The Good The Bad & The Indifferent

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: obvert

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: Paladin1dcs
I'm really looking forward to seeing how he does once he's got most of the fun toys in late '44 and '45.

Alas, I doubt we'll see those dates in this game. I could be wrong, but that's what I think. I'd lay odds were I a bettin' man. Which I am. So I'll give anyone interested 2:1 odds.

Is the bet whether this gets into 44? I might take you up on that one! John won't likely quit if the KB is still in operation.

I'll take 'the other side' of that bet. PM me if you're serious. I'll give you 2:1 odds.

[Chickenboy]

That's quite the vent, CR. I wonder what 'ownership' of his own problems he'll claim in this game? Perhaps his use of a stacking limit based on another mod was not fully calculated in his own mod. Good on you for using his own self-conceived limitations against him! [&o]

[Crackaces]

I have stated before .. Plan works .. brillant strategy .. plans do not work .. bad die rolls .. [8|] And your diabolical single ship TF! You scoundrel! The fact that John has loss sight of measured response has nothing to do with the results .[8D]

Hmmm.. There has been two other AAR's of recent beta's where as previous mixes of IJ OOB have failed to take Singapore in a reasonable time. But airpower allocation has been much different also. One thing that is different is flak effectiveness in terms of disrupting now poorly coordinated strike packages so ground attacks vs. places with flak are not as effective as in the past. John has not adaopted to this new world though he helped write this scenario.

Ramree and the results are going to unhinge him. I am wondering about your pwhexe file? Do you have an editor so you can check the hex at Ramree island?

[Chickenboy]

Well, to be fair to John, dumping unsupported troops onto undefended rocks isn't a war-winning strategy, even for the Allies. Can CR supply, hold and leverage these footholds in the Gilberts at a reasonable cost? That's the question.

How would the Allies have felt if, IRL, they lost some 30 ships after such an endeavor? I'd wager they would have felt as if this were a defeat, even with the newly captured ground.

I let real life guide my thoughts at times like these as well. What would the Allied thoughts have been about dropping off a regiment (or smaller LCU) on a rock in the middle of the Pacific and then, BY DESIGN, cutting, splitting into singleton TFs and running like the wind? Do you think that a real life Admiral would make such a decision or implement it in this manner? Before we decry one player as a simpleton and hail another as a brilliant tactician and player, let's let real life have a say, shall we?

[Canoerebel]

Under the totality of the circumstances it's reasonable.  But the game forces us into strategies that don't perfectly align with real life.  A few examples:

1.  In real life, a small American CV TF suddenly learns that an overwhelmingly powerful enemy carrier force is 350 miles distant.  The American commander can immediately turn around and vamose.  In the game, the American commander continues to steam forward and cannot reverse course until the next day.  To avoid this nonhistoric situation, we send out flankers 90 or 180 miles or more whereas in the real war they might have only been five or ten miles out.

2.  In real life, Japan couldn't have within one day of an invasion sent patrol aircraft to basically ungarrisoned Baker, Tabituea and other islands and had immediate 360 degree saturated coverage of the entire ocean, getting solid sightings on the entire Allied fleet location.  Japan also couldn't have staged Betties forward hundreds of miles within 24 hours and then flown strikes the very next day a further 500 or 750 miles to the east.  The KB wouldn't have had perfect vectoring into the fleeing target TFs, which would have remained closer together for mutual support and protection.  So, of necessity, I scatter my ships and flee.

AE is replete with similar situations.  So do I feel the least bit remorseful in how I've handled the Gilberts Invasion?  Heck no!  Think of it this way - I knew the KB was 28 hexes SW of Tarawa.  Had John had a single patrol plane operating in the Gilberts, or a single patroling warship, he would've been alerted and I'd have had to stand down instanter.  He didn't so I rush in under circumstances quite similar to what the Allies did in Operation Watchtower. The Allies weren't sure they could hold that island, the supporting ships scattered, and for quite awhile it was a tossup - or the Americans thought it was.

[Canoerebel]

Update re Ramree Island.  The "problem" was a figment of my imagination.  The base is still controlled by Japan (Ramree isn't an atoll, so my guys didn't auto shock attack).  When I take the base tomorrow, I'll be able to build the forts and airfield.

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Under the totality of the circumstances it's reasonable. 

Oh, I agree. By all means. It's a reasonable event / outcome / approach when the game mechanics and vagaries are considered.

I'm just not conflating 'reasonable, non-gamey gameplay' with 'brilliant, balanced gameplay' is all.

[JocMeister]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy
Well, to be fair to John, dumping unsupported troops onto undefended rocks isn't a war-winning strategy, even for the Allies. Can CR supply, hold and leverage these footholds in the Gilberts at a reasonable cost? That's the question.

Does it matter? [:)] John is now reacting to what CR is doing and not the other way around. Isn´t that in itself worth a hefty price? Even if John takes it back it just means he is taking back something of no value instead of actually taking something with/of value?

