Civil War 150th

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

In Georgia, Sherman began his next flanking move, sending his three armies along different routes, but all in the same direction.

[font="Times New Roman"]On the 17th we began the general movement against Atlanta, Thomas crossing the Chattahoochee at Powers's and Paice's, by pontoon-bridges; Schofield moving out toward Cross Keys, and McPherson toward Stone Mountain. We encountered but little opposition except by cavalry.

[center]--Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman[/center][/font]

Sherman anxiously awaited reports of what Joe Johnston would do. In all previous cases, the Southern commander had pulled his forces back to another line of entrenchments. But this time, with the Union forces divided, there was the serious danger of a counter-attack. But as it happened, Johnston would no longer be doing anything. On this date, the proverbial axe fell:

[font="Times New Roman"]On the 17th, Major-General Wheeler reported that the whole Federal army had crossed the Chattahoochee, and was near it, between Roswell and Powers’s Ferry. At ten o’clock p. m., while Colonel Prestman was with me receiving instructions in relation to his work of the next day on the intrenchments of Atlanta, the following telegram was received from General Cooper, dated July 17th: “Lieutenant-General J. B. Hood has been commissioned to the temporary rank of general, under the late law of Congress. I am directed by the Secretary of War to inform you that, as you have failed to arrest the advance of the enemy to the vicinity of Atlanta, far in the interior of Georgia, and express no confidence that you can defeat or repel him, you are hereby relieved from the command of the Army and Department of Tennessee, which you will immediately turn over to General Hood.” Orders transferring the command of the army to General Hood were written and published immediately, and next morning I replied to the Hon. Secretary’s telegram: "Your dispatch of yesterday received and obeyed. Command of the Army and Department of Tennessee has been transferred to General Hood. As to the alleged cause of my removal, I assert that Sherman’s army is much stronger compared with that of Tennessee, than Grant’s compared with that of Northern Virginia. Yet the enemy has been compelled to advance much more slowly to the vicinity of Atlanta, than to that of Richmond and Petersburg; and penetrated much deeper into Virginia than into Georgia."

[center]--Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations during the Civil War[/center][/font]

A fair argument can be made that the removal of Johnston did nothing less than to cost the South its independence. John Bell Hood is generally considered by historians to have been a good division commander but not equal to corps command. Now he had been made a full theater commander. And he was definitely not equal to the task of fighting 100,000 battle-toughened Union soldiers, led by William Tecumseh Sherman.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

In Washington, President Lincoln decided what to do about the apparent Confederate peace initiative. He would send a delegation of his own to Niagra Falls, and it would include publisher Horace Greeleey. This was apparently not at all what Greeley had in mind when he forwarded the message of the two Southern representatives. Nonetheless, he could not back out without great loss of face after his plea to the President. Lincoln wrote out the authorization for Greeley, but it contained terms that he must have known would be unacceptable to Jefferson Davis:

[font="Times New Roman"]EXECUTIVE MANSTON, WASHINGTON, July 18, 1864.
To whom it may concern,
Any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union, and the abandonment of Slavery, and which comes by and with authority that can control the armies now at war against the United States, will be received and considered by the Executive Government of the United States, and will be met by liberal terms on other substantial and collateral points; and the bearer or bearers thereof shall have safe conduct both ways.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.[/font]


In Georgia, Sherman quickly learned of the change of command of the opposing army:

[font="Times New Roman"]On the 18th all the armies moved on a general right wheel, Thomas to Buckhead, forming line of battle facing Peach-Tree Creek; Schofield was on his left, and McPherson well over toward the railroad between Stone Mountain and Decatur, which he reached at 2 p.m. of that day, about four miles from Stone Mountain, and seven miles east of Decatur, and there he turned toward Atlanta, breaking up the railroad as he progressed, his advance-guard reaching Decatur about night, where he came into communication with Schofield's troops, which had also reached Decatur. About 10 A.M. of that day (July 18th), when the armies were all in motion, one of General Thomas's staff-officers brought me a citizen, one of our spies, who had just come out of Atlanta, and had brought a newspaper of the same day, or of the day before, containing Johnston's order relinquishing the command of the Confederate forces in Atlanta, and Hood's order assuming the command. I immediately inquired of General Schofield, who was his classmate at West Point, about Hood, as to his general character, etc., and learned that he was bold even to rashness, and courageous in the extreme; I inferred that the change of commanders meant "fight." Notice of this important change was at once sent to all parts of the army, and every division commander was cautioned to be always prepared for battle in any shape.

[center]--Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman[/center][/font]

The news was devastating to the men in the Confederate ranks. Some promptly deserted; they had been fighting for their leader, not the far-away government in Richmond. And at least one flatly refused to believe it:

[font="Times New Roman"]...our pickets on the south side, the Yankees on the north side. By a tacit agreement, as had ever been the custom, there was no firing across the stream. That was considered the boundary. It mattered not how large or small the stream, pickets rarely fired at each other. We would stand on each bank, and laugh and talk and brag across the stream.
One day, while standing on the banks of the Chattahoochee, a Yankee called out: "Johnny, O, Johnny, O, Johnny Reb."
Johnny answered, "What do you want?"
"You are whipped, aren't you?"
"No. The man who says that is a liar, a scoundrel, and a coward."
"Well, anyhow, Joe Johnston is relieved of the command."
"What?"
"General Joseph E. Johnston is relieved."
"What is that you say?"
"General Joseph E. Johnston is relieved, and Hood appointed in his place."
"You are a liar, and if you will come out and show yourself I will shoot you down in your tracks, you lying Yankee galloot."
"That's more than I will stand. If the others will hands off, I will fight a duel with you. Now, show your manhood."
Well, reader, every word of this is true, as is everything in this book. Both men loaded their guns and stepped out to their plates. They were both to load and fire at will, until one or both were killed. They took their positions without either trying to get the advantage of the other. Then some one gave the command to "Fire at will; commence firing." They fired seven shots each; at the seventh shot, poor Johnny Reb fell a corpse, pierced through the heart.
[...]
His face was always to the foe. They could make no movement in which they were not anticipated. Such a man was Joseph E. Johnston, and such his record. Farewell, old fellow! We privates loved you because you made us love ourselves. Hardee, our old corps commander, whom we had followed for nearly four years, and whom we had loved and respected from the beginning, has left us. Kirby Smith has resigned and gone home. The spirit of our good and honored Leonidas Polk is in heaven, and his body lies yonder on the Kennesaw line. General Breckinridge and other generals resigned. I lay down my pen; I can write no more; my heart is too full. Reader, this is the saddest chapter I ever wrote.

[center]--Sam R. Watkins, "Co. Aytch" Maury Grays, First Tennessee Regiment[/center][/font]

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

In Georgia, the Union army had passed the Chattahoochee River, but there were still a few smaller streams before the troops could reach Atlanta. Though they could be easily forded, there would be a delay while getting the wagons and artillery across. John Bell Hood planned to take advantage of this, and strike part of the Northern army during the vulnerable time.

