Analysis of Naval Gunnery Combat

[el cid again]

There are 18 ammo rounds on the Warspite for her main guns and 18 goes into 800 44.44 times, or 44 rounds per gun. We know that if Warspite shoots 3 rounds that is 132 shells.

MAYBE it means that. I note IJN submarines - with radically different guns - ALSO are almost always rated at 18 rounds of ammo. And they usually carried 17 or 18 shells! That is only 1 shell per round!

Every time I get into WITP data, I find serious and amazing data errors.
Even where the engine has great potential, this is squandered by

A) A lack of clear definitions, even for in house use, so someone doing data entry lacks critical knowledge of what to enter. Note that the release of an editor implies these definitions should also have been released with it.

B) A lack of consistent application of uniform standards even to the extent a definition appears to exist, de facto. Thus, some planes get more than 200% of their service ceiling, many get exactly 100%, and many others get less - exactly 3000 or 10000 feet less. That is four different data entry standards in the same field! Even if the code uses ceiling perfectly every time, you cannot model the planes in the data set properly with such variations in the data (from ceiling minus 10,000 feet all the way to 210% of ceiling)!

Which is a technical way of saying that, IF something is wrong with naval combat, it is very possible it is in the data set, not in the code. I can show that devices are awfully defined (in terms of consistency). It is barely possible to show that someone knew the penetration of guns is 1.75 times the caliber at close range - a significant number of guns use this value. But many use completely different values - including penetrations of ZERO! There are similar errors in accuracy (which is really ROF) and range. There are also gross errors in armor - probably more ships wrong than right. There may be errors in other things that matter in the routine as well - things we do not even know. Until we get all the data reasonably close to right, running battles is more or less an exercise in generating random results.

[el cid again]

Can you name one Allied ship DD class or larger that was in an engagement in the PTO in 1942 whose crew had no training in night combat?

The experience at Savo indicates the correct answer may be "all of them." It is hard to find any example of a crew that had much of a sense of what to do that night. Ships in contact with the enemy didn't report to SOPA - nor to the absent force flagship. Ships that should have seen the enemy - and were seen by the enemy - seem not to have seen anything. Not one captain who survived was deemed to have done well - I read somewhere all were relieved and one committed suicide. This was the first significant naval surface action for USN in the war and the greatest defeat in actual battle in US naval history. [Pearl Harbor cost more ships and was a battle, but it was not a NAVAL battle. Defense of Oahu was an ARMY mission, and the fleet was properly regarded as not able to fight a naval action when in port.]

There is something more than training and doctrine and experience as well: there is equipment. Japan had technically better optics - even binoculars - than USN did. This could and did matter. It should be modeled. And radar in a game is a terrible skew - it was not as effective as Japanese night optics in 1942 - but if present it always works in computer code!

[el cid again]

If you had to throw USS Augusta into the game as an ahistorical "what if," how would you rate her night combat experience in contrast to, say, IJN Mogami, as of 8 December 1941?

4. How would USS Pillsbury fall on that ranking scheme?

Since NO US ship had binoculars, nor larger optical instruments, equal to their IJN counterparts, whatever the ranking might be, it would favor the IJN.

Since NO US ship EVER had night lookouts blindfolded by day or fed special diets to enhanse night vision, same same.

In spite of these technicial issues, it is clear the USN became very skilled in night combat. Only part of this was mastery of radar - and arrival of better radars in significant numbers. A lot of it was better training and better doctrine. Until Java Sea there was no use of tactical radios in naval battles anywhere. One notable exchange was by a US destroyer division under fire by the main Allied cruiser line! The reply was

"Please excuse the next six salvos. They are already on the way."

This was a GOOD exchange. The radio permitted the destroyers to stop the shelling. It also permitted them to know to not stay on course - because shells assuming they would were inbound. A ships rating should change over time. This is a good design: the rating DOES get better over time!

[el cid again]

Most of the new construction start with higher crew ratings than the ships manned by career regular navy types at game start.

A rational argument can be made this is correct. . Submarine actions, surface actions and AAA actions all were dismal most of the time early on - with those "regulars." As doctrine and training methods improved, crew quality in USN went up.
But in IJN it went down. It had to. They could not maintain the high level of peacetime training! This subject is complex, and probably the game is not treating it in a sufficiently sophisticated way. But it tried - and I am impressed it did.

[barbarrossa]

I witnessed USS Boston fire a Terrier while it was locked on to USS Waddell - this is testimony since I was on the passive ECM set at the time. Had the missile not jumped the beam, it must have hit. When it did jump the beam the radar REMAINED locked on! Nothing but dangerous incompetence can explain that. The range safety system for Terrier was "turn off the beam."

