (steam/electricity/potable water), meant the ships constantly provided their own, leading to more wear/tear on their engineering plants, less maintenence, less rest for the engineers, and a constant drain on their fuel. Just having the BBs and CA/CLs of the Combined Fleet, there just wasn't enough fuel for them all. Certainly unable to fill them all with fuel.

The Japanese didn't have forward deployed mobile dry docks, so if they had some underwater damage , they had to go to Singapore, the home islands, or captured facilities in the PI. (oh, right, that operation is postponed.) And any ship damaged enough to be unseaworthy to do that, was just parked somewhere and abandoned.

How much worse would it be on some island in Hawaii with..... nothing?

[Aurelian]

As for the KB sticking around Curtis Lemay has previously confirmed in a previous post that the KB would not hang around:

"Initially, the troops (a few battalions, as I said) and supplies are landed via destroyers (as the Japs used frequently for small invasions). Most of the neighboring islands had ports and airfields. The carriers are long gone and are not being worn down or risked".

That's interesting. If the Japanese carriers and fleet depart the area what prevents those still intact USN cruisers and destroyers from sortieing every night from Pearl Harbor to bombard and harass these new Japanese airfields, interfering with any attempt to keep them supplied? PT boats as well. The army airfield at Barking Sands in Kauai is literally on the beach and would be right under the guns. Plus, I don't think it was of the size yet to accommodate two-engine bombers in 1941. You can bring in engineers to lengthen it, but that is not going to happen overnight.

I suppose you can leave some Japanese cruisers and DDs behind, but without a port in the surrounding islands on a par with Pearl Harbor in which to replenish torpedoes, ammo, fuel, and effect repairs they are going to lose in a battle of logistics. Major naval depots don't get set up overnight either and the US West Coast is a lot closer than Japan.

And probably backed up by a couple of battleships.

And probably the Atlantic Fleet as well.

[Orm]

If Japan hangs around waiting to bag a couple of CVs in the port strike, then it stands to reason that they miss a couple of BBs in the raid. Thus, they would have been available almost at once in the defence of the Islands. Considering that the Japanese CVs left. Transferring the Atlantic fleet to Hawaii should take a bit longer.

[Torplexed]

How much worse would it be on some island in Hawaii with..... nothing?

Not quite nothing, but not much more. At the time the small ports at Kauai, Maui and the Big Island were built with the sugar and pineapple industries in mind and little else. They had breakwaters and a dredged harbor, maybe a pier or two for cargo or ferries but certainly no luxuries like drydocks, tank farms or wharves equipped with cranes and rail spurs. They were probably comparable to some of the small harbors of the South Pacific like Suva or Pago Pago. Cargo could be unloaded there, but slowly. A rough rule of thumb at the time was that a single berth could load or unload six ships per month.

So, like you said about Truk ,it's going to involve using a flotilla of lighters as well, which was a slow and manpower-intensive process.

When the Japanese took over the excellent anchorage and the former Quantas airfields at Rabaul, New Britain on the 23rd of January 1942, it wasn't until mid-February that it was deemed ready for bombers to fly in. Aviation personnel had to set up shop, new runways and fueling facilities had to be built, dock-space expanded, etc. It didn't become a bomber base overnight although it did eventually become a major installation with time.

Another nearby naval asset the USN had available in the area were a good number of dedicated minelayers and destroyers converted to minelayers berthed in Pearl Harbor. None were lost to the raid except for the old Oglala which was later raised and repaired. There was also the large minelaying submarine Argonaut. I could certainly see them being profitably used in offensive minelaying in narrow waters like the Kauaii Channel at night.

[Bo Rearguard]

Now, now, in the old boardgame Victory in the Pacific, I took Hawaii. It took optional rules and some luck, but I did it.

Me too! Conquest by cardboard counter! However, I'm not quite sure that was the impressive feat I thought it was at the time. Both VITP and it's sister game War at Sea were often called Yahtzee at Sea due to all the heavy dice rolling.

VITP.jpg (127.47 KiB) Viewed 1039 times

[warspite1]

So questions here from your simulations:

- In playing out this scenario, how many (battalion strength? - please confirm) of troops are landed and at which islands?

Since the neighbor islands are undefended, it's not really critical. A couple of battalions per island should do. I would probably capture Kauai and Maui. Since the PI invasion is postponed there are plenty of battalions available.

