Dissapointed in IJN Night Combat

[SoulBlazer]

On the contray, Mogami. I would be happy if the IJN ships just USED their torpeados more. I think the hit rate could be tweaked slightly upwards, but it's not as big a deal to me as the firing rate. More torpeados in the water, of course, should lead to more hits.

In several test battles, I had about a dozen torpeado capeable ships (DD's and CL's and CA's) go aganist American battleships and cruisers....a task force you WANT to use torpeados on. Only about half of the Japanese ships fired a spread and then only once, with a lousy one hit.

Perhaps the easiest way to compromise might be to ask Matrix if it's possible to add some combat factors into the options screen. For example, tweaking hit rates or something else of that nature, so players could do what they wish.

[mogami]

Greetings, If the IJN fires torpedos they will not fire again in that battle. The battles do not last long enough. It requires over 30 minutes of slower speed to reload tubes, they should be reloaded and ready if the TF becomes engaged a second time.
I am not as against the IJN firing their torpedos as my posts sound. I mainly am trying to warn players that this may not solve their problems. I might just be lucky but my ships do fire torpedos quite often. I had 4 DD's torpedo and sink the North Carolina at Tulagi. (IJN 1 CL 6 DD vrs USN 1 BB 2 CA and 4 DD-IJN clobbered USN)
I have tried to set up combats to see where problem lies but my ships just keep firing their torpedos. I will begin posting results.

(Last night IJN bombardment TF engaged at PM 2 battles both times fired torpedos and both times scored hits. Battles only lasted 1 round with all allied ships being sunk (but they were only the PM port guard (ASW/MSW types)


EDIT: combat results from night surface battles

Night Time Surface Combat, near Lunga at 38,40

Japanese Ships
AV Kamikawa Maru
DD Yugumo
DD Minegumo, Shell hits 1
DD Ariake

Allied Ships
CA Salt Lake City, Shell hits 4, Torpedo hits 3, on fire, heavy damage
CA San Francisco
CL Leander
CL St. Louis
DD Mustin
DD Russell
DD Ralph Talbot
DD Patterson
DD Jarvis
DD McCall
DD Maury
DD Balch
DD MacDonough
DD Alwin


Japanese Ships
BB Haruna, Shell hits 5
BB Kirishima, Shell hits 2
CA Mogami, Shell hits 7, on fire
CA Suzuya, Shell hits 1
CL Naka, Shell hits 2, on fire
DD Hatsukaze
DD Maikaze
DD Murasame
DD Harusame
DD Hatakaze

Allied Ships
CA Chicago, Shell hits 4, and is sunk
CL Hobart, Shell hits 30, and is sunk
DD Walke, Shell hits 10, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
DD Farragut, Shell hits 13, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk


AFTER ACTION REPORTS FOR 08/27/42

Night Time Surface Combat, near Lunga at 38,40

Japanese Ships
CA Takao, Shell hits 7
CA Mikuma, Shell hits 4
CL Yura, Shell hits 2
CL Tatsuta, Shell hits 1
DD Kazegumo, Shell hits 3
DD Takanami
DD Yukikaze
DD Maikaze, Shell hits 1, on fire
DD Shiranui
DD Amatsukaze
DD Nowaki, Shell hits 1
DD Arashi
DD Wakaba
DD Ariake
DD Akatsuki

Allied Ships
BB North Carolina, Shell hits 13, Torpedo hits 8, and is sunk
CA Chester, Shell hits 14, on fire, heavy damage
DD Swanson, Shell hits 5, on fire, heavy damage
DD Monssen
DD Aaron Ward, Shell hits 7, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
DD Buchanan, Shell hits 3, on fire
DD Farenholt
DD Case, Shell hits 3, on fire
DD Cushing
DD Porter, Shell hits 2, on fire
DD Worden
DD Arunta


Night Time Surface Combat, near Lunga at 38,40

Japanese Ships
CA Takao
CA Mikuma, Shell hits 2
CL Yura, Shell hits 4, on fire
CL Tatsuta
DD Kazegumo, Shell hits 1
DD Takanami, Shell hits 3
DD Yukikaze
DD Maikaze, on fire
DD Shiranui
DD Amatsukaze, Shell hits 1, on fire
DD Nowaki, Shell hits 1
DD Arashi, Shell hits 2
DD Wakaba
DD Ariake
DD Akatsuki