Though Hood would demonstrate he was clearly out of his depth on other occasions, on this date his attack plan was generally good. (There is reason to think he got the plan from Joseph Johnston before the latter's departure.) His subordinates did not time their assaults well, however, and strangely held Patrick Cleburne's division, easily the best shock troops in the Rebel army, in reserve instead of in the first wave. In what was even more of an help for the Federal side, the assault fell on the part of Sherman's force lead by George "The Rock of Chickamauga" Thomas, and included the corps commanded by "Fighting Joe" Hooker.

[font="Times New Roman"] I soon learned that the enemy had made a furious sally, the blow falling on Hooker's corps (the Twentieth), and partially on Johnson's division of the Fourteenth, and Newton's of the Fourth. The troops had crossed Peach-Tree Creek, were deployed, but at the time were resting for noon, when, without notice, the enemy came pouring out of their trenches down upon them, they became commingled, and fought in many places hand to hand. General Thomas happened to be near the rear of Newton's division, and got some field-batteries in a good position, on the north side of Peach-Tree Creek, from which he directed a furious fire on a mass of the enemy, which was passing around Newton's left and exposed flank. After a couple of hours of hard and close conflict, the enemy retired slowly within his trenches, leaving his dead and many wounded on the field. Johnson's and Newton's losses were light, for they had partially covered their fronts with light parapet; but Hooker's whole corps fought in open ground, and lost about fifteen hundred men. He reported four hundred rebel dead left on the ground...

[center]--Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman[/center][/font]

Total losses in killed, wounded, and missing were roughly 1,900 for the Union and 2,500 for the Confederacy. Given the Northern superiority in numbers, the advantage was clearly to their side. But that would not stop Hood from trying again.

[Capt. Harlock]

Mid-to-late July, 1864:

At Niagra Falls, Canada, Horace Greeley 's doubts about the Southern peace effort turned out to be well-founded. Clement Clay and James Holcombe, the two supposed Confederate envoys, had no authority to discuss terms. But even though they did not receive safe conduct to Washington, they were shown the note containing Lincoln's terms. This was apparently what the two men were after; they leaked the story to the press, with emphasis on Lincoln' s demand for the end of slavery. Lincoln tried to suppress the story, but to no avail.

The result was uproar in both North and South. Southern newspapers ran editorials about Lincoln's plans for subjugation, and in the North, Clement Clay was able to report, "From all that I can see or hear, I am satisfied that this correspondence has tended strongly towards consolidating the Democrats and dividing the Republicans." Horace Greeley complained to the President that if things stayed as they were, "we shall be beaten out of sight next November."

By coincidence, there was a Northern peace effort at the same time. Colonel James Jaquess and journalist James R. Gilmore, with genuine credentials from the Lincoln administration, gained an interview with President Davis. But on that occasion the emphasis was on Southern independence. The two Northerners confirmed Lincoln's proclamation of December offering amnesty for all members of the Confederate government. Davis was not interested, declaring that, "Amnesty, Sir, applies to criminals. We have committed no crime . . . We are fighting for Independence, and that, or extermination, we will have." At the end of the interview, the Southern President shook the hands of the two men, and courteously but firmly repeated his position: "Say to Mr. Lincoln, from me, that I shall at any time be pleased to receive proposals for peace on the basis of our Independence. It will be useless to approach me with any other."

But although a transcript of the interview was published in the press, the general feeling seemed to be that Lincoln was sacrificing thousands of lives solely for the cause of "the negroes". The Democrats were able to evade the point that an immediate cease-fire meant that disunion would be permanent, and the American nation would be split in half.

One other measure of the general feeling in the North was the music. The Civil War had dozens of songs written for the soldiers and for the families back home. In the days before recordings, a song's popularity was measured by the copies of sheet music sold. In the early days of the war, the songs had been more stirring and patriotic, such as "The Battle Hymn of the Republic". In the summer of 1864, the biggest seller was "When This Cruel War Is Over".

[british exil]

ORIGINAL: Capt. Harlock

150 Years Ago Today:

It was now depressingly clear to both sides that Grant's attempt to smash the Army of Northern Virginia and capture Richmond had turned into a siege. There was every sign of its being a long one, for both sides had built formidable fortifications. Opposite one of the Confederate forts was the 48th Pennsylvania Infantry, commanded by one Lieutenant Colonel Henry Pleasants. Staring at the obstacle, Pleasants and his men came up with the idea of digging a tunnel underneath it and blowing it up.

Pleasants had been a mining engineer before the war, and a number of his men, being from Pennsylvania, were coal miners. The challenge was considerable, for the distance to be tunneled was about 500 feet (152 m), and this was before electric ventilating fans. But Pleasants managed to convince his chain of command that his men were up to the job, and on this date, the digging began.

(Note the original tunnel entrance was destroyed, but has been re-created as part of the Petersburg National Battlefield.)

Nearly a month has passed and I have heard nothing of the mining project. Did it have sucess? I could google, but your thread is my window to the ACW.

Mat

[Walloc]

Wait until the 30th july and more will be revealed, or so i assume. Ofc i cant know for sure as im not contribuator to the thread

[Capt. Harlock]

Nearly a month has passed and I have heard nothing of the mining project. Did it have sucess? I could google, but your thread is my window to the ACW.

Apologies. Yes, the tunneling did succeed. (I might say "will succeed", for the digging was completed about July 26.) As Edward Porter Alexander warned Lee, the Northerners came up with an ingenious ventilation system, using a fire burning at an outlet. The resulting hot-air draft drew fresh air into the tunnel. (It is worth considering the operation of stuffing tons of gunpowder into a place involving a continuously burning fire.)

The Confederates had begun counter-mining operations, but they were not deep enough.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

John Bell Hood planned another attack against the advancing Yankees. This time he used the majority of his Army of Tennessee, but remarkably, still managed to achieve surprise. Sherman and James McPherson, the commander of the Army of the Tennessee, were meeting that morning to discuss the progress against Atlanta. They generally agreed that things were going well, and were looking forward to placing artillery that could shell the city. But soon there came a change:

[font="Times New Roman"]While we sat there we could hear lively skirmishing going on near us (down about the distillery), and occasionally round-shot from twelve- or twenty-four-pound guns came through the trees in reply to those of Schofield, and we could hear similar sounds all along down the lines of Thomas to our right, and his own to the left; but presently the firing appeared a little more brisk (especially over about Giles G. Smith's division), and then we heard an occasional gun back toward Decatur. I asked him what it meant. We took my pocket-compass (which I always carried), and by noting the direction of the sound, we became satisfied that the firing was too far to our left rear to be explained by known facts, and he hastily called for his horse, his staff, and his orderlies.
[center]--Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman[/center][/font]

What would be called the Battle of Atlanta was on, although the actual battleground was still outside the main city defenses. The name is not inappropriate, however, for it would be the biggest and bloodiest single contest of the Atlanta campaign.

