Comprehensive Wishlist

[ColinWright]

The link is both definitive and conclusive. It supports everything I’ve been saying all along. It should be the end of this discussion.

Lol.

Without wasting more time on this than it merits, let me point out the most obvious problem with your assertion. You have adopted the singularly improbable position that the 88 could be used to provide mobile flak protection, and you apparently feel that the fact that this unit claimed 35 aircraft shot down during its approach march to Normandy is 'both definitive and conclusive proof' for this assertion. Yet the only relevant fact you cite suggests that the unit contained more light AA than 88's ('They lost about 35 8,8 cm guns and 70 light Flak guns'). How is it that you know that it was the 88's that shot down these aircraft rather than the light AA? I might as well argue that since Fliegerkorps VIII contained Stukas, and since it shot down 387 Russian fighters during the battle of _______, that the Stuka was a formidable opponent in dog fights.

As I say, I could go on, but why bother? You'd never concede even the most carefully proven proposition.

However, regardless of how stubbornly you attempt to defend them, at the end of the day you not only haven't found proof for your assertions, but you won't find it, because the assertions themselves are ill-considered and arbitrary, and have no foundation in reality. It doesn't matter how much energy I invest in attempting to prove that Australia lies north of the equator. It doesn't, and I won't get anywhere.

[ColinWright]

This was despite the fact that the unit did not have SPAAG.

I really should quit -- but Curtis is such a gold mine!

I read the above sentence and wondered in passing: does that have any basis in fact, or did he just say it because it would be helpful to his argument if such was the case?

After all, this is Curtis we're talking about.

So I should be working on that retaining wall out back, but...

I read the one page article he cites. No discussion of the matter either way. I went to 'Lexicon der Wehrmacht.' Looked up the composition of the 'Flak Sturm Regimenter' that made up the 'Flak Korps III' under discussion. The light flak batteries are listed as (sf).

Uh huh. Off to Niehorster. 'Sf' = 'self-propelled.'

[madner]

That is indeed a very good link, but there seems to be a slight discrepancy between the claims. The 462 claim for aircraft is matched with 92 tanks and 14 armored cars. Now Normandy isn't the desert or the Ukraine, so the long range advantage is less.

However, notice that the Flak unit was still used in the ground support role, not primarily, but it wasn't withdrawn from that role. That link is evidence that despite much better pak guns, the 8.8 still saw ground combat, despite the far less favorable terrain.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: madner

That is indeed a very good link, but there seems to be a slight discrepancy between the claims. The 462 claim for aircraft is matched with 92 tanks and 14 armored cars. Now Normandy isn't the desert or the Ukraine, so the long range advantage is less.

However, notice that the Flak unit was still used in the ground support role, not primarily, but it wasn't withdrawn from that role. That link is evidence that despite much better pak guns, the 8.8 still saw ground combat, despite the far less favorable terrain.

Yeah. The points made in the original article aren't without merit -- the author can't be held to blame for the uses Curtis attempts to make of them.

At the same time, the merits of the 88 -- long range and excellent optics -- were of considerably more value in the desert or in the East than in Normandy. In Normandy, you probably weren't going to see your target until it was a few hundred yards away anyway. Under such circumstances, the ability to hit it at a range of several thousand meters was of decidedly limited value.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

The link is both definitive and conclusive. It supports everything I’ve been saying all along. It should be the end of this discussion.

Lol.

Without wasting more time on this than it merits, let me point out the most obvious problem with your assertion. You have adopted the singularly improbable position that the 88 could be used to provide mobile flak protection, and you apparently feel that the fact that this unit claimed 35 aircraft shot down during its approach march to Normandy is 'both definitive and conclusive proof' for this assertion. Yet the only relevant fact you cite suggests that the unit contained more light AA than 88's ('They lost about 35 8,8 cm guns and 70 light Flak guns'). How is it that you know that it was the 88's that shot down these aircraft rather than the light AA? I might as well argue that since Fliegerkorps VIII contained Stukas, and since it shot down 387 Russian fighters during the battle of _______, that the Stuka was a formidable opponent in dog fights.

The article is definitive and conclusive about the role that the 88mm Flak gun was used for by field units in 1944. It was used for air defense, with a secondary use of artillery support (there's something TOAW lacks). It could still be used for AT, but was employed at that rarely, and was abysmal at it when it was.

