Civil War 150th

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

[font="Times New Roman"]On the 18th day of March, 1864, at Nashville, Tennessee, I relieved Lieutenant-General Grant in command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, embracing the Departments of the Ohio, Cumberland Tennessee, and Arkansas ... General Grant was in the act of starting East to assume command of all the armies of the United States, but more particularly to give direction in person to the Armies of the Potomac and James, operating against Richmond, and I accompanied him as far as Cincinnati on his way, to avail myself of the opportunity to discuss privately many little details incident to the contemplated changes, and of preparation for the great events then impending.
[center]--Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman[/center][/font]

Neither Sherman nor Grant was fond of holding formal councils of war, so it is quite possible that the train ride to Cincinnati was the most important meeting of the war. It was vital that both clearly understood each other, for Grant's overall strategy depended on a coordinated strategic offensive. Abraham Lincoln had actually tried something like it as far back as February 1862, but the ability to move armies on schedule had not then been mastered. Now, Grant believed, it was time to try it again, with a few important changes.

Grant himself summarized the military situation about as well as any historian has managed in his memoirs:

[font="Times New Roman"]When I assumed command of all the armies the situation was about this:
The Mississippi River was guarded from St. Louis to its mouth; the line of the Arkansas was held, thus giving us all the North-west north of that river. A few points in Louisiana not remote from the river were held by the Federal troops, as was also the mouth of the Rio Grande. East of the Mississippi we held substantially all north of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad as far east as Chattanooga, thence along the line of the Tennessee and Holston rivers, taking in nearly all of the State of Tennessee. West Virginia was in our hands; and that part of old Virginia north of the Rapidan and east of the Blue Ridge we also held. On the sea-coast we had Fortress Monroe and Norfolk in Virginia; Plymouth, Washington and New Berne in North Carolina; Beaufort, Folly and Morris islands, Hilton Head, Port Royal and Fort Pulaski in South Carolina and Georgia; Fernandina, St. Augustine, Key West and Pensacola in Florida. The balance of the Southern territory, an empire in extent, was still in the hands of the enemy.

In the East the opposing forces stood in substantially the same relations towards each other as three years before, or when the war began; they were both between the Federal and Confederate capitals. It is true, footholds had been secured by us on the sea-coast, in Virginia and North Carolina, but, beyond that, no substantial advantage had been gained by either side. Battles had been fought of as great severity as had ever been known in war, over ground from the James River and Chickahominy, near Richmond, to Gettysburg and Chambersburg, in Pennsylvania, with indecisive results, sometimes favorable to the National army, sometimes to the Confederate army; but in every instance, I believe, claimed as victories for the South by the Southern press if not by the Southern generals.

[center]--The Personal Memoirs of General U.S. Grant[/center][/font]

One of the key differences in the coordinated move was this time, Grant would wait for spring and good campaigning weather, rather than move when it was still winter. This would also have the benefit of bringing many of his veterans back from furlough, and with luck they would have inspired new recruits to enlist. The most important difference, however, was that although the movements would be as close to simultaneous as could be managed, there would be priorities. Grant believed that armies were more important than territory, since ground could be taken at leisure when the enemy forces had been neutralized. In the East, the primary objective would be Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, and then, since congress and public opinion demanded it, the city of Richmond. And in the west:

[font="Times New Roman"] There could have been no difference of opinion as to the first duty of the armies of the military division of the Mississippi. Johnston's army was the first objective, and that important railroad centre, Atlanta, the second. At the time I wrote General Halleck giving my views of the approaching campaign, and at the time I met General Sherman, it was expected that General Banks would be through with the campaign which he had been ordered upon before my appointment to the command of all the armies, and would be ready to co-operate with the armies east of the Mississippi, his part in the programme being to move upon Mobile by land while the navy would close the harbor and assist to the best of its ability. The plan therefore was for Sherman to attack Johnston and destroy his army if possible, to capture Atlanta and hold it, and with his troops and those of Banks to hold a line through to Mobile, or at least to hold Atlanta and command the railroad running east and west, and the troops from one or other of the armies to hold important points on the southern road, the only east and west road that would be left in the possession of the enemy. This would cut the Confederacy in two again, as our gaining possession of the Mississippi River had done before.

[center]--The Personal Memoirs of General U.S. Grant[/center][/font]


Other Union forces would also move in concert, including an offensive in the Shenandoah Valley, and the attempt to capture Mobile, once Nathaniel Banks got back from his cotton-looting expedition up the Red River. These would be side shows, however, and the bulk of reinforcements and supplies would be fed to the forces moving against Lee's Army of Northern Virginia and Johnston's Army of Tennessee. Grant and Sherman would therefore be the primary theater commanders, and they would control not just single armies, but two or three armies each. At the start of the war, Sherman had requested not to be given an independent command, and the complexities of being the military governor of Kentucky had caused him to have what looked very much like a nervous breakdown. Now, he was to be given responsibility for vast territory, and well over a hundred thousand men. The fate of the Union would eventually turn on how well he could handle it.

