Modeling of Carrier Battles

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

Ok, well I'll see if I can do it just from what you've posted. Thanks again!
[:)]

Ok, here is a summary table of the data Nik posted earlier in this thread related to the Flak and CAP losses during the 1942 Carrier Battles.

Of course, as always, the devil is in the details, some could argue that this plane should be included and this plane not included, but I tried to be fairly strict and count only enemy planes shot down over enemy ships (for example). This means that losses to "escort fighters" are not included (among other things). Also, I did not include "possible"(s) which Nik had on his list.


A next step would be to take stock and try to run the historical battles a few times and see what the results are. Let's take a "base line" before we decide how "broke" it is!

A problem here is that the thread is about "carrier battles" - but the game is about air raids - not always related to carriers - and whatever we do - it will apply generally. Another problem is that in a game PLAYERS decide what ships are in what task force - and they may not do what was done historically. It should matter - the model should cover the possible ships - and possible armament on them - rather than be based on a particular small sample. For one thing -
we don't have a statistically valid sampling - there are not 30 carrier battles in all history to model from - and you need that many for validity. It is a good starting point - but we need to use theory to deal with more options that are likely to matter in many game battles.

[jwilkerson]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

A problem here is that the thread is about "carrier battles" - but the game is about air raids - not always related to carriers - and whatever we do - it will apply generally. Another problem is that in a game PLAYERS decide what ships are in what task force - and they may not do what was done historically. It should matter - the model should cover the possible ships - and possible armament on them - rather than be based on a particular small sample. For one thing -
we don't have a statistically valid sampling - there are not 30 carrier battles in all history to model from - and you need that many for validity. It is a good starting point - but we need to use theory to deal with more options that are likely to matter in many game battles.

I agree - and that was kind of what I meant when I started out by saying ... that all statements needed a "context" ... i.e

(a) Theoretical
(b) Examples from Real Battles
(c) WITP Game related

http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/fb.asp?m=1657775

But there is value in talking in all three contexts, as long as it is clear in which context we are talking!!! Sometimes we have two people "debating" an issue with one talking in one context and another talking in another context!
[:)]

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: spence

The US Army was not allowed to use Proximity fuzed AA shells over land (near the front anyways) until early in the Battle of the Bulge lest the secret of the shells be discovered because a dud landed in enemy territory. The "VT fuze bonus" probably should not be applied to all Allied AAA fire; and certainly not to some warlord's AA guns in China.

Any VT-fuze bonus should be associated with specific gun systems. Perhaps this could be handled as a cheap upgrade during refitting?

[el cid again]

Joe: concur in detail.

Herwin: I think your idea is a good one - but we are not likely to get another field (just like we won't get director devices - which are easy enough database wise - but would require code interpretation)

What we might do is restrict the VT Frag by nationality - use it as a modifier for the AA routine.

Also - we might be able to add another effect:

IF VT Frag does NOT apply,

THEN FRIENDLY ships (or infrastructure ashore) is damaged, or some high risk of that.

At PH virtually ALL the damage done to Honolulu was caused by ALLIED AA shells! Seems they detonated when they hit the ground.

A related problem is this:

IF VT FRAG is to be used at all - ever - we should probably NOT use it in a single AAA routine:

we should distinguish between heavy AA shells - with radar inside them - and light AA shells - without.

Thus -

a plane attacking a ship is subject to two different AAA attacks - heavy and light - from the same ship

it might evade the light one by flying above the ceiling of the light guns -

it might evade the heavy one the same way - but the ceiling is so high it would then almost always miss the target

IF VT Frag applies, it would only apply to the heavy AA attack.

OR IF VT Frag quadruples heavy AAA - THEN Matrix "doubling" makes sense - we are quadrupling the heavy half of the AAA - but not the light half. If you need to rationalize. Don't quadruple ALL the AAA however.

[jwilkerson]

Allied AAA Bonus:

The right way to implement the VT Fuse (in the current game) would be to add an "VT Effective Date" field to the device. If this was 9999 then no VT ever, but if like 4301 then in Jan 43, this device would start firing VT Fused AAA ammo. I doubt we will get that, maybe in a patch, but probably not for initial release.

So instead, we have to pick a date for the land based VT weapons to take effect. I'd say in WITP terms 4501 would probably be a good number, this gives time for the Battle of the Bulge order to reach the Pacific. And even if the Chinese warlords get it by then also, it won't matter as much.

As to "heavy" versus "light", there is already a check to see of the "ceiling" is >25000 and if so then the VT effects apply. And this is for landbased and ship based. So if we like the 25000 filter, then we can leave that as it is.

