Civil War 150th

[Capt. Harlock]

Late June 1864:

In the Shenandoah Valley, the Union force under David Hunter was marching back north by a much different route than it had taken in advancing. This made it unwise for the Confederates under Jubal Early to pursue. However, Early was not displeased:

[font="Times New Roman"] I had seen our soldiers endure a great deal, but there was a limit to the endurance even of Confederate soldiers. A stern chase with infantry is a very difficult one, and Hunter's men were marching for their lives, his disabled being carried in his provision train, which was now empty. My cavalry was not strong enough to accomplish anything of importance, and a further pursuit could only have resulted in disaster to my command from want of provisions and forage.
I was glad to see Hunter take the route to Lewisburg, as I knew he could not stop short of the Kanawha River, and he was, therefore, disposed of for some time. Had he moved to Southwestern Virginia, he would have done us incalculable mischief, as there were no troops of any consequence in that quarter, but plenty of supplies at that time. I should, therefore, have been compelled to follow him.
[center]--Jubal Early, Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War Between the States[/font][/center]

The main reason that Early was glad of the Yankees' movement was that it had opened up the Shenandoah Valley for an invasion of the North. Robert E. Lee had authorized Early to make a bold gamble in just such an event, and march on Washington D.C.


In Georgia, Sherman was disappointed that his advance had been stopped for the time being, but optimistic for the future. He sent a message to Henry Halleck in Washington:

[font="Times New Roman"]"We continue to press forward on the principle of an advance against fortified positions. The whole country is one vast fort, and Johnston must have at least fifty miles of connected trenches, with abatis and finished batteries. We gain ground daily, fighting all the time. On the 21st General Stanley gained a position near the south end of Kenesaw, from which the enemy attempted in vain to drive him; and the same day General T. J. Wood's division took a hill, which the enemy assaulted three times at night without success, leaving more than a hundred dead on the ground.
Yesterday the extreme right (Hooker and Schofield) advanced on the Powder Springs road to within three miles of Marietta. The enemy made a strong effort to drive them away, but failed signally, leaving more than two hundred dead on the field. Our lines are now in close contact, and the fighting is incessant, with a good deal of artillery-fire. As fast as we gain one position the enemy has another all ready, but I think he will soon have to let go Kenesaw, which is the key to the whole country. The weather is now better, and the roads are drying up fast. Our losses are light, and, not- withstanding the repeated breaks of the road to our rear, supplies are ample."

[center]--Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman[/center][/font]

But Sherman would very soon find that his positive outlook was mistaken. The Rebels had no intention of "Letting go" of Kennesaw Mountain:

[font="Times New Roman"]The battles of the Kennesaw line were fought for weeks. Cannonading and musketry firing was one continual thing. It seemed that shooting was the order of the day, and pickets on both sides kept up a continual firing, that sounded like ten thousand wood-choppers. Sometimes the wood- choppers would get lazy or tired and there was a lull. But you could always tell when the old guard had been relieved, by the accelerated chops of the wood-choppers.
[center]-- Sam R. Watkins , "Co. Aytch" Maury Grays, First Tennessee Regiment[/center][/font]

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

It was now depressingly clear to both sides that Grant's attempt to smash the Army of Northern Virginia and capture Richmond had turned into a siege. There was every sign of its being a long one, for both sides had built formidable fortifications. Opposite one of the Confederate forts was the 48th Pennsylvania Infantry, commanded by one Lieutenant Colonel Henry Pleasants. Staring at the obstacle, Pleasants and his men came up with the idea of digging a tunnel underneath it and blowing it up.

Pleasants had been a mining engineer before the war, and a number of his men, being from Pennsylvania, were coal miners. The challenge was considerable, for the distance to be tunneled was about 500 feet (152 m), and this was before electric ventilating fans. But Pleasants managed to convince his chain of command that his men were up to the job, and on this date, the digging began.

(Note the original tunnel entrance was destroyed, but has been re-created as part of the Petersburg National Battlefield.)

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

In Georgia, Sherman's forces were at a standstill. He could not advance along the railroad any further because of the Confederate position at Kennesaw Mountain. A wide movement around was out for the time being: the rains had made the roads too muddy for the wagons he would need to support his troops. There seemed to be only one thing to do:

[font="Times New Roman"]I had consulted Generals Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield, and we all agreed that we could not with prudence stretch out any more, and therefore there was no alternative but to attack "fortified lines," a thing carefully avoided up to that time. I reasoned, if we could make a breach anywhere near the rebel centre, and thrust in a strong head of column, that with the one moiety of our army we could hold in check the corresponding wing of the enemy, and with the other sweep in flank and overwhelm the other half. The 27th of June was fixed as the day for the attempt, and in order to oversee the whole, and to be in close communication with all parts of the army, I had a place cleared on the top of a hill to the rear of Thomas's centre, and had the telegraph-wires laid to it. The points of attack were chosen, and the troops were all prepared with as little demonstration as possible.

[center]--Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman[/center][/font]

The preliminary bombardments did not go entrely unnoticed, however:

[font="Times New Roman"]Our regiment was stationed on an angle, a little spur of the mountain, or rather promontory of a range of hills, extending far out beyond the main line of battle, and was subject to the enfilading fire of forty pieces of artillery of the Federal batteries. It seemed fun for the guns of the whole Yankee army to play upon this point. We would work hard every night to strengthen our breastworks, and the very next day they would be torn down smooth with the ground by solid shots and shells from the guns of the enemy. Even the little trees and bushes which had been left for shade, were cut down as so much stubble. For more than a week this constant firing had been kept up against this salient point. In the meantime, the skirmishing in the valley below resembled the sounds made by ten thousand wood-choppers.