[Capt. Harlock]

Mid-March, 1864:

While Grant and Sherman were working out the details of the grand strategic plan, they also discussed assignments. A number of capable officers were now languishing without commands, and Grant wanted to use their talent. Chief among these were George McClellan and Don Carlos Buell. It sounded good in theory, but Grant would find that there were personality issues, both with the two generals and with Secretary of War Stanton.


In Richmond, Jefferson Davis and his cabinet were very much aware that Union offensives would ramp up as the winter weather gave way to spring. The question was how to meet those moves with the limited manpower available to the South. James Longstreet, working on the theory that the best defense was a good offense, had proposed stripping South Carolina of troops, combining them with Joseph Johnston's Army of Tennessee and his own force, and re-conquering Tennessee and then Kentucky. Davis considered the plan, and suggested that Longstreet prepare to join with Johnston. But the Confederate President soon realized the plan was politically unacceptable. Taking the men away from South Carolina meant, among other things, the loss of Charleston, "The Cradle of Secession".


Near Alexandria on the Red River in Louisiana, disturbing signs began to appear for the Union offensive. Nathaniel Banks and the majority of the Federal troops were supposed to have linked up with the two advance divisions by the 20th, but they were delayed. The two divisions had been borrowed from Sherman's forces on the understanding that they would return in thirty days, to join in the drive against Atlanta. But a week of that time was already gone. More, the campaign had been planned to take advantage of the late winter rise of the river, necessary for the draft of the navy's ironclads. The waters, however, were not rising. When they started to fall, the gunboats might end up trapped, and prey to the Confederate troops.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

At Alexandria, Louisiana, the clock was ticking for the Union forces. Nathaniel Banks and the majority of the ground troops had still not appeared, nor was there any word of the column from Arkansas under Frederick Steele. (In fact, Steele and his men had not yet set out from Little Rock.) Nearly all of the cotton in the area had by now been seized -- when cotton was found in private hands it was marked as confederate government property and then confiscated. When reports were received of southern cavalry, it was almost a relief.

The Yankee cavalry advanced to meet the Rebels, and without much more than a skirmish, drove them back. The Confederates then occupied a hill as a good defensive position, unlimbered their artillery, and kept their foes at a respectful distance. But there were Northern sympathizers in the area, who sent word that the hill had only a few practical routes off it. The Federals quickly seized the opportunity, marching infantry around to block off the escape routes. It was a difficult move, for although it was officially now Spring, a hailstorm came to trouble the already tired troops.

But men from W. T. Sherman's army were by this time used to rapid and difficult marching. They got into position, and at the signal, launched a coordinated assault. Discovering they were trapped, the Southerners surrendered, with only a handful a men including their commander managing to escape. Said commander now had the unpleasant duty of reporting to General Richard Taylor, in charge of the Confederate forces in the region, that nearly all of his cavalry were now Union prisoners.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

At Little Rock, Arkansas, 7,000 Federals under General Frederick Steele finally moved out, heading for Shreveport, Louisiana. In the meantime, the two main bodies of Union infantry had still not linked up; Nathaniel Banks' column was slowed by rains. The rain hit the "Golden Medium" for the defending Confederates, for they were enough to delay the Northern advance but not enough to significantly raise the level of the Red river on which the Union fleet depended.


In Washington, D.C., the newly made Lieutenant-General Grant arrived, back from turning over the western command to W. T. Sherman. Once again he was reminded that it would be well to have his headquarters outside of the city and away from politics. He was met by the demand from several influential members of Congress that George Meade be removed from command of the Army of the Potomac. But Grant had promised Meade that he could keep his job, and indeed saw no one more qualified. (With the possible exception of George McClellan, but it is highly unlikely that Grant and McClellan could have worked well together.) Arrangements were made for several changes in the Army of the Potomac, however. The First and Third Corps had never recovered from the casualties of Gettysburg, so on this date they were disbanded in a large-scale reorganization. And although the Union cavalry was now the equal of the Confederate arm in men and horses, the Northerners still had no commander to match the likes of "Jeb" Stuart or "Fitz" Lee. General Alfred Pleasanton had fallen short in the eyes of both Grant and Secretary of War Stanton, so it was decided to replace him. Grant's thoughts turned to the young and aggressive Philip Sheridan, who was not a cavalryman, but had shown himself competent at just about any position he was given.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

Nathan Bedford Forrest's latest raid got off to a good start. He attacked the town of Union City (which must have been a provocation to him) in northwestern Tennessee. After some resistance, the Federal garrison of 400 men realized that they were outnumbered by about five to one. (Forrest had been known to bluff about the number of troopers he had, but this time there was no mistake.) The Yankees surrendered, and were marched off as prisoners. Now Forrest set his sights on Kentucky, whose border was just a few miles to the north.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:


In Alexandria, Louisiana, the second column of Union troops finally arrived. However, commanding general Nathaniel Banks himself would not arrive until the next day.