If we could really make it device specific, I'd favor quadrupling the effect, rather than the current doubling. The RL data seems to indicate VT fused shells required 500 rounds to bring down a plane versus the 2,000 required for non-VT rounds. But, as long as we have to keep it generic, applying to all Allied "heavy" AAA then, maybe doubling is better.

[TheElf]

Ok. I am late entering the fray, but since a lot of the Air Team's conceptual thought has gone into this area of A2A and A2S CV combat I am going to start reading this thread from the beginning. More later...

[spence]

It seems to me that some kind of formula already exists, in the form of the airstrike coordination rule, to break big strikes up into smaller strikes. I envision a field for each CV, CVL, CVE which I'll call the "Air Operations Field". For the 6 carriers of the (real) KB, the Yorktowns, Essexes and other late-war strike carriers the value would be 1.00. For the Hiyos, Ryujo and all CVEs the value would be less than 1.00 (or more depending how the formula works) such that the number of a/c included in a strike from these ships would tend to be less than maximum. Basically this attribute is an extra one inserted into whatever the formula is for determining strike coordination. Presumably the formula involves some sort of multiplication thus the value of 1.00 for the "strike" carriers doesn't effect whatever the formula was before but the "other than 1" value has some impact (I suppose if the formula involves addition or subtraction then the value for the real CVs could be zero and the others would have some non-zero value).

Just throwing out an idea.

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson



But there is value in talking in all three contexts, as long as it is clear in which context we are talking!!! Sometimes we have two people "debating" an issue with one talking in one context and another talking in another context!
[:)]

Apples and Oranges or would that be Tangerines or possibly even Tangeloes....or heaven forbid the old Toe-Mate-Toe vs Toe-Mot-Toe dust-up...

[TheElf]

ORIGINAL: spence

Neither sides CVEs should be capable of launching torpedo-armed strikes. The ships were too slow and their flight decks too short to get the planes off the deck so armed. I doubt any of them carried anti-ship torpedos in their magazines although some of the USN CVEs carried the FIDO ASW torpedo. The Mark 13s used by the TAFFY planes off Samar against Adm Kurita's Fleet were apparently obtained from an airstrip on Leyte.

The Japanese CVEs were too slow, too short and apparently even lacked arrestor gear such that they could only operate a very few aircraft simultaneously. They mostly served as aircraft ferries.

Can this be confirmed? Can it be an exclsuive statement? CVEs NEVER carried torpedoes in their magazines?

Let me know.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Joe: concur in detail.

Herwin: I think your idea is a good one - but we are not likely to get another field (just like we won't get director devices - which are easy enough database wise - but would require code interpretation)

What we might do is restrict the VT Frag by nationality - use it as a modifier for the AA routine.

Also - we might be able to add another effect:

IF VT Frag does NOT apply,

THEN FRIENDLY ships (or infrastructure ashore) is damaged, or some high risk of that.

At PH virtually ALL the damage done to Honolulu was caused by ALLIED AA shells! Seems they detonated when they hit the ground.

A related problem is this:

IF VT FRAG is to be used at all - ever - we should probably NOT use it in a single AAA routine:

we should distinguish between heavy AA shells - with radar inside them - and light AA shells - without.

Thus -

a plane attacking a ship is subject to two different AAA attacks - heavy and light - from the same ship

it might evade the light one by flying above the ceiling of the light guns -

it might evade the heavy one the same way - but the ceiling is so high it would then almost always miss the target

IF VT Frag applies, it would only apply to the heavy AA attack.

OR IF VT Frag quadruples heavy AAA - THEN Matrix "doubling" makes sense - we are quadrupling the heavy half of the AAA - but not the light half. If you need to rationalize. Don't quadruple ALL the AAA however.

Well, light and heavy AA should be modelled separately--you mean they aren't now? Heavy AA was used in barrages with shells exploding at a given delay (or later at near approach to a target), while light AA was used in point defence, with shells exploding only on contact.

[spence]

quote:

ORIGINAL: spence

Neither sides CVEs should be capable of launching torpedo-armed strikes. The ships were too slow and their flight decks too short to get the planes off the deck so armed. I doubt any of them carried anti-ship torpedos in their magazines although some of the USN CVEs carried the FIDO ASW torpedo. The Mark 13s used by the TAFFY planes off Samar against Adm Kurita's Fleet were apparently obtained from an airstrip on Leyte.

The Japanese CVEs were too slow, too short and apparently even lacked arrestor gear such that they could only operate a very few aircraft simultaneously. They mostly served as aircraft ferries.