[Crackaces]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

Well, to be fair to John, dumping unsupported troops onto undefended rocks isn't a war-winning strategy, even for the Allies. Can CR supply, hold and leverage these footholds in the Gilberts at a reasonable cost? That's the question.

How would the Allies have felt if, IRL, they lost some 30 ships after such an endeavor? I'd wager they would have felt as if this were a defeat, even with the newly captured ground.

I let real life guide my thoughts at times like these as well. What would the Allied thoughts have been about dropping off a regiment (or smaller LCU) on a rock in the middle of the Pacific and then, BY DESIGN, cutting, splitting into singleton TFs and running like the wind? Do you think that a real life Admiral would make such a decision or implement it in this manner? Before we decry one player as a simpleton and hail another as a brilliant tactician and player, let's let real life have a say, shall we?

This game is as much as a similation of WWII as much as a "Civil War chess set" represents the War Between the States. Undoubtedly It is a great game, but when we start expecting a game to become a similation soon it breaks down. My personal rant centers on the detection hex always being the target hex, which is fudemental not only if I want to fantasize that this simulates WWII in someway, but game play is seriously affected. But I adapt .. The rules are the rules ...and thus I have done moves probably no commander would do but .. the game dictates that these moves are optimium. For example, sending all my LBA fighters in escort mode because of the penality of LRCAP over a TF ... the KB is one hex away from my LBA .. My CV's are 7 hexes away .. So .. my fighters do not intercept strike packages flying directly overhead .. no no . they would fly 400 miles away under severe penality ... so I send them in with some DB's and get a much better fight over the KB ...

BTW) Dumping unsupported troops on rocks and the opponent reacting like the home islands have been attacked is a war winning strategy in my book [;)]

In my first game it took me two months to relieve Tarawa at this very same moment in the game. My opponent reacted somewhat like this. The KB and BB's stayed out here which then allowed forces to operate rather freely elsewhere. I suspect CR's moves are likewise ..

BTW II) I might propose that John gets crap from a certain audience because he never recognizes the brilliance of the other guys strategy. It is always a die roll, the game, gamey play, but never John .. but if they other guy catches an unluckly break .. its John's most brillant move ever .. [8|]

[Chickenboy]

Not necessarily. I've never been of the belief that goading the Japanese into a victory, losing LCUs and ships in the process is a universally profitable venture.

IMO, too many Allied players think that tweaking the Japanese timetable is worth paying an exorbitant price. We haven't seen enough AARs where early Allied forays are reversed with tremendous loss of Allied men and materiel to reinforce this, IMO.

Inspiring an opponent's action is one thing. Making the outcome of that reaction profitable to your position is another.

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: Crackaces

BTW II) I might propose that John gets crap from a certain audience because he never recognizes the brilliance of the other guys strategy. It is always a die roll, the game, gamey play, but never John .. but if they other guy catches an unluckly break .. its John's most brillant move ever .. [8|]

I don't follow...[&:]

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: Crackaces

BTW) Dumping unsupported troops on rocks and the opponent reacting like the home islands have been attacked is a war winning strategy in my book [;)]

Ah! So, if the 2nd Marine Division had been overrun and liquidated on Guadalcanal IRL, this would have been viewed as an Allied success because of the attention the Japanese paid it? Bataan was a war winner, was it?

[Crackaces]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: Crackaces

BTW II) I might propose that John gets crap from a certain audience because he never recognizes the brilliance of the other guys strategy. It is always a die roll, the game, gamey play, but never John .. but if they other guy catches an unluckly break .. its John's most brillant move ever .. [8|]

I don't follow...[&:]

Perth is an excellent example ... John uses the KB like a hammer .. CR moves some CV aircraft to Perth and lays a trap. John makes a tactical error in my view by striking the port ignoring the strategic error of not appricating the flak and effect on results in the target hex .. John losses a great deal of IJN CV based aircraft platforms with little to show for the losses ... Of course this has nothing to do with CR and everything to do with the borked die rolls .. [8|]

[JocMeister]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

Not necessarily. I've never been of the belief that goading the Japanese into a victory, losing LCUs and ships in the process is a universally profitable venture.

IMO, too many Allied players think that tweaking the Japanese timetable is worth paying an exorbitant price. We haven't seen enough AARs where early Allied forays are reversed with tremendous loss of Allied men and materiel to reinforce this, IMO.

Inspiring an opponent's action is one thing. Making the outcome of that reaction profitable to your position is another.

I´m only into my second PBEM so I have limited experience. But I played a very defensive first game and my pools were overflowing with materials and squads in late 42. I had hundreds of USA and USMC squads. Ships on the other hand...Loosing AP/AKs and CV are certainly bad. Everything else is expendable (in my very humble and limited experience).

[Crackaces]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: Crackaces

BTW) Dumping unsupported troops on rocks and the opponent reacting like the home islands have been attacked is a war winning strategy in my book [;)]

Ah! So, if the 2nd Marine Division had been overrun and liquidated on Guadalcanal IRL, this would have been viewed as an Allied success because of the attention the Japanese paid it? Bataan was a war winner, was it?

