Agreed, but it is not an excuse to have coordinated US CV airstrikes with 150 planes in 4/42 or to be able to produce more than 420 Tojos in a month.
The US launched coordinated strikes against multiple targets in 4/42. Particularly germane are the trans-Owens-Stanley range raid in (IIRC) March, by
Lexington and
Yorktown, which was a very well coordinated strike. At Midway, the two factors that took much of the starch out of the USN's attacks was
Enterprise's group leader's decision not to fly the course he was allegedly given -- resulting in a coordinated strike package of F4Fs, the Scout Bombing squadron, the Attack Bombing squadron [both SBDs] and the Torpedo Bombing Squadron going astray. Of these, the TBDs diverted to the correct course. But there's no reason to imagine that sort of thing was typical of the USN. The other of the two factors was
Hornet's consistent piss poor performance, in which bumbling efforts she was rivalled by the recon assets of Mobile Force, especially
Tone.
I think the 150+ plus plane US coordinated strike is, as a matter of alt-history, less contingent upon (false) assumptions of USN incapability and instead more contingent on the CVs doing the attack. I can *easily* see a well coordinated 150 plane strike coming off of
Enterprise,
Yorktown, and
Lexington operating together pretty much any time after 7 December. Based on "Shattered Sword" I'd have to peg down
Hornet's performance initially. But if the USN exercised
Hornet in a suite of learning experience raids in, say, the Marshalls, I would expect
Hornet to be potentially very capable of delivering a well coordinated strike package in concert with other USN CVs in April 1942.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?