Can this be confirmed? Can it be an exclsuive statement? CVEs NEVER carried torpedoes in their magazines?

Let me know.

OK I take back what I said about US CVEs having no torpedos. According to the following link each CVE in Taffy 3 at the Battle Off Samar carried 12 torpedos in its magazines. Use of the single catapult on the CVE to launch a TBM with one was undoubtably required due to deck length and max speed of only 19 kts.

http://www.bosamar.com/book/bosc2.html

The planes that loaded torpedos at Tacloban airstrip went there because the wind was from the NE and to be recovered meant the CVEs would have had to steam towards the IJN fleet.

[TheElf]

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker


Ahhh...the scale issue. With the use of such generalizations as hexes and rigid time pulses (especially with air and naval movement being totally seperate phases, should an operational game have included such tactical game elements such as exact ranges of aircraft, Japanese strike coordination benefits yet not include CV launch/recovery rates, coordinated strike range penalties and non coordinated strike range bonuses and Allied CAP direction team bonuses? What is needed is to either include all tactical details into the operational scope of the game's mechanics to allow for more historical results or remove the few that exist which lead to ahistorical results.

A question that ranks right up there with "Why are we here"!
[:D]

Well, I started playing something called War In The Pacific, in about 1978 IIRC. The scale was 60 mile hexes, 2.33 day turns and individual ships, at least at the CV/CVL/CVE/BB/BC/CA/CL level. So, very similar at the high level.
Airpoints were modeled at 10:1 .. so one airpoint equalled 10 planes. But each major plane type was individualized, So Akagi, might have 3xA6m2, 2xD3Y and 3xB5N. And the ranges, attack strengths, defense strengths etc. were all individualized.

One of the strengths and weaknesses of that game and this one (WITP by 2b3/Matrix) is the multi-level aspect. I bet being able to be King and Nimitz on the one hand while also being able to command a minesweeper TF or manage the training of a fighter squadron, is one of the reasons many of us are here. This "multi-level" aspect of the game of one of the things that make it truly unique. Of course, life is full of trade-offs.

For ground units, the problem is that we have daily turns (well most players do) yet in the game it can take weeks to move one hex. So the "decision/effect" cycle is not ideal. For carrier vs carrier combat, we seem to have some control over decisions that might be made in cycles of like 4 hours or 8 hours (what planes to launch with at what altitude and range) yet we have to make them for a 24 (or even 48) hour period.

But, I've been living with this problem for about 30 years now - it was in the original WITP - it is still there. If I really want to play Flattop or CV, I've got 5 copies of flattop and 2 copies of CV, so I can wip those out and play them. For WITP, I have to compromise and live with some abstractions at least as things stand now.

For WITP_II, I suspect we might be able to have a variable "tactical" cycle with perhaps 2 hour, 4 hour, 6 hour or 8 hour options. But for WITP and for AE, we will have to live with the 12 hour naval phase and the 12 hour (pseudo 8 hour) air phase(s).

OK. But is there any way to simply add range penalties for coordinated strikes (the larger the strike the shorter the range), range bonuses for uncoordinated strikes (to ensure that CVs with shorter range a/c have a much higher chance of getting off a strike within the limits of the games operational scale), enhanced Allied CAP to reflect fighter direction, and reduced Japanese flak in CV TFs to reflect the two differrent CV TF defensive doctrines to level the playing field?

There is, but it isn't going to make it into AE. It was my biggest priority item that I had to shelve due to time constraints. We accomplished so much and yet had to leave entire portions of the code untouched.

The issue of coordination is rooted in the doctrinal practices of both the IJN and the USN. The basic CV doctrine, initially widely accepted was mobile air power from the sea. The USN, IJN, & RN all aligned early on in the simplicity of it. From there they diverged based on real limitations stemming first from the design of their Carriers and their physical capabilities, and then evolved completely separate strains of CV Doctrine from the composition and positioning of screens, Aircraft design, to the emphasis (or lack of), on and execution of radar tactics and other technology.

Add to this one of the most important facet of the development of carrier power, culture, not to mention continuing evolution and refingin of the assumptions that were norm on Dec 7, 1941 and you have a bang up job trying to turn 1s & 0s into a facsimile of it. For instance if you are the Allied player and you Avoid KB til 1944 how can you reasonably expect your CV force to function the same way it did after it evolved to the killing machine it was IRL 1944? You can't because none of the RL experiences that forced that evolution aren't present in you game!!

My answer to this is still in the works, but suffice it to say there is one control that is missing from the game as it is right now in Stock and at least initially in AE...

