Wait, I can't read Cuttlefish's new AAR? - Cribtop (J) vs CF (A)

[ny59giants]

Tarpon duds on one of our ASW DDs near Truk, the return depth charges explode above the sub. I guess we haven't gotten past that date yet. Because of this, our deep water ASW near Truk will retire.

Ships with Type 95 depth charges are pretty much useless in deep water hexes. [:(]

[Crackaces]

One thing about the "disruptive thrust" .. one can get embroiled into a real fight that becomes a distracting front .. a la my disruptive thrust into Katha in my game that accomplished the mission of getting the IJA to react out of China and move forces to Burma .. .now I am in the fight of my life and must secure Katha soon ..or go home with a lot more IJA on the front ..[X(]

As Allies I was able to use the Flexible defense to my advantage. This can be mistaken for a "Brave Sir Robi"n but in fact I chose to defend where I felt there was a purpose and an advantage. Thus the IJ are stymied where I want to draw the line. The flexibility part is staging air platforms and SAG's to provided resistance while the clock ticks toward '44 ..

I would think the IJ are in the same position. With AV not possible the next step is to last unitl '46 and a transition into a flexible defense is the next prudent thing to do at some juncture?

[obvert]

One obvious move is a direct counterattack on Baker Island. It is too late to use this as a method of bringing the USN to battle. I'm not sure it's really worth recapturing, especially if I have to reveal MKB's location to do it (that is not necessary, but with the IJN CVs in deep support if something goes wrong they may have to show themselves, or, alternatively, may want to if CF commits fleet elements).

-Cribtop

The search from Baker could be useful for any later ops in the area. Because it's so small it seems it could be worth it just to take away 12-24 Cats roaming the Central Pacific.

[temagic]

edit: disregard

[Capt. Harlock]

I'm also reading Cuttlefish's side of the story, but will of course not reveal anything from his side of the conflict.

Given that Cuttlefish hasn't posted anything directly bearing on the game since Dec. 11 (June 10 game time), that isn't all that hard. [:(]

[Cribtop]

Wow, great contributions, all. Special thanks to temagic for the detailed post! I certainly agree that the easiest case is the direct counterattack, and the main reason for that is the ability to use the surrounding network of Japanese bases to project power and provide logistical support at the key point. It was with this idea in mind that I chose to stop my expansion at the points I did - we stopped just before big open ocean jumps - as it necessitates that the Allies come in force into a defensive network akin to interlocking machine gun positions in an MLR. That's also why I put a lot of effort into Munda Point, Bougainville, Lae and Nadzab, as they create intermediate positions between the front and Rabaul that the Japanese didn't have and sorely missed IRL. Similar attention was given to Kusaie, Ponape and Eniewetok, for example. I envision this triangle as a second line of defense once the Gilberts and Marianas go.

I want to keep other options available, as in the right circumstances they can create good results. However, I fully recognize they are higher risk and will use them sparingly or only use expendable forces pursuing them. As a further caution, it will be important to keep the IJN as a fleet in being for as long as possible, as it will limit CF to advances along a single axis that can be protected by the Allied CV Death Star (New Guinea is a bit of an exception to this) and will otherwise keep him honest because otherwise Combined Fleet will exact too high a price against any given unsupported landing.

[Cribtop]

Let me follow up. One thing that we haven't discussed is the value of the initiative. What value do you place on it? Obviously one can chase the initiative for unsound reasons until the IJN is gone - cough - Midway - cough - but sitting behind the fortress walls waiting to counterattack any potential offensive may be too passive. Indeed, I think that was the point raised by Alfred and others. How to find the balance and how to evaluate risk and reward is essential, and an art I'm trying to improve.

[Cribtop]

Regarding transports, I have both LSDs at Truk and plan to use them in the counterattack role. I also have most of the AKs. Are these ships good or do they take too long to unload? Is it better to pile into smaller ships to maximize unloading in one day? I've had success with that on atoll assaults, but how it plays out unloading three divisions into a non-atoll base is another matter.

[Crackaces]

ORIGINAL: Cribtop

Let me follow up. One thing that we haven't discussed is the value of the initiative. What value do you place on it? Obviously one can chase the initiative for unsound reasons until the IJN is gone - cough - Midway - cough - but sitting behind the fortress walls waiting to counterattack any potential offensive may be too passive. Indeed, I think that was the point raised by Alfred and others. How to find the balance and how to evaluate risk and reward is essential, and an art I'm trying to improve.

I think you hit the nail on the head with this one .. typical story in AAR.. IJ remains agressive never thinking about a flexible defense when eventually the Allies get lucky or something and not only is inititive lost ... but the game determined. IMHO ) If Autovictory is not the end goal than lasting until 1946 is the next line of victory helped if the Allies decide to use the big ones .. Once the planned goals are achieved then a mix of the operational decisions tuned for the moment are the rule of the day .. with the main overridding mantra is timing the transition to a flexible defense for within these couterstrikes occur ... but the fact that the IJ plan for defense rather than getting boxed into a corner I believe is paramount ..

I am a newbie to this game .. but not a newbie to wargaming ..[8D]

[Alfred]

ORIGINAL: Cribtop

... I want to keep other options available, as in the right circumstances they can create good results. However, I fully recognize they are higher risk and will use them sparingly or only use expendable forces pursuing them. As a further caution, it will be important to keep the IJN as a fleet in being for as long as possible, as it will limit CF to advances along a single axis that can be protected by the Allied CV Death Star (New Guinea is a bit of an exception to this) and will otherwise keep him honest because otherwise Combined Fleet will exact too high a price against any given unsupported landing.

Go back to my comments in post #1219 re fleet in being.

Having a fleet in being provides some benefits but when you boil it down to its essentials, those benefits only accrue if the opponent with the superior fleet is timid. Historically, in maritime conflicts, I cannot think of a single instance where the side with the inferior fleet which maintained a fleet in being approach won the war precisely because of that approach.

The PTO was essentially a maritime conflict. Did the Allies ever adopt a fleet in being approach even during the dark days of 1942 when the balance of naval power lay with the Japanese? Did the Japanese fleet in being approach employed after November 1942 until mid 1944 stop the Allies moving forward? The answer is no for the inherent weakness of the fleet in being approach was well understood to those who had studied and understood Mahan. Go back centuries before Mahan and the victorious maritime powers already knew how to defang the fleet in being concept. Actually the fleet in being concept is only a very recent concept which really only dates from Tirpritz and the Kaiser.

Now it might, just might, be that maintaining a fleet in being coincides with Cuttlefish advancing along only one axis and it might be true that Cuttlefish restricts himself to a single axis because he is afraid of the fleet in being. But all it would demonstrate is that your opponent is timid. A confident Allied player can advance on multiple axes simultaneously with no fear of the fleet in being.

1. How exactly does the fleet in being concept stop an Allied advance out of India into Burma?

2. How exactly does the fleet in being concept stop a concentrated Allied commerce raiding advance using both Allied submarines and single ship destroyer focused surface raiders?

3. How exactly does the fleet in being concept stop an island hopping campaign conducted under cover of LBA in the DEI, or the Solomons?

4. How exactly does the fleet in being concept stop a sudden crossing of the air sea gap anywhere in the PTO?

5. How exactly can the fleet in being concept be converted into the necessary force multiplier to respond to multiple simultaneous, widely separated in geographic terms, invasions?

A timid Allied player may baulk at the prospect of defeat in any of those axes. A confident Allied player will accept the possibility of being totally defeated on one axis, but nonetheless press forward on the basis of success on multiple axes and reinforce success therein knowing that in the long run, that is the quickest and cheapest route to victory.

The bottom line is this. Adoption of a fleet in being approach totally cedes the initiative to the opponent.

Alfred

[Alfred]

Two posts (#1238 and #1244) talk about indirect counterattack. The first one, from Cribtop, as Maxwell Smart would have said missed it by that much. The second one, from temagic, missed the point of the exercise.

An indirect counterattack does not aim at disupting the enemy forces. Its objective is to defeat the enemy spearpoint by destroying the shaft upon which that spearpoint depends. At the tactical level it is represented by a flanking move. At an operational level it can be seen when the shoulders of a newly formed salient are attacked. Peeled back to its essentials, what you witness is a counterattack against the logistics base and LOCs which supports the forward position.

The great advantage of the indirect counterattack launched by the "strategic defender" is that it follows the enemy's initial offensive and strikes with concentrated force on a part of the enemy position which has fewer assets present than at its offensive spearhead or schwerpunkt. It relies upon economy of scale to contain the schwerpunkt, or at least materially slow it down from reaching any of the defenders logistics vitals whilst allowing the counterattack to move more rapidly to capture the enemy logistics vitals. No finer WWII demonstration of the indirect counterattack can be found than the Soviet Operation Uranus which indirectly saved Stalingrad.

In WWII, Japan largely followed the direct counterattack approach because of lack of opportunities and a very poorly thought out and implemented bushido creed. The only time during the war when Japan was able to, and did, and was aided by poor Allied doctrine in doing so, use the indirect approach was during the Malaya offensive when it used the driving charge. At the tactical level that was basically just a series of flanking moves against a British Army that continuously presented open flanks.

Once on the strategic defensive, Japan had no opportunities for indirect counterattacks. On an atoll there was simply no room for a salient to form and consequently an opportunity to hit the shoulders/base did not exist. Besides which the Allied logistical vitals were offshore and simply out of reach. Also the lack of Japanese firepower was "made up" by substituting more "bayonets", consequently there was no economy of force to contain the attack and thereby release forces to concentrate on an overwhelming indirect counterattack. Similar issues arose in jungle fighting. Instead all that was seen usually was a militarily pointless frontal banzai charge.

The indirect counterattack relies upon identifying an enemy position whose loss would be much more significant to the enemy than the benefit they would derive from achieving their initial offensive objective. It requires the counterattack moving more rapidly towards gaining its objective than the schwerpunkt moving towards its objective. It relies upon economy of force at the spearpoint to buy both time and make available the necessary assets for the counterattack's success, a situation which is not replicated by the enemy schwerpunkt which has frontloaded its assets to achieve the breakthrough.

Thus contrary to the position put forward by temagic, the aim is for the defender not to have really strong triangle apexes, but just sufficiently strong, the strength of the counterattack instead being maximised. In this context any ideas of fleet in being (see my previous post) being discarded.

Alfred

[Mike Solli]

ORIGINAL: Cribtop

Regarding transports, I have both LSDs at Truk and plan to use them in the counterattack role. I also have most of the AKs. Are these ships good or do they take too long to unload? Is it better to pile into smaller ships to maximize unloading in one day? I've had success with that on atoll assaults, but how it plays out unloading three divisions into a non-atoll base is another matter.

The LSDs and AKs should unload faster than any of the other riff raff. I prefer many smaller ships vs. a couple big ones. Ship losses minimize LCU casualties (with many ships) and they unload faster. Lots of small ships increase the chances of collisions though. I prefer get in, one day dump, get out.

[Cribtop]

Very useful discussion, gents. Alfred, if I missed it by "that much" by your lights, I'm feeling pretty good. [;)]

The analogy to Operation Uranus made sense to me. A similar move would be what Patton proposed against the "Bulge" salient, which would probably have worked better, faster and cheaper than the frontal reduction Eisenhower employed.

Regarding fleet in being, I see your point. Like the French theory of staying in port mostly, then sailing for specific objectives during American Revolution, French Revolution and Napoleonic times, it is in essence an inferiority strategy, and an opponent who recognizes it as such can make hay. In AE, it appears that KB projects an outsized reputation with Allied players for a time, but I cannot count on that. I think when I used fleet in being the phrase was shorthand for "use it but in situations where the risk/reward is favorable in order to maximize the time period in the game in which the IJN is relevant." However, not only did I not make that clear (except through implication by discussing various counterattack strategies), use of the term probably subconsciously colored, and would continue to color, my actual play absent your comments.

Much to ponder as far as how to put all this into effect. One question, Alfred: Would you recommend offensive action at this stage prior to CF's next move, or should I instead prepare for his attack with the specific idea of meeting it when it comes with the approaches discussed? I suspect the answer is "it depends on whether the proposed Japanese offensive is aimed at a strategically relevant target," but I'm curious what you think.

[Alfred]

Could you clarify exactly what offensive action you have in mind?[:)]

The only one I'm conscious of that you are half prepared for, but appear to have decided against, is the counter invasion of Baker Island.

Assuming that is the one you have in mind, I am inclined to go for because:

1. You have already concentrated the KB into position to quickly strike at Baker
2. I think you said you already have the necessary ground force in position to send against Baker which is only a garrisoned by a single bn which probably only amounts to about 30 AV
3. Your recon has recently disclosed the presence of some Allied cruisers at Baker - their destruction would be a nice savoury canape
4. The KB can get to and back from Baker quicker than the Allied CVs can move from Sydney to support an invasion
5. Even if I'm mistaken about (4) the likely Japanese targets are more solidly held than is Baker for the Allies, hence they will buy you more time to recover
6. Not too much fuel would be consumed in the operation
7. There is no necessity to maintain a japanese garrison on Baker. You can just immediately evacuate and if the Allies subsequently reinvade, reassess whether a rinse and repeat operation is worthwhile.
8. However, if you do feel somewhat frisky, with Baker under Japanese control, you could make some noices to plant in your opponent's mind the idea that Canton Island is next. Then you might be in a position to ascertain whether a similar grab and leave on Canton is worthwhile or perhaps benefit from the Allies rushing some reinforcements to Canton, thereby delaying their own plans.

If the KB were over in the Bay of Bengal then there would be greater risk attached to launching the Baker operation. Greater risk would also attach if you don't have the ground forces to destroy the Allied garison on day 1/were temporarily borrowing from your carefully husbanded indirect counter attack force.

The other factor arguing against the Baker operation is if you have a more meaningful target in mind. In this context maybe you have identified a per-emptive or disruptive thrust target. Solely based on what you have disclosed to date i would doubt you would currently have really good targets in mind but you are more across the situation than I am. However to give you some food for thought.[:)]

If you really believe cuttlefish is preparing for a move on the Solomons or New Guinea supported out of Australia, a deep disruptive thrust target could be either a land raid on Perth to cut off the SLOC back to Cape Town or Adelaide to strike at Melbourne's industry. In either case you immediately destroy allied local supply generating capacity (plus the potential to destroy addition nearby facilities) and you increase the strain on the Allied merchant marine to import the necessary supply to sustain offensive operations in New Guinea/Solomons. Cuttlefish would also have to factor in the possibiloity that you are intending a link up with your existing forces in nrthern Australia. You of course need not harbour such grandiose plans but as I have previously said providing one's opponent with multiple opportunities to make the wrong choice is always a good situation to be in.

If on the other hand you suspect that the support is coming out of New Caledonia, New Hebrides or American Samoa, you have the indirect counter attack possibilities already identified (best launched after the Allied move is made) or the deep disruptive thrust against developed Allied atolls astride the SLOC. Although in this case, unlike Perth/Adelaide, with this deep disruptive thrust you would be stretching your own LOCs and landing in areas where you would have to totally import the victuals to benefit from the acquisitions plus you would not be permanently destroying Allied capacity.

The Patton analogy is also on point. I used Uranus because it is more likely to appeal to Nemo and therefore increases the odds he might chip in. Plus I do really think Chuikov's 62nd Army exploits in holding Stalingrad with great economy of force, all the while Zhukov patiently accumulated the counter attack forces, is a text book example of indirect defence. Note that Kursk was not a demonstration of an indirect counterattack. Rather Kursk was essentially a direct frontal counter attack, the secret positioning of Konev's forces fundamentally not constituting an indirect counter attack approach.

Alfred

[temagic]

edit: disregard

[Cribtop]

Thanks again for everyone's input.

Alfred, I was looking at various targets (Luganville, Perth, perhaps even New Caledonia), but conclude that for a few more weeks I don't have the forces needed. I would also like CF to tip his hand a bit - so long as his CVs and battle line are under observation in Sydney he will not be making a big move, and once he sails, the direction of his move will be telling. Perth intrigues me (I was originally considering it as a Phase II target to further deny the Oz - Timor axis).

However, I do have the force needed for Baker, and will take it. Intention is to use pickets and PBs for force protection and early warning, seize the island with a brigade of 20th Division, pull out (maybe leaving behind an SNLF if I can scrounge one), then have Combined Fleet hide behind the Gilberts in hopes of ambushing a counter-counter-invasion.

[Cribtop]

August 19, 1942

We are on the brink of seizing Tennant Creek

Subs

Gar duds on a small TK near Toyohara. We're in a bind here as IJN DCs don't reach the depth of USN subs and there are limited routes to send oil and resource TFs from Sakhalin. We'll re-route to Kushiro for a while and see how that goes. Research shows that the Congressional OpSec breach on DCs occurred in May 1943.

Our I-boats near Sydney are in good position to watch the port while remaining out of range of ASW air and sea patrols (although CF could re-position them). We will order one mini sub capable I-boat back to Rabual and try an attack on Sydney. These are usually considered a waste of time by Cribtop HQ, but given that every USN CV and modern BB is known to be in port it's worth a shot.

A wolf pack watching currently quiet Fiji is ordered back to Kwaj to provide the screen for the Baker Op.

4th Fleet

Reinforcements load at Tokyo for the Pacific. 4th Fleet AO will receive a second Naval Guard unit for Tarawa.

SE Fleet

Lae hits level 5 forts. Nice. We will land 2nd Area Army HQ here. It is 100% prepped for PM and will be in range to assist with defense if CF ever comes calling.

14th Army

Our forces enter the Bataan hex today. One LCU will launch a probing BA tomorrow. Constant bombing continues.

16th Army

Lots of action today. We sweep and bomb Tennant Creek to good effect, while the enemy B-17s shift targets and ground attack a brigade of 21st Division at Daly. Although the enemy raid is effective, the tanks at Tennant are allowed to launch a DA without having to face the 4Es. We do have the satisfaction of damaging four B-17s with flak, and based on those results order more AA to the base.

The DA at Tennant goes very well, with 1:1 odds, forts dropped to 1, casualties 123(2) vs 7(2). Better yet, at the end of the turn our tanks are all in the white for supply, the lack of which has been holding down adjusted AV in the prior two attacks. Sensing the time is here to push hard, Cribtop HQ orders a maximum effort tomorrow, including Nick LRCAP, bombing, air re-supply and a shock attack. We believe we have at least a 50/50 shot at a capture, which will leave the enemy stack near Daly hurting for supply.

Geraldton makes level 3 airfield.

25th Army

Ketapang invaded. We have base forces and search aircraft ready to occupy Sinabang and Siboeret as soon as those bases fall.

15th Army

Weather scraps the night attack at Ledo. We'll try again tomorrow.

Mandalay goes to airfield level 4.

China

CF noticed that we moved a few LCUs out of Changsha and into Pingsiang. He tries a DA at Changsha but we calculated well and the attack fails with 1:2 odds, casualties 7587(45) vs 1840(4). We doubt the base has the supply to recover those disablements.

More forces are headed for Pingsiang. We hope to fully isolate and destroy the 17 LCUs there, freeing up troops to finish Changsha in conjunction with reinforcements flowing down from the Ichang and Tienshui fronts.

[ny59giants]

Gar duds on a small TK near Toyohara. We're in a bind here as IJN DCs don't reach the depth of USN subs and there are limited routes to send oil and resource TFs from Sakhalin. We'll re-route to Kushiro for a while and see how that goes. Research shows that the Congressional OpSec breach on DCs occurred in May 1943.

Two possible stop gap measures would be: increase the size of your TF and use better ASW equipped ships AND/OR add one ship that has non-Type 95 depth charges so at least one ship 'may' hit the sub. I used some of my DDs convert to APDs as escorts for some time until I got more ships with non-Type 95 depth charges through production and upgrades.

Place re-sized Jakes units up here to search for subs. Their small bombs may not do much damage, but just spotting them helps.

[Cribtop]

Good suggestions. We have Jakes in place. What DC types are effective? Mod-2?

[ny59giants]

Type 95-2 and Type 2