The fact that the unit shot down 35 interdicting aircraft is definitely a data point that supports my position. There is nothing in the article that contradicts that position.

As I say, I could go on, but why bother? You'd never concede even the most carefully proven proposition.

That's hilarious, considering I've just posted an article that destroys your claim that the 88's were only used by field units in the AT role and only defended fixed targets against air attack. Yet here you are sticking to your, now indefensible, claims.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

This was despite the fact that the unit did not have SPAAG.

I really should quit -- but Curtis is such a gold mine!

I read the above sentence and wondered in passing: does that have any basis in fact, or did he just say it because it would be helpful to his argument if such was the case?

After all, this is Curtis we're talking about.

So I should be working on that retaining wall out back, but...

I read the one page article he cites. No discussion of the matter either way. I went to 'Lexicon der Wehrmacht.' Looked up the composition of the 'Flak Sturm Regimenter' that made up the 'Flak Korps III' under discussion. The light flak batteries are listed as (sf).

Uh huh. Off to Niehorster. 'Sf' = 'self-propelled.'

"Handbook on German Military Forces", pg 167, figure 151: "Antiaircraft Regiment (motorized)". No SPAAG.

And, of course, the article notably fails to list any of the guns as SPAAG.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: madner

That is indeed a very good link, but there seems to be a slight discrepancy between the claims. The 462 claim for aircraft is matched with 92 tanks and 14 armored cars.

"Of the tanks destroyed about twelve fell victims to the man-held Panzerfaust close range antitank weapon.32"

"The number of tanks claimed is quite small. Given the fact that Army and Waffen-SS units claimed to have destroyed 3 663 enemy tanks from 6 June to 21 August35, the III. Flak-Korps can not be regarded as a very important part of German anti-tank defences."

And:

"If enemy tanks had broken through, the flak units were expected to engage them if they reached the positions of the flak."

Now Normandy isn't the desert or the Ukraine, so the long range advantage is less.

"The longer range of the 8,8 cm Flak gun compared to the 7,5 cm AT gun was of course an advantage, but at longer range, accuracy declines for all guns, even the 8,8 cm gun. Thus, the chances of hitting with the first shot was lower. Since the 8,8 cm AA gun was difficult to conceal and easy to spot when it had fired, this made it likely that the enemy tanks could respond with HE fire, or call for indirect artillery on the positions of the Flak guns before they were destroyed at long range."

However, notice that the Flak unit was still used in the ground support role, not primarily, but it wasn't withdrawn from that role. That link is evidence that despite much better pak guns, the 8.8 still saw ground combat, despite the far less favorable terrain.

"The fact that the 8,8 cm Flak was not suitable for anti-tank misisons was also clearly recognized by the commanders and men serving in the III. Flak-Korps. Both in the post-war manuscript produced by the corps commander, Wolfgang Pickert5, and in a report, dated 20 September 1944, discussing the experiences from the actions of the corps during the battles in Normandy6, this is clear."

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

This was despite the fact that the unit did not have SPAAG.

I really should quit -- but Curtis is such a gold mine!

I read the above sentence and wondered in passing: does that have any basis in fact, or did he just say it because it would be helpful to his argument if such was the case?

After all, this is Curtis we're talking about.

So I should be working on that retaining wall out back, but...

I read the one page article he cites. No discussion of the matter either way. I went to 'Lexicon der Wehrmacht.' Looked up the composition of the 'Flak Sturm Regimenter' that made up the 'Flak Korps III' under discussion. The light flak batteries are listed as (sf).

Uh huh. Off to Niehorster. 'Sf' = 'self-propelled.'

"Handbook on German Military Forces", pg 167, figure 151: "Antiaircraft Regiment (motorized)". No SPAAG.

And, of course, the article notably fails to list any of the guns as SPAAG.

There's really no point in bothering. I cite evidence that those specific regiments contained self-propelled AA guns -- you steam roller right over it. Never mind you've still shown no reason at all to think the 88's served as mobile flak.

[ColinWright]

...

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay



That's hilarious, considering I've just posted an article that destroys your claim that the 88's were only used by field units in the AT role and only defended fixed targets against air attack. Yet here you are sticking to your, now indefensible, claims.

Nothing in the article supports your assertion that 88's were used as mobile AA. I have never asserted that 88's were only used by field units in the AT role.