[center]-- Sam R. Watkins , "Co. Aytch" Maury Grays, First Tennessee Regiment[/center][/font]


In the Shenandaoh Valley, the small Southern army under Jubal Early had reached the town of Staunton, and paused to re-group. The troops were fewer than Early had hoped, and the state of their equipment was poor. Early had a decision to make, but given his characteristic determination, there could have been little doubt what he would decide:

[font="Times New Roman"]The official reports at this place [Staunton] showed about two thousand mounted men for duty in the cavalry, which was composed of four small brigades, to wit: Imboden's, McCausland's, Jackson's, and Jones' (now Johnson's). Vaughan's had not been mounted, but the horses had been sent for from Southwestern Virginia. The official reports of the infantry showed 10,000 muskets for duty, including Vaughan's dismounted cavalry. Nearly, if not quite, half of the company's officers and men were bare-footed or nearly so, and a dispatch had been sent from Salem by courier, and Lynchburg by telegraph, to Richmond, requesting shoes to be sent to Staunton, but they had not arrived.

Another telegram was received here from General Lee stating that the circumstances under which my original orders were given had changed, and again submitting it to my judgment, in the altered state of things, whether the movement down the Valley and across the Potomac should be made. The accession to my command from Breckenridge's forces had not been as great as General Lee supposed it would be, on account of the disorganization consequent on Jones' defeat at Piedmont, and the subsequent rapid movement to Lynchburg from Rock-fish Gap, but I determined to carry out the original design at all hazards, and telegraphed General Lee my purpose to continue the movement.

[center]--Jubal Early, Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War Between the States[/center][/font]

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

At Kennesaw Mountain in Georgia:

[font="Times New Roman"]Well, on the fatal morning of June 27th, the sun rose clear and cloudless, the heavens seemed made of brass, and the earth of iron, and as the sun began to mount toward the zenith, everything became quiet, and no sound was heard save a peckerwood on a neighboring tree, tapping on its old trunk, trying to find a worm for his dinner. We all knew it was but the dead calm that precedes the storm.

[...]

It seemed that the archangel of Death stood and looked on with outstretched wings, while all the earth was silent, when all at once a hundred guns from the Federal line opened upon us, and for more than an hour they poured their solid and chain shot, grape and shrapnel right upon this salient point, defended by our regiment alone, when, all of a sudden, our pickets jumped into our works and reported the Yankees advancing, and almost at the same time a solid line of blue coats came up the hill. I discharged my gun, and happening to look up, there was the beautiful flag of the Stars and Stripes flaunting right in my face . . . My pen is unable to describe the scene of carnage and death that ensued in the next two hours. Column after column of Federal soldiers were crowded upon that line, and by referring to the history of the war you will find they were massed in column forty columns deep; in fact, the whole force of the Yankee army was hurled against this point, but no sooner would a regiment mount our works than they were shot down or surrendered, and soon we had every "gopher hole" full of Yankee prisoners. Yet still the Yankees came . . . The sun beaming down on our uncovered heads, the thermometer being one hundred and ten degrees in the shade, and a solid line of blazing fire right from the muzzles of the Yankee guns being poured right into our very faces, singeing our hair and clothes, the hot blood of our dead and wounded spurting on us, the blinding smoke and stifling atmosphere filling our eyes and mouths, and the awful concussion causing the blood to gush out of our noses and ears, and above all, the roar of battle, made it a perfect pandemonium. Afterward I heard a soldier express himself by saying that he thought "Hell had broke loose in Georgia, sure enough."

[center]-- Sam R. Watkins, "Co. Aytch" Maury Grays, First Tennessee Regiment[/center][/font]

Both Sherman and Johnston found no fault with the courage displayed by the Northern assaulting troops. But it was not enough against the Southern fortifications and firepower. Before noon Sherman admitted that it was hopeless; there would be no break in the Confederate lines. The attacks were called off, although many of the Northerners refused to accept complete defeat and instead "covered themselves with parapet" and remained on the slopes.
Sherman estimated his losses at about 3,000 men in total. (He made exact reports only at the end of each month, since there was combat nearly every day of his campaign of four months.) Johnston estimated the Confederate casualties at about 800, and later expressed doubt that the Federal casualties had been that low:

[font="Times New Roman"]From the number of dead counted from his breastworks, Lieutenant-General Hardee estimated the loss of the troops engaged with his corps at five thousand; and in his official report, dated July 30th, Major-General Loring estimated that of the Army of the Tennessee, which assailed his corps, at twenty-five hundred. I think that the estimate of Northern officers of their killed and wounded on that occasion, “near three thousand,” does great injustice to the character of General Sherman’s army. Such a loss, in the large force that must have been furnished for a decisive and general attack by an army of almost a hundred thousand men, would have been utterly insignificant —too trifling to discourage, much less defeat brave soldiers, such as composed General Sherman’s army. It does injustice to Southern marksmanship, too. The fire of twenty thousand infantry inured to battle, and intrenched, and of fifty field-pieces poured into such columns, frequently within pistol-shot, must have done much greater execution.

[center]--Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations during the Civil War[/center][/font]

There had been one Union accomplishment, however. Although Sherman and his generals had agreed that they could not safely stretch their lines further, the day's action had done just that to the south of Kennesaw Mountain. The troops under John Schofield on the Union right, tasked with no more than a "demonstration" to keep the Southerners from shifting their men to reinforce the main attack points, had found the area lightly defended. The Federals pushed across Olley's Creek, ending up within 5 miles (8.0 km) of the Chattahoochee River, the last major natural obstacle to Atlanta.

Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

At the town of Staunton in the Shenadoah Valley, Jubal Early ordered his little army to move out. And it officially was an army now: the Army of the Valley instead of merely a corps of the Army of Northern Virginia. Early had received some reinforcements, bringing his strength up to 10,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. Because the Confederacy tended to count only the front-line combat personnel instead of cooks, teamsters, etc., it is likely that Early had at least 14,000 men under his command. It was still a small force, but enough to capture Washington D. C. , because the city had been stripped of virtually all the experienced soldiers to provide replacements for the fearful casualties Grant's campaign had suffered. Because time was of the essence, Early ordered the march before the supply of shoes he had requested could arrive. Nearly half his infantry, including a number of officers, would begin the march barefoot.


