Did the South have any chance of victory ?

[Jonathan Palfrey]

ORIGINAL: chris0827
Jefferson Davis and many southern generals didn't understand that the confederate's most valuable resource was their army. They lost far too many men trying to hold on to specific locations. Fort Donelson, Island #10, Vicksburg, and Port Hudson all saw the surrender of large numbers of confederate soldiers. When you're outnumbered more than two to one you can't afford to throw away men like that. No city in the confederacy was worth losing an army for.

Yes, that's one of the most striking things that we see so easily now and they didn't seem to see then. They were so outnumbered and yet they behaved as though it wasn't important.

[Jonathan Palfrey]

ORIGINAL: RERomine
Hindsight allows me to know they were going to lose much of the West anyhow, but they didn't know that.

I don't think the loss of the West was inevitable. With better play, perhaps...

Clearly, the fewer men they kept in the West, the faster they'd have lost it.

[RERomine]

ORIGINAL: Jonathan Palfrey
I don't think the loss of the West was inevitable. With better play, perhaps...

Clearly, the fewer men they kept in the West, the faster they'd have lost it.

In the hypothetical realm where they do something different, no it wasn't. But the loss of the Mississippi didn't stop the war from going on almost two years more, so the Trans-Miss. area wasn't as critical as it was thought to be. I'm not suggesting a march to Atlanta go unopposed. More, I'm suggesting a quick shift of troops from the West to the East for a decisive strike against the Union army there. Lee was the most capable commander available. A quick strike that captures Washington and brings foreign recognition to the Confederacy could happen too quickly for the Union to capitalize on the situation in the West. Troops are then shifted back to the West to perform damage control if the war isn't ended. The question would be how quickly could the Confederacy transfer, lets say, 30,000 men from the West to the East? It would be a bold stroke that could end the war quickly, one way or another. The old adage is the best defense is a good offense.

[Mike Scholl]

Well, if you try it, it will have to be done in Mid-Summer to Early Fall when "living off the land" is most feasable, and you will have to keep moving, and even giving Lee another 30,000 men will only bring him up close to the average size of the Union Field Army in the East, minus all the Garrisons and support troops. It might be "the best chance", but it's not a forgone conclusion by any means.

[RERomine]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

Well, if you try it, it will have to be done in Mid-Summer to Early Fall when "living off the land" is most feasable, and you will have to keep moving, and even giving Lee another 30,000 men will only bring him up close to the average size of the Union Field Army in the East, minus all the Garrisons and support troops. It might be "the best chance", but it's not a forgone conclusion by any means.

Figured it might be iffy. Kinda like betting the entire Confederacy on a pair of deuces.

[Grifman]

ORIGINAL: Texican

Let me make one thing clear: Lee's victories correlate mostly with Stonewall Jackson's victories. Lee was largely victorious when he had Stonewall Jackson around. After ol' Stonewall passed on, Lee started losing.

I don't think the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and Cold Harbor were considered CSA defeats by most historians. You must be living in an alternative universe.

[Grifman]

ORIGINAL: RERomine

ORIGINAL: Twotribes

They failed these things all of these would have helped them again in 1864 when all they had to do was hold out long enough to let Mac win the Presidency.

I've read that McClellan wasn't going to be as kind as everyone expected if he got elected. The main reason was Lee was already bottled up and Sherman was marching through Georgia. I can dig up where I read that if you like.

The point was though if this had NOT happened. If Johnston had kept Sherman out of Altanta.

[RERomine]

ORIGINAL: Grifman
The point was though if this had NOT happened. If Johnston had kept Sherman out of Altanta.

He wasn't that effective at that. Johnston would generally get in Sherman's way and Sherman would just go around. And Johnston didn't seem to do much about preventing this from happening.

[RERomine]

ORIGINAL: Grifman
I don't think the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and Cold Harbor were considered CSA defeats by most historians. You must be living in an alternative universe.

Two are considered inconclusive and Cold Harbor a Confederate victory. Seems like Wilderness and Spotsylvania Court House were Confederate victories to me. Not sure how they are different from Cold Harbor. The Union got the daylights kicked out of them and Grant moved around.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: RERomine

ORIGINAL: Grifman
The point was though if this had NOT happened. If Johnston had kept Sherman out of Altanta.

He wasn't that effective at that. Johnston would generally get in Sherman's way and Sherman would just go around. And Johnston didn't seem to do much about preventing this from happening.

When the other side outnumbers you considerably, and you can only hold so much front before your line becomes so thin he can punch through it, you will eventually be outflanked. Joe Johnson kept his Army intact and in front of Sherman all Spring and Summer. Someone pointed out just a while ago that the South didn't seem to realize that it's Armies where it's most important asset..., yet here is a General who does and you are criticising him for it. J.E.Johnson may not have been R.E.Lee, but he gave Sherman a very tough campaign at minimal cost to Southern Manpower. "Cump" was more than happy to see Hood replace him.

[RERomine]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
When the other side outnumbers you considerably, and you can only hold so much front before your line becomes so thin he can punch through it, you will eventually be outflanked. Joe Johnson kept his Army intact and in front of Sherman all Spring and Summer. Someone pointed out just a while ago that the South didn't seem to realize that it's Armies where it's most important asset..., yet here is a General who does and you are criticising him for it. J.E.Johnson may not have been R.E.Lee, but he gave Sherman a very tough campaign at minimal cost to Southern Manpower. "Cump" was more than happy to see Hood replace him.

Lee was outnumbered very badly as well and was able to inflict heavy casualties on the Union. I was just pointing out that Johnston wasn't able to force an engagement. Maybe it was the terrain and maybe it was just Sherman's style. By 1864, the armies were much less a factor because the war was pretty much lost by then. Hope rested on the election and not the results in the field.

[Grifman]

ORIGINAL: RERomine

ORIGINAL: Grifman
The point was though if this had NOT happened. If Johnston had kept Sherman out of Altanta.

He wasn't that effective at that. Johnston would generally get in Sherman's way and Sherman would just go around. And Johnston didn't seem to do much about preventing this from happening.

I repeat again, the point was a HYPOTHETICAL one, IF Johnston had been able to keep Sherman out. Please don't make me repeat myself again [:-]

[RERomine]

ORIGINAL: Grifman
I repeat again, the point was a HYPOTHETICAL one, IF Johnston had been able to keep Sherman out. Please don't make me repeat myself again [:-]

Sorry about that. I didn't even remember responding to your comment yesterday. [8|]

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: RERomine

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
When the other side outnumbers you considerably, and you can only hold so much front before your line becomes so thin he can punch through it, you will eventually be outflanked. Joe Johnson kept his Army intact and in front of Sherman all Spring and Summer. Someone pointed out just a while ago that the South didn't seem to realize that it's Armies where it's most important asset..., yet here is a General who does and you are criticising him for it. J.E.Johnson may not have been R.E.Lee, but he gave Sherman a very tough campaign at minimal cost to Southern Manpower. "Cump" was more than happy to see Hood replace him.

Lee was outnumbered very badly as well and was able to inflict heavy casualties on the Union. I was just pointing out that Johnston wasn't able to force an engagement. Maybe it was the terrain and maybe it was just Sherman's style. By 1864, the armies were much less a factor because the war was pretty much lost by then. Hope rested on the election and not the results in the field.

Two reasons for this. Grant didn't have as much room to manuever..., and Grant was looking for a fight. Sherman had more room, and he was satisfied to "turn" Johnson out of positions. So Sherman's losses were much lower than Grants..., and Johnson's losses were much lower than Lee's. And Johnson dragged the "approach" out longer, even though both Rebel Armies wound up pinned at the citiy's they were defending in the end.

[RERomine]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
Two reasons for this. Grant didn't have as much room to manuever..., and Grant was looking for a fight. Sherman had more room, and he was satisfied to "turn" Johnson out of positions. So Sherman's losses were much lower than Grants..., and Johnson's losses were much lower than Lee's. And Johnson dragged the "approach" out longer, even though both Rebel Armies wound up pinned at the citiy's they were defending in the end.

Grant didn't seem to have a problem getting by when he wanted to. That might be the personality difference between Grant and Sherman. Aside from the Wilderness, where Lee was on the offensive, Grant bounced Lee at both Spotsylvania Court House and Cold Harbor (one he wished he had passed on). Sherman just opted to maneuver when he could. Not sure who's approach was longer and don't feel like getting out the map. Off the top of my head, the distance seemed about the same.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: RERomine

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
Two reasons for this. Grant didn't have as much room to manuever..., and Grant was looking for a fight. Sherman had more room, and he was satisfied to "turn" Johnson out of positions. So Sherman's losses were much lower than Grants..., and Johnson's losses were much lower than Lee's. And Johnson dragged the "approach" out longer, even though both Rebel Armies wound up pinned at the citiy's they were defending in the end.

Grant didn't seem to have a problem getting by when he wanted to. That might be the personality difference between Grant and Sherman. Aside from the Wilderness, where Lee was on the offensive, Grant bounced Lee at both Spotsylvania Court House and Cold Harbor (one he wished he had passed on). Sherman just opted to maneuver when he could. Not sure who's approach was longer and don't feel like getting out the map. Off the top of my head, the distance seemed about the same.

I meant that Johnson had held Sherman's approach to Atlanta off longer. And Grant was simply more willing to fight. He may have felt he needed to engage Lee to prevent him trying anything "tricky", or to encourage the other commanders ordered to advance that Spring, or just have been more belligerant than Sherman. He certainly proved able to "sidestep" Lee's position on the North Anna River when he wanted to. Have to agree he would have done well to "sidestep" Cold Harbor as well.

[RERomine]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
I meant that Johnson had held Sherman's approach to Atlanta off longer. And Grant was simply more willing to fight. He may have felt he needed to engage Lee to prevent him trying anything "tricky", or to encourage the other commanders ordered to advance that Spring, or just have been more belligerant than Sherman. He certainly proved able to "sidestep" Lee's position on the North Anna River when he wanted to. Have to agree he would have done well to "sidestep" Cold Harbor as well.

That was my mistake. It was clear you meant longer in time. I was just thinking about the distance differential, but didn't articulate that well.