Nathan Bedford Forrest arrived in the town of Paducah, Kentucky, at the head of about 3,000 men. The Union garrison there was 650 men, making the numerical odds about the same as they had been at Union City the previous day. However, this time the Northerners had two major advantages.

The first was a well-contructed fort named Fort Anderson, at the west end of the town. The Union soldiers quickly withdrew into it, leaving the town proper and much of the supplies in the hands of the Confederates. But Forrest was not satisfied. He sent a politely worded but ominous note to the Federal commander:

[font="Times New Roman"] Colonel:
Having a force amply sufficient to carry your works and reduce the place, and in order to avoid the unnecessary effusion of blood, I demand the surrender of the fort and troops, with all public property. If you surrender, you shall be treated as a prisoner of war; but if I have to storm your works, you may expect no quarter.
N.B. Forrest,
Major-General, Commanding Confederate Troops.[/font]

The threat to grant no quarter should be considered seriously, for the men manning the fort's cannon were black troops. At this point in the war, such troops, if captured, were often either killed or enslaved. Their officers were considered to be leading a slave rebellion, and there was no worse crime in Southern eyes. However, the Yankee Colonel was one Stephen G. Hicks, who had a tradition to uphold. His father had been one of the few Americans killed at the Battle of New Orleans in 1815, and he himself had been wounded at Shiloh. He promptly wrote back:

[font="Times New Roman"] Sir:
I have this moment received yours of this instant*, in which you demand the unconditional surrender of the forces under my command. I can answer that I have been placed here by the Government to defend this post, and in this, as well as all other orders from my superiors, I feel it to be my duty as an honorable officer to obey. I must, therefore, respectfully decline surrendering as you may require.
S.G. Hicks
Colonel, Commanding Post[/font]

Hicks' refusal was more than mere bravado, for he was aware of the second advantage on the Union side -- the presence of the gunboats USS Peosta and USS Paw Paw. The Confederates went ahead with an assault, to be swiftly driven back by the combined cannon fire of the fort and the Yankee vessels. Forrest did not repeat the attack, but contented himself with seizing the rations and ammunition in the town. Officially reported casualties are 90 in total for the Union, and 50 in total for the Confederacy. The actual Rebel losses were very likely greater.


*Note: the practice of the time was to use the term "instant" to refer to the current month, and "ultimo" to refer to the previous month.

[wings7]

Capt, I enjoy your Civil War research and info! [&o] What computer Civil War games do you recommend and own? Thanks!

Patrick

[Capt. Harlock]

What computer Civil War games do you recommend and own? Thanks!

My apologies -- I blush to confess that I haven't bought any ACW games since "No Greater Glory" back in 1991.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

As there were pro-Unionists in many of the Southern states, there were pro-Southerners in a number of Northern states. Democrats who opposed the war called themselves "Peace Democrats", but were regarded as little better than traitors and dubbed "Copperheads" by the Republicans. Illinois was such a divided state, and a town named Charleston had an especially high percentage of pro-Southerners.

On this date, a combination festival and political rally was being held to celebrate the beginning of court sessions. As was common in political events of the day, alcohol flowed freely. Unfortunately a number of soldiers from the 54th Illinois Regiment were also present, being on furlough. Tempers rose throughout the afternoon.

Eventually, shouting and shoving gave way to shooting. At first the "Copperheads" had the best of it, because the 54th Illinois men had stacked their muskets, and were only carrying a few pistols. The Pro-southerners also had some help when the local sheriff showed up -- and proceeded to fire on the soldiers. But in a few minutes the Federals had re-armed themselves, and the Copperheads were swiftly chased out of town. Nine men had been killed.

The sheriff having fled, the soldiers now constituted the authority, and made a number of arrests. President Lincoln at first suspended Habeas Corpus and had the suspects moved to a fort in Delaware. But eventually only two men would be put on trial, and both acquitted.

[Capt. Harlock]

End of March, 1864:

Along the Red River in Louisiana, the Union army had sent advance units to Natchitoches, about 65 miles (105 km) south of Shreveport. But Commander Nathaniel Banks seemed in no hurry to bring the main body. Instead, being a political general, he had dallied to hold an election for representatives to a convention for a new state Constitution. He also found, to his annoyance, that the Treasury Department had sent some agents to collect the cotton in the area, thus bypassing the Army. The Navy was able to apply its own rules, because the cotton the sailors seized was considered a prize of war, and treated as if it had been captured on the open seas. Between the Navy and the Treasury, very little cotton money went into Banks’ pockets.

On the naval side, Admiral David Porter was also moving slowly. There was a falls at Alexandria, and with the level of the river not as high as had been expected, it was difficult to get ships past. One ship was wrecked in the process, and it was decided to keep much of his fleet below the falls.