Allied Ships
CA Chester, Shell hits 10, on fire, heavy damage
DD Swanson, and is sunk
DD Monssen, Shell hits 6, Torpedo hits 2, on fire, heavy damage
DD Buchanan, Shell hits 5, on fire, heavy damage
DD Farenholt
DD Case, on fire
DD Cushing
DD Porter, on fire
DD Worden, Shell hits 4
DD Arunta

AFTER ACTION REPORTS FOR 09/05/42

Night Time Surface Combat, near Lunga at 38,40

Japanese Ships
DD Nenohi, Shell hits 13, and is sunk
DD Ariake
DD Mutsuki, Shell hits 4
DD Kikuzuki
DD Kamikaze, Shell hits 10, Torpedo hits 1, on fire, heavy damage (sank after battle)
DD Asanagi, Shell hits 1, on fire
DD Minekaze, Shell hits 36, and is sunk
DD Hokaze
DD Namikaze

Allied Ships
CA Astoria, Shell hits 5
CA Minneapolis, Shell hits 20, Torpedo hits 2, on fire, heavy damage
DD Woodworth, Shell hits 3
DD Russell
DD Morris
DD Bagley
DD Sterett
DD Wilson
DD Craven
DD Cummings
DD Selfridge
DD Phelps

[panda124c]

Originally posted by Califvol
fired 133 rounds 5" from 0025 to 0034 at ranges about 10,000 yards

**** 133 rounds in nine (9) minutes, that's got to ruin a superstructer on any ship not to mention their day or night.

[SoulBlazer]

Mogami, I'm envious. How the heck did you get your ships to fire all those torpeados? Mine don't even shoot a third of that! And I've done about a dozen or so real and test battles.

If the hint from Matrix in their posts yesterday can be taken correctly, they are going to look at the issue of naval combats. Maybe that means this will get a second look.

And yes, that IS a lot of shells. I think during their eight minute battle the Washington only hit the Kirashima with about 50-60 shells, mostly of the smaller type.

[mdiehl]

Drongo has convinced me that some of the pro-IJN debaters here may not be Axis Fanboy propagandists. I will respond to two msgs here that I had heretofore decided to ignore because they seemed AF absurdities.Chit:

Oh I agree, its just that after they sank Kirishima suddenly Kirishima became a BB overnight. USN vanity.

Leaving aside the term "vanity" as a provocation, bear in mind that there is no hard and fast definition of a BB. Kirishima displaced 7K tons more than the R-class British battleships (Kirishima's 36,601K from combinedfleet.com to, say, Ramilles' 29,150Kt), had an 8" belt, deck strengthened from 2.75" in the 1920s to a thicker depth, and 15" main armament. IJN put her in a BB division (*their words*) and expected her to behave as a BB. USN claiming a BB sunk is not vanity, it's consistent with everybody's classification of the ship at the time. One *could* say that Kirishima was a very outdated and in some respects badly designed BB. (One should probably also then say that Hood was a very outdated and in some respects badly designed BB as well).

Really? Did anyone notice how quick Fletcher de-camped
to re-fuel at Guadalcanal?

...

Tell me Mdiehl are you saying that Lee didnt send those
messages? Have you read Morrison?

There have been several far more nuacned analyses of Fletcher's performance at G'canal. You might see Frank's (Guadalcanal), and H.P. Wilmott's The Barrier and the Javelin. There is no doubt that his DDs were low on fuel, and there you have a real problem that SE Morrison never faced. Stay, and risk a CV engagement (carriers rumoured in the area) with DDs not up to the level of maneuvering needed to fight such an engagement? The implication is that you trot into the waters e/se of G'canal, known to be crawling with IJN subs, without an effective ASW escort. Alternatively, go, refuel, and come back ready for any of the many contingencies. *Given* what was known about IJN surface abilities at the time (not much), and given that the USN/RAN ships in the area on almost any other night would have turned in a much better performance than at Savo Island, were I Fletcher, I'd expect the USN/RAN CAs and DDs to do an adequate job.

Sure they were more than willing to fight an AIR WAR.
But they feared the big guns. Who knows, maybe they were
correct to do so.

Here you really seem to be reaching for the moon? In 1942 the examples of the USN charging into fights with the IJN are abundant. I can only assume that your aspersion is based on the once incident in 1944 where a BB vs BB duel was on the table, and Lee declined the offer. That Lee chose not to engage Yamato when she could be sunk far more handily, with lower risk of casualties, by aircraft is simply sound judgement. No one respects a commander who needlessly pisses away lives, and no well-informed commander will long suffer incompetance of that sort. (I do not view Yamato's last charge as an example of heroics. I view it as an example of a bunch of higher up IJN chickens__t admirals covering their asses and avoiding "loss of face" in interservice rivalry by pissing away the lives of their subordinates.)