I'd be curious to know what claims you think I've made that are indefensible. The fact of the matter is that with you, one wastes a great deal of time proving the obvious, and invariably, the obvious turns out to be true. Australia does indeed lie south of the equator. The current month of July will shortly be succeeded by the month of August.

Etc. It gets really tedious. Worse, it interferes with potentially useful and constructive debates. Here comes Curtis. He will now say something ridiculous, and we will then play semantic games about who said what and whether what he produces as evidence actually supports his contentions.

[ColinWright]

The worst of it all is that it's all majestically beside the point.

A game at the level of TOAW can't meaningfully discriminate between flak that's useful for forces on the move and flak that is best used from a fixed position. 88's should indeed reduce the effectiveness of close support and interdicting aircraft. Flak in general should do that. That's definitely a needed change.

Otherwise, it would be nice if flak could either provide AA protection or be used for direct ground support. As noted here, 88's did not do both at once. They did apparently serve simultaneously as both AA and artillery, which is interesting, and yet another aspect of their role that could be simulated -- but isn't something we're arguing about.

No -- we've gotten onto something that appears to involve Curtis simultaneously contending that 88's could serve usefully as flak while on the move and that they were no longer useful in an AT role -- neither contention being remotely defensible or supported by anything Curtis cites.

[madner]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: madner

That is indeed a very good link, but there seems to be a slight discrepancy between the claims. The 462 claim for aircraft is matched with 92 tanks and 14 armored cars.

"Of the tanks destroyed about twelve fell victims to the man-held Panzerfaust close range antitank weapon.32"

"The number of tanks claimed is quite small. Given the fact that Army and Waffen-SS units claimed to have destroyed 3 663 enemy tanks from 6 June to 21 August35, the III. Flak-Korps can not be regarded as a very important part of German anti-tank defences."


"The longer range of the 8,8 cm Flak gun compared to the 7,5 cm AT gun was of course an advantage, but at longer range, accuracy declines for all guns, even the 8,8 cm gun. Thus, the chances of hitting with the first shot was lower. Since the 8,8 cm AA gun was difficult to conceal and easy to spot when it had fired, this made it likely that the enemy tanks could respond with HE fire, or call for indirect artillery on the positions of the Flak guns before they were destroyed at long range."

However, notice that the Flak unit was still used in the ground support role, not primarily, but it wasn't withdrawn from that role. That link is evidence that despite much better pak guns, the 8.8 still saw ground combat, despite the far less favorable terrain.

"The fact that the 8,8 cm Flak was not suitable for anti-tank misisons was also clearly recognized by the commanders and men serving in the III. Flak-Korps. Both in the post-war manuscript produced by the corps commander, Wolfgang Pickert5, and in a report, dated 20 September 1944, discussing the experiences from the actions of the corps during the battles in Normandy6, this is clear."

Now that is a good argument if someone would argue that, but your argument was that due to superior allied tactics the flak units were no longer used to support ground operations. Clearly the III. Flak-Korps was used in that fashion, and clearly it did destroy around 80 tanks.

Now, 92 or 80 out of 3663 may be a low percentage, but consider this, on his heyday:

Causes of T-34 losses from June 1941 to September 1942 (expressed as % of total).
Weapon Calibre 88mm 3.4%.

So the 2.5% don't look out of ordinary.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: ColinWright



I really should quit -- but Curtis is such a gold mine!

I read the above sentence and wondered in passing: does that have any basis in fact, or did he just say it because it would be helpful to his argument if such was the case?

After all, this is Curtis we're talking about.

So I should be working on that retaining wall out back, but...

I read the one page article he cites. No discussion of the matter either way. I went to 'Lexicon der Wehrmacht.' Looked up the composition of the 'Flak Sturm Regimenter' that made up the 'Flak Korps III' under discussion. The light flak batteries are listed as (sf).

Uh huh. Off to Niehorster. 'Sf' = 'self-propelled.'

"Handbook on German Military Forces", pg 167, figure 151: "Antiaircraft Regiment (motorized)". No SPAAG.

And, of course, the article notably fails to list any of the guns as SPAAG.

There's really no point in bothering. I cite evidence that those specific regiments contained self-propelled AA guns -- you steam roller right over it. Never mind you've still shown no reason at all to think the 88's served as mobile flak.

And I cite evidence that they didn't. And the article supports it at every turn:

"The III. Flak-Korps was made up of motorized units only1, even though there were shortages of vehicles."