In Washington itself, the U. S. Congress finally got around to repealing the shameful Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. By this time, it made very little difference: escaped slaves from the Confederacy were free under the Emancipation Proclamation, Maryland was in the process of abolishing slavery, and the parts of Missouri that were not under military law were under no law at all.

Still, Lincoln was happy to have the act off the books. The man responsible for introducing the repeal bill was an Ohio Congressman named Rufus P. Spalding, who had, before being elected to the House, defended at least two people charged under the act and argued that it was unconstitutional.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

It was a grim time for the U. S. Department of the Treasury. Money was running low, and lenders were losing confidence with Grant and Sherman both apparently stalled. Printing more "greenbacks" was not a good idea, for without the central influence of the Gold Room, gold was now selling for as much as 249 greenbacks for 100 dollars in gold coin. Yet Secretary Salmon P. Chase had chosen this time to nominate an unqualified political crony to the key post of Assistant Treasurer of New York. Lincoln rejected the choice, and asked for another.

Unwilling to lose any more of his control over his department, Chase sent his resignation to Lincoln (for the third or fourth time). He expected the President to give way as the price for keeping Chase at his post, as had happened before. It was an unwise move. Lincoln was well aware that Chase had been intriguing to replace him earlier in the year, and the Treasury now needed someone who inspired more confidence than the innovator of paper money. Lincoln would later recall, "I put my pen into my mouth, and grit my teeth upon it. I did not long reflect." The President took his pen back out of his mouth and speedily wrote an acceptance of the resignation. Chase would be told he was no longer in charge when he went to his office next day. There would be trouble, of course, for Chase still had powerful friends in the Senate.

Lincoln had had the foresight to keep Chase's previous letters of resignation. When the Senate Finance Committee called on him in a body, the President read the letters aloud. They left still unhappy, but with a realization that matters had come to a head. To further mollify the Senators, Lincoln would later suggest that Chase would make a good Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

In Georgia, the weather continued sunny and hot. The drying roads now made a large movement of Sherman's army feasible, which it would not have been a week before. South of Kennesaw Mountain, the Yankees continued to press the single advantage of the battle of June 27, curving around the far left of the Confederate lines. If they continued along that direction, they would cut the Rebel army off from Atlanta. Confederate commander Joseph Johnston did not have the troops, and especially not enough cavalry, to halt the movement. He must have realized that another evacuation of his lines would soon be necessary.

But when Confederate Senator Benjamin Hill visited Johnston's headquarters on this date, the general gave a mostly optimistic assessment. It is likely that Johnston knew that his job was in jeopardy, for the Richmond newspapers had nicknamed him "Retreating Joe". (He probably did not know that John Bell Hood, who wanted the promotion, had been sending negative reports and just happened to be present for the meeting.) Johnston asked that President Davis order Nathan Bedford Forrest to cut Sherman's railroad supply line, estimating that it would take two weeks to a month for the Northerners to repair. (Actually, both sides had learned to repair railroads in less than four days.) And when Senator Hill asked him how long he could hold the Yankee horde north of the Chattahoochee River, Johnston told him until the end of July. It would prove to be badly optimistic.


At Petersburg, Virginia, the Confederates could tell that the Yankees were up to something, and had a good idea what:

[font="Times New Roman"]On my way home, I was that day [June 30] wounded by a sharpshooter and received a furlough of six weeks to visit my home in Ga. On my way to the cars next day, I was driven by Lee's headquarters, where I reported my belief about the mine. There happened to be present Mr. Lawley, the English correspondent of the London times, who was much interested and asked how far it would be necessary to tunnel to get under our works. I answered about 500 feet. He stated that the longest military tunnel or gallery which had ever been run was at the siege of Delhi, and that it did not exceed 400 feet. That it was found impossible to ventilate for any greater distance. I replied that in the Federal army were many Pa. coal miners who could be relied on to ventilate mines any distance that might be necessary, and it would not do to rely upon military precedents. It proved that my suspicion was correct.

[center]-- Edward Porter Alexander, Military Memoirs of a Confederate[/center][/font]


In Washington, Lincoln was quick to nominate a new Secretary of the Treasury. He chose Maine Senator William P. Fesenden, a man with a reputation for honesty. Anticipating some resistance, the President sent the nomination to the Senate before informing Fessenden himself. And as Lincoln expected, Fessenden tried to back out of it when he was informed later that day, claiming that his health was poor, and the pressures of the job would lead to his death. Secretary of War Stanton bluntly pointed out that the war was killing many men, and that "you cannot die better than in trying to save your country." Lincoln was more diplomatic though equally firm, but what was probably most persuasive of all was a stream of telegrams applauding the nomination.

The news also helped stabilize the price of gold, though still at the alarming level of 249. For a few days Fessenden could reasonably call himself the most popular man in the country.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

Under great pressure from Northern merchants, the U.S. Congress repealed the Gold Act just fifteen days after it had passed. It also passed the Wade-Davis Reconstruction bill, a considerably harsher alternative to Lincoln's Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction. For one thing, it required that a majority of the voters in a state to be re-admitted to the Union take an oath, rather than the ten percent of Lincoln's plan. For another, it demanded that the returning states have constitutions abolishing slavery, which was unconstitutional until the Thirteenth Amendment was passed. The President had yet another political dilemma on his hands: if he signed the bill it would make it nearly impossible for some of the states to be fully re-admitted; they would have to be under military occupation permanently. But if he vetoed it, the goodwill from William Fessenden's taking over the Treasury Department would instantly cease, leading to financial problems and political gridlock.

The text of the bill is at:
http://www.civilwar.org/education/histo ... -bill.html


In Georgia, with Senator Hill on his way back to the Confederate Capital to report, Joe Johnston conceded the reality of the situation and ordered his army to pull out of Kennesaw Mountain. It was something he had already prepared for but apparently not wanted to admit to Senator Hill:

[font="Times New Roman"]Some time before, Captain Grant, the engineer-officer who directed the construction of the intrenchments around Atlanta, was instructed to strengthen them in a manner explained to him, and was authorized to impress negro laborers for the work. The reports of outposts, and observation from the top of Kenesaw on the 1st and 2d of July, showed that General Sherman was transferring strong bodies of troops to his right. The Confederate army was therefore moved to the position prepared for it by Colonel Prestman...