Meanwhile, Confederate commander Richard Taylor encamped his forces 25 miles (40 km) to the northwest at a place called Pleasant Hill. He had just 20,000 men, about half of what the Northerners had. But some reinforcements were on the way; in particular a column of Texas cavalry which would more than replace what had been captured on the 21st. The Yankees would receive no further men. In fact, the two divisions borrowed from Sherman’s army were now half-way through the agreed-upon thirty days. In order to return them within the appointed time, they would have to start moving back in ten days. This began to look unlikely.


Not yet realizing that those divisions might not be punctually returned, Sherman was applying himself to the preparations for a great campaign. He found that even the extensive northern railroad networks had reached their limit:

[font="Times New Roman"]About the end of March, therefore, the three army commanders and myself were together at Chattanooga. We had nothing like a council of war, but conversed freely and frankly on all matters of interest then in progress or impending. We all knew that, as soon as the spring was fairly open, we should have to move directly against our antagonist, General Jos. E. Johnston, then securely intrenched at Dalton, thirty miles distant; and the purpose of our conference at the time was to ascertain our own resources, and to distribute to each part of the army its appropriate share of work.
[…]
Then, of course, as we advanced into Georgia, it was manifest that we should have to repair the railroad, use it, and guard it like- wise: General Thomas's army was much the largest of the three, was best provided, and contained the best corps of engineers, railroad managers, and repair parties, as well as the best body of spies and provost-marshals. On him we were therefore compelled in a great measure to rely for these most useful branches of service.
[…]
I then addressed myself specially to the troublesome question of transportation and supplies. I found the capacity of the railroads from Nashville forward to Decatur, and to Chattanooga, so small, especially in the number of locomotives and care, that it was clear that they were barely able to supply the daily wants of the armies then dependent on them, with no power of accumulating a surplus in advance. The cars were daily loaded down with men returning from furlough, with cattle, horses, etc.; and, by reason of the previous desolation of the country between Chattanooga and Knoxville, General Thomas had authorized the issue of provisions to the suffering inhabitants.

[center]-Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman[/center][/font]


In the New York “Gold Room”, the price of gold in greenback dollars was drifting slowly higher. It had reached the level of 166, a rise of 8 points since the start of the year.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

While at Alexandria, Louisiana, General Nathaniel Banks had found a letter from U. S. Grant awaiting him. The missive reminded Banks that his Red River expedition was not considered a top priority as the drives against Richmond and Atlanta were to be. On this date, Banks composed a reply, stating that he was aware that the two divisions of infantry under A. J. Smith had to be returned by the middle of April. He then started to build a case for being late by blaming various factors such as the difficulty the Navy was having getting its vessels further up the river. (In truth, several warships had gotten past the "falls" at this point, which was enough for naval superiority. The Confederates had no warships in the area.) Banks left out his own administrative failures and the fact that he had paused to conduct a local election.

Further up the Red River, an opportunity was lost for the Yankees. They had captured nearly all of the Southern cavalry in the immediate area on March 21, leaving the way open for a rapid advance. But also on this date, a column of replacement Rebel horsemen from Texas arrived. Although as many as a quarter of them did not have guns yet, they promptly began skirmishing with the Northerners. Their numbers would grow to 1,500, and they would be a thorn in the Northerners' side from then on.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

In Arkansas, General Frederick Steele's little Union army was having trouble already. The Northerners had to cross the Little Missouri River, and the Confederates had rendered all of the bridges unusable. Happily there was a ford at a place called Elkin's Ferry, which the Yankees put to use. The Southerners naturally tried to attack them at this juncture, but they had not yet been able to assemble enough troops to do more than slow operations down. Casualties were about 40 for the Union side, and 50 for the Confederate side.


At Grant's newly-established headquarters in Culpepper Court House, Virginia, the Lieutenant-General put more detail into his plans for the summer campaign. However, he had not yet determined the exact date when everything would start moving, except for the advance against Mobile, which he wanted as soon as possible.

[font="Times New Roman"][PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES WASHINGTON D. C., April 4, 1864.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the Mississippi