I think the fudemental difference in our arguements is that I see WitP AE as a game. I sense you view it as a similation. So I perceive that your arguements are based on some latient factors not represented in the game such as political factors, logistics, etc. Now, I understand there are two distinct opposite ends of the spectrum. On one end is the expectation that the opponent will manage the other persons view of reality and a series of "home rules" to somehow set up a situation that will turn this game into a similation. On the other end of the spectrum is the understanding that the game will never be a similation because basic assumptions are flawed. To wit the detection hex is the target hex not the first hex detected but many many more fundemental design problems. To wit the fundemetnal unit for a strike package is the squadron .. players cannot detach squadrons into smaller units to strike small scatering TF's a la PQ-17 .. so .... such moves are "Gamey"

Now believing this is a game and only a game .. I very much like CR's strategy of getting John to over committ resources i.e. platforms for what would be otherwise considered a small raid of sorts ... one that could be dealt with using measured force .. CR predicted and elicited the intended reaction and he will use this to push the big bowl of jelly in many places ...

[crsutton]

If you have not sent your return reply then I would not. We all need to vent when things don't go our way. Best to give John time to absorb his own vent. I have done it enough myself and a day or two of thought generally made me regret my vent or see it as a bit silly.

[Canoerebel]

Okay, crustton, that sounds like good advice.  I won't send it.  I'll try to send something very short and "non adversarial."

[HansBolter]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

Well, to be fair to John, dumping unsupported troops onto undefended rocks isn't a war-winning strategy, even for the Allies. Can CR supply, hold and leverage these footholds in the Gilberts at a reasonable cost? That's the question.

How would the Allies have felt if, IRL, they lost some 30 ships after such an endeavor? I'd wager they would have felt as if this were a defeat, even with the newly captured ground.

I let real life guide my thoughts at times like these as well. What would the Allied thoughts have been about dropping off a regiment (or smaller LCU) on a rock in the middle of the Pacific and then, BY DESIGN, cutting, splitting into singleton TFs and running like the wind? Do you think that a real life Admiral would make such a decision or implement it in this manner? Before we decry one player as a simpleton and hail another as a brilliant tactician and player, let's let real life have a say, shall we?

While I don't want to wade into this debate, I do want to make the point that Guadalcanal was almost exactly what you are describing, except it was a whole division we dropped of and scattered like the wind to avoid retribution.

A temporary withdrawal to avoid the hammer is not the same as dropping them off and leaving them to their fate. Once the KB has to leave to refuel and rearm, there will be plenty of opportunity to sneak in support units and supply on the sly.

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: Crackaces

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: Crackaces

BTW II) I might propose that John gets crap from a certain audience because he never recognizes the brilliance of the other guys strategy. It is always a die roll, the game, gamey play, but never John .. but if they other guy catches an unluckly break .. its John's most brillant move ever .. [8|]

I don't follow...[&:]

Perth is an excellent example ... John uses the KB like a hammer .. CR moves some CV aircraft to Perth and lays a trap. John makes a tactical error in my view by striking the port ignoring the strategic error of not appricating the flak and effect on results in the target hex .. John losses a great deal of IJN CV based aircraft platforms with little to show for the losses ... Of course this has nothing to do with CR and everything to do with the borked die rolls .. [8|]

No, I'm not being clear. I understand your point about John's outlook on this game and mostly agree with it. My question was about 'proposing that John get crap from a certain audience'. Were you proposing that that audience was me / other readers of CR's AAR?

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: Crackaces

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: Crackaces

BTW) Dumping unsupported troops on rocks and the opponent reacting like the home islands have been attacked is a war winning strategy in my book [;)]

Ah! So, if the 2nd Marine Division had been overrun and liquidated on Guadalcanal IRL, this would have been viewed as an Allied success because of the attention the Japanese paid it? Bataan was a war winner, was it?

I think the fudemental difference in our arguements is that I see WitP AE as a game. I sense you view it as a similation. So I perceive that your arguements are based on some latient factors not represented in the game such as political factors, logistics, etc. Now, I understand there are two distinct opposite ends of the spectrum. On one end is the expectation that the opponent will manage the other persons view of reality and a series of "home rules" to somehow set up a situation that will turn this game into a similation. On the other end of the spectrum is the understanding that the game will never be a similation because basic assumptions are flawed. To wit the detection hex is the target hex not the first hex detected but many many more fundemental design problems. To wit the fundemetnal unit for a strike package is the squadron .. players cannot detach squadrons into smaller units to strike small scatering TF's a la PQ-17 .. so .... such moves are "Gamey"

Now believing this is a game and only a game .. I very much like CR's strategy of getting John to over committ resources i.e. platforms for what would be otherwise considered a small raid of sorts ... one that could be dealt with using measured force .. CR predicted and elicited the intended reaction and he will use this to push the big bowl of jelly in many places ...

OK, Crackaces, that POV makes sense and describes my feelings on the matter well. [:)]