...CAG

I won't go into any details as this may never see the light of day, but at least for the CV Air Combat piece of this puzzle I intend to make use of a HQ unit called "CAG" (CAG-1, CAG-2, CARDIV 1 Buntachio etc) that has several of the controls or "priority tasking" some people have astutely called it, rolled into a leader, whose values have a meaningful effect on the outcome of the battle. It won't ever be a tactical "phase" if you will, but the intent is to allow more player control over those things previously discussed here. At least those that are deemed appropriate for an operational level wargame. So likely you'll continue to see valuable air assets dump their ordnance on tankers when 2 hexes away 3 CVs lurk...sorry.

One other thing that will likely never change is the importance of up to the minute intel and quick decisions. This is not modeled in the game and without drastic rewrites we'll likely never institute a real time dynamic carrier battle simulation nestled in the code for an operational wargame. But we have already made use of a "timeline" as it relates to Air interception and scrambling CAP, so who knows.

I'm talking about doctrinal decisions that when selected by the player can affect the intiative of a battle or yes Ron, the range of a strike. Things like Urgent, Deferred, and Normal departures for the USN, and the Concept of a Supra-Air Group that is divided in half for strike resolution due to the real physical limitations of IJN CV design. These were REAL considerations that are left unspoken to in the original release.

But be careful what you ask for...you might not like it

EDIT: Changed "are" to "aren't" 3rd para.

[tsimmonds]

ORIGINAL: TheElf

There is, but it isn't going to make it into AE. It was my biggest priority item that I had to shelve due to time constraints. We accomplished so much and yet had to leave entire portions of the code untouched.

The issue of coordination is rooted in the doctrinal practices of both the IJN and the USN. The basic CV doctrine, initially widely accepted was mobile air power from the sea. The USN, IJN, & RN all aligned early on in the simplicity of it. From there they diverged based on real limitations stemming first from the design of their Carriers and their physical capabilities, and then evolved completely separate strains of CV Doctrine from the composition and positioning of screens, Aircraft design, to the emphasis (or lack of), on and execution of radar tactics and other technology.

A crucial point that many seem to wish to ignore. There is a basis in reality for the coordination rule...

Add to this one of the most important facet of the development of carrier power, culture, not to mention continuing evolution and refingin of the assumptions that were norm on Dec 7, 1941 and you have a bang up job trying to turn 1s & 0s into a facsimile of it. For instance if you are the Allied player and you Avoid KB til 1944 how can you reasonably expect your CV force to function the same way it did after it evolved to the killing machine it was IRL 1944? You can't because none of the RL experiences that forced that evolution are present in you game!!

Excellent!! One of my pet peeves since the first Sir Robin bugged out way back in the 1970s[;)]

My answer to this is still in the works, but suffice it to say there is one control that is missing from the game as it is right now in Stock and at least initially in AE...

...CAG

I won't go into any details as this may never see the light of day, but at least for the CV Air Combat piece of this puzzle I intend to make use of a HQ unit called "CAG" (CAG-1, CAG-2, CARDIV 1 Buntachio etc) that has several of the controls or "priority tasking" some people have astutely called it, rolled into a leader, whose values have a meaningful effect on the outcome of the battle. It won't ever be a tactical "phase" if you will, but the intent is to allow more player control over those things previously discussed here. At least those that are deemed appropriate for an operational level wargame. So likely you'll continue to see valuable air assets dump their ordnance on tankers when 2 hexes away 3 CVs lurk...sorry.

One other thing that will likely never change is the importance of up to the minute intel and quick decisions. This is not modeled in the game and without drastic rewrites we'll likely never institute a real time dynamic carrier battle simulation nestled in the code for an operational wargame. But we have already made use of a "timeline" as it relates to Air interception and scrambling CAP, so who knows.

I'm talking about doctrinal decisions that when selected by the player can affect the intiative of a battle or yes Ron, the range of a strike. Things like Urgent, Deferred, and Normal departures for the USN, and the Concept of a Supra-Air Group that is divided in half for strike resolution due to the real physical limitations of IJN CV design. These were REAL considerations that are left unspoken to in the original release.

But be careful what you ask for...you might not like it

If you eventually can incorporate these ideas, I promise I'll like it.

[TheElf]

A couple OTBWs...

1. Air Search has been modified a bit, but testing still needs to bear out whether the desired effect has occurred.

2. Naval TF AAA has been tweaked to account for the DOA (Direction Of Arrival) of attack. So a torpedo bomber making a run from the beam(most desirable angle) is only faced with that facing of the target ship. We even went as far as suggestin level bombers be treated differentlt due to a different attack profile, ie. being subject to more guns at a further distance.

