Did the South have any chance of victory ?

[Twotribes]

I disagree with your Premise. Jackson of course was a fine general but his was not the leading role for the Army. Lee lost a trusted and capable subordinate when Jackson was accidently killed by his own picket. But Lee made the decisions not Jackson. Lee ran the Army, not Jackson.

Lee didnt actually ( except the gettysburg disaster) start "losing" until mid 1864 and that was more a matter of the right General in command of the Northern Armies. Grant understood he had the larger, better equiped, better supplied and supported army. He could afford to lose a tactical battle as long as Strategicly he kept forcing Lee to engage him and kept moving towards his objective.

After that first lose with Grant in command when he didnt turn his army and march dejectedly into cantonment around Washington the troops were amazed and happy that Grant continued forward, continued to force Lee to fight.

[AU Tiger_MatrixForum]

Texican has a bit of a point. In Jackson, Lee had a subordinate with initiative, decisiveness, and daring. One Lee could simply issue an order, "March to turn their left flank if practicable" and it would be done. After Jackson passed, Lee could no longer paint the broad strokes for his corps commanders (Longstreet the exception). He had to adopt a micro-management command style that did not match his temperament. It could be argued also though, the Union army's officer corps was learning to do its job better at this point. Lee continued to succeed, but lost a very potent offensive weapon in Jackson.

[Mike Scholl]

Jackson was VERY aggressive and bold, but he was best on his "home ground" in northern Virginia. The Penninsula Campaign was hardly a shining moment for "Old Jack". And he might not have been what Lee needed against Grant in 1864, given that the one time Lee led a totally defensive battle WITH Jackson (Fredricksburg) his "Right Arm" left a hole in his Right Flank that would have been BIG trouble had anyone been supporting Meade's attack.

Mostly what made Union Commanders fear Jackson was his ability to move decisively and attack boldly before they were ready (Some, like the Spaniards Jack Aubry relished taking on, were NEVER ready). They treated him like a "live grenade" that could go off anytime. and were often "half beaten" before the fight commenced. But he would probably have had a LOT of difficulty with a phlegmatic foe like Grant who couldn't be "buffaloed".

[AU Tiger_MatrixForum]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

Jackson was VERY aggressive and bold, but he was best on his "home ground" in northern Virginia. The Penninsula Campaign was hardly a shining moment for "Old Jack". And he might not have been what Lee needed against Grant in 1864, given that the one time Lee led a totally defensive battle WITH Jackson (Fredricksburg) his "Right Arm" left a hole in his Right Flank that would have been BIG trouble had anyone been supporting Meade's attack.

Mostly what made Union Commanders fear Jackson was his ability to move decisively and attack boldly before they were ready (Some, like the Spaniards Jack Aubry relished taking on, were NEVER ready). They treated him like a "live grenade" that could go off anytime. and were often "half beaten" before the fight commenced. But he would probably have had a LOT of difficulty with a phlegmatic foe like Grant who couldn't be "buffaloed".

Certainly Grant couldn't be "buffaloed", but his (Meade's) corps commanders still could. Jackson, I argue, would have given Grant fits, but in the end the result would have been the same.

[Texican]

Of course, I do acknowledge that Jackson never would have made it far into 1864 or 1865. It was probably a miracle he survived as long as he did. Generals who ride around on the front lines during the Civil War were wide open to get picked off eventually.

[chris0827]

Sheridan versus Jackson in the valley instead of Early would've been interesting.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: AU Tiger

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

Jackson was VERY aggressive and bold, but he was best on his "home ground" in northern Virginia. The Penninsula Campaign was hardly a shining moment for "Old Jack". And he might not have been what Lee needed against Grant in 1864, given that the one time Lee led a totally defensive battle WITH Jackson (Fredricksburg) his "Right Arm" left a hole in his Right Flank that would have been BIG trouble had anyone been supporting Meade's attack.

