Sinking USN CVs - is it worth it?

[Ron Saueracker]

But again, it is not a question whether or not the US could replace CVs, CAs, DDs, SSs (anything less than a CLs except MSW are not replaced)...it is a question of RENAMING. The entire issue evolved around trying to avoid Hornet II for example.

Below is a text file which lists the ships missing from OOB due to duplicate name issue...the source of the "respawn feature". Ignore some old data at beginning.

[TIMJOT]

ORIGINAL: Mogami

OK let me explain. in 1942 the USN gets 6 CV
In 1943 regular Essex arrive minus several that did arrive so if no 1942 Cv lost the USN has fewer 1943 Essex then history.

Nope that is not correct. You all are looking at "Commision" dates NOT "Operational" dates. It typically took 3-5 months after commisioning for a CV to become operational.

There were four Essex that were operational in 43 historically (Essex, Lex2, York2, Bunkerhill) and the game gives you 4 Essex in 43 ( Essex, Bunkerhill, Intrepid, Franklin) Historically Intrepid and Franklin did not become operational until 44.

If USN loses 1942 CV they will arrive (if lost before July 1942 they arrive in 1943 after July 1942 they arrive in 1944) as Essex but no matter how many 1942 CV are lost the USN will never have more Essex then historical. If Wasp is not lost an Essex does not arrive.

Nope, actually any CV sunk will result in MORE than Historical Essex in 43 and 44 thats because 2by3 has moved up the arrival dates of enough non-renamed Essex to account for the historic number in 43 ( Four Essex ) operational and 44 ( 7 Essex ) operational

1943 Four in the game; Essex, Bunkerhill, Intrepid (moved up to take the place of historical Lex2 ) Franklin (moved up to take the place of historical Yorktown2)

1944 seven in the game; Hanock, Randolph, Ticonderoga, *PLUS* Bennington, Antietem, Bon Homme Richard and Shangrila *ALL* moved up from 1945 to take the place of Intrepid & Franklin moved into 43 and the Historic Hornet2 and Wasp2 missing in 44 oob.

So as you can see ANY USN loss in 42 will result in a "Respawn" being inserted in either 43 or 44 resulting in MORE than historic number of Essex in either of those years.

As I said this shifting does results in less Essex than historical in 45. Only 2 Essex in 45 instead of the historic 6 but at that point in the game the issue is rather moot at best. Since you will either have more Essex sooner or more pre-war CVs later.

So USN can have fewer Essex then history but never more. And they can have them later if 1942 CV are lost later.

Nope, the USN can only have fewer Essex in 45. In 43 and 44 he will always have either equal or more.

[mogami]

Hi, I think you are counting some of them twice. If 1 essex is removed all together (Allthose with a II after their name) and others moved up to fill their place you have correct number but wrong names. So if USN does not lose any CV the Essex problem does not exist at all. (except for names)

Now if they lose a 1942 CV it matters when it is lost. Before June 42 it will arrive in 1943 after June (or July some time about then) it arrives in 1944. So really it is a question of if and when they lose 1942 CV. But I think there is a CAP of 4 replacement CV no matter what.

(I have yet to lose a USN CV so I have not seen it since last patch or since game release. )

[Subchaser]

ORIGINAL: Mogami

CAP is CAP. Making it easier for USN bombers would make it easier for IJN bombers the CV would be sunk same as now only more ac would go down with ships or splash out of fuel then crash in flames.

This is not that easy Mogami. There is a relationship between CAP activities and ability to mount offensive strikes, more carriers are in TF then more tighter this connection. If you want to maintain huge CAP over your TF you must understand that you have to keep flight decks of your carriers clear to support constant CAP operations, by doing so you effectively eliminate your crucial ability to mount offensive strikes when you really need it (Midway). With the CAP over 50% IJN carriers should not be able to launch coordinated strikes with even 30% of their attack aircraft and the number of these strikes should also be limited, not enough windows to launch all-out strikes between launching and recovering CAP fighters. This is especially true for so-called Death Star force, too many carriers, keeping CAP at 40-50% can cause disintegration of battle formation and dramatically reduce effect of combined AA defenses and enlarge area that CAP fighters have to cover to the point when CAP lose its effectiveness, you either have to split CAP to zones over the each carrier or expect that enemy will penetrate your defenses in one of the gaps between CAP fighters formations and will commit attack unopposed. whatever you do you cannot hope that enemy will meet entire might of your CAP in this situation. So there should another rule for Japanese that together with their ability to mount more well-coordinated strikes would move abilities of Kido Butai closer to reality. There should be dilemma, powerful CAP or powerful strikes, set up CAP more than 40% and you lose your coordinated strikes benefit, make CAP less numerous – ensure the destruction of enemy carriers at the risk to lose half of yours. Something must be done here anyway, as it now game see no difference between CAP over the carrier TF and over the land base, practically no difference. Carriers in WitP are not warships but something like mobile aerodromes, I mean there are all attributes of the land airstrip, no launch/recover after 50+ damage receive, identical air operations rules etc.