[font="Times New Roman"]He [McPherson] hastily gathered his papers (save one, which I now possess) into a pocket-book, put it in his breast-pocket, and jumped on his horse, saying he would hurry down his line and send me back word what these sounds meant. His adjutant-general, Clark, Inspector-General Strong, and his aides, Captains Steele and Gile, were with him. Although the sound of musketry on our left grew in volume, I was not so much disturbed by it as by the sound of artillery back toward Decatur. I ordered Schofield at once to send a brigade back to Decatur (some five miles) and was walking up and down the porch of the Howard House, listening, when one of McPherson's staff, with his horse covered with sweat, dashed up to the porch, and reported that General McPherson was either "killed or a prisoner."
[center]--Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman[/center][/font]



McPherson had ridden into some woods between Union units, where he had encountered an advance party of Confederate skirmishers. They called on him to surrender, but he decided to spur his horse and make a break for it. At least one of the Rebels was a marksman, and the Northern general was shot from the saddle. He had made a contribution, however, for he had earlier extended his units to the east, and the Southern attack was not able to get into the planned position.

As the battle raged on, the difficulty of coordinating large forces in the days before radio was a great problem for the Confederate attackers. At one spot they had managed to get on both sides of the Union XVII Corps. But their attacks happened one at a time, so that after repelling one assault, the Yankees would climb over to the other side of their field fortifications, and drive off the next assault coming from the opposite side. This went on for nearly two hours, until the Rebels finally managed simultaneous attacks and force the Northerners to withdraw to a nearby hill.

A little to the north, the Southerners achieved a small breakthrough, capturing a battery of artillery. But the Federals rallied and took it back:

[font="Times New Roman"]This time we went to an open field when reforming as best we could, [then] again advanced. Upon reaching the crest of the first ridge the men halted and laid down to avoid the sheet of bullets which swept over … . I pushed through the line, dashed ahead, shouting, cheering and exhorting [but] only one man followed. I went fifty yards in this manner and finally halted and gave three lusty cheers, [then] without waiting I pushed on and in a moment had the pleasure to see that the line was hurrying [forward]. I soon struck another line [of Northerners] on the left which had halted. I sent Capt. Pinkerton & Lieut. [William] Brachman with a portion of the regiment again on the right, while I with the rest of it and the remainder of [the men from other regiments] pushed up immediately on the left, pouring a continuous and deadly fire upon the enemy, driving them from their works and recapturing a section of artillery upon the left of the railway which the [Rebels] had turned upon us … .
[Brigadier General John] Lightburn said we had disgraced ourselves. I told him ‘that was enough of that! I would show him whether we had.’ I had no idea that I had such determination, such stubbornness or strength. I was almost frantic, yet perfectly sane–directed the entire line. All the officers obeyed me and ran to me for advice and directions. I saw men perform prodigies, display the most unparalleled valor.
[center]--Letter of Major Thomas T. Taylor[/center][/font]

Night fell, and the fighting died down. The Union had suffered 3,641 casualties to the Confederate 5,500. The Union positions were essentially what they had been at the beginning of the day, and Atlanta was within artillery range.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

In the Shenandoah Valley, the Union pursuit of Jubal Early's army had met with moderate success. Although nothing like a decisive battle had taken place, Northern cavalry had inflicted casualties, and an outnumbered Federal force had managed to win a small engagement at Rutherford's Farm. The Confederates seemed to be retreating, so it was decided to pull the VI Corps and XIX Corps from the valley to return to the siege of Petersburg, leaving only three divisions. But Jubal Early learned of this move, and decided that he could best help Lee and the defenders of Petersburg by a counter-attack that would change the minds of the Union high command.

Early attacked the Northerners at Kernstown, where Stonewall Jackson had suffered a tactical defeat in March 1862. However, this time the Confederates had the advantage in numbers, about 13,500 men to a little under 10,000 Federals under the unfortunate George Crook (below). The Rebel veterans attacked with their customary zeal:

[font="Times New Roman"]After the enemy's skirmishers were driven in, it was discovered that his left flank, extending through Kernstown, was exposed, and General Breckenridge was ordered to move Echols' division, now under Brigadier General Wharton, under cover of some ravines on our right and attack that flank. This movement, which was made under General Breckenridge's personal superintendence, was handsomely executed, and the attacking division struck the enemy's left flank in open ground, doubling it up and throwing his whole line into great confusion. The other divisions then advanced, and the rout of the enemy became complete. He was pursued, by the infantry and artillery, through and beyond Winchester; and the pursuit was continued by Rodes' division to Stephenson's depot, six miles from Winchester--this division then having marched twenty-seven miles from its position west of Strasburg. The cavalry had not been moved according to my orders; and the enemy, having the advantage of an open country and a wide macadamized road, was enabled to make his escape with his artillery and most of his wagons.

[center]--Jubal Early, Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War Between the States[/center][/font]


Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com

Northern casualties were about 1,200 men in total, and the Southern losses only half as much. The victory was even greater than these numbers suggest, for the Union army was broken and scattered. General Crook would pull what units he could find back across the Potomac River, leaving the entire Shenandoah Valley under Confederate control once more. And the way was now open for Jubal Early's forces to invade Northern territory again.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

In Georgia, Sherman had an unpleasant but necessary task: selecting a replacement for James McPherson. General John Logan was in acting command by reason of seniority, but he was a political rather than a professional soldier, having been a Congressman at the opening of the war. After consulting with his lieutenants, Sherman selected Major General Oliver O. Howard, who had thus far not had an impressive record, but was a West Point graduate. On this date, the appointment became official.

Logan was disappointed at not keeping the position, and indeed he seems to have been one of the best of the politician-generals, but he accepted the decision. Not so another Major General: Joseph “Fighting Joe” Hooker would submit his resignation.

[font="Times New Roman"] General Hooker was offended because he was not chosen to succeed McPherson; but his chances were not even considered; indeed, I had never been satisfied with him since his affair at the Kulp House, and had been more than once disposed to relieve him of his corps, because of his repeated attempts to interfere with Generals McPherson and Schofield. I had known Hooker since 1836, and was intimately associated with him in California, where we served together on the staff of General Persifer F. Smith. He had come to us from the East with a high reputation as a "fighter," which he had fully justified at Chattanooga and Peach-Tree Creek; at which latter battle I complimented him on the field for special gallantry, and afterward in official reports. Still, I did feel a sense of relief when he left us.

[center]--Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman[/center][/font]

Sherman then moved on to the drive against Atlanta and the Rebel army. One of his subordinates had a change in mind:

[font="Times New Roman"]My plan of action was to move the Army of the Tennessee to the right rapidly and boldly against the railroad below Atlanta, and at the same time to send all the cavalry around by the right and left to make a lodgment on the Macon road about Jonesboro.

All the orders were given, and the morning of the 27th was fixed for commencing the movement. On the 26th I received from General Stoneman a note asking permission (after having accomplished his orders to break up the railroad at Jonesboro) to go on to Macon to rescue our prisoners of war known to be held there, and then to push on to Andersonville, where was the great depot of Union prisoners, in which were penned at one time as many as twenty-three thousand of our men, badly fed and harshly treated. I wrote him an answer consenting substantially to his proposition, only modifying it by requiring him to send back General Garrard's division to its position on our left flank after he had broken up the railroad at Jonesboro.