Was this a practice shoot or an actual engagement? They must have ironed out the problems by the time I got to the Terrier system. Actual target range and speed would show up on the 1210 CRT underneath the A-scope displays for both pulse and doppler recievers. There's a big difference between a surface ship return (target size and speed) not to mention director elevation and an air target!

The Boston must have been using "capture and guidance" which was removed from service in the Mod 9 configuration. C and G was used for nuke birds.

We could guide the bird (SM2-ER) using uplink data from the search radar (48C) without having to illuminate the target the whole way in. The target might have 5 seconds warning when we had to illuminate him before the bird intercepted.

[MkXIV]

ORIGINAL: el cid again
And radar in a game is a terrible skew - it was not as effective as Japanese night optics in 1942 - but if present it always works in computer code!

Not too sur if this is the case, I have had radar equipped ships in night combat and and either

1)Still been surprised
or
2) Spotted them with Radar and still not fire a surprise Salvo (ala the IJN first strike LL attacks)

I don't think that Radar in WitP is a end all be all.

[el cid again]

I witnessed USS Boston fire a Terrier while it was locked on to USS Waddell - this is testimony since I was on the passive ECM set at the time. Had the missile not jumped the beam, it must have hit. When it did jump the beam the radar REMAINED locked on! Nothing but dangerous incompetence can explain that. The range safety system for Terrier was "turn off the beam."

Was this a practice shoot or an actual engagement? They must have ironed out the problems by the time I got to the Terrier system. Actual target range and speed would show up on the 1210 CRT underneath the A-scope displays for both pulse and doppler recievers. There's a big difference between a surface ship return (target size and speed) not to mention director elevation and an air target!

USS Boston long had a reputation as a technical disaster. It was the first of the missile conversions (for Terrier) I think - and it may have suffered from being a prototype? Anyway, the incident occurred off San Clemente island in a REFTRA in 1968. Later that year (in June) USS Boston was present when HMAS Hobart got creamed - but failed to open fire. Even though the targets were USAF F-4s, it is doctrine to shoot down (or at least shoot at) attacking aircraft. Ships are worth more, and shooting sends a clear message "we ain't helicopters"! The F-4s were trying to shoot down Mi-6 helos - acting as gunships - and mistaking a formation of four ships for two helos is hard to understand - even if the radar scopes were tiny and visibility was almost zilch. Boston should have fired - it was shells from Hobart that caused the F-4s to realize something was wrong. [Both of Hobarts SAM radars went down after 3 Sparrow hits, so she could not fire missiles] No one was surprised Boston failed to shoot when it should - it always shot when it shouldn't!

[el cid again]

The Boston must have been using "capture and guidance" which was removed from service in the Mod 9 configuration. C and G was used for nuke birds.

Good bet. The terrior of that period on Boston was nuclear capable.

[el cid again]

I don't think that Radar in WitP is a end all be all.

May God (or at least Gary Grigsby) grant you are correct!

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

I witnessed USS Boston fire a Terrier while it was locked on to USS Waddell - this is testimony since I was on the passive ECM set at the time. Had the missile not jumped the beam, it must have hit. When it did jump the beam the radar REMAINED locked on! Nothing but dangerous incompetence can explain that. The range safety system for Terrier was "turn off the beam."

Was this a practice shoot or an actual engagement? They must have ironed out the problems by the time I got to the Terrier system. Actual target range and speed would show up on the 1210 CRT underneath the A-scope displays for both pulse and doppler recievers. There's a big difference between a surface ship return (target size and speed) not to mention director elevation and an air target!

USS Boston long had a reputation as a technical disaster. It was the first of the missile conversions (for Terrier) I think - and it may have suffered from being a prototype? Anyway, the incident occurred off San Clemente island in a REFTRA in 1968. Later that year (in June) USS Boston was present when HMAS Hobart got creamed - but failed to open fire. Even though the targets were USAF F-4s, it is doctrine to shoot down (or at least shoot at) attacking aircraft. Ships are worth more, and shooting sends a clear message "we ain't helicopters"! The F-4s were trying to shoot down Mi-6 helos - acting as gunships - and mistaking a formation of four ships for two helos is hard to understand - even if the radar scopes were tiny and visibility was almost zilch. Boston should have fired - it was shells from Hobart that caused the F-4s to realize something was wrong. [Both of Hobarts SAM radars went down after 3 Sparrow hits, so she could not fire missiles] No one was surprised Boston failed to shoot when it should - it always shot when it shouldn't!