[center]--Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations during the Civil War[/center][/font]

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

In Georgia, Sherman was not long discovering that his opponent had anticipated his flanking operation:

[font="Times New Roman"]...by the earliest dawn of the 3d of July, I was up at a large spy-glass mounted on a tripod, which Colonel Poe, United States Engineers, had at his bivouac close by our camp. I directed the glass on Kenesaw, and saw some of our pickets crawling up the hill cautiously; soon they stood upon the very top, and I could plainly see their movements as they ran along the crest just abandoned by the enemy. In a minute I roused my staff, and started them off with orders in every direction for a pursuit by every possible road, hoping to catch Johnston in the confusion of retreat, especially at the crossing of the Chattahoochee River.

[center]--Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman[/center][/font]

But changing the orders of an army on the march was not all that easy to accomplish in the days before radio. The staff couriers no longer knew exactly where the recipients of their dispatches were. And even when the orders had been delivered, the officers at the heads of the columns did not know where the enemy was, and had to navigate different roads while being careful of ambushes. Sherman's temper flared, but he could not get the battle outside of fortifications that he badly wanted:

[font="Times New Roman"]I rode into Marietta, just quitted by the rebel rear-guard, and was terribly angry at the cautious pursuit by Garrard's cavalry, and even by the head of our infantry columns. But Johnston had in advance cleared and multiplied his roads, whereas ours had to cross at right angles from the direction of Powder Springs toward Marrietta, producing delay and confusion. By night Thomas's head of column ran up against a strong rear-guard intrenched at Smyrna camp-ground, six miles below Marietta...

[center]--Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman[/center][/font]

Joseph Johnston had prepared his fall-back positions ahead of time, and the preparation paid off. He had (for the time being at least) halted Sherman's advance still north of the Chattahoochee River.


In the Shenandoah Valley, Jubal Early's force was borrowing the Northern technique of living off the land as they advanced:

[font="Times New Roman"]...early on the morning of the 3rd, Bradley Johnson was sent by Smithfield and Leetown, to cross the railroad at Kearneysville east of Martinsburg, and unite with McCausland at Haynesville, so as to cut off the retreat of Sigel, who was at Martinsburg with a considerable force. Breckenridge moved, on the same morning, direct from Martinsburg, with his command preceded by Gilmor's battalion of cavalry, while I moved with Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions, over the route taken by Johnson, to Leetown. On the approach of Breckenridge, Sigel, after very slight skirmishing, evacuated Martinsburg, leaving behind considerable stores, which fell into our hands.
[center]--Jubal Early, Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War Between the States[/center][/font]

There is reason to believe that the Rebels took not only the abandoned Union supplies but all of the loose eatables in Martinsburg, whether public or private.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

At the mouth of the Shenandoah Valley, the unhappy town of Harper's Ferry changed hands yet again. This time, however, the Northerners knew that the town could not be defended, but the high ground above it could be fortified:

[font="Times New Roman"]During the night of the 4th, the enemy evacuated Harper's Ferry, burning the railroad and pontoon bridges across the Potomac.
It was not possible to occupy the town of Harper's Ferry, except with skirmishers, as it was thoroughly commanded by the heavy guns on Maryland Heights; and the 5th was spent by Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions in demonstrating at that place. In the afternoon Breckenridge's command crossed the river at Shepherdstown, and Gordon's division was advanced over the Antietam towards Maryland Heights. At night, considerable stores, which had been abandoned at Harper's Ferry, were secured...
[center]--Jubal Early, Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War Between the States[/center][/font]

Early knew that time was critical. Therefore, he did not make an effort to seize the Union fortifications, but simply bypassed them. Late in the day, his advance units crossed the Potomac River into Maryland. The third Confederate invasion in the Eastern theater had begun.


In Georgia, Sherman's latest advance had not brought him any closer to defeating Joseph Johnston and his Army of Tennessee. It had, however, brought him within sight of his second objective:

[font="Times New Roman"]From a hill just back of Mining's Station I could see the houses in Atlanta, nine miles distant, and the whole intervening valley of the Chattahoochee; could observe the preparations for our reception on the other side, the camps of men and large trains of covered wagons; and supposed, as a matter of course, that Johnston had passed the river with the bulk of his army, and that he had only left on our side a corps to cover his bridges; but in fact he had only sent across his cavalry and trains. Between Howard's corps at Paice's Ferry and the rest of Thomas's army pressing up against this tete-du-pont, was a space concealed by dense woods, in crossing which I came near riding into a detachment of the enemy's cavalry; and later in the same day Colonel Frank Sherman, of Chicago, then on General Howard's staff, did actually ride straight into the enemy's camp, supposing that our lines were continuous. He was carried to Atlanta, and for some time the enemy supposed they were in possession of the commander-in-chief of the opposing army.

[center]--Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman[/center][/font]

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

The word went out that the Rebels were north of the Potomac River once more. They were not in the numbers of Lee's two invasions, but then again, the garrison of Washington was at it weakest. It had been anticipated that Grant's army would block in Virginia, and Union forces under Sigel or Hunter would block in the Shenandoah Valley. But now both obstacles had been removed. The bulk of Grant's army was south of Richmond at Petersburg, and Hunter's army had retreated west of the valley. Jubal Early had thoughtfully sent cavalry to burn the railroad bridges which could have brought the Northerners back quickly.