In a head to head fight, any Iowa class BB so outclassed Yamato that the vastly most likely result would have been Yamato mission-killed in less than an hour. As she displaced alot, and as torps are generally more effective for flooding compartments than BB shells, the final kill may have taken more time. However, in surface engagements, many unexpected things can happen. So in teh end it was a much more rational decision and sound military judgement to avoid un-necessary risks (however low) entailed in a BB engagement in favor of the certainty of taking Yamato out with a/c at minimal loss.

[Joel Billings]

Mike has made a few changes to surface combat that will allow chances for barrage fire of Japanese torpedoes early in the battle under certain conditions (determined by spotting/radar/command/experience ratings) and the possibility of the Allies surprising the Japanese and getting an extra gunfire round (if they make radar/command rolls). He has included text describing what is happening during the combat. Hopefully this will help the problem people are having with surface combat. The version 2.01 is currently in test. No release date is set yet for this version and it will need some decent test before release.

[mogami]

Originally posted by SoulBlazer
Mogami, I'm envious. How the heck did you get your ships to fire all those torpeados? Mine don't even shoot a third of that! And I've done about a dozen or so real and test battles.

If the hint from Matrix in their posts yesterday can be taken correctly, they are going to look at the issue of naval combats. Maybe that means this will get a second look.

Hi, Well I hope it help explain my stance on the torpedo issue. I have not had a problem. All the above combat reports are taken from my AAR's (they are not test battles). I've always been satisfied with naval combat (from both sides, as USN I keep NC out of battle unless there is no choice (I consider her a torpedo magnet) As USN I will not go where I beleive IJN CA's are present.
Bad enough to dodge the DD fish. I try to ambush smaller IJN TF's (where the larger size of my TF's can absorb a few hits and still win the battle) Straight up 4 CA 6 DD battles are to be avoided till after the new radar comes and the ships have had a few battles against the smaller stuff.

[Chiteng]

Ahh so its that you find me obnoxious =) Well I find YOU obnoxious also.

I seek TRUTH Mdiehl, and truth is hard to find among the propaganda. Not just Axis lied to their people.

If you look at Janes 1914. Look up the 4 Jap BattleCruisers.
They are not nearly so terrifying. In fact even then they only had speed as an edge.

What was the Bismark really? It wasnt even close to state of the art. It was an upscaled 'Baden' class crusier. The brilliant design
teams of the Kaiser no longer existed. They used what they had.

A objective view of Scott's battleline would be that it was unwieldy and that he lost control of the battle. He misused the
radar.

From my point of view the entire Guadalcanal Campaign was un-needed and just a PR exercise by King to keep his assets from
being re-directed to Europe. It takes a callous man to risk lives
for a political purpose.

But you never hear this. You hear that the USN fought a brilliant
delaying action, and then counter-attacked and never lost the initiative. That they never had inept commanders and that
everything was thought out ahead of time.

In some respects it sounds at times like Stalin's historians
talking about Papa Stalin's far seeing strategy to delibretly
retreat and allow the Germans to over-extend.

Somehow, I doubt that.

[mdiehl]

Joel -

Mike ought to add that torp barrage possibility for the USN. Managed to get ahold of Talbot's orders prior to night action at Balikpapan, January 1942. At the time the orders were issued, it was possible that CL Marblehead would accompany the mission, so you will see a references to "cruisers as necessary."

"Primary weapon torpedoes. Primary objective transports. Cruisers as necessary to accomplish mission. Endeavor launch torpedoes at close range before being discovered . . . Set torpedoes each tube for normal spread. Be prepared to fire single shots if size of target warrants. Will try to avoid action en route . . . Use own discretion in attacking independently when targets located. When torps are fired close with all guns. Use initiative and determination."

[Dunedain]

Joel, tell Mike thanks for making adjustments to try and fix the problem with the
jap use of torpedoes.

If the japs fire a volley of torpedoes, even if none of them hit (or if some do), will there
be a chance that this large spread of torpedoes will cause the U.S. battle line to suffer
disruption and lack of coordinated return gun fire in the immediately following rounds of
combat as they take emergency evasive action to avoid all those torpedoes?