No shortage of guns is listed. By definition, SPAAG doesn't require a vehicle to tow it. The need for vehicles strongly suggests that they were towed. And:

"According to the 20 September 1944 experience report, losses during the march included 20 guns, 110 trucks and towing vehicles, 100 motorcycles, passenger cars and trailers.26 "

No SPAAG is ever listed in any loss reports. Towing vehicles are, however.

Finally, it's improbable that a purely defensive unit, intended for rear area deployment would have been given SPAAG. That was reserved for units whose mobility was critical - Panzer Divisions, for example.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Nothing in the article supports your assertion that 88's were used as mobile AA. I have never asserted that 88's were only used by field units in the AT role.

Direct quote from your post #1072:

Very few of them were there with the field units. And they were up front to serve as AT, not as AA. In their AA role, they would be used to defend fixed targets vulnerable to high-level bombing, not for defense against tactical aircraft.

In contrast, I have never explicitly stated that 88's were used as mobile AA. I've simply challenged you basis for your explicit statement that they weren't. Same post:

A limbered up 88 moving along with a column would be useless if some Tomahawks showed up.

None of your claims about this have stood up to scrutiny. And you're now reduced to claiming that all the kills of the unit while it moved were by light AA. You have no evidence for this, and you're starting to look like the British at Isandhlwana.

All I've ever claimed is that the 88mm Flak was providing a dual use to ground units early in the war - air defense and AT. That they were used for air defense of ground units is now an established fact.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: madner

Now that is a good argument if someone would argue that, but your argument was that due to superior allied tactics the flak units were no longer used to support ground operations. Clearly the III. Flak-Korps was used in that fashion, and clearly it did destroy around 80 tanks.

I've never claimed that their use as AT completely ended. I've said that they were phased out of that role. And that's just what happened. The unit kept its guns behind the lines for air defense purposes, rarely engaging tanks. But the Germans were on the defensive in Normandy, so tanks couldn't be avoided altogether.

Now, 92 or 80 out of 3663 may be a low percentage, but consider this, on his heyday:

Causes of T-34 losses from June 1941 to September 1942 (expressed as % of total).
Weapon Calibre 88mm 3.4%.

So the 2.5% don't look out of ordinary.

Those T-34's were primarily on the defensive for those periods, in contrast to Allied tanks in Normandy. Regardless, I'm sure those figures pale in comparison to the 88's performance in the Desert.

The important point is that longer ranges don't realy benefit an unarmored gun. That's because it is subject to HE fire, and HE ranges far exceed AT ranges. Only in those cases where the enemy has poor coordination of artilery with armor, and tanks that lack HE will that range matter. Late in the war even the Soviets were probably competent enough to discount that advantage, and they had huge artillery support.

Since we now know for certain that the 88mm Flak was used for air defense of ground units, that makes my point about the Pak 43 telling: Why build a dedicated AT gun if a Flak gun can give you dual use? The only answer is that the Flak gun was no longer effective in the AT role. And that's just what the article emphasizes.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Otherwise, it would be nice if flak could either provide AA protection or be used for direct ground support. As noted here, 88's did not do both at once. They did apparently serve simultaneously as both AA and artillery, which is interesting, and yet another aspect of their role that could be simulated -- but isn't something we're arguing about.

Actually, the figures do show that they did both at once. 462 AC and 92 Tanks destroyed.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Otherwise, it would be nice if flak could either provide AA protection or be used for direct ground support. As noted here, 88's did not do both at once. They did apparently serve simultaneously as both AA and artillery, which is interesting, and yet another aspect of their role that could be simulated -- but isn't something we're arguing about.

Actually, the figures do show that they did both at once. 462 AC and 92 Tanks destroyed.

Similarly, the Short Stirling was used as a strategic bomber and as a target tug, thus showing it was able to do both at once.

[madner]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: madner

Now that is a good argument if someone would argue that, but your argument was that due to superior allied tactics the flak units were no longer used to support ground operations. Clearly the III. Flak-Korps was used in that fashion, and clearly it did destroy around 80 tanks.

I've never claimed that their use as AT completely ended. I've said that they were phased out of that role. And that's just what happened. The unit kept its guns behind the lines for air defense purposes, rarely engaging tanks. But the Germans were on the defensive in Normandy, so tanks couldn't be avoided altogether.