Mostly what made Union Commanders fear Jackson was his ability to move decisively and attack boldly before they were ready (Some, like the Spaniards Jack Aubry relished taking on, were NEVER ready). They treated him like a "live grenade" that could go off anytime. and were often "half beaten" before the fight commenced. But he would probably have had a LOT of difficulty with a phlegmatic foe like Grant who couldn't be "buffaloed".

Certainly Grant couldn't be "buffaloed", but his (Meade's) corps commanders still could. Jackson, I argue, would have given Grant fits, but in the end the result would have been the same.

Sorry..., but I'm missing your reference to Meade in the above. I was refering to his Division's attack at Fredricksburg, which was all his "Wing Commander" thought necessary to do when ordered to "move against the heights". It was the ONE place on that day where a "full Corps or Wing assult" MIGHT have stood a chance of success, given Jackson's erroneous deployment.

Jackson would certainly have "livened things up" for Grant..., but Grant would probably have given Jackson fits as well with his refusal to panic and "run around like a wet hen" when Stonewall said "BOO!".

[AU Tiger_MatrixForum]

The Meade reference is that the AOP still belonged to him technically.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: AU Tiger

The Meade reference is that the AOP still belonged to him technically.

So you're referring to the 1864 Campaign, not Fredricksburg 1862? OK..., just wanted to be sure I wasn't missing something.

[andysomers]

Wow - I check back into this thread after an eternity and were into the "what-if" on Jackson!  Cool stuff.  My take is that the PA campaign would have gone much different.  In the MD campaign, Lee's army was in such bad shape they couldn't do much.  But he had something to work with in '63.  I have no doubt that in Ewell's shoes (which he would have been) - he would have taken Harrisburg - ala Harper's Ferry in '62.  I think that Lee would have kept the army in two corps - Longstreet as a strong base, and Jackson doing the daring out in front stuff.  If the battle had gone over in the same location, I think Longstreet would have held the CS center, and Jackson would have tried to hit more on flanks/rear.  I seriously doubt Pickett's Charge would have gone off (or needed to)...
 
A great series on this subject is the three-volume Gettysburg/Grant Comes East/Never Call Retreat set by none other than Newt Gingrich.  Excellent excellent what-if reading.  The other great fictional work waiting to be written is this same subject, but Jackson lives through Chancellorsville (or simply, he just doesn't catch pneumonia after being shot).  I was actually in the porcess of developing an online forum game for this scenario a couple months ago.
 
AS

[AU Tiger_MatrixForum]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: AU Tiger

The Meade reference is that the AOP still belonged to him technically.

So you're referring to the 1864 Campaign, not Fredricksburg 1862? OK..., just wanted to be sure I wasn't missing something.

Yup, we were talking kumquats and kiwi fruit.

[AU Tiger_MatrixForum]

ORIGINAL: andysomers

Wow - I check back into this thread after an eternity and were into the "what-if" on Jackson! Cool stuff. My take is that the PA campaign would have gone much different. In the MD campaign, Lee's army was in such bad shape they couldn't do much. But he had something to work with in '63. I have no doubt that in Ewell's shoes (which he would have been) - he would have taken Harrisburg - ala Harper's Ferry in '62. I think that Lee would have kept the army in two corps - Longstreet as a strong base, and Jackson doing the daring out in front stuff. If the battle had gone over in the same location, I think Longstreet would have held the CS center, and Jackson would have tried to hit more on flanks/rear. I seriously doubt Pickett's Charge would have gone off (or needed to)...

A great series on this subject is the three-volume Gettysburg/Grant Comes East/Never Call Retreat set by none other than Newt Gingrich. Excellent excellent what-if reading. The other great fictional work waiting to be written is this same subject, but Jackson lives through Chancellorsville (or simply, he just doesn't catch pneumonia after being shot). I was actually in the porcess of developing an online forum game for this scenario a couple months ago.