- When are these troops landed in terms of the attack? Have these troops sailed with the KB or are these follow-up?

Sailed with them in DDs. They would land the same day as the raid.

- Presumably these units have come from the PI OOB?

Yes.

- What aircraft are earmarked for this operation? Please confirm the unit ID's and where they are based in December 1941.

Apparently it would have to be the Zeros and Bettys from the PI operation. Other air units would have to substitute for them in the PI. That may mean that neighbor islands to Luzon have to be grabbed too for range reasons. Luzon would remain postponed.

It's possible that some of the carriers might drop off their zeros as they depart. They could then take the PI zeros onboard later.

- Which specific islands have you flown them to?

Here's where my memory from doing this years ago may have slipped. It's possible the only island that Zeros could get to Hawaii from would be Midway. But, that just means Midway has to be added to the target package. Doable if the PI is postponed.

- Finally what is the timetable for them reaching HI and how do they get there? A timetable would be really useful here please.

Just as soon as Midway can be made operational.

- What provision is made for supplying, refuelling, arming, repairing and replacing these aircraft units once on the islands?

Initially, they would be resupplied by DDs, until slower cargo ships arrive. Replacement aircraft can be flown in from Midway.

warspite1

So I think, given these answers, we need to step back a bit. The questions I've asked previously have not gone away, but the Pearl Harbor raid, re-imagined to ensure the carriers are at Pearl and to land troops and aircraft to some of the Hawaiian Islands, has now started to morph into something considerably larger and more complex - even without an assault on Oahu.

So, before we get back to that, let's understand what this means.

1. You've mentioned taking two islands with a couple of battalions each and these are to be taken to the target by destroyer. The KB obviously needs its own destroyer defence, so I assume you've used additional destroyers units when gaming this? For four battalions, how many additional destroyers have you had to add to the KB? How many men can a destroyer comfortably carry + their equipment, initial supplies, AA weaponry etc.

2. Have any other ships been added to the KB? Even if not, and given that the date for the attack is unknown and the KB may be at sea for weeks, how many tankers do Japan now need to employ to ensure the enlarged KB is kept supplied?

3. You've brought the need for Midway to be taken as an essential part of this plan (not sure why you didn't mention that you needed to do this before) and so the obvious questions are:

- What, if anything, did the US have by way of defence forces and coastal guns on Midway in December 1941?
- What forces do the Japanese commit to ensuring the island is taken? This is both troop numbers, and naval vessels.
- Where do these forces sail from?
- What timescale are we talking about in terms of their arrival off Midway? I am assuming you've not put these to sea until a date for the PH attack has been confirmed? When do they arrive off Midway? I'm trying to understand how long the troops, landed on the HI, have to wait for any kind of air cover, and how big a window do the Americans have for reinforcing the islands.
- You still haven't confirmed which air units (fighters and bombers) you have earmarked for the two Hawaiian Islands. Can you confirm this as of course this is potentially important in terms of knock on effect on the operations against Malaya, the NEI, and keeping the aircraft on PI quiet.

[TulliusDetritus]

The land based naval air units the 7 december, sorted by number of planes or size of the unit. Some army fighters (Oscars) are long range. Plenty in the pool, apparently (if the modder got it right that is).

[warspite1]

The land based naval air units the 7 december, sorted by number of planes or size of the unit. Some army fighters (Oscars) are long range. Plenty in the pool, apparently (if the modder got it right that is).

warspite1

Plenty in the pool? Well if I read this right, as one example alone, you have three units of the 22nd Air Flotilla included in this table. This is why I have asked Curtis Lemay for detail. These units can’t be in two places at once. If they are sinking Force Z, they are not heading for the PI.

[TulliusDetritus]

Plenty in the pool? Well if I read this right, as one example alone, you have three units of the 22nd Air Flotilla included in this table.

No, I'm talking about the long range army fighters or Oscars. If zeroes are diverted to the east I assume these fighters would be doing the fighting. Most of the army fighter squadrons (Nates and Oscars) were in the south vs the British.

I only give you the big picture, I won't be planning this what if lol

[TulliusDetritus]

See the army fighters involved. Much less in the Philippines (5th division). The 3rd is in the south.