[center]--Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman[/center][/font]

“Harshly treated” was an understatement. There were not enough tents, even with what was improvised, for the swelling numbers of captives. Combined with the fevers resulting from the prison’s poor sanitary arrangements, the hot Georgia sun killed many. In addition, prison commandant Henry Wirz had put in place a “dead line” in front of the stockade walls, and ordered that any prisoner who went beyond the line be immediately shot without a warning. By this time, the prisoners were dying at the rate of a thousand a month.




On the outskirts of Petersburg, the Union miners had not only reached their goal tunneling under a Confederate fort, but had dug several side "galleries", ready to hold large numbers of barrels of gunpowder. The enthusiasm of the Union high command for the project had been dim at the outset, and the equipment and other resources provided had made it the proverbial shoestring operation. (Colonel Pleasants and his men had even had to improvise containers out of used boxes of crackers to carry the dirt out of the tunnel.) But Grant's interest increased week by week as the tunneling progressed successfully. And a curious situation had developed where the Southerners knew that the Yankees were building a tunnel, but the Yankees knew that they knew.

On this date, Ambrose Burnside reported to George Meade: “It is altogether probable that the enemy are cognizant of the fact that we are mining, because it has been mentioned in their newspapers and they have been heard to work on what are supposed to be shafts in close proximity to our galleries, but the rain of night before last no doubt filled their shafts and much retarded their work. We have heard no sounds of work in them either yesterday or to-day, and nothing is heard by us in the mine but the usual sounds of work on the surface above. This morning we had some apprehension that the left lateral gallery was in danger of caving in from the weight of the batteries above it and the shock of their firing, but all possible precautions have been taken to strengthen it and we hope to preserve in intact. The placing of the charges in the mine will not involve the necessity of making a noise. It is therefore probable that we will escape discovery if the mine is to be used within two or three days..."

Encouraged by the overcoming of all obstacles, Grant now decided to make a full-scale effort, and even managed to out-fox Lee:

[font="Times New Roman"]The mine was constructed and ready to be exploded, and I wanted to take that occasion to carry Petersburg if I could. It was the object, therefore, to get as many of Lee's troops away from the south side of the James River as possible. Accordingly, on the 26th, we commenced a movement with Hancock's corps and Sheridan's cavalry to the north side by the way of Deep Bottom, where Butler had a pontoon bridge laid. The plan, in the main, was to let the cavalry cut loose and, joining with Kautz's cavalry of the Army of the James, get by Lee's lines and destroy as much as they could of the Virginia Central Railroad, while, in the mean time, the infantry was to move out so as to protect their rear and cover their retreat back when they should have got through with their work. We were successful in drawing the enemy's troops to the north side of the James as I expected. The mine was ordered to be charged, and the morning of the 30th of July was the time fixed for its explosion.

[center]--The Personal Memoirs of General U. S. Grant[/center][/font]

[GaryChildress]

Wow! Capt. Harlock you are a master of the U.S. Civil War (at the very least)!
 
Amazing thread!
 
I may have posted this earlier in this thread but I have a book called the "Civil War Chronicle" by John W. Keeler USAF ret. which was given to me by my step-grandfather who was a civilian working for the Navy Department during WW2 (he was between 30-40 at the time, born around the turn of the 20th century). He worked in the mail room in Washington D.C. most of his life, one of his bosses just before WW2 was Admiral Nimitz. Anyway, the "Civil War Chronicle" is an interesting collage of snips from various US newspapers during the ACW. Do you have this book? If not I have an extra copy I would like to give you. Please PM me if you are interested. [:)]
 
Thank you again for an amazing thread! [&o]

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

[font="Times New Roman"]We had learned through deserters who had come in that the people had very wild rumors about what was going on on our side. They said that we had undermined the whole of Petersburg; that they were resting upon a slumbering volcano and did not know at what moment they might expect an eruption.

[center]--The Personal Memoirs of General U. S. Grant[/center][/font]

At the tunnel outside Petersburg, the loading of the mine went remarkably smoothly. It was not as massive as the town's inhabitants feared, but no less than 320 kegs, totaling 8,000 pounds (3,600 kg) of gunpowder, were packed into the tunnels below the Confederate fort.


Near Atlanta, the Confederates detected the wing of the Union forces curving around west of the city to cut one of the vital railroad lines. Although he had been worsted in two previous attacks, John Bell Hood decided on a third attempt at a place called Ezra Church. But Sherman was alert to the possibility, although he ran some risk in finding out:

[font="Times New Roman"]Personally on the morning of the 28th I followed the movement, and rode to the extreme right, where we could hear some skirmishing and an occasional cannon-shot. As we approached the ground held by the Fifteenth Corps, a cannon-ball passed over my shoulder and killed the horse of an orderly behind; and seeing that this gun enfiladed the road by which we were riding, we turned out of it and rode down into a valley, where we left our horses and walked up to the hill held by Morgan L. Smith's division of the Fifteenth Corps. Near a house I met Generals Howard and Logan, who explained that there was an intrenched battery to their front, with the appearance of a strong infantry support.

[...]

As the skirmish-fire warmed up along the front of Blair's corps, as well as along the Fifteenth Corps (Logan's), I became convinced that Hood designed to attack this right flank, to prevent, if possible, the extension of our line in that direction. I regained my horse, and rode rapidly back to see that Davis's division had been dispatched as ordered. I found General Davis in person, who was unwell, and had sent his division that morning early, under the command of his senior brigadier, Morgan; but, as I attached great importance to the movement, he mounted his horse, and rode away to overtake and to hurry forward the movement...

[center]--Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman[/center][/font]

The third time was not the charm for Hood and the Army of Tennessee. Although the Southerners actually had the edge in numbers on the battlefield, bringing a little over 18,000 men into action against 13,000 Federals, this time they did not have the advantage of surprise. The Union soldiers had time to put up field fortifications, and to unlimber and place their artillery. They were none too soon:

[font="Times New Roman"]By this time the sound of cannon and musketry denoted a severe battle as in progress, which began seriously at 11.30 a.m., and ended substantially by 4 p.m. It was a fierce attack by the enemy on our extreme right flank, well posted and partially covered.

[center]--Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman[/center][/font]

During the four and a half hours of pitched battle, the Rebels made at least six separate charges against the Yankee lines. All ended in failure, with lopsided casualties for the Confederates. They lost roughly 3,000 men in all, while the Northerners lost only 642.

But from the strategic point of view, Ezra Church was Hood's most successful battle against Sherman. He had prevented the southern railroad into Atlanta from being wrecked, and Sherman was now convinced he could not afford to thin his lines enough to surround the city. For the time being at least, Union operations would now become a siege, and not a true siege, for there was still a supply route into the city. In the eyes of President Davis, and most of the rest of the South, it was worth the casualties if Atlanta could be saved.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

At the mine outside Petersburg, final preparations got underway.

[font="Times New Roman"]“Meade’s instructions, which I, of course, approved most heartily, were all that I can see now was necessary. The only further precaution which he could have taken, and which he could not foresee, would have been to have different men to execute them."