AS

You beat me to the punch on the PA campaign.[:(]

Side note:
On the pneumonia, I read, about a year or so ago, an article from a modern physician who strongly suspects Jackson did not contract pneumonia, but instead threw a blood-clot from the amputation which lodged in the lungs. According to the Doc, the syptoms Jackson suffered more closely resembled this than pneumonia.

[RERomine]

ORIGINAL: Jonathan Palfrey
But getting regional superiority in the East would have required abandoning the West completely -- perhaps politically impossible as well as strategically alarming. And supporting so many troops in the East could have been a logistical nightmare for the South (the North was better equipped for that sort of thing).

Hindsight allows me to know they were going to lose much of the West anyhow, but they didn't know that. The political aspect makes a lot of sense. Someone more dynamic than Bragg might have been able to keep Rosecrans in check while some men were moved East. The logistics they would have had to figure out. Some sort of decisive move was required to make the North throw in the towel.

[AU Tiger_MatrixForum]

ORIGINAL: RERomine

ORIGINAL: Jonathan Palfrey
But getting regional superiority in the East would have required abandoning the West completely -- perhaps politically impossible as well as strategically alarming. And supporting so many troops in the East could have been a logistical nightmare for the South (the North was better equipped for that sort of thing).

Hindsight allows me to know they were going to lose much of the West anyhow, but they didn't know that. The political aspect makes a lot of sense. Someone more dynamic than Bragg might have been able to keep Rosecrans in check while some men were moved East. The logistics they would have had to figure out. Some sort of decisive move was required to make the North throw in the towel.

We will all know for sure soon enough. Has anyone checked the new releases lately.....?

[AU Tiger_MatrixForum]

ORIGINAL: RERomine

ORIGINAL: Jonathan Palfrey
But getting regional superiority in the East would have required abandoning the West completely -- perhaps politically impossible as well as strategically alarming. And supporting so many troops in the East could have been a logistical nightmare for the South (the North was better equipped for that sort of thing).

Hindsight allows me to know they were going to lose much of the West anyhow, but they didn't know that. The political aspect makes a lot of sense. Someone more dynamic than Bragg might have been able to keep Rosecrans in check while some men were moved East. The logistics they would have had to figure out. Some sort of decisive move was required to make the North throw in the towel.

We will all know for sure soon enough. Has anyone checked the new releases lately.....?

[Twotribes]

The South had to act decisively in the 1st year , they had several opportunities they squandered then. The refusal to sell cotton was a death kneel. The failure to find an agrresive general early on ( understandable given no one had ever commanded that kind of force in America before) and move against a rattled poorly trained Union "army" in the east. BUT the biggest kicker was simply starting a shooting war when they did.

They failed these things all of these would have helped them again in 1864 when all they had to do was hold out long enough to let Mac win  the Presidency.

[RERomine]

WOW, there's an echo [:D]

[chris0827]

Jefferson Davis and many southern generals didn't understand that the confederate's most valuable resource was their army. They lost far too many men trying to hold on to specific locations. Fort Donelson, Island #10, Vicksburg, and Port Hudson all saw the surrender of large numbers of confederate soldiers. When you're outnumbered more than two to one you can't afford to throw away men like that. No city in the confederacy was worth losing an army for.

[RERomine]

ORIGINAL: Twotribes

They failed these things all of these would have helped them again in 1864 when all they had to do was hold out long enough to let Mac win  the Presidency.

I've read that McClellan wasn't going to be as kind as everyone expected if he got elected. The main reason was Lee was already bottled up and Sherman was marching through Georgia. I can dig up where I read that if you like.

[RERomine]

ORIGINAL: chris0827

Jefferson Davis and many southern generals didn't understand that the confederate's most valuable resource was their army. They lost far too many men trying to hold on to specific locations. Fort Donelson, Island #10, Vicksburg, and Port Hudson all saw the surrender of large numbers of confederate soldiers. When you're outnumbered more than two to one you can't afford to throw away men like that. No city in the confederacy was worth losing an army for.

I would say that is correct with the exception of Richmond. Lose Richmond and international credibility is lost.