Now if that would be true, why would the above mentioned report complain about the usage versus ground forces? It only makes sense if they were deliberately used (like latter in Wacht am Rhein) to support ground forces.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

Now, 92 or 80 out of 3663 may be a low percentage, but consider this, on his heyday:

Causes of T-34 losses from June 1941 to September 1942 (expressed as % of total).
Weapon Calibre 88mm 3.4%.

So the 2.5% don't look out of ordinary.

Those T-34's were primarily on the defensive for those periods, in contrast to Allied tanks in Normandy. Regardless, I'm sure those figures pale in comparison to the 88's performance in the Desert.

The important point is that longer ranges don't realy benefit an unarmored gun. That's because it is subject to HE fire, and HE ranges far exceed AT ranges. Only in those cases where the enemy has poor coordination of artilery with armor, and tanks that lack HE will that range matter. Late in the war even the Soviets were probably competent enough to discount that advantage, and they had huge artillery support.

Since we now know for certain that the 88mm Flak was used for air defense of ground units, that makes my point about the Pak 43 telling: Why build a dedicated AT gun if a Flak gun can give you dual use? The only answer is that the Flak gun was no longer effective in the AT role. And that's just what the article emphasizes.

Not comparable as in the desert the flak units represented a significant percentage of German units capable of destroying tanks. If you posses one third of the anti tank assets you should at least destroy as many tanks.

The Red army artillery coordination was always poor, that said they 7.62 was by design meant to be both field and AT gun, and engage targets mostly by direct fire. But I digress, wasn't it you that claimed that the 8.8 was able to be dismounted fast enough to engage strafing aircraft without prior warning? Certainly after destroying targets it would be possible to shift the firing positions?

[ColinWright]

Sigh. The whole thing always gets pulled out of all connection with reality when Curtis comes trooping in. While there's the usual conventional praise for the 88/revisionist modification, the essential facts aren't particularly debatable.

There is light flak and heavy flak. Light flak is mobile, effective against low-level aircraft, and quickly deployed. It is, in particular, suitable to accompany moving columns of troops, because it is able to come into action very quickly. Heavy flak is intended more to be used against aircraft at elevation, and takes some time to deploy. Aside from the sheer size of the piece, you're gonna be going through a ton of shells, and presumably, there's some sort of observation, fuse-setting, and gun-laying rigamarole connected with taking full advantage of the potential of the piece. The 88 was heavy flak -- or medium flak, or whatever you want to call it. That's what it was made for, and that's what it was best at. No doubt it could do something about that P-47 that just came zipping over the tree-line, but a limbered 88 wasn't really what was called for in that situation.

I don't really see anything too hard to swallow in the foregoing. I don't see how anyone could. Now for the second part of my exposition on the obvious.

The Germans always were noticeably ready to employ their flak in a ground support role, and the 88 was no exception. Early on, its value for bunker-busting and as a long-range AT gun were noticed and exploited. 88's did not accompany front-line troops because they were especially suitable for the role of mobile AA. When they appeared in a direct-fire role in mobile warfare, it was because they were useful in ground combat roles. I'm interested to hear it was apparently also used to provide indirect artillery support, but that's really kind of beside any point anyone seems interested in disputing.

Now...what seems to be driving Curtis is the usual 'all is for the best in this best of all possible worlds.' The fact of the matter -- again as usual -- is that it isn't. 88's, employed as AA guns, would tend to be in the rear with the gear, protecting fixed and vulnerable points, which yes, were plentiful, even in the desert. As such, they would usually not be in a position to support assaults and provide AT protection. When they were deployed in such roles, they were usually not in a position to fulfill the AA mission they were best at. The 88's can be protecting Tank Repair Workshop 8, or they can be smashing up Matildas. They can't be doing both. Not at once.

Now, we could be having a useful conversation -- or at any rate, an illuminating debate -- aimed at defining this and similar defects and deciding how best to remedy them. But no -- we're hung up with Curtis and his attempts to prove that two and two make five, or that someone else said two and two make five, or something else connected with whatever the needs of his inner world are.

[madner]

Well prior to the war there was quite a debate about the proper caliber for light divisional artillery, with the US army and Wehrmacht going for the 105mm, UK for 87mm and Red Army for 7.62mm guns (which were to be replaced by 107mm artillery, starting in 1941). And the Germans had the long range 105mm as well, so clearly they felt there was a niche for a longer range light artillery piece. Mainly useful for counter battery fire I suppose.