--The Personal Memoirs of General U. S. Grant[/font]

In your humble amateur historian's opinion, Grant was less than forthright, for all three Union commanders did poorly on this date. Ambrose Burnside had spent the last two weeks training a division of "colored" troops to make the assault immediately after the mine was exploded. However, George Meade now became anxious, fearing that the assault would fail, and there would be outrage that black men had been sent to be slaughtered to save white men. He directed Burnside to select a white division. Burnside protested to Grant, but Grant, to his discredit, upheld the decision.

And now Burnside contributed his part to the fiasco. He called for a division commander to volunteer, but none of the available three leaders did so. Then Burnside, instead of choosing the division he judged best for the job, had the three men draw lots. As wretched luck would have it, the choice fell to the 1st Division, commanded by Brigadier James Ledlie, almost certainly the worst of the trio. Ledlie had been promoted to his position because of bravery on the battlefield, which was very likely due to his being drunk at the time and therefore heedless of the danger.

With less than twelve hours before the planned detonation, the division could not have been briefed and prepared fully, but something could have been done. Ledlie did nothing. No specific instructions were given, and no special equipment such as scaling ladders was issued.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

Outside Petersburg, the explosion was planned for between 3:30 and 3:45 A.M. The fuse was lit and the entrance sealed to contain the blast. But the minutes ticked away silently, and it became clear there was a "hang fire". With extraordinary courage, Lieutenant Jacob Douty and Sergeant Harry Reese unsealed the tunnel and crawled inside. They discovered the fuse had failed at a splice (no continous fuse of the necessary length had been available). Adding a new length, they relit the fuse and scrambled out. This time it worked, and at 4:44 A.M. the four tons of gunpowder detonated:

[font="Times New Roman"]The explosion made a crater 150 feet long, 97 feet wide, and 30 feet deep, the contents being hurled so high in the air that the foremost ranks of the assaulting columns, 150 yards away, shrank back in disorder in fear of the falling earth. The bulk of the earth, however, fell immediately around the crater, mingled with the debris of 2 guns, 22 cannoneers, and perhaps 250 infantry (nine companies of the 19th and 22d S. C., which had been carried up in the air). Quite a number of these who fell safely were dug out and rescued alive by the assaulting column. Some, not yet aroused, were lost, covered up in the bomb-proofs of the adjacent trenches by the falling earth. This formed a high embankment, as it were, all around the crater, with one enormous clod, the size of a small cabin, perched about the middle of the inside rim, which remained a landmark for weeks.

[center]--Edward Porter Alexander, Military Memoirs of a Confederate[/center][/font]

The depiction of Battle of the Crater in the early part of the movie "Cold Mountain" is not quite accurate. There was no immediate charge right after the explosion, for both sides were awed by the destruction. The Yankees advanced cautiously at first. On the other hand, many Confederate were anxious to leave at first:

[font="Times New Roman"]I . . . expected that when the mine was exploded the troops to the right and left would flee in all directions, and that our troops, if they moved promptly, could get in and strengthen themselves before the enemy had come to a realization of the true situation. It was just as I expected it would be. We could see the men running without any apparent object except to get away. It was half an hour before musketry firing, to amount to anything, was opened upon our men in the crater. It was an hour before the enemy got artillery up to play upon them; and it was nine o'clock before Lee got up reinforcements from his right to join in expelling our troops.

[center]--The Personal Memoirs of General U. S. Grant[/center][/font]


The original division planned to lead the Union assault had been instructed to go around the sides of the crater as well as to enter it. But the enormous depression seemed to have a magnetic effect on the unprepared troops of the newly chosen division. Nor did they have much in the way of leadership, for their commander James Ledlie stayed behind, very likely drunk. And once they were in the crater, that found it was much harder to get back out, particularly since the walls were steeper on the far side, and they had no scaling ladders. Union guns opened up an impressive-sounding bombardment, but they dared not aim too closely for fear of hitting their own men. The Rebel artillery had no such difficulties.

[font="Times New Roman"]Into this crater the leading division literally swarmed, until it was packed about as full as it could hold, and what could not get in there, crowded into the adjacent trenches, which the falling earth had caused to be vacated for a short distance on each flank. But, considering the surprise, the novelty of the occasion and the terrific cannonade by 150 guns and mortars which was opened immediately, the coolness and self-possession of the entire brigade was remarkable, and to it is to be attributed the success of the defence. This was conducted principally by Col. McMaster of the 17th S. C., Gen. Elliott having been soon severely wounded. The effect of the artillery cannonade was more a moral effect than a physical one, for the smoke so obscured the view that the fire was largely at random, at least for one or two hours, during which it was in fullest force. The effort was at once made to collect a small force in the trenches upon each flank, and one in an intrenchment occupying a slight depression which ran parallel to our line of battle some 250 yards in rear of it, the effort being to confine the enemy to the crater and the lines immediately adjoining. The multiplicity of the deep and narrow trenches, and the bomb-proofs in the rear of our lines, doubtless contributed to our success in doing this on the flanks,
[...]
Meanwhile the reenforcements to the storming column, instead of spreading to the flanks, massed outside of our lines in rear of the storming column, which had made no further advance, but had filled the crater and all the captured lines. Several efforts were made to advance from time to time, but the first were feeble, and could be checked by the remnants of the brigade under McMaster, until two regiments of Wise’s brigade and two of Ransom’s were brought up from the left. With their aid, the situation was made safe and held until about 10 A. M., when Mahone arrived at the head of three brigades of his corps, drawn from the lines on our right. A regiment of Hoke’s from the left also came up later. In the meantime, a few of our guns had found themselves able to fire with great effect upon the enemy massed in front of our lines. The left gun in the next salient to the right, occupied by Davidson’s battery, was in an embrasure which flanked the Pegram Salient, but was not open to any gun on the enemy’s line. This gun did fearful execution, being scarcely 400 yards distant.

[center]--Edward Porter Alexander, Military Memoirs of a Confederate[/center][/font]

Confederate reinforcements now began to arrive, including Robert E. Lee and P.G.T. Beauregard to supervise. After the hapless Northerners in the crater had been subjected to hours of musket and artillery fire, the Rebels mounted their counter-attack:

[font="Times New Roman"]Wright’s brigade arriving about half-past 11, Mahone made a second attack, which was repulsed with the aid of the Federal artillery bearing upon the ground. Between 1 and 2 P. M., Sanders’s brigade having arrived, and also the 61st N. C. from Hoke, a combined movement upon both flanks of the crater was organized. Mahone attacked on the left, with Sanders’s brigade, the 61st N. C. and the 17th S. C.; Johnson attacked on the right with the 23d S. C. and the remaining five companies of the 22d, all that could be promptly collected on that flank. This attack was easily successful. Mahone has stated that the number of prisoners taken in the crater was 1101, including two brigade commanders, Bartlett and Marshall.

[center]--Edward Porter Alexander, Military Memoirs of a Confederate[/center][/font]

Total Union losses were 504 killed, 1,881 wounded, 1,413 missing or captured, while the Confederates lost 361 killed, 727 wounded, 403 missing or captured. Once again, a number of black troops were killed rather than taken prisoner.