[mdiehl]

If you look at Jane's 1914 you may not find 4 Kongo class CBs. These are the commissioning dates (see combinedfleet.com)

Kongo: 1913
Hiei: 1914
Kirishima: 1915
Haruna: 1915

All four vessels received substantial refit including added deck armor in the 1920s and 1930s. In sum, the CBs of 1914 were not the same as the CBBs (or whatever) of 1942.

From my point of view the entire Guadalcanal Campaign was un-needed and just a PR exercise by King to keep his assets from being re-directed to Europe. It takes a callous man to risk lives for a political purpose.

Well, you must be now (or at some recent time) some highly placed military expert to know better than the JCS in 1942.

Speaking in defense of the 1942 JCS, I'm sure that some of the Australians on this board are reasonably happy that the Allies undertook the effort to deny Japan a forward air base along the US West Coast-Australia line of supply in 1942.

But you never hear this. You hear that the USN fought a brilliant delaying action, and then counter-attacked and never lost the initiative. That they never had inept commanders and that everything was thought out ahead of time.

Maybe because the claim that Guadalcanal was the consequence of political intrigue is farcical. Don't know what "brilliant delaying action" you are referring to or which author says so. Morrison, whose name you drop habitually, had many assessments of USN performance in 1942 that came to the conclusion that the USN delaying tactics were sometimes less than brilliant.

Personally, I think Morrison had some agendas to push, 40-45 years ago, when the series came out. Certainly the engagements in 1942 were complex, nuanced and contingent. Talbot's performance at Balikpapan was on par with IJN performance at Savo.

What was the Bismark really? It wasnt even close to state of the art. It was an upscaled 'Baden' class crusier. The brilliant design teams of the Kaiser no longer existed. They used what they had.

Whatever. Surely a POS among BBs, but rated as a BB nonetheless.

[CapAndGown]

I am reposting this since apparently Mogami missed it the first time. I really would like to know what you have been seeing in your games. May give me some ideas on how to improve my own game play.


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Mogami


But in game USN does not set up TF's in same manner as was done. This to me is reason for unhistoric results (not lack of torpedo hits).

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Could you elaborate on this? I am not sure I understand what you are seeing. Don't most people go in with a TF of CAs and DDs?


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Mogami

The Japanese player in offense is trying to bombard airfields versus USN TF's trying to prevent. Historically there were not many USN ships on hand, UV players will not go on "shoestring" producing these monster battles.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Again, I am not clear what you mean here. Certainly, try to bombard airfields (Henderson) is historic. I am most unclear about what you mean by "shoestring" and monster battles. Do you mean the USN has too many ships in the early part of the game?

[mogami]

Originally posted by cap_and_gown
I am reposting this since apparently Mogami missed it the first time. I really would like to know what you have been seeing in your games. May give me some ideas on how to improve my own game play.


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Mogami


But in game USN does not set up TF's in same manner as was done. This to me is reason for unhistoric results (not lack of torpedo hits).

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Could you elaborate on this? I am not sure I understand what you are seeing. Don't most people go in with a TF of CAs and DDs?


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Mogami

The Japanese player in offense is trying to bombard airfields versus USN TF's trying to prevent. Historically there were not many USN ships on hand, UV players will not go on "shoestring" producing these monster battles.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Again, I am not clear what you mean here. Certainly, try to bombard airfields (Henderson) is historic. I am most unclear about what you mean by "shoestring" and monster battles. Do you mean the USN has too many ships in the early part of the game?

Ok by USN TF set up I mean players do not give command to lower rated leaders. TF's always have leader present.

Watchtower was put together rather quickly after Midway when US discovered floatplane base on Tulagi. There were not a lot of ships on hand. In UV May 42 is not the time for USN to try to fight surface battles. The players of allied side after the increase in IJN night ability will learn not to try to engage the Japanese.
The result will be IJN having to travel to US bases for battles where the USN will gain from friendly nearby repair ports while IJN limps back home. Not a game breaker but it will produce changes in playing style (it might in fact restore them to what they should have been in first place. I have read many AAR concerning Allies rushing forward to build bases before USN has inflicted a carrier defeat on IJN (producing multiple bloodbaths of surface battles.)

[Chiteng]

You dont need to take my word for it. Just look at the
Cruiser 'Baden' then take a look at the 'Bismark'

The Bismark had more beam its true. No not a POS, but not nearly
the terrifying state of the art monster that myth would have you believe.

The USN 'Washington' deserves that title.

[Chiteng]

Well, you must be now (or at some recent time) some highly placed military expert to know better than the JCS in 1942.
****************************************************

Non-sequitor. I dont need to be an military expert to have an opinion. The entire JCS did NOT support Watchtower.