GENERAL: It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me to take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts of the army together, and somewhat toward a common centre. For your information I now write you my programme, as at present determined upon.
I have sent orders to Banks, by private messenger, to finish up his present expedition against Shreveport with all dispatch; to turn over the defense of Red River to General Steels and the navy, and to return your troops to you, and his own to New Orleans; to abandon all of Texas, except the Rio Grande, and to hold that with not to exceed four thousand men; to reduce the number of troops on the Mississippi to the lowest number necessary to hold it, and to collect from his command not less than twenty-five thousand men.
To this I will add five thousand from Missouri. With this force he is to commence operations against Mobile as soon as he can. It will be impossible for him to commence too early.
Gillmore joins Butler with ten thousand men, and the two operate against Richmond from the south aide of James River. This will give Butler thirty-three thousand men to operate with, W. F. Smith commanding the right wing of his forces, and Gillmore the left wing. I will stay with the Army of the Potomac, increased by Burnside's corps of not less than twenty-five thousand effective men, and operate directly against Lee's army, wherever it may be found.
Sigel collects all his available force in two columns, one, under Ord and Averill, to start from Beverly, Virginia, and the other, under Crook, to start from Charleston, on the Kanawha, to move against the Virginia & Tennessee Railroad.
Crook will have all cavalry, and will endeavor to get in about Saltville, and move east from there to join Ord. His force will be all cavalry, while Ord will have from ten to twelve thousand men of all arms.
You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up, and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources.
I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but simply to lay down the work it is desirable to have done, and leave you free to execute it in your own way. Submit to me, however, as early as you can, your plan of operations.
As stated, Banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as he can. Gillmore is ordered to report at Fortress Monroe by the 18th inst., or as soon thereafter as practicable. Sigel is concentrating now. None will move from their places of rendezvous until I direct, except Banks. I want to be ready to move by the 25th inst., if possible; but all I can now direct is that you get ready as soon as possible. I know you will have difficulties to encounter in getting through the mountains to where supplies are abundant, but I believe you will accomplish it.
[...]
From the expedition from the Department of West Virginia I do not calculate on very great results; but it is the only way I can take troops from there. With the long line of railroad Sigel has to protect, he can spare no troops, except to move directly to his front. In this way he must get through to inflict great damage on the enemy, or the enemy must detach from one of his armies a large force to prevent it. In other words, if Sigel can't skin himself, he can hold a leg while some one else skins.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
[/font]

The phrase "those not skinning can hold a leg" would soon catch on as the description for the grand plan. (Grant was the son of a tanner.)

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

William T. Sherman was finding that the supplies he needed for his campaign were not accumulating nearly fast enough. The railroads had to deliver not only the "beans and bullets" his armies required, but the troops returning from furlough, and the foodstuffs for the population of the surrounding territory. There was not enough capacity in the available trains.

[font="Times New Roman"] Accordingly, on the 6th of April, I issued a general order, limiting the use of the railroad-cars to transporting only the essential articles of food, ammunition, and supplies for the army proper, forbidding any further issues to citizens, and cutting off all civil traffic; requiring the commanders of posts within thirty miles of Nashville to haul out their own stores in wagons; requiring all troops destined for the front to march, and all beef- cattle to be driven on their own legs. This was a great help, but of course it naturally raised a howl. Some of the poor Union people of East Tennessee appealed to President Lincoln, whose kind heart responded promptly to their request. He telegraphed me to know if I could not modify or repeal my orders; but I answered him that a great campaign was impending, on which the fate of the nation hung...

[center]--Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman[/center][/font]


In Virginia, Robert E. Lee was also of the opinion that the war would be decided in the Western Theater. The situation between Washington and Richmond was largely unchanged after three years, while the Union had made great strides in the area of the Mississippi. But reports were now coming in that Grant was preparing a massive campaign. Confederate spies were still very active in Washington, which was just across the Potomac from Virginia, and Northern newspapers found their way into Southern hands with little delay. (Southern newspapers also went North, but the press in the Confederacy was more circumspect in what was printed.) Accordingly, on this date Lee took pen in hand and wrote to the Davis administration: "...All the information I receive tends to show that the great effort of the enemy in this campaign will be made in Virginia.... Reinforcements are certainly daily arriving to the Army of the Potomac.... The tone of the Northern papers, as well as the impression prevailing in their armies, go to show that Grant with a large force is to move against Richmond...

The letter received an immediate and sympathetic hearing. The Confederacy could not afford to lose Richmond. Although the government could be evacuated from the capital, the irreplaceable Tredegar Iron Works could not, and above all the impact to already poor Southern morale would be crushing.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

In Washington, the Senate approved the 13th Amendment by a vote of 38 to 6, eight votes more than the required two-thirds majority. All 30 Republicans voted in favor; while the Democrats had four in favor, five against, and three absent. Four senators from the smaller parties (yes, there were smaller parties) were in favor, with one against.

The Senate vote was by far the easiest hurdle. The House had already failed to reach two-thirds on a preliminary vote (78 ayes to 62 nays), and also defeated an alternate and even stronger amendment proposed by Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania. There was also the matter of getting the approval of three-fourths of the states. To give the Amendment better odds, Lincoln and his fellow Republicans had begun the process of making Nevada a state. This in spite of the fact that the territory had only 40,000 official residents, a lower number than any candidate for statehood had had before.


Nathaniel Banks' Union Army of the Gulf finally encountered the main body of Confederate troops near Mansfield, Louisiana. However, Banks had stretched out his army on the roads, while Southern general Richard Taylor had managed to concentrate his force. He had also called up the local militia, giving him about 14,000 men to the Yankees' 12,000 at the point of contact.