…
Nagumo clearly appreciated the danger in which he would place his ships during deck spotting of strike force aircraft, in that it created a window of time during which no additional CAP could be cycled. As a consequence, his options were more constrained than has been previously understood— spotting an offensive strike meant hanging his CAP out to dry for nearly an hour at a time when American attacks were constant.
…
Before the days of modern angled flight decks, a carrier flight deck could be doing only one of three things: spotting aircraft, launching aircraft, or recovering aircraft. To this list most American writers would be quick to add “parking aircraft” and “servicing aircraft.” However, it is important to understand that the Japanese avoided performing these activities on the flight deck. Japanese carriers did not use permanent deck parks in the fashion of the U.S. Navy. While temporary deck parks were established forward of crash barriers during recovery operations, they acted only as transitional “overflow” mechanisms until returning aircraft could be moved below decks.
…
Furthermore, while the Japanese could service aircraft on the flight deck (Japanese carriers were equipped with refueling points around the deck edge, for instance), most fueling occurred in the hangars. Likewise, except for arming dive-bomber aircraft, the Japanese serviced planes in the hangar as well. Japanese carrier design is also notable for its use of enclosed hangar decks. In contrast to U.S. carriers, whose hangars could be opened to the elements by rolling up metal screens along their sides, Japanese hangars were fully enclosed by storerooms, workshops, and crew spaces, with no natural ventilation. This meant that aircraft engines were never warmed up below. This is in direct contrast to American practice, where aircraft commonly were warmed up in the hangars, brought to deck, and immediately launched. These factors had important ramifications during the battle of Midway and imposed severe restrictions on Japanese operational tempos.
…
“It was not the inefficiency of Japanese communications (which is debatable) that doomed Japanese hopes in the Midway battle but the inefficiency of Japanese flight operations”

DOCTRINE MATTERS WHY THE JAPANESE LOST AT MIDWAY
Jonathan B. Parshall, David D. Dickson, and Anthony P. Tully

Another problem here is that it looks like radar doesn’t help to obtain a reward for earlier detection of incoming enemy force, one of the main advantages of US carrier force is not modeled, (radars on IJN carriers were not modeled at all, another OB flaw) is there radar aboard or not doesn’t matter, no CAP benefits.

A bit OT... one of the patch 1.5 new features is that cargo in transport ships is damaged when ship takes hits, this is a good rule no doubt, now the question why this is not modeled for CV and their air groups, I saw it in the game many times, carrier mauled, it is nothing but the floating wreckage, sys damage around 70-80 and ship is burning (there were some fuel tanks and magazine explosions)… what’s with air group? Everything fine! No aircraft were damaged and no pilots were killed, their morale is high and no relief needed. Strange. Something needed to be tweaked here.

[Tom Hunter]

I have noticed that the model for CAP seems to be unrealistic. In my reading about air combat sending a small group of fighters to confront a large group of fighters usually results in similar casualties on both sides because large groups can't really gang up on small groups. Look at Dowdings very successful tactics in the battle of Britain, or the air war in the desert or even German attacks on the US bomber forces later in the war.

In WitP this is clearly not true when one side sends 100 planes and the other sends 60 the loss ratio heavily favors the 100 plane force. (my experience in the post Zero bonus air battles I am fighting now)

I am not asking for or expecting a change, its the way the game is coded but I am adjusting my tactics and looking for more opportunities for equal odds battles.

For CV Vs. CV combat my current thinking as the allies is on the offensive is that 2 big CV forces (not TFs, forces) is the way to go. One to chew up the Japanese LBA and the second kept fresh to fight KB. I have traded shots with KB in one of my games and sunk baby KB in another in both cases the reason I did well (no CV losses) was land based air tiring out and attriting KB. When the shoe is on the other foot I want to have a CV group that is not tired to work with.

[TIMJOT]

ORIGINAL: Mogami

Hi, I think you are counting some of them twice. If 1 essex is removed all together (Allthose with a II after their name) and others moved up to fill their place you have correct number but wrong names.

No unfortunately, I am not counting any of them twice. Forget about names, they just confuse things. Historically there were 4 operational Essex in 43; the game gives you only 4 in 43 as well "IF" there zero pre-war CV losses in 41/42. Any losses in the first 6 months of the war will result in that number additional "respawn" CVs in 43 ( up to 4 I guess if what you say is correct )

Now the game also starts you with the historic number of Essex in 44 ( seven ). So any pre-war CV lost in the last 6 months of 42 will result in that number repawned and inserted into 1944
(again up to 4 )

The result is ANY USN CV lost in 42 will result in more than historic number of Essex in either or both 1943 and 1944.

So if USN does not lose any CV the Essex problem does not exist at all. (except for names)

Yes that is correct if no CV are lost the Essex problem does not exist. Except as it stands that the USN gets less than the historic number of Essex in 1945. However is highly probable that those Later war Essex would not have been completed if there had been no prior USN CV losses.

[jwilkerson]

I can track down the source if you like - but my memory is that before Taiho the IJN CV did not have munition hoists going up to the flight deck ... only to the hanger deck ... hence they had to strike the planes below to bomb up the planes.

[freeboy]

Now if they lose a 1942 CV it matters when it is lost. Before June 42 it will arrive in 1943 after June (or July some time about then) it arrives in 1944. So really it is a question of if and when they lose 1942 CV. But I think there is a CAP of 4 replacement CV no matter what.

nope, I have lost oops six!!! and they are all coming back.. at 1.5 yeears after sinking

[jwilkerson]

<http://www.combinedfleet.com/kojinshavolume6.pdf>

Page 66 of the above link details ordnance hoists to flight deck were new with Taiho ( boy I'd like to have this whole book with the pictures - not just the excerpts in the link ! )

[scout1]

Regardless of how many units are re-spawned in 1.5-2.5 yrs after there loss, the IJN can not afford a defensive war. Sink EVERYTHING quickly. The Allied tidal wave WILL come, not matter what. In the meantime, seek and destroy.