The last chance to take Petersburg and then Richmond by a quick move instead of a slow siege had passed. Now all eyes would turn to Sherman, and Atlanta.



The Confederates under Jubal Early now had the run of the entire Shenandoah Valley, and Early had been outraged to see the destruction inflicted by the Yankees as they had advanced through the valley in June. He decided on retaliation, claiming later that he believed it would cause the Northerners to restrain their troops if they knew their vandalism and arson would rebound on Northern soil. He chose cavalry General John McCausland for the job:


[font="Times New Roman"]The town of Chambersburg in Pennsylvania was selected as the one on which retaliation should be made, and McCausland was ordered to proceed, with his brigade and that of Johnson and a battery of artillery, to that place, and demand of the municipal authorities the sum of $100,000 in gold or $500,000 in U. S. currency, as a compensation for the destruction of the houses named and their contents; and in default of payment, to lay the town in ashes. A written demand to that effect was sent to the authorities, and they were informed what would be the result of a failure or refusal to comply with it: for I desired to give the people of Chambersburg an opportunity of saving their town, by making compensation for part of the injury done, and hoped the payment of such a sum would have the effect of causing the adoption of a different policy.

On the 30th of July McCausland reached Chambersburg and made the demand as directed, reading to such of the authorities as presented themselves the paper sent by me. The demand was not complied with, the people stating that they were not afraid of having their town burned, and that a Federal force was approaching. The policy pursued by our army on former occasions had been so lenient that they did not suppose the threat was in earnest this time, and they hoped for speedy relief. McCausland, however, proceeded to carry out his orders, and the greater part of the town was laid in ashes.*

[center]--Jubal Early, Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War Between the States[/center]
* For this act I, alone, am responsible, as the officers engaged in it were simply executing my orders, and had no discretion left them. Notwithstanding the lapse of time which has occurred and the result of the war, I see no reason to regret my conduct on this occasion.[/font]

Your humble amateur historian does, in fact, see a reason. The burning of Chambersburg outraged the entire North. Unlike the burning of the Virginia Military Institute, there had been no military installations of any kind in the town, and the act was seen as premeditated extortion against a defenseless civilian population. The effect was exactly the opposite of what Jubal Early intended, for "remember Chambersburg" became a Union battle-cry, and the Union armies would proceed to unleash destruction on a scale far beyond anything yet seen in the war.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

At Atlanta, both sides settled in for the siege. One side was distinctly happier than the other:

[font="Times New Roman"]The month of August opened hot and sultry, but our position before Atlanta was healthy, with ample supply of wood, water, and provisions. The troops had become habituated to the slow and steady progress of the siege; the skirmish-lines were held close up to the enemy, were covered by rifle-trenches or logs, and kept up a continuous clatter of musketry. The mainlines were held farther back, adapted to the shape of the ground, with muskets loaded and stacked for instant use. The field-batteries were in select positions, covered by handsome parapets, and occasional shots from them gave life and animation to the scene. The men loitered about the trenches carelessly, or busied themselves in constructing ingenious huts out of the abundant timber, and seemed as snug, comfortable, and happy, as though they were at home.

[center]--Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman[/center]


Cannon balls, at long range, were falling into the city of Atlanta. Details of citizens put out the fires as they would occur from the burning shells. We could see the smoke rise and hear the shells pass away over our heads as they went on toward the doomed city.
[...]
When we got back to the regiment, then stationed near a fine concrete house (where Shepard and I would sleep every night), nearly right on our works, we found two thirty-two-pound parrot guns stationed in our immediate front, and throwing shells away over our heads into the city of Atlanta. We had just begun to tell all the boys howdy, when I saw Dow Akin fall. A fragment of shell had struck him on his backbone, and he was carried back wounded and bleeding. We could see the smoke boil up, and it would be nearly a minute before we would hear the report of the cannon, and then a few moments after we would hear the scream of the shell as it went on to Atlanta. We used to count from the time we would see the smoke boil up until we would hear the noise, and some fellow would call out, "Look out boys, the United States is sending iron over into the Southern Confederacy; let's send a little lead back to the United States." And we would blaze away with our Enfield and Whitworth guns, and every time we would fire, we would silence those parrot guns. This kind of fun was carried on for forty-six days.

[center]--Sam R. Watkins, "Co. Aytch" Maury Grays, First Tennessee Regiment[/center][/font]


Morale may have been lower with the Southerners, but the military advantage was theirs. Sherman was now stalled outside Atlanta as Grant was stalled outside Petersburg and Richmond. More, the cavalry raid towards Andersonville was meeting with disaster.

General George Stoneman had decided to ride for the prison instead of first destroying his assigned section of railroad and then linking up with the second Northern cavalry force under General Edward McCook. This proved a serious mistake, for the Confederates now had a strong cavalry force attached to their regular army as well as the independent force under Nathan Bedford Forrest. This force was led by General Joseph Wheeler (below), who now proved himself a match for either of the two Northern commanders. Along with Rebel infantry, Wheeler had overwhelmed McCook's Union troopers, and would soon deal with Stoneman's column.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

The Union naval blockade was doing great damage to the Southern economy, but it was far from perfect. Blockade runners continued to slip past the Yankee patrol vessels, so the Northerners wisely attempted to capture the Confederate ports as well. Mobile, Alabama, was now the only major port left on the Gulf Coast (outside of Texas, which was cut off by Union control of the Mississippi). Knowing it was a major asset to the Confederacy, the Federals had been planning to capture it since the fall of Vicksburg. But there always seemed to be some other task of greater importance, and the troops could not be spared.

In August 1864, the shortage of men was worse than ever because of the demands to replace the massive casualties Grant had sustained in his drive on Richmond. The Union commander in the area calculated that he could spare only about 3,000 men, not nearly enough to seize the protecting forts and then the city. But it might be enough for an amphibious operation against the other forts guarding the entrance to Mobile Bay, and that would shut down the blockade runners as had been done at Charleston, South Carolina. An amphibious operation meant naval cooperation, of course, and it happened that Rear Admiral David Farragut and his fleet were looking for useful employment.

But it also meant a fight on the water. The Confederates understood the situation very well, and in addition to three forts commanding the opening of Mobile Bay, they had planted a good-size minefield. (They had been compelled to mark it with buoys so as not to sink their own blockade runners, but it meant that any ships entering Mobile Bay had to sail directly under the batteries of the forts.) More, they had built their own flotilla of warships, including the CSS Tennessee, the best-armored Southern ironclad ever launched. To deal with this, the North would need ironclads of their own. Two river ironclads had joined up with Farragut, but he wanted a more powerful type with 15-inch Dahlgren guns. Finally, it had been decided to give them to him, and USS Tecumseh and USS Manhattan made the potentially deadly sea voyage around the tip of Florida. Tecumseh was late, but on this date joined the fleet, though her engines were still being worked on.