The telegraphic orders went out to collect whatever troops were available. Some of the garrison of Baltimore was sent south. At Petersburg, Grant began loading units on ships for transport up the coast. But these moves would take days. In the meantime, many of the soldiers in Washington itself were members of the "invalid corps", now officially called the Veteran Reserve Corps, composed of men disabled by wounds or poor health. The corps had been formed to provide men for positions that did not involve combat or marching such as nurses (nursing had not yet become a primarily female profession). Now, the Corps was mustered to man the fortifications around Washington.
These moves did not inspire confidence. The price of gold began to rise again, going to 261½ on this date.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

Newspaper publisher Horace Greeley had not been satisfied with the Emancipation Proclamation and was turning against Lincoln and the war. He had received a message that emissaries from the South were in Canada, with an offer for peace. Greeley was not so desperate for peace that he did not realize the Confederate overture might be phony; for there was no assurance that the men had been authorized by Jefferson Davis to negotiate. Still, Greeley was horrified, as many in the North were, by the carnage of the last two months. He wrote to Lincoln, urging the President to give negotiations a chance:

[font="Times New Roman"]New York, July 7, 1864

My Dear Sir:

I venture to inclose you a letter and telegraphic dispatch that I received yesterday from our irrepressible friend, Colorado Jewett, at Niagara Falls. I think they deserve attention. Of course, I do not indorse Jewett’s positive averment that his friends… have “full powers” from J.D. [Jefferson Davis], though I do not doubt that he thinks they have. I let that statement stand as simply evidencing the anxiety of the Confederates everywhere for peace. So much is beyond doubt.

And thereupon I venture to remind you that our bleeding, bankrupt, almost dying country also longs for peace–shudders at the prospect of fresh conscriptions, of further wholesale devastations, and of new rivers of human blood. And a wide-spread conviction that the Government… are not anxious for Peace, and do not improve proffered opportunities to achieve it, is doing great harm now, and is morally certain, unless removed, to do far greater in the approaching Elections…

I entreat you, in your own time and manner, to submit overtures for pacification to the Southern insurgents which the impartial must pronounce frank and generous. If only with a view to the momentous Election soon to occur in North Carolina, and of the Draft to be enforced in the Free States, this should be done at once.
I would give the safe conduct required by the Rebel envoys at Niagara… but you may see reasons for declining it. But, whether through them or otherwise, do not, I entreat you, fail to make the Southern people comprehend that you and all of us are anxious for peace…

Mr. President, I fear you do not realize how intently the people desire any peace consistent with the national integrity and honor.… With United States stocks worth but forty cents in gold per dollar, and drafting about to commence on the third million of Union soldiers, can this be wondered at?

I do not say that a just peace is now attainable, though I believe it to be so. But I do say, that a frank offer by you to the insurgents of terms… will… prove an immense and sorely needed advantage to the national cause; it may save us from a northern insurrection.…

I beg you to invite those now at Niagara to exhibit their credentials and submit their ultimatum.

Yours truly,

Horace Greeley[/font]

As if to emphasize Greeley's point, on this date the price of gold jumped to the frightening level of 273.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

In Washington, Lincoln considered Harace Greeley's message of possible peace negotiations. He was even more doubtful of the offer than Greeley, and indeed the timing of such an offer while a Confederate army was marching on Washington was suspect. Also, there was a serious divide on what the North and South considered fair terms. For the South, it was a cease-fire in place, which meant de facto independence. For the North, it was not to execute the Confederate generals and government officials as traitors, which was after all the aftermath of most of history's failed rebellions.

Lincoln also needed to do something further about the harsh Wade-Davis Reconstruction bill. Since either signing it or vetoing it would make enemies, he did neither. Under Article 1, Section 7 of the U.S. Constitution, such a bill would become law in ten days, unless Congress was adjourned -- which it was. In this case, called a "pocket veto", the bill would fail. Lincoln decide he owed a bit more explanation:

[font="Times New Roman"][center]JULY 8, 1864. BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

A Proclamation.[/center]

Whereas at the late session Congress passed a bill "to guarantee to certain states whose governments have been usurped or overthrown a republican form of government," a copy of which is hereunto annexed; and

Whereas, the said bill was presented to the President of the United States for his approval less than one hour before the sine die adjournment of said session, and was not signed by him; and

Whereas the said bill contains, among other things, a plan for restoring the States in rebellion to their proper practical relation in the Union, which plan expresses the sense of Congress upon that subject, and which plan it is now thought fit to lay before the people for their consideration:

Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do proclaim, declare, and make known that while I am (as I was in December last, when, by proclamation, I propounded a plan for restoration) unprepared by a formal approval of this bill to be inflexibly committed to any single plan of restoration, and while I am also unprepared to declare that the free State constitutions and governments already adopted and installed in Arkansas and Louisiana shall be set aside and held for naught, thereby repelling and discouraging the loyal citizens who have set up the same as to further effort, or to declare a constitutional competency in Congress to abolish slavery in States, but am at the same time sincerely hoping and expecting that a constitutional amendment abolishing slavery throughout the nation may be adopted, nevertheless I am fully satisfied with the system for restoration contained in the bill as one very proper plan for the loyal people of any State choosing to adopt it, and that I am and at all times shall be prepared to give the Executive aid and assistance to any such people so soon as the military resistance to the United States shall have been suppressed in any such States and the people thereof shall have sufficiently returned to their obedience to the Constitution and the laws of the United States, in which cases militia-governors will be appointed with directions to proceed according to the bill.

In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.
A. LINCOLN.[/font]



In Georgia, Sherman had sent part of his forces to the town of Roswell. It was dwarfed as industrial center by Atlanta, but still had mills and foundries. A day's work from Union wrecking crews soon changed that. The destruction accomplished, the Yankees noted that the Chattahoochee River ran here as well, northeast of Atlanta. There were several fords, which were lightly guarded. A crossing here would have no chance of cutting off the Southern army, but it would nonetheless get the Federals to the south side of the river at minimal cost.