The word shoestring was handed around several times. But King
made the final decisions.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by mdiehl
Joel -

Mike ought to add that torp barrage possibility for the USN. Managed to get ahold of Talbot's orders prior to night action at Balikpapan, January 1942. At the time the orders were issued, it was possible that CL Marblehead would accompany the mission, so you will see a references to "cruisers as necessary."

Yeah I agree, USN should have a possibilty of an opening barage if they happen to come accross a bunch of stationary undefended Transports.:rolleyes:

[TIMJOT]

I think many of you might have missed Joe Billings post. It looks like a compormise is in the works.

I would be happy with a possibilty of an intitial barage, zero hits, then have my CLs and DDs runaway. As it is My CL&DD flottillas will try to duke it out toe to toe against CAs and BBs with their 5" pop guns, fireing few if any torps. This is just silly. CLs and DDs did not close within range of their pop guns and not fire their torps. It just didnt happen. Im not talking hits here Im talking shooting their **** fish. I cant think of a single surface action in which the IJN didnt fire torps. Yet in UV it happens routinely.

[CapAndGown]

I think the addition may be a good compromise. Yes, I would like to see the IJN DD's consistently fire torps more than they do now. Not every one, every time. But if they do fire their guns, then I expect them to fire torps. Guns is the optional part, torps are mandatory. Watching a jap DD trying to duke it out with guns while not even firing torps is rather silly. If they miss the action because they are out of position or whatever, so be it.

As far as running away: well yeah it would be nice. But that doesn't mean that the other side is going to just let them retire. Shouldn't the other guy have a chance to blow away an inferior force? How would you feel if you were playing the USN and the japs got to run away every time they were outclassed? I would feel robbed. Maybe once and a while, but certainly not on a consistent basis. And besides, who's to say the combat engine is not doing that already? If you go through the area 51 reports you will see a bunch of actions where neither side scored. (Usually the range for those uneventful actions was in the 8-9000 yards area.)

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by cap_and_gown
I think the addition may be a good compromise. Yes, I would like to see the IJN DD's consistently fire torps more than they do now. Not every one, every time. But if they do fire their guns, then I expect them to fire torps. Guns is the optional part, torps are mandatory. Watching a jap DD trying to duke it out with guns while not even firing torps is rather silly. If they miss the action because they are out of position or whatever, so be it.

As far as running away: well yeah it would be nice. But that doesn't mean that the other side is going to just let them retire. Shouldn't the other guy have a chance to blow away an inferior force? How would you feel if you were playing the USN and the japs got to run away every time they were outclassed? I would feel robbed. Maybe once and a while, but certainly not on a consistent basis. And besides, who's to say the combat engine is not doing that already? If you go through the area 51 reports you will see a bunch of actions where neither side scored. (Usually the range for those uneventful actions was in the 8-9000 yards area.)

Yeah I agree. Im not saying I want them to runwaway scott free. In no way do I believe they should get a free disengagement. Just dont line up and trade gunfire with CAs and BBs.

[mdiehl]

Yeah I agree, USN should have a possibilty of an opening barage if they happen to come accross a bunch of stationary undefended Transports.

Some port in Japan, maybe? At Balikpapan the transports were defended by a CL-DD squadron. That the IJN lookouts were staring down their own shorts that night says something about the allpervasive AF mightiness of IJN night optics and training or else simply that the IJN could screw up when multitasking escort and shore support just as badly as the USN. Bppn was an early version of Savo, in many respects.

The players of allied side after the increase in IJN night ability will learn not to try to engage the Japanese

Which is not only ahistorical (the USN regularly opposed the IJN in night combat and did quite well, even in 1942) but exactly what the IJN player does not want. If the only reasonable option to the USN is to hold back until every engagement is a cinch because of overwhelming numbers, all you've done is replicate a bunch of really boring board games that are already available. If the game sets up some sort of wierd non-history such that the USN *must* oppose invasions but is highly likely to lose night engagements (which would be ahistorical), it's not worth playing.

More than that, what IJN player *wants* to play an Allied opponent whose only recourse is to never commit until the outcome of each engagement is a dead certainty? In that event there's *no chance* of a series of decisive battles that favor the IJN, and no chance to implement the attrition strategy that Japan had hoped to employ.

I see some Axis Fanboy has escalated the desired fantasy (now that the torp first routine has been added) to "~ and get away scott free." What a surprise. :rolleyes: :rolleyes: