Originally posted by Jeremy Pritchard
Regarding the Battleship fleets...
The IJN was outnumbered, however, its battleships were "better".
The Nagatos were better then the Colorados in speed and durability.
The Fuso/Ise classes were better then the contemporary USN 14" Battleships because of their speed (25-26 kts vs. 21 kts), as well as their firepower (2 more guns then the Nevada/Texas class) even though they had an equal number of guns as the Pennsylvania and Tennessee class, the Japanese mounted theirs on 6 turrets of 2 guns, while the USN had theirs on 4 turrets of 3 guns. This is b etter because if a turret is knocked out (happens a lot in battle), then the Japanese lose less guns then if an American battleship was hit.
The Kongo class, even though under armoured, faired VERY well. the Kirishima was able to battle both the Washington and South Dakota (I believe) and survive fairly long (and battered up the South Dakota fairly well!). They were GREAT carrier escorts, and superb Battle Cruisers (they could easily deal with USN Cruisers).
Before the arrival of the North Carolinas, the USN battlefleet suffered from being slow and poorly equipped. They had NO large vessel to escort their carriers until the new battleships arrived. The Japanese ships also out sped US ships by 4-5 kts, which really counts when engaging in battle. Had the USN and IJN actually fought a real surface engagement with their battlefleets, the IJN would have had superior ships to the USN. Both sides had ancient battleships, but the Japanese were much better at making them capable of fighting very well 20 years after they were built. The US never used their Pre-War battleships as much other then bombardment vessels, not because of an abundance of new battleships, but because theirs were too slow, and in need of years of refitting to reach the levels of the IJN battleships. By early 1942 the USN had around 6 Pre-War battleships in the Pacific, but were all left on the West Coast.
The
Nagatos, as all IJN BBs in this period, were handicapped by their "diving" shells, which were actually designed to splash short of the target and then continue underwater in the hopes of scoring hits below the waterline (and, it was hoped, below the armored belt). Unfortunately, optimizing the shell design for this feature (which proved to be completely useless in practice, as NO such hits were EVER recorded with the special shells) seriously impeded AP performance. The
Colorados, though never upgraded to handle the "superheavy" Mk8 16" shells, still had a much better gun/shell combination than
Nagato. The US ships also sported
thicker armor on the belt, conning tower, turrets, and barbettes; and as the war wore on, increasingly better fire control as well.
Fuso had two more guns and was noticeably faster than its US contemporary,
Nevada, but was less well protected. The
Fuso also shared with the rest of the IJN battle line the handicap of inferior AP shell performance, and increasingly inferior fire control as the war progressed. The
Ise class basically repeated the
Fusos, but their contemporaries were the US
New Mexico class, which had a more modern armor scheme.
I must also strongly disagree with your statement that distributing the main battery across six turrets was a good thing. Yes, it allows you to preserve a greater portion of your firepower in the event of disabling turret hits, but by increasing the number of turrets you simultaneously increase the target area and therefore the likelihood of such hits. In that sense, it's a wash. In another sense, though, it's very much NOT a wash. Spreading the main battery over six turrets greatly increases the length of the ship's vitals, and thus greatly increases the weight of armor needed to protect them to a given standard. Concentration allows superior protection to be afforded at a reduced weight penalty.
The
Kongo class managed to be the most useful elements of the Japanese battlefleet in WW2, serving in capacities for which their newer stablemates were judged too slow, too uneconomical, or too valuable. But they were
seriously underarmored, barely able to withstand cruiser fire; with only 8 14" rifles, they were also seriously underarmed by the standards of the 1940s. Despite their speed advantage, they'd be meat on the table for any USN BB from at least
New York on. Indeed, a couple of cruisers managed to bite off
Hiei (so much for "easily able to deal with..."); and
Kirishima only did as well as she did because
South Dakota suffered a (self-inflicted) casualty in engineering that knocked out all electrical power in the ship at the start of the battle. When
Washington managed to get an unobstructed shot,
Kirishima got clobbered fast.
Before the arrival of the
North Carolinas in the PTO, the USN battlefleet suffered from being attacked where they swung at anchor in peacetime, putting most of the BBs out of commission for varying lengths of time. The lack of BBs suitable for CV escort wasn't perceived as a problem, because CVs were supposed to support the BBs, not vice versa - cruisers were supposed to fill the escorting roles. In practice, it turned out that BBs made great AA escorts; but that wasn't what anyone, including the IJN, originally intended.
The speed advantage of the IJN battlefleet over the old Standards is of relatively little consequence once the decision has been made to give battle - fast or slow, similar gun ranges mean that bringing the enemy under fire requires exposing yourself to his fire in turn. Once the fleets start trading blows, the firepower, protection, FC, and sheer numbers advantages of the US ships make the outcome nearly certain. Prewar IJN planners knew that - that's the reasoning behind the heavy Japanese emphasis on "super" weapons, such as the Long Lance torpedos, the "diving" shells, and the
Yamato class BBs. That's also the reason why Japanese plans for the "Decisive Battle" grew increasingly (and overly) complex, and ever more dependant on freakishly good luck, impossibly good C4I, and a totally cooperative opponent acting exactly as their script decreed. If the pre-war battlefleets of Japan and the US had met in a Tsushima-style engagement, the US would have been hurt. But the IJN would have been annihilated.
Some days you're the windshield.
Some days you're the bug.