The Federal land troops had also been dispatched. They were to be led by Brigadier General Gordon Granger, who had helped to save the Union army at Chickamauga by sending in his reserves without orders to stem the Confederate breakthrough. His career had languished since then, apparently because he was more outspoken than most senior generals liked in a subordinate. Farragut himself was somewhat quick-tempered, and the two men do not seem to have been friends.

But they were both "fighters", commanders who believed in striking hard blows against the Rebels, and there was no serious disagreement about what needed to be done. Farragut also had other worries: the admiral of the Confederate squadron was none other than Franklin Buchanan, who had commanded the CSS Virginia (AKA Merrimac) the first day of battle at Hampton Roads in 1862. In addition to the Tennessee, Buchanan had three other ironclads under construction. Time was running short.

There were three Confederate forts that needed to be knocked out: Fort Morgan on the eastern side, and Fort Gaines and the smaller Fort Powell on the western side. On this date, General Granger landed his men on the far side of Dauphin Island, and began the march to Fort Gaines. Out to sea, Admiral Farragut summoned his ship captains and carefully went over the plan to steam past the forts while they were partly distracted by the ground troops. He made clear that his fleet was to avoid the sunken "torpedoes" (mines).

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

There were political snags over what to do about the Shenandoah Valley. Parts of it fell into four different Union military districts, and the hapless Northern generals in the field kept receiving different orders. Even the narrow escape of Washington from Jubal Early's raid, plus his being able to evade the Yankee pursuit, had not resolved the squabbling. U. S. Grant was resolved to make the Valley area a unified command, and he knew just who he wanted as commander: Philip Sheridan, who had done much to turn his cavalry into a truly offensive instrument. But Congress and the War Department were unhappy; Sheridan was only 33 years old at this point.

The burning of Chambersburg focused minds. Lincoln gave Grant his approval, even telling the General-in-Chief that he would have to give the matter his personal effort. On this date, Grant and Sheridan met near Monocacy, Maryland, and Grant gave Sheridan the orders that had originally been meant for David Hunter:

[font="Times New Roman"]HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD,
Monocacy Bridge, Md., Aug. 5, 1864.

GENERAL: Concentrate all your available force without delay in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards and garrisons for public property as may be necessary.
Use in this concentration the railroad, if by so doing time can be saved. From Harper's Ferry, if it is found that the enemy has moved north of the Potomac in large force, push north, following and attacking him wherever found; following him, if driven south of the Potomac, as long as it is safe to do so. If it is ascertained that the enemy has but a small force north of the Potomac, then push south the main force, detaching, under a competent commander, a sufficient force to look after the raiders and drive them to their homes. In detaching such a force, the brigade of cavalry now en route from Washington via Rockville may be taken into account.
There are now on the way to join you three other brigades of the best of cavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and horses. These will be instructed, in the absence of further orders, to join you by the south side of the Potomac. One brigade will probably start to-morrow.
In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, as it is expected you will have to go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for the use of your command. Such as cannot be consumed, destroy. It is not desirable that the buildings should be destroyed —they should, rather, be protected; but the people should be informed that so long as an army can subsist among them recurrences of these raids must be expected, and we are determined to stop them at all hazards.
Bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south; and to do this you want to keep him always in sight. Be guided in your course by the course he takes.
Make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving regular vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in the country through which you march.

Very respectfully,
U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.[/font]

The farms of the Shenandoah Valley had provided for Lee's army and for the guerrillas in the valley itself. Now it was to become a scene of devastation.


Outside Mobile Bay, the day dawned clear, and the Union ground troops had dug in on Dauphin Island. Admiral Farragut had four of his gunboats placed to shell one of the Confederate forts, and ordered the rest of his force into position. The ironclad monitors took the lead, and the wooden warships were tied together in pairs, so that if the engines of one were knocked out, the other could still bring them both into the bay. At 5:30 a.m. the signal to sail past the Southern forts was raised.

For almost half an hour, as the fleet went closer and closer to the entrance of the bay, there was only an occasional shot fired. Then the forts opened up with everything that would bear, the Yankees fired back with equal determination, and the little Confederate flotilla joined in. Soon there was so much firing and smoke that Farragut had to go aloft into Hartford's rigging to see what was going on. It was not a happy sight. The monitors and the lead wooden ship, Brooklyn, were sailing erratically as they tried to engage the forts and the Rebel gunboats. Finally the lead monitor, Tecumseh, went too far to the west and struck a "torpedo", which detonated.

Water poured through the resulting hole, and it was immediately clear that the Union ironclad had been mortally wounded. Captain Tunis Craven and his helmsman rushed to the ladder leading to the deck. "After you, pilot," said the Captain. The courtesy was the difference between life and death, for the helmsman had just gone through the hatchway when the Tecumseh turned on its side and went under, carrying Craven and 93 other officers and crew to the bottom.


Seeing this, the lead wooden ship Brooklyn hesitated, and thus held up the remainder of the Northern fleet. An impatient Farragut shouted, "What is the trouble?"

"Torpedoes! Torpedoes!" came the reply from the Brooklyn.

If flagship Hartford stayed on course to clear the Brooklyn, she would sail through the minefield. But Farragut instantly chose to take the risk, gambling that most of the torpedoes were now inactive from long immersion in salt water. He roared something like, "Damn the torpedoes! Four bells, Captain Drayton, go ahead. Jouett, full speed." This was later shortened to the immortal line, "Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead!"

Hartford, with Metacomet at her side and the remainder of the fleet following, plunged into the minefield. Some men reported they heard the snap of the primers as the sips brushed by the submerged torpedoes, but Farragut had calculated correctly. There were no further explosions.

Once past the minefield and the forts, the Union ships cast loose from each other and proceeded to make short work of the Rebel gunboats supporting the Tennessee. CSS Selma had her deck crew cut down by shell and grapeshot, and surrendered. CSS Gaines was quickly holed and her crew ran her aground to prevent her sinking, then evacuated and burned her. CSS Morgan turned around and fled, probably without firing a shot, eventually making her way to the docks of Mobile. That left the mighty ironclad Tennessee.

Admiral Franklin Buchanan apparently decided that he could defeat the entire Union flotilla with Tennessee alone. He gave the orders, and the Confederate ironclad moved out. Farragut, who had been watching Buchanan's ship intently, noticed at once. For a short time his officers believed the 63-year-old Admiral's eyesight was playing tricks. Surely the Rebels would not be so rash. But quickly the word spead from the other lookouts, "The ram is coming!"

Initially, the Northerners tried to do the ramming. First Monongahela and then Lackawanna hit, but the Tennessee was too sturdily built, and the Union vessels only took damage themselves. With Tecumseh sunk, the only guns on the Federal side that had a chance of penetrating Tennessee's armor were the pair on the Manhattan. And one, but only one, of them did:

[font="Times New Roman"]The Monongahela was hardly clear of us when a hideous-looking monster came creeping up on our port side, whose slowly revolving turret revealed the cavernous depths of a mammoth gun. "Stand clear of the port side," I cried. A moment after a thunderous report shook us all, while a blast of dense, sulphurous smoke covered our port-holes and four hundred and forty pounds of iron, impelled by sixty pounds of powder, admitted daylight through our side, where before it struck us there had been over two feet of solid wood, covered with five inches of solid iron. This was the only fifteen-inch shot that struck us fair. It did not come through; the inside netting caught the splinters, and there were no casualties from it. I was glad, however, to find myself alive after that shot.
--Lieutenant A. D. Wharton, C.S.N.[/font]

But then the Manhattan's propulsion and steering turned troublesome. Unable to manuver with the rest, she dropped out of the fight. The monitor Winnebago also developed problems, and could not fire effectively.

