Houston, we have an (economic) problem

[el cid again]

One wonders where all the money and resources were to be found for this enhanced Phillipine defence. Certainly not during the early 30's during the depression.
[/quote]

Actually, the economy of the Philippines was the second strongest in Asia, after Japan. Its currency was backed 100% in silver and pegged at fifty US cents per peso. A VAST amount of sugar tax money was held by the US Treasury too - see The Philippine Army - and we refused to release it for buying weapons or anything for a very long time - and never did release most of it before the war began. And I proposed NO ADDITIONAL spending whatever - I spoke ONLY in terms of what is naturally already present if nary a peso was spent. This is my point: NO additional resources was required - just use what is there.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: AlaskanWarrior

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Retired:

There is a wonderful book US Army Ships and Watercraft of the Second World War (or World War II). It lists the 12,000 named ships - and describes the 80,000 watercraft - of the US Army in that conflict - numbers which dwarfed the USN (but which are also given in the introduction).

Do you by chance own a copy of this. It seems like everytime I look for at the Loussac Library it cannot be found? I have trying to get my hands on a copy.

Yes. Call me - 272 8251.

[Big B]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Andrew thinks there is too much HI. I think there is too little - and have added some in places where it clearly is present but not in CHS or stock. My HI is actually bigger slightly - due to adding it - particularly in cities we added.

Remember - I compared resources not only with needs but with real world lists. I used Parillo mostly - and Liddle Hart as a backup - to get the lists of what materials are needed for a war economy. I used the Oxford Economic Atlas and similar materials in certain industries - and Parillo again - to measure the amount of production of resources and oil. So when I say there is not enough - I mean compared to real life - not just to the needs of HI.

I am not an expert on the economic model in this game - but here are some basic questions:

1) In stock WitP - can Japan out produce the Allies? - could be wrong here - but I am under the impression that the answer is - YES.

2) If the above answer is Yes - then the model needs to be corrected so that Japan will produce in proportion to what the Allies produced for the Pacific Theatre.

3) if the answer to question #1 is NO - then how close is it? and I believe it should be made to function somewhat near historical levels.

This is all (from my perspective) if you want an accurate simulation of the war against Japan.

Now, the economic model is probably off - as you pointed out. But to me - the basic question should not be "how do we get Japan enough oil and resources to maximize it's HI?" - It should be "how do we make sure that Japan's HI is in a proper historical relationship to that of the Allies?".

B

EDIT: I think the best solution is probably to verify what Japan's industrial capacity should be (in relation to the Allies) and base that on "Best Case" conditions - then let all the other factors come into play - like shipping losses, Allied air bombardment, etc.

[akdreemer]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

IF Panama were made "off limits" the troops and ships and planes that defend it should ALSO be "out of the game" -

RHS lets PLAYERS decide the risks of sending how much forward - and does not saddle them with possibly irrelevent historical decisions. Take your pick - but we pick "power to the players." Of course, as always, a player can leave as much in Panama as he thinks is "historical" - even if not needed in his opinion. Still "power to the players." We DO say "if you don't think real commanders would do it, don't do it" - so that would fall in that category.

Well then we should go back to square one with the unmodified map and still get the reinforcements. Normally I would agree with you el cid, but the artificial way in which Panama was added precludes any effective tactics of diversion or surprise, as well as not having any other bases nearby that could be used bye either side to land reinforcements. Just like the "artifical" sea lanes make it impossible for the Allied player to modify routing merchies and the argument that the Japanese should be able to runs subs into these artificial paths. So you have your opinion and I have mine, neither of which is superior.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Big B

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Andrew thinks there is too much HI. I think there is too little - and have added some in places where it clearly is present but not in CHS or stock. My HI is actually bigger slightly - due to adding it - particularly in cities we added.

Remember - I compared resources not only with needs but with real world lists. I used Parillo mostly - and Liddle Hart as a backup - to get the lists of what materials are needed for a war economy. I used the Oxford Economic Atlas and similar materials in certain industries - and Parillo again - to measure the amount of production of resources and oil. So when I say there is not enough - I mean compared to real life - not just to the needs of HI.

I am not an expert on the economic model in this game - but here are some basic questions:

1) In stock WitP - can Japan out produce the Allies? - could be wrong here - but I am under the impression that the answer is - YES.

Not even close. At least not if "outproduce" means the total of stuff arriving in theater. Japan will be overwhelmed in every scenario, even EOS.

2) If the above answer is Yes - then the model needs to be corrected so that Japan will produce in proportion to what the Allies produced for the Pacific Theatre.

Not Applicable. Japan's production is getting close to history - but is slightly too low - for various technical reasons.

3) if the answer to question #1 is NO - then how close is it? and I believe it should be made to function somewhat near historical levels.

About 90%.

This is all (from my perspective) if you want an accurate simulation of the war against Japan.

Now, the economic model is probably off - as you pointed out. But to me - the basic question should not be "how do we get Japan enough oil and resources to maximize it's HI?" - It should be "how do we make sure that Japan's HI is in a proper historical relationship to that of the Allies?".

Note most Allied HI isn't on the map. All Japanese HI is on the map. This may be confusing you.

B

EDIT: I think the best solution is probably to verify what Japan's industrial capacity should be (in relation to the Allies) and base that on "Best Case" conditions - then let all the other factors come into play - like shipping losses, Allied air bombardment, etc.

[el cid again]

Sorry you feel that way AK. I think Andrew' Brown's Extended map is a vast improvement - and I think putting Panama on the map (which Andrew ALWAYS said was fair game) allows the I-400 class to have its real design purpose (a raid on the place). It adds a new point of arrival for the Allies - and a vital one (I want to add still more - but let Melbourne substitute for Cape Horne route). I see little point in having Aden and Panama if they are not on the map? Why bother? And if they were not fair game, all the units can be sent forward unrealistically. Many Allied units anywhere in the mideast (air units in particular) appear in CHS and RHS and stock - and this is wrong if they can be sent to the Far East with zero risk.

[Big B]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: Big B

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Andrew thinks there is too much HI. I think there is too little - and have added some in places where it clearly is present but not in CHS or stock. My HI is actually bigger slightly - due to adding it - particularly in cities we added.

Remember - I compared resources not only with needs but with real world lists. I used Parillo mostly - and Liddle Hart as a backup - to get the lists of what materials are needed for a war economy. I used the Oxford Economic Atlas and similar materials in certain industries - and Parillo again - to measure the amount of production of resources and oil. So when I say there is not enough - I mean compared to real life - not just to the needs of HI.

I am not an expert on the economic model in this game - but here are some basic questions:

1) In stock WitP - can Japan out produce the Allies? - could be wrong here - but I am under the impression that the answer is - YES.

Not even close. At least not if "outproduce" means the total of stuff arriving in theater. Japan will be overwhelmed in every scenario, even EOS.

2) If the above answer is Yes - then the model needs to be corrected so that Japan will produce in proportion to what the Allies produced for the Pacific Theatre.

Not Applicable. Japan's production is getting close to history - but is slightly too low - for various technical reasons.

3) if the answer to question #1 is NO - then how close is it? and I believe it should be made to function somewhat near historical levels.

About 90%.

This is all (from my perspective) if you want an accurate simulation of the war against Japan.

Now, the economic model is probably off - as you pointed out. But to me - the basic question should not be "how do we get Japan enough oil and resources to maximize it's HI?" - It should be "how do we make sure that Japan's HI is in a proper historical relationship to that of the Allies?".

Note most Allied HI isn't on the map. All Japanese HI is on the map. This may be confusing you.

B

EDIT: I think the best solution is probably to verify what Japan's industrial capacity should be (in relation to the Allies) and base that on "Best Case" conditions - then let all the other factors come into play - like shipping losses, Allied air bombardment, etc.

I am not really confused about that - I am merely asking - from a scenario designers perspective... with the stock economic model - where is Japan's prodution capacity for war materiel as compared to what she actually was able to produce?

The most obvious case here looks like Japan is way out stripping it's historical aircraft production, but then also consider all the men, guns, and tanks Japan is producing as reinforcements is without even using it's production facilities.

I don't think Japan (in WitP) is underrated as compared to history, on the contrary - it seems WitP Japan can already produce much more than Japan did historically - if this is the case - then I think a reduction in Japanese HI is more appropriate than making HI run better.

Now, if WitP Japan is actually not able to match what Japan really did, then I suppose an improvement of WitP Japan's economy is in order.

B

EDIT: Maybe your idea of expanding Japanese production would work better if Japan had NO reinforcements - and has to produce from scratch ..everything.

And lastly - of course Japan will be overwhelmed in the end - The USA alone had twice thier population and 10 times thier industrial capacity - that's why US production was being scaled back way before the war ended.


El Cid, I realize this is your teams' mod and I am not trying to interfere - just engageing you in a little thought provoking conversation....

[Mike Scholl]

One of the MAJOR PROBLEMS with trying to model any of the Axis economies if starting out by reccognizing just how horribly inefficient they were to start with. The people controlling production were generally the military, and knew nothing of modern manufacturing proceedures. Georing's dismissal of American Mass Production technologies as "Usefull for making razor blades" is typical of the whole mess. The military didn't want a bunch of "technocrats" telling them how to make weapons.

The great majority of the "economic miracles" in the German and Japanese economies in 1944 came not from new industries or production lines, but from finally using what already existed intelligently. The Allies did this from the very start..., spurred by the thought that the Axis must be doing the same. In our "models" HI produces at the same rate throughout the war if inputs are available. What may be needed is a "slider" effect in production, with HI being able to utilize larger and larger amounts of inputs as the years go by. This would make modelling Japan's wartime economy much easier and more accurate.

[el cid again]

Big B - I greatly reduced Japanese production of aircraft - in the historical scenarios - so it is historical. Americans simply never believe how low it was! But the game is very efficient in terms of producing and deploying planes - too efficient. For that reason I also delayed when planes appear. They are up to a year ahead in CHS - and Joe and I disliked that.
We make them appear AFTER (not on) production date - so there is time to distribute and train. Never less than 2 months - often much more - if we have hard data on ops.

Ship production is dead on - no changes whatever - but you get the ship on the date she commissions - green - not later (which was the case in CHS often times). Vehicle production is also dead on.

But note that EOS is different - it is set to ramp up planes and vehicles faster than history. So don't compare EOS - with efficient planning assumed - with the strictly historical scenarios.

Now you cannot compare this with the Allies - UNLESS you add all the reinforcements and points that appear without production. They all count on the battlefield! Also - a big deal - don't just look at INITIAL Allied production. Allied production often quadruples - occasionally multiplies by as much as 11 - and in general triples over the course of the war. Japanese production grows very little - perhaps 10 or 20%.

[Big B]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Big B - I greatly reduced Japanese production of aircraft - in the historical scenarios - so it is historical. Americans simply never believe how low it was! But the game is very efficient in terms of producing and deploying planes - too efficient. For that reason I also delayed when planes appear. They are up to a year ahead in CHS - and Joe and I disliked that.
We make them appear AFTER (not on) production date - so there is time to distribute and train. Never less than 2 months - often much more - if we have hard data on ops.

Ship production is dead on - no changes whatever - but you get the ship on the date she commissions - green - not later (which was the case in CHS often times). Vehicle production is also dead on.

But note that EOS is different - it is set to ramp up planes and vehicles faster than history. So don't compare EOS - with efficient planning assumed - with the strictly historical scenarios.

Now you cannot compare this with the Allies - UNLESS you add all the reinforcements and points that appear without production. They all count on the battlefield! Also - a big deal - don't just look at INITIAL Allied production. Allied production often quadruples - occasionally multiplies by as much as 11 - and in general triples over the course of the war. Japanese production grows very little - perhaps 10 or 20%.