Both sides held their fire for about two hours while they deployed into position. It was not until 4:00 p.m. that the Rebels attacked, and their first attempt was repulsed. Shortly afterwards, however, a Texas division managed to envelop one of the Union flanks. The Northerners' line was rolled up, and those not captured retreated in panic. A second Federal line did not hold, as the Southerners pressed the fleeing Yankees closely. Finally, a fresh Union division manged to establish a solid defensive position several miles back from the original lines. Several Confederate charges failed, and nightfall ended the fighting.

The Union losses were 113 killed, 581 wounded, and 1,541 captured. As often happened, the record of Southern losses is much more vague: theater commander Edmund Kirby Smith reported about 1,000 casualties all told. Adding to the imbalance of casualties, the Confederates had also seized 20 cannon, 156 wagons, and roughly 1,000 horses and mules. With the loss of supplies and the fact that it was time to send back two divisions he had borrowed, Nathaniel Banks realized that he was not going to reach his objective of Shreveport. It was time to begin the retreat.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

Richard Taylor was not satisfied as long as Union forces controlled any part of the Red River. He set his army in pursuit of Nathaniel Banks' force, hoping to build on the momentum of the previous day's victory near Mansfield. However, the militia that had fought for the Southerners was not up to the march. When the two forces met at Pleasant Hill, they were fairly evenly matched at about 12,000 men each.

Skirmishing fire was opened shortly after noon, but it was not until 5:00 that the Confederates began the contest in earnest. Their charge overran the first Union line of defense, and for a time it looked as if the previous day's debacle was to repeat itself. This time, however, the Northerners stabilized their line, and then a determined counter-attack succeeded in driving the Rebels from the field.


The Northerners lost 150 killed, 844 wounded, and 375 missing. The Southerners lost around 1,200 in killed and wounded, and 426 captured. (Note the captured were counted by the Union, whose records have survived.) The Federals claimed the victory, since they had inflicted slightly more casualties, and held the ground, for the moment. But since they then resumed their retreat, and the losses were not far from even, the Confederacy claimed a strategic victory . . . and Southern sympathizers maintain that position to this day.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

In Louisiana, Confederate District Commander Edmund Kirby Smith arrived to take charge of the Southern forces. Kirby Smith had always differed with Richard Taylor, wanting to assume the defensive rather than risk attack against the larger Union army under Nathaniel Banks. Since he was effectively the ruler of the Confederacy west of the Mississippi, Kirby Smith's opinion now prevailed. Unless they made a mistake and opened themselves to attack, the Yankees would be allowed to retreat without serious interference.

Such was not the case in Arkansas. Frederick Steele's column of Federals encountered a force under Sterling Price at a place called Prairie D'Ane. The Union troops attacked, and drove the Rebels back some distance, but did not achieve a breakthrough. For once, the Northerners as well as the Southerners failed to record their casualties.


In Nashville, W. T. Sherman faithfully replied to Grant's request for a plan of operations. In spite of Sherman's cancelling of all non-military railroad travel, it can be seen that he was still worried about supplies:

[font="Times New Roman"] HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, April 10, 1864

DEAR GENERAL: Your two letters of April 4th are now before me, and afford me infinite satisfaction. That we are now all to act on a common plan, converging on a common centre, looks like enlightened war.

Like yourself, you take the biggest load, and from me you shall have thorough and hearty cooperation. I will not let side issues draw me off from your main plans in which I am to knock Jos. Johnston, and to do as much damage to the resources of the enemy as possible. I have heretofore written to General Rawlins and to Colonel Comstock (of your staff) somewhat of the method in which I propose to act. I have seen all my army, corps, and division commanders, and have signified only to the former, viz., Schofield, Thomas, and McPherson, our general plans, which I inferred from the purport of our conversation here and at Cincinnati.

First, I am pushing stores to the front with all possible dispatch, and am completing the army organization according to the orders from Washington, which are ample and perfectly satisfactory.

It will take us all of April to get in our furloughed veterans, to bring up A. J. Smith's command, and to collect provisions and cattle on the line of the Tennessee. Each of the armies will guard, by detachments of its own, its rear communications.

At the signal to be given by you, Schofield, leaving a select garrison at Knoxville and London, with twelve thousand men will drop down to the Hiawassee, and march against Johnston's right by the old Federal road. Stoneman, now in Kentucky, organizing the cavalry forces of the Army of the Ohio, will operate with Schofield on his left front--it may be, pushing a select body of about two thousand cavalry by Ducktown or Elijah toward Athena, Georgia.

This is about as far ahead as I feel disposed to look, but I will ever bear in mind that Johnston is at all times to be kept so busy that he cannot in any event send any part of his command against you or Banks.