Sherman decided to take the opportunity, though it was not a practical crossing for his entire army. Supplies could not be sent all the way to the ford, carried across in wagons, and brought back down in quantities sufficient for his 100,000 men. Nonetheless, on this date the first Union soldiers crossed the Chattahoochee, over three weeks ahead of how long Joe Johnston had predicted it would take them.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

In Georgia, some scouting had found the second crossing that the Northerners had been looking for, and led to Confederate commander Joe Johnston's only real mistake of the campaign:

[font="Times New Roman"] Of course, I expected every possible resistance in crossing the Chattahoochee River, and had made up my mind to feign on the right, but actually to cross over by the left. We had already secured a crossing place at Roswell, but one nearer was advisable; General Schofield had examined the river well, found a place just below the mouth of Soap's Creek which he deemed advantageous, and was instructed to effect an early crossing there, and to intrench a good position on the other side, viz., the east bank.

Schofield effected his crossing at Soap's Creek very handsomely on the 9th, capturing the small guard that was watching the crossing. By night he was on the high ground beyond, strongly intrenched, with two good pontoon-bridges finished, and was prepared, if necessary, for an assault by the whole Confederate army.

That night Johnston evacuated his trenches, crossed over the Chattahoochee, burned the railroad bridge and his pontoon and trestle bridges, and left us in full possession of the north or west bank-besides which, we had already secured possession of the two good crossings at Roswell and Soap's Creek. I have always thought Johnston neglected his opportunity there, for he had lain comparatively idle while we got control of both banks of the river above him.
[center]--Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman[/center][/font]


At the Monocacy River in Maryland, Jubal Early and his force were advancing towards Washington. Union general Lew Wallace had managed to scrape together a force a little less than 6,000 men, and only one division of those were veterans. Lew Wallace himself was a man in something like disgrace: he had been blamed for failing to bring his men into line in time at the battle of Shiloh, although it now seems that he was scapegoated.

Most accounts of the battle assume that the Confederates were present in their full strength of 14,000 men. This is almost certainly wrong, for Jubal Early had received ridiculous orders, amazingly endorsed by Robert E. Lee himself, to detach much of his cavalry off on a raid to the Union prisoner of war camp at Point Lookout. There, they were supposed to join with Confederate naval units to liberate the 10,000 Rebels being held in the camp. Even if the Southerners had made it to Point Lookout, they would almost certainly have been trapped, for there was zero chance that Southern gunboats could fight past the Union blockade and join them.

In addition, Early had sent a force to the large town of Frederick, to collect what they could. Still, the Southerners clearly outnumbered the Northerners when they clashed on the route to Washington. The Rebels were cautious in the first stage of the battle, looking for a way to outflank their opponents instead of mounting a straight-on attack.

The cavalry that had stayed with the main Confederate body believed it had found a flanking route at a ford. Unfortunately for them, the Rebel horsemen ran into the only group of Yankee veterans present under General James B. Ricketts. Heavy Northern musket fire drove the Confederates back. Elsewhere on the battlefield, the less experienced Federals were holding their positions surprisingly well, though at a serious cost in casualties.

Eventually, Jubal Early took command of the Southerners in person, and sent an infantry division against Ricketts' men. The Yankees were forced out of their lines, and the entire Northern position began to unravel. Having already lost a quarter of his force, Lew Wallace ordered a retreat, and the way to the capital was open.


[font="Times New Roman"] The pursuit was soon discontinued, as Wallace's entire force had taken the road towards Baltimore, and I did not desire prisoners. Wallace's force I estimated at 8,000 or 10,000 men, and it was ascertained that one division of the 6th corps (Rickett's), from Grant's army, was in the fight. Between 600 and 700 unwounded prisoners fell into our hands, and the enemy's loss in killed and wounded was very heavy. Our loss in killed and wounded was about 700, and among them were Brigadier General Evans wounded, and Colonel Lamar of the 61st Georgia Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Tavener of the 17th Virginia Cavalry and Lieutenant Hobson of Nelson's artillery, killed. The action closed about sunset, and we had marched fourteen miles before it commenced. All the troops and trains were crossed over the Monocacy that night, so as to resume the march early next day. Such of our wounded as could not be moved in ambulances or otherwise were sent to the hospitals at Frederick under charge of competent medical officers, and our dead were buried. During the operations at Monocacy, a contribution of $200,000 in money was levied on the city of Frederick, and some needed supplies were obtained.

[center]--Jubal Early, Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War Between the States[/center][/font]

(The "contribution" was a demand for the very large sum of money, on pain of burning the town.)

Wallace would be relieved from command following the defeat. But two weeks later, Grant would realize that the outnumbered and mostly green Northern troops had given as good an account of themselves as could be expected against the Rebel veterans. More, the battle had cost Early and his army a day, and that single day might well have saved Washington.

[font="Times New Roman"]If Early had been but one day earlier, he might have entered the capital before the arrival of the reinforcements I had sent. ... General Wallace contributed on this occasion by the defeat of the troops under him, a greater benefit to the cause than often falls to the lot of a commander of an equal force to render by means of a victory.
[center]--The Personal Memoirs of General U. S. Grant[/center][/font]

Lew Wallace would be restored to his position. It would turn out, however, that the experience of apparent failure and then redemption would be more valuable to Wallace than any military pension. Drawing on the inspiration, he would write the novel "Ben-Hur", which would surpass even "Uncle Tom's Cabin" as the best-selling American novel of the 19th century.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

Both in Atlanta and in Richmond, there was more and more doubt that Joseph Johnston would ever go on the offensive against W. T. Sherman. Since the fall of New Orleans, Atlanta was now the second most important city in the Confederacy, and the Northerners were drawing closer and closer. True, Sherman's forces were still further away from Atlanta than Grant's were to Richmond and Petersburg, but Lee at least had inflicted tremendous casualties and brought the Federals to a halt. Sherman's losses had been less than a third of what Grant's army had suffered, and what was more they were proportionately less than what Johnston had lost. A delegation of Atlanta city fathers had visited Johnston, and been disturbed by the report of Yankees crossing the Chattahoochee River. Johnston had reassured them that this move would necessarily split the Union forces, and now he would attack and defeat them piecemeal. But on this Sunday, there was no sound of guns, only the church bells of the city's morning services. Johnston had retreated to yet another line of prepared entrenchments.