Ouch for Hobart. My best friends father served in Burma during WW2 and a few postwar deployments in the region and asked what scared him most during his service he said laughing, "the Americans!".[:D]

[spence]

I've just been messing around with Scen 16. Dec 16th, 1941 USS Houston, Boise, Marblehead and 7 DDs intercept a Japanese landing force at Davao which had been sighted and bombed the day before with damage to 2 transports. In round 1 there is no surprise - initial range is 6000 yds. USS Marblehead and 4 of the DDs engage the enemy. Marblehead naturally fires only its 3" guns. Yah right.

[MkXIV]

ORIGINAL: spence

I've just been messing around with Scen 16. Dec 16th, 1941 USS Houston, Boise, Marblehead and 7 DDs intercept a Japanese landing force at Davao which had been sighted and bombed the day before with damage to 2 transports. In round 1 there is no surprise - initial range is 6000 yds. USS Marblehead and 4 of the DDs engage the enemy. Marblehead naturally fires only its 3" guns. Yah right.

Her Main Battery must have been off doing something else![8|]

[Demosthenes]

ORIGINAL: spence

I've just been messing around with Scen 16. Dec 16th, 1941 USS Houston, Boise, Marblehead and 7 DDs intercept a Japanese landing force at Davao which had been sighted and bombed the day before with damage to 2 transports. In round 1 there is no surprise - initial range is 6000 yds. USS Marblehead and 4 of the DDs engage the enemy. Marblehead naturally fires only its 3" guns. Yah right.

Well,...that's easily explained....soI'll just wait to see who can easily explain it.[8|]

[mogami]

Hi, Marblehead has a night experiance rating of 36 Boise 39 Houston 52.
who was TF commander? which DD?
You can't send these untrained units into action and then complain they don't fight at 100 percent perfection.

[Demosthenes]

ORIGINAL: Mogami

Hi, Marblehead has a night experiance rating of 36 Boise 39 Houston 52.
who was TF commander? which DD?
You can't send these untrained units into action and then complain they don't fight at 100 percent perfection.

Just an observation -
The net effect was a poorly trained crew(s) made no hits except with the 3" guns (Marblehead).
Now as plausable as that end result might be - I think it would have been more reassuring/less frustrating for players if poorly trained crews were at least seen to fire their guns and miss, rather than watching the same end result - but being led to belive that the guns simply didn't fire at all....

Just my twocents

[denisonh]

More relevant than an individual ships experience would be a rating that reflected the "collective" experience of the task force. Task forces that trained and operated together operate better than ad hoc formations. The naval actions of the ABDA forces illustrate that.

[Demosthenes]

ORIGINAL: denisonh

More relevant than an individual ships experience would be a rating that reflected the "collective" experience of the task force. Task forces that trained and operated together operate better than ad hoc formations. The naval actions of the ABDA forces illustrate that.

Granted the above, but I think the only contention is the appearance that the MA was not even fired.

[Tom Hunter]

Here are the cruisers that were in the TF with Prince of Wales and Repulse. Admiral is Palliser, 60 Naval 61 Aggression, (oddly) the best the British have in the game. All ships are hand picked night combat XP ranges from 72 to 84. No suprise on either side, fighting at 6,000yrds and 7,000yrds
in the first engagement and 8,000yrds and 10,000yrds in the second.

Cornwall Failed to fine in round 1 of the first encounter and opened fire in round two at 7000 yards on Nachi hitting twice with the main battery and once with secondaries. She checked fire in round 1 of the second engagement and then fired again in round 2 but did not hit. Cornwall was fired on by Nachi in all 4 rounds of both engagements but not hit until the second engagement when she took 2 8” shells and 2 torpedoes. Cornwall fired 62 main battery shells and scored at a 3.2 % hit rate she can fire this many shells in 1 minutes 57 seconds. Her secondary battery fired 22 shells and scored 2 hits for a rate of 9%. Both of these hit numbers are plausible.

Dauntless
Does not fire in rounds 1 or 2 of the first encounter, or in round one of the second but fires on Naka in round 2 of the second engagement scoring one hit at 10000 yards. She fired 17 rounds from her main battery a 5% hit rate. However there is something very odd about Dauntless’s ammo load. Though she has 200 rounds per gun like all the other CLs she has only 6 guns = 1200 rounds but has the same amount of ammo, 72, as the ships that carry 24000 rounds. So Dauntless with 200 actual shells per gun has 17 shells per round, and Glasgow with 200 actual shells per gun has 50 shell per round. Of course this has the potential to cause the kinds of problems that El Cid alluded to up above. In theory Dauntless can fire 17 shells in 24 seconds. He secondaries also fired one round, firing 20 shells and scoring no hits. Dauntless was fired on by Naka but no hits were scored.