Then it was the turn of Hartford. For a few moments the two flagships bid fair for a head-on collision at full steam, which would likely have been fatal for both. But this would have left the remainder of the Union fleet in control of Mobile Bay. So, at almost the last second, Tennessee swerved, and the ships scraped each other, ending up broadside to broadside. They were so close that the Hartford's Captain Drayton spotted Buchanan through an open port and threw his binoculars at the Southern admiral. (As a high-ranking officer, Drayton carried a sword but no gun.) The binoculars did no damage, but neither did Hartford's cannon.

At this point, Franklin Buchanan's rash move seemed to be paying off: Tennessee was taking little real damage, but inflicting a good amount on the Union vessels. More, in attempting to ram the Confederate ironclad again, Lackawanna accidentally rammed the Hartford.

There was only one effective Northern ironclad left, the Chickasaw. Farragut had not expected much from her captain Perkins, who had gone into battle with his officer's jacket off and wearing a straw hat against the August heat. But Perkins now placed his vessel in the ideal spot, less than 50 yards (46 m) off the stern and fired his guns "like a pair of pocket pistols". The 11-inch projectiles still could not penetrate Tennessee's armor, but they could do serious damage. By a poor design choice, the chains controlling the the Confederate ship's rudder were outside the armor, running in grooves to the stern. These were shot away, leaving the vessel without the ability to change course. The smokestack was shot nearly in two, and toppled sideways, slowing the ship. The concussion of the solid shot striking the armor gave the crew nosebleeds. The shutters over the gunports jammed one by one, and when the crew attempted to clear the one bearing on the Yankee ship, they received a horrifying lesson in the transmission of shock. One man had braced himself against the inside of the armored casemate, and when a shot struck the outside, his body was instantly pulverized.

At around this time Admiral Buchanan himself was wounded, sustaining a compound fracture of his leg. (He had also been shot in the leg during the fight with the Monitor in 1862.) He ordered the captain to fight until there was no more hope. Going to the pilot house, the captain observed that three of the Yankee steamships, including Hartford, had untangled themselves and were on ramming courses. No longer having the ability to dodge, he personally lowered his ensign and hoisted the white flag.

The casualties were even heavier than when Farragut had attacked New Orleans: The Northerners lost 151 killed and 177 wounded, while the Southerners lost 13 killed, 22 wounded, and 1,587 captured, including Admiral Buchanan. The result was equally decisive: Mobile Bay passed into the control of the Union Navy. Now for the forts.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

In the aftermath of the naval battle of Mobile Bay, The Northerners set to work repairing damage, including on the captured Tennessee. They found their prize easily repairable: a new smokestack, new steering chains, unjamming the shutters to the gunports, and the now USS Tennessee would be fit for action in a few days. (They also had to train a crew.) In the meantime, the three surviving monitors were able to find positions from which they could shell the three main Confederate forts with minimal risk. For the smallest fort, Fort Powell, this was too much. The garrison had been shocked witnessing the defeat of the Southern fleet, and now their morale broke. Even though no Union troops had approached the fort as yet, they spiked the guns, blew up the magazines, and evacuated.


On the outskirts of Atlanta, Sherman faced the loss of two generals. The news had come in that George Stoneman's cavalry column had been surrounded near Macon. Stoneman had broken his force into smaller groups, some of which made their way back to the main Union lines and safety. Stoneman himself had stayed behind with a brigade, drawing the attention of the Confederates, and eventually surrendered. He became the most senior Union officer to be made prisoner during the war. Sherman correctly guessed that the Southerners would now return the gambit and send cavalry raids into his own rear, and gave top priority to re-constituting his disorganized troopers.

But he also had to worry about his infantry. Major-General John Schofield, with XXIII Corps, had been assigned to seize the Macon Railroad below Atlanta, and he had also been given XIV Corps under Major-General John Palmer. Palmer promptly claimed to be senior to Schofield by date of commission, and argued that he was merely cooperating with Schofield rather than under his orders. As in most cases throughout history, two commanders proved to be one too many, and the move against the railroad was a failure. On this date, Palmer met with Sherman and gave his resignation. Sherman referred him to George Thomas, who was Palmer's immediate superior, and the resignation was accepted, the only example of a general's quitting in the middle of an operation in the history of the U. S. Army.

Shortly thereafter, Jefferson Davis (the Union general, not the Confederate President) took command of XIV Corps and was accordingly promoted to Major General, the highest rank in the Union Army save for the single Lieutenant General.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

On this date, it was the Southerners' turn to suffer a cavalry disaster, as the Yankees got a measure of revenge for the burning of Chambersburg. A cavalry force led by Brigadier William Averell (below) had been chasing after the Rebels, and in the early hours of this date, finally caught up near the town of Moorefield in West Virginia. The Federals were actually outnumbered by about 1,800 to 3,000, but Confederate commander John McCausland had divided his command into two separate camps:

[font="Times New Roman"] [McCausland] then invested the post on the railroad at New Creek, but finding it too strongly fortified to take by assault, he moved to Moorefield in Hardy County, near which he halted to rest and recruit his men and horses, as the command was now considered safe from pursuit. Averill, however, had been pursuing from Chambersburg with a body of cavalry, and Johnson's brigade was surprised in camp, before day, on the morning of the 7th of August, and routed by Averill's force. This resulted also in the rout of McCausland's brigade, and the loss of the artillery (4 pieces), and about 300 prisoners from the whole command. The balance of the command made its way to Mount Jackson in great disorder, and much weakened. This affair had a very damaging effect upon my cavalry for the rest of the campaign.
[center]--Jubal Early, Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War Between the States[/center][/font]

The Confederate losses were even worse than Early was willing to admit, with at least 13 killed, 60 wounded, and 415 captured. The Union lost only 11 killed, 18 wounded, and 13 captured or missing. This would be the last major engagement in West Virginia of the war.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

At Mobile Bay, Fort Gaines turned out to be a poorly designed work. Especially, it had not been constructed with good protection from the rear, for it had not been anticipated that a Union fleet would be cruising around Mobile Bay with impunity. The front was only a little better, for the Northern troops were able to quickly dig in to the sand dunes and fire mortars into the fort.

Colonel Charles D. Anderson, in command of the 818-man garrison, did not believe he could hold the fort long under the conditions he now faced. He requested permission to surrender from Brigadier Richard L. Page at Fort Morgan. Page flatly forbade it, and even sent a wire attempting to relieve Anderson from command. But the officers and men of Fort Gaines apparently agreed with Col. Anderson, for on this date they surrendered to the over 3,000 Union besiegers.

Two forts down, one to go.