In Richmond, Georgia Senator Benjamin Hill (below) had returned from his own interview with Johnston a few days before. Although President Davis and Johnston had come to loathe each other, Senator Hill had remained friends with both, and hoped to bring about a reconciliation. But his meeting with the Southern President started off badly and became even worse. Hill brought the general's appeal for cavalry raids on Sherman's supply lines. But Davis had news that two Northern infantry divisions were marching from Memphis, Tennessee, and Nathan Bedford Forrest was badly needed to stop them. Then Davis showed Hill a telegram with the news of the crossing of the Chattahoochee. Hill had reported Johnston's word that the Yankees could be held north of the river at least until the end of the month. All reassurances about Johnston's ability were now suspect.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

By hard marching, Jubal Early and his Army of the Valley reached the outskirts of Washington. But so did the reinforcements Grant had sent, and they arrived at nearly the same time:

[font="Times New Roman"]We moved at daylight on the 11th; McCausland moving on the Georgetown pike, while the infantry, preceded by Imboden's cavalry under Colonel Smith, turned to the left at Rockville, so as to reach the 7th Street pike which runs by Silver Spring into Washington. Jackson's cavalry moved on the left flank. The previous day had been very warm, and the roads were exceedingly dusty, as there had been no rain for several weeks. The heat during the night had been very oppressive, and but little rest had been obtained. This day was an exceedingly hot one, and there was no air stirring. While marching, the men were enveloped in a suffocating cloud of dust, and many of them fell by the way from exhaustion. Our progress was therefore very much impeded, but I pushed on as rapidly as possible, hoping to get into the fortifications around Washington before they could be manned. Smith drove a small body of cavalry before him into the woods on the 7th Street pike, and dismounted his men and deployed them as skirmishers. I rode ahead of the infantry, and arrived in sight of Fort Stevens on the road a short time after noon, when I discovered that the works were but feebly manned.

Rodes, whose division was in front, was immediately ordered to bring it into line as rapidly as possible, throw out skirmishers, and move into the works if he could. My whole column was then moving by flank, which was the only practicable mode of marching upon the road we were on, and before Rodes' division could be brought up, we saw a cloud of dust in the rear of the works towards Washington, and soon a column of the enemy filed into them on the right and left and skirmishers were thrown out in front, while an artillery fire was opened on us from a number of batteries. This defeated our hopes of getting possession of the works by surprise, and it became necessary to reconnoitre.

Rodes' skirmishers were thrown to the front, driving those of the enemy to the cover of the works, and we proceeded to examine the fortifications in order to ascertain if it was practicable to carry them by assault. They were found to be exceedingly strong, and consisted of what appeared to be enclosed forts of heavy artillery, with a tier of lower works in front of each pierced for an immense number of guns, the whole being connected by curtains with ditches in front, and strengthened by palisades and abattis. The timber had been felled within cannon range all around and left on the ground, making a formidable obstacle, and every possible approach was raked by artillery. . . the examination showed, what might have been expected, that every appliance of science and unlimited means had been used to render the fortifications around Washington as strong as possible. This reconnaissance consumed the balance of the day.

The rapid marching which had broken down a number of the men who were barefooted or weakened by previous exposure, and had been left in the Valley and directed to be collected at Winchester, and the losses in killed and wounded at Harper's Ferry, Maryland Heights and Monocacy, had reduced my infantry to about 8,000 muskets. Of those remaining, a very large number were greatly exhausted by the last two days' marching, some having fallen by sunstroke, and I was satisfied, when we arrived in front of the fortifications, that not more than one-third of my force could have been carried into action.

[center]--Jubal Early, Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War Between the States[/center][/font]

Early conveniently forgot to mention that a number of his men were drunk after having looted and burned the home of the prominent Blair family, discovering whiskey in the cellar before the flames reached it.

Skirmishing between the Confederate and Union soldiers continued, while Early considered whether and where to launch an assault. In the meantime, the reports of Southerners at the gates of Washington went out, and in New York the price of gold went to 285.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

After a night's rest, Jubal Early now had 9,000 men or more fit for action against the defenses of Washington. But the Northerners had reinforced even more: there were now as many as 20,000 manning the fortifications, and a number of those were combat veterans from the VI and XIX Corps sent by Grant from Virginia. Sharpshooters and artillery engaged as the Confederates probed for a weakness. But the only weakness, and it was a minor one, was the Union command structure. Since the only Lieutenant General was away besieging Richmond and Petersburg, arguments erupted over which of the Major Generals present should have overall command.

One possible resolution was when the Commander-in-Chief himself arrived on the scene in the afternoon. President Lincoln had decided to pay a visit (and it is possible that he was there briefly the day before as well). However, the primary concern was Lincoln's safety. A Union officer was shot down by a Rebel sharpshooter about three feet away from Lincoln, and Major General Horatio Wright "peremptorily" told the President to get down out of sight of the Confederates. In later years Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who was present at the time as a Captain, claimed that he was the one doing the shouting, and that, not recognizing Lincoln, he had yelled "Get down, you damned fool, before you get shot!" However, this appears to be an after-war embellishment.

Late in the afternoon, Jubal Early reluctantly concluded that he could not make an assault without unacceptable casualties. Neither could he stay where he was, for he did not have a good supply line, an he was certain to lose an extended long-range duel to the heavy guns of Fort Stevens. As it was, a late-day sally by the Yankees drove off a number of his sharpshooters. Early gave the orders to pull out. On the retreat, he would remark to one of his subordinates, "we didn't take Washington, but we scared Abe Lincoln like hell."

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

After the extraordinary Confederate victory at Brice's Crossroads, William T. Sherman had realized the threat to his supply line and promptly dispatched a force of 14,000 men to counter Nathan Bedford Forrest. This column, headed by General A. J. Smith, marched through Mississippi to engage the 6,000 troopers under Forrest. The Southerners scraped up reinforcements of their own for Forrest, but only a feeble 2,000 led by General Stephen Lee.