Fair enough, I'll have to check out your historical scenario and look Japan over to see how you did it. I'm intrigued

B

[anarchyintheuk]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Anarchy:

1) I did not say that a Philippine Army division was equal to an IJA division. But Mac had created the Philippine Army personally - over many years - and been paid millions of dollars to do so. Whatever its condition, it is not someone elses fault. Further, HE said - and I think believed - it COULD meet the IJA on equal terms at the beaches. Doesn't matter if they were not as good - he had a lot of troops - and lots of other assets - which were poorly employed in quite defensible terrain. I bet they had a fighting chance to stay in the field until relieved. And in the process deny the rich ores of Northern Luzon to the enemy.

2) You are confused about which defeat I refer to in Korea. The People's Volunteer Army of Korea was NOT Korean!!!! It was Chinese. It attacked on Thanksgiving Eve 1950 along the banks of the Conng Chong River - and Mac was fully in command - having ordered 8th Army to jump off on attacks along the same river the following morning (having no clue the real situation).

1. I'm not here to defend him. You said Mac was twice defeated by inferior forces. I was attempting to show that that was not necessarily the case or that it was, at least, a matter of opinion.

2. I did misunderstand you. The PVAK had outnumbered the 8th Army in frontline troops. In experience and morale it was not outclassed by the 8th Army.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Sorry you feel that way AK. I think Andrew' Brown's Extended map is a vast improvement - and I think putting Panama on the map (which Andrew ALWAYS said was fair game) allows the I-400 class to have its real design purpose (a raid on the place). It adds a new point of arrival for the Allies - and a vital one (I want to add still more - but let Melbourne substitute for Cape Horne route). I see little point in having Aden and Panama if they are not on the map? Why bother? And if they were not fair game, all the units can be sent forward unrealistically. Many Allied units anywhere in the mideast (air units in particular) appear in CHS and RHS and stock - and this is wrong if they can be sent to the Far East with zero risk.

Now if only it was possible to send things back and forth between the two (with maybe a 90 day delay).
Has anyone worked that out yet?

[el cid again]

Anarchy: You might possibly find some current scholarship on Korea interesting. Now we have material available to Western academic standards from both sides - there are things we didn't know. But my original "military education" (informal) was at the hands of the official historian of the US Army (in retirement, a neighbor when I grew up). It was pretty clear even in the 1950s and 60s that we were woefully outclassed, and hopelessly deployed (front line positions were not able to support each other). But the problem was not just at the top: troops admitted rediculous standards (tolerated by junior officers) of carrying hand grenades, bayonettes and ammunition - something the incoming commander identified and changed almost immediately. Prisoner interrogations - the loss of a major Allied formation - and other forms of intelligence were ignored - not only at the top - but comphrehensively - all along the line. On the other side the Chinese commander was telling his staff "we are going to ask a lot of our troops - lets do all we can to support them" - not the sort of thing being told to our staffs. Granted, these were veterans - and granted they had a wholly unexpected set of operational methods not yet encountered - they were not (as a popular mythology came to say) greater in numbers - nor equipped to a comparable standard (a division got a single battalion of about 8 75mm field guns - often just two batteries) as Eight Army was for set piece warfare. We had been fighting a North Korean army that DID use set piece tactics - so we were not afraid or even respectful of an army with less gear - assuming it too would play the same way. What the enemy had was information superiority, concealment, surprise, and cohesion. Not supermen. Not better or even comparable weapons. And certainly not hordes. The Mongol Horde has, in European languages, an implication of "masses" - when in fact it was just organized. Using double envelopment tactics and good communications - it SEEMED like the Monglos were "numerous everywhere." So it seemed along the ChongChong River when you platoon had to engage a company - which was the normal case.

[el cid again]

Mike: we might be able to use a trail of hexes along the map edge - to Hudson Bay area - shielded by blocked hex sides - as a sort of speed/time/distance computer and display - for movement to strategic points distant from PTO. That WOULD have to be an "allied only area."