Mauritius Had no Captain, she opened fire immediately on Nagara in round one of the first engagement, then checked fire and then fired in both rounds of the second engagement. She expended 100 rounds of ammunition and scored no hits. Mauritius was hit once by Nagara in the last round of the second engagement.

Birmingham was not fired on at all during either engagement. She opened up on Teruzuki in the second round of the first engagement scoring 2 hits at 7000 yards. She expended 50 main battery shells for a hit rate of 4%. It takes her 48 seconds to fire this many shells.

Glasgow Glasgow opened up on Yugumo in round 1 of the first engagement and scored 3 hits with her main battery at 6000 yards. During round 1 Glasgow was not under fire, in all subsequent rounds she was fired on by Yugumo but never hit. In round 2 Glasgows secondaries hit Yugumo twice, there were no main battery hits. In round 1 and 2 of the second encounter Glasgow scored 2 main battery hits in each round, at 8000 and 10000 yards. Glasgow fired 300 main battery shells and scored a hit rate of 2.3 % it takes Glasgow 5 minutes to fire this many shells. She fired 20 secondary shells scoring 2 hits for a 10% hit rate, the secondaries on Glasgow are heavily automated and she can fire 20 shells in 22 seconds.

Over all the cruisers seem to have a hit rate that is low but within the realm of plausibility. The do not seem to shoot very often considering the high quality of their crews and captains. Japanese return fire was just as bad or worse.

The other thing that I started to notice in this combat is that if a ship is fired on she will return fire in the next round of combat Nachi fired on both Cornwall and Panther, and Kurisho did the trick of firing on two ships in the same combat round using the same guns! A bit more on this when we get to the DDs but the serious problem this causes will become apparent when the USS Oklahoma engages 5 different ships in the next combat, most of them at the same time.

[Feinder]

Why would the night experience rating have anything to do with whether the main battery guns open up?

Personally, I think the -overall- naval combat model is "adaquate".

But Mog (and others), you're just digging your heels in, just to dig your heels in.

THERE ARE WARTS ON THE MODEL. Tom his very adaquately demonstated this. If ONE ship did not fire it's main battery, that might be a random event you could explain (like PoW or SoDak main battery failures). But when ships are CONSTANTLY not firing their main battery...?! "Night experience was low... etc. etc." Fine. Maybe they have a lower chance to hit. But it shouldn't be case where the Lt. Commander in charge of Fire Control manages to get thru the entire action and goes, "Holy snikeys! I forgot about the 8" guns sir! We were blasting away with the secondaries, but we just new barrels on the big guns, and I didn't want to mess them up!"

Shesh Mog, you're the captain of the Titanic telling folks that, "We've taken on a little water, but don't worry!"

-F-

[mogami]

Hi, No I am saying there is nothing in the model to tell you why a ship does not fire it's main guns. The ship is checked to fire. It checks it's main guns they fire or they don't, it checks it's secondary they fire or they don't it checks the next slot of weapons and so on.
Now TF commander, ship CO and crew ratings are used in these checks.
The only problem I have is when people use poor crews and leaders and then post their ships don't perform to perfection. Tom is saying he used good crews (and the RN always does well for me in combat) But I don't match his recollections because I saw Atago take 2 back to back 15in hits. And she was hit by other large guns (14in) The IJN TF moved 2 hexes and parts moved 3 and other parts moved 4. Undamaged they would all have moved 6 hexes (the max a TF can move in a single phase)
Air attacks finished them off but I think most of them would have sunk without any further damage being inflicted. Tom wondered why they did not sink outright which is another issue that I have explained many times before. (damage is resolved slower then in actual time. )
But the model does not explain combat in enough detail for anyone to say why Ship A does not fire a set of guns in a certain round. You don't watch the battle your seeing it on the radio. For all you know every gun fires every round but you only see those shots that are reported. Just like in air attacks not every group of aircraft shows a splash (but they all drop bombs you just will never get a hit without a splash)
If a ship expended ammo then it fired it's guns. If a ship expended ammo from one slot and not another then the reason was when it was checked it failed to pass the check to aquire a target. while the animation shows one ship at a time firing in realty there are many ships firing at once and you see part of the action. (the highlights so to speak it does not show you when a ship fires at shadows or wildly off target it just subtracts ammo and since you didn't see the guns firing you assume the ship did not fire. )

In fact Tom look on the sunk ships list. CA Atago is listed as sunk by a 15in
The combat report lists 67 hits on Japanese

Other IJN ships sunk by gunfire to date
CA Chokai 14in
CA Mogami 15in
BB Mutsu 16in
Somebody is firing mainguns