Unfortunately for the Confederate side, Lee outranked Forrest. Even more unfortunately, when the two sides collided near Tupelo, Mississippi, the Yankees had decided not to advance but to put up field fortifications while they did their usual work of tearing up railroad tracks and burning other Southern infrastructure. The "Wizard of the Saddle" tried valiantly to do his part, but the Rebel attacks were not coordinated, and were driven back with serious losses.

After nightfall, Union commander Smith decided to burn the rest of the town of Harrisburg, which was abandoned. The flames gave enough light that Forrest's men tried a last assault. It fell against a part of the Union lines held by a brigade of "colored" troops. In a payback for Fort Pillow, the black troops coped very well with Southerners, repulsing the attack. Nonetheless, Smith learned that his army was now low on ammunition, and decided to withdraw the next day.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

Just north of Tupelo, Mississippi, the Union army was withdrawing back towards its supply base in Memphis. This seemed to be just what Nathan Bedford Forrest wanted: the Yankees out in the open, so that he could attack with his cavalry. But now Forrest pushed a little too hard, and found that the Northerners had posted their rear-guard well. He led an attack, which fared no better than those of the day before. And this time one of the casualties was Forrest himself, who took a bullet to the foot which would keep him out of action for almost a month.

Having fired off most of their ammunition, the Yankees continued back to Memphis to replenish. Neither side had accomplished the destruction of the other, but the Rebels had lost about 1,300 men, one-sixth of their force. The Northerners had lost almost exactly half, 648 casualties in all, which was a much lower percentage of their 14,000 men. The threat to Sherman's supply lines was greatly reduced for a time. It was time that Sherman would make good use of.


Near Atlanta, a key drama had begun:

[font="Times New Roman"]Just then the army was visited by General Bragg. That officer was directly from Richmond, on his way, he said, to Lieutenant-General S. D. Lee’s headquarters, to confer with him and communicate with Lieutenant-General E. Kirby Smith—to ascertain what reenforcements for me their departments could furnish. His visit to me was unofficial, he assured me. At the same time Governor Brown promised to bring ten thousand more State militia into the army; he was confident that it would be done in ten days. The promise gave me great satisfaction, for such a force might be made very valuable in operations about Atlanta.

[center]--Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations during the Civil War[/center][/font]
Johnston was badly mistaken in his satisfaction. Whether or not his visit was official, Braxton Bragg was sending telegrams to President Davis, and they were not complimentary to Johnston. Bragg had in fact arrived at Atlanta two days before, and found the city in mounting fear of the Union hordes approaching. Many of the wealthier families were packing up their valuables and boarding trains for points south. Johnston had not helped matters by requesting that all the Union prisoners be evacuated from Andersonville, in case it should be overrun by the Federals and the more than 25,000 captives there freed. It is a grim point that thousands would not have to be moved, for they were already dead of malnutrition, disease, or the bullets of Confederate guards.

Nor was Bragg alone in his negative view of Johnston. Georgia Governor Joseph E. Brown had written to Davis that Atlanta "is to the Confederacy as important as the heart is to the body. We must hold it." Many other influential men from Georgia and elsewhere, sent letters, petitions, and even personal delegations to urge that Johnston be replaced. Bragg even found that the Army of Tennessee, though it was still strongly loyal to its commander, was bewildered that it had given up so much of Georgia.

Already, Bragg was examining the question of who might replace Johnston. He favored John Bell Hood, who had a solid record of aggressive command. Hood clearly wanted the job, for he had been sending messages to friends complaining about Johnston's failure to give battle. Robert E. Lee had been sounded about the matter, and he had expressed some reluctance: "Hood is a bold fighter. I am doubtful as to the other qualities necessary." Lee made an alternate suggestion, writing: "General Hardee has more experience managing an army. May God give you wisdom to decide in this momentous matter."

As it happened, General William J. Hardee had been one of the subordinates urging the removal of Braxton Bragg during the Confederate debacle at Chattanooga. Possibly because of this, Bragg wired to President Davis, "If any change is made, Lieutenant General Hood would give unlimited satisfaction."

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

President Jefferson Davis was a man who carried grudges, and he had a grudge against Joseph Johnston. But, to give credit where credit is due, Davis was also a man who was reluctant to dismiss generals without giving them every chance to prove themselves. He now gave Joseph Johnston one last chance, and telegraphed: "I wish to hear from you as to the present situation, and your plan of operations so specifically as will enable me to anticipate events."

However, Johnston apparently did not realize that his job now hung by a slender thread. "As the enemy has double our numbers, we must be on the defensive," he wired back. "My plan of operations must, therefore, depend on that of the enemy. It is mainly to watch for an opportunity to fight to advantage. We are trying to put Atlanta in condition to hold it for a day or two by the Georgia militia, that army movements may be freer and wider."

In Richmond, this was read as an indication that Johnston was ready to abandon Atlanta, and certainly it meant that Johnston did not have a specific plan for an offensive. Davis well remembered the fall of Vicksburg the year before, when Johnston had refused to attack with his relief army. The last chance had been missed.


In northern Virginia, Jubal Early and his little Confederate army had successfully retreated from Washington. This in spite of the fact that the Union reinforcements Grant had sent to the scene were on the march, plus David Hunter and the troops that were supposed to be occupying the Shenandoah Valley had finally returned from their roundabout march. But as in Jackson's Valley Campaign of 1862, the Yankees did not seem to be able to coordinate with each other. They had allowed Early's force to slip south of the Potomac, and into Southern sympathetic territory where partisans roamed. The embarrassment of the Lincoln administration was great.

The only Northern forces able to engage the Rebels were small numbers of cavalry. On this date they attacked a train of Southern wagons at Heaton's Crossroads. After capturing and burning a few dozen wagons, they faced a Confederate counter-attack, and were only able to escape by abandoning their horse artillery. This would not do; Grant realized that there needed to be a unified command in the area.