If Banks can at the same time carry Mobile and open up the Alabama River, he will in a measure solve the most difficult part of my problem, viz., "provisions." But in that I must venture. Georgia has a million of inhabitants. If they can live, we should not starve. If the enemy interrupt our communications, I will be absolved from all obligations to subsist on our own resources, and will feel perfectly justified in taking whatever and wherever we can find. I will inspire my command, if successful, with the feeling that beef and salt are all that is absolutely necessary to life, and that parched corn once fed General Jackson's army on that very ground.

As ever, your friend and servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.
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[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

In Virginia, Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was running very low on food, which boded poorly for the campaign virtually everyone now knew was coming:

[font="Times New Roman"][right]Headquarters, April 12, 1864.[/right]
Mr. President: My anxiety on the subject of provisions for the army is so great that I cannot refrain from expressing it to Your Excellency. I cannot see how we can operate with our present supplies. Any derangement in their arrival or disaster to the railroad would render it impossible for me to keep the army together, and might force a retreat to North Carolina. There is nothing to be had in this section for men or animals. We have rations for the troops to-day and to-morrow. I hope a new supply arrived last night, but I have not yet had a report. Every exertion should be made to supply the depots at Richmond and at other points. All pleasure travel should cease, and everything be devoted to necessary wants.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

R. E. Lee, General.
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At Fort Pillow overlooking the Mississippi River in Tennessee, a mixed garrison of white and colored troops was holding the place for the North. Orders had been given to abandon it, but the fort had become a sanctuary for escaped slaves and other black civilians. When Nathan Bedford Forrest's raiders drew near, the Southerners confronted a situation much like that of their repulse in Paducah, Kentucky. The Union fort was supported by a river gunboat, the USS New Era.

Lively fire was being exchanged between fort and gunboat, and the attacking Confederates, by the time Forrest arrived to take active command. He sent a demand for surrender: "The conduct of the officers and men garrisoning Fort Pillow has been such as to entitle them to being treated a prisoners of war. I demand the unconditional surrender of the entire garrison, promising that you shall be treated as prisoners of war. My men have just received a fresh supply of ammunition, and from their present position can easily assault and capture the fort. Should my demand be refused, I cannot be responsible for the fate of your command." Unknown to Forrest, the fort's commander had already been killed by a sharpshooter. The second-in-command, Major William F. Bradford, refused to surrender, having withstood several hours of skirmishing.

But this time Forrest had a good idea of how to deal with the situation. He posted a number of sharpshooters to cover the advance of his men. Some kept the fort's defenders from firing over the walls, while others forced the crew of the Northern gunboat to keep their gunports closed. The Rebels, angered by some taunting from the fort earlier in the day, made a furious charge and clambered over the fort walls. Now they had the advantage, not only in numbers but also because many were armed with revolvers more suited to close-quarter combat than muzzle-loading muskets.

The Union commander ordered his men to save themselves, but led to complete panic. Soldiers and civilians rushed to the river, trying to escape, but no one had hauled down the fort's flag, and the Confederates kept firing. As Forrest reported to his superior a few days later:

[font="Times New Roman"]The victory was complete, and the loss of the enemy will never be known from the fact that large numbers ran into the river and were shot and drowned. The force was composed of about 500 negroes and 200 white soldiers. The river was dyed with the blood of the slaughtered for 200 yards. There was in the fort a large number of citizens who had fled there to escape the conscript law. Most of these ran into the river and were drowned.
The approximate loss was upward of 500 killed, but few of the officers escaping.
It is hoped that these facts will demonstrate to the Northern people that negro soldiers cannot cope with Southerners.[/font]

The actual number of Union dead is more likely around 230, with a further 60 wounded and 126 captured. The Southerners lost only 14 killed and 86 wounded. Whether this was the result of indiscriminate fighting or deliberate massacre is one of the greater ongoing controversies of the Civil War. However, first-person accounts from both sides written shortly after the fall of Fort Pillow state that many Northerners were shot or bayoneted while attempting to surrender. Also noteworthy is that 168 whites but only 58 blacks were taken prisoner.

[Capt. Harlock]

Mid-April, 1864:

William T. Sherman's orders for improving railroad deliveries had been implemented, but the supplies coming in still did not satisfy him. He was a general who planned his campaigns in a scientific manner, and his calculations clearly came up short. His answer would be a "great train robbery" of sorts, but what would be taken was the trains themselves:

[font="Times New Roman"] I accordingly called together in Nashville the master of transportation, Colonel Anderson, the chief quartermaster, General J. L. Donaldson, and the chief commissary, General Amos Beckwith, for conference. I assumed the strength of the army to move from Chattanooga into Georgia at one hundred thousand men, and the number of animals to be fed, both for cavalry and draught, at thirty-five thousand; then, allowing for occasional wrecks of trains, which were very common, and for the interruption of the road itself by guerrillas and regular raids, we estimated it would require one hundred and thirty cars, of ten tons each, to reach Chattanooga daily, to be reasonably certain of an adequate supply. Even with this calculation, we could not afford to bring forward hay for the horses and mules, nor more than five pounds of oats or corn per day for each animal. I was willing to risk the question of forage in part, because I expected to find wheat and corn fields, and a good deal of grass, as we advanced into Georgia at that season of the year. The problem then was to deliver at Chattanooga and beyond one hundred and thirty car-loads daily, leaving the beef-cattle to be driven on the hoof, and all the troops in excess of the usual train-guards to march by the ordinary roads. Colonel Anderson promptly explained that he did not possess cars or locomotives enough to do this work. I then instructed and authorized him to hold on to all trains that arrived at Nashville from Louisville, and to allow none to go back until he had secured enough to fill the requirements of our problem. At the time he only had about sixty serviceable locomotives, and about six hundred cars of all kinds, and he represented that to provide for all contingencies he must have at least one hundred locomotives and one thousand cars. As soon as Mr. Guthrie, the President of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, detected that we were holding on to all his locomotives and cars, he wrote me, earnestly remonstrating against it ... I wrote to him, frankly telling him exactly how we were placed, appealed to his patriotism to stand by us, and advised him in like manner to hold on to all trains coming into Jeffersonville, Indiana ... and in a short time we had cars and locomotives from almost every road at the North; months afterward I was amused to see, away down in Georgia, cars marked "Pittsburg & Fort Wayne," "Delaware & Lackawanna," "Baltimore & Ohio," and indeed with the names of almost every railroad north of the Ohio River. How these railroad companies ever recovered their property, or settled their transportation accounts, I have never heard, but to this fact, as much as to any other single fact, I attribute the perfect success which afterward attended our campaigns...
[center]--Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman[/center][/font]


On the Red River, Admiral Porter heard the news that Nathaniel Banks and his army were retreating. It was now high time to get the Union fleet back down the river, for the water level was still going down. (This was not only because of less than average rainfall, but also because the Confederates had thoughtfully blasted a levee, diverting a considerable amount of water that would otherwise have continued downstream.)

Confederate General Richard Taylor wanted very much to take advantage of the situation. But he was overruled by General Edmund Kirby Smith, who believed that it was time to pay attention to the Union column in Arkansas under Frederick Steele. The Mississippi River was still firmly under Union control, and while this was so, Kirby Smith saw no chance of recovering New Orleans and eastern Louisiana. On the other hand, if Steele's army could be smashed, Arkansas might be recovered for the Confederacy.

And the chances of inflicting a major defeat on Steele were improving. His forces were running short on supplies in the less-developed lands in southern Arkansas. He had decided to seize the town of Camden, where he hoped to capture Confederate stores. This meant a delay in his progress to the south, and more time for the Rebels to concentrate forces against him.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

Admiral Porter's worrisome situation on the Red River became even worse when his most powerful vessel, the ironclad USS Eastport, hit a "torpedo" and settled on the bottom. The good news was that the water was shallow, and much of the ship was still above the surface. The salvage crews had easy access to begin their work. The bad news was that the shallow level meant that mearely refloating the warship would not be sufficient. She would have to ride as high in the water as possible, to clear the rocks, sunken logs, and other obstructions in the river. This meant pumping out each and every compartment.


The Confederate defensive works at Camden, Arkansas, were impressive to look at. The Northerners counted no less than nine forts surrounding the town as they approached. But there were scarcely any Rebel troops to man the forts at that particular moment. When Frederick Steele launched his assault, his men seized the forts and town with only a few shots fired.

The very great disadvatage was that, with few Confederate mouths to feed, equally few provisions had been stored in the town. There was nothing like the quantities of food and forage that Steele and his men would need to advance to Shreveport. And later in the day, Southern cavalry arrived on the outskirts of the town. Camden looked like it would be rather more difficult to get out of than to get in.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

Although General Benjamin Butler was universally loathed by the South, he was the man in charge of arranging prisoner exchanges for the Union army. On this date, U. S. Grant ordered Butler to demand that black Federal soldiers be treated equally with whites. If the Confederates declined, it would "be regarded as a refusal on their part to agree to the further exchange of prisoners, and be so treated by us." Grant knew that the Southerners were exceedingly unlikely to agree: to consider blacks and whites equal in any way was almost unthinkable to Southern society. The prisoner exchanges, already greatly slowed, were about to come virtually to a halt.


At a place called Edward's Ferry on the Roanoke River in North Carolina, a Confederate ironclad or "ram" had been under construction since January of 1863. The vessel mounted only two guns, but they were powerful 100-pound Brooke rifles, and could be moved to fire out of three gunports each. The Northerners had learned of this, but had decided against an attack, believing that the underwater obstacles in the river would prevent a vessel with the draft of an ironclad from moving downstream to threaten them.

On this date, the warship was commissioned into the Confederate Navy. She was not yet ready for action: Captain James W. Cooke spent much of the day exercising the crew at the guns, while workmen secured the last of her armor, and dealt with an engine failure, a common occurrence with Southern steam engines.