We discussed the idea of an outer ring with detection value and a modest opportunity to disrupt or damage a raid and figuring in the wider dispersment of ships in the outer screen, and then the inner screen increasing the intensity proportionally. Finally you have the target ship with it's facing AAA and a random chance for the USN to have a close escort CA, CLAA, CL, or BB assisting in what I call the "Terminal phase".

Unfortunately everything before the terminal phase has not made it in.

3. Night CVs should be possible by default now, and likely dependent more on the specific training of the air units on board. However we do not make a distinction at the moment between night skills and day skills. Have not gotten to that. there are some simple solutions that could be implemented, but will have to wait for a patch. Again dedicated Night CVs don't come til 44'-45' so closest alligator...

[TheElf]

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

ORIGINAL: TheElf

Add to this one of the most important facet of the development of carrier power, culture, not to mention continuing evolution and refining of the assumptions that were norm on Dec 7, 1941 and you have a bang up job trying to turn 1s & 0s into a facsimile of it. For instance if you are the Allied player and you Avoid KB til 1944 how can you reasonably expect your CV force to function the same way it did after it evolved to the killing machine it was IRL 1944? You can't because none of the RL experiences that forced that evolution are present in you game!!

Excellent!! One of my pet peeves since the first Sir Robin bugged out way back in the 1970s[;)]

Not to rain on your parade, but I was saying this is something we can't really address.

In order to delve into the evolution of doctrine in a game like this we'd have to use date-based options. By definition they would be hard-coded, and not dynamically based on a players existing game conditions. Thus a new can of worms...

Might be a topic worthy of a poll...

Bottom line is Given the 20/20 syndrome we all have here you can't have your cake and eat it too. It has to be one or the other, unless you trigger doctrinal "upgrades" based on events, such as a certain number of CV battles, which isn't a bad idea...

HEY MICHAEL!!!![;)]

[tsimmonds]

When you look at the CV battles of 1942, on the US side they are all characterized by poor strike coordination, poor allocation and direction of CAP, and poor communication (particularly of scouting reports) between the various 1 carrier TFs present (only at Midway was there ever more than a single CV in one TF).

Contrast this with the performances turned in by the fast carrier groups in their raids during the last 6 months of 1943, and in operations Galvanic (Gilberts) and Flintlock (Marshalls). Clearly they had learned some things in the interim. Equally clearly, the lessons were dearly bought at the cost of 4 CVs lost in 1942.

I would go so far as to submit that had there been no Coral Sea, no Midway, no Eastern Solomons, no Santa Cruz, there could have been no Turkey Shoot. An epic CV battle fought in mid-1944 without the benefits of the experiences (as well as the attrition) of the 1942 battles might have had just about any result imaginable....add CarDivs 1&2 to the IJN OOB at Philippine Sea.....yes, USN would still have incorporated the great technological advances, but would its doctrine have evolved to use these to the great advantage as IRL?

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

When you look at the CV battles of 1942, on the US side they are all characterized by poor strike coordination, poor allocation and direction of CAP, and poor communication (particularly of scouting reports) between the various 1 carrier TFs present (only at Midway was there ever more than a single CV in one TF).

Contrast this with the performances turned in by the fast carrier groups in their raids during the last 6 months of 1943, and in operations Galvanic (Gilberts) and Flintlock (Marshalls). Clearly they had learned some things in the interim. Equally clearly, the lessons were dearly bought at the cost of 4 CVs lost in 1942.

I would go so far as to submit that had there been no Coral Sea, no Midway, no Eastern Solomons, no Santa Cruz, there could have been no Turkey Shoot. An epic CV battle fought in mid-1944 without the benefits of the experiences (as well as the attrition) of the 1942 battles might have had just about any result imaginable....add CarDivs 1&2 to the IJN OOB at Philippine Sea.....yes, USN would still have incorporated the great technological advances, but would its doctrine have evolved to use these to the great advantage as IRL?

Yes and no. One of the primary reasons for the US to use single carrier TF's was that CV's were in short supply and it made sense to provide each the best "escort" possible. Also the matter of puting all your limited supply of eggs in one basket. By the end of 1943 this was no longer the case, and massing more CV's together to combine the air groups made a lot more sense. The US HAD practiced with combined CV's pre-war (under Ernie King's command), but with PH devestating the "battleline" each CV became a precious commodity. I don't think you can make any sweeping generalizations in this area...

[TheElf]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

When you look at the CV battles of 1942, on the US side they are all characterized by poor strike coordination, poor allocation and direction of CAP, and poor communication (particularly of scouting reports) between the various 1 carrier TFs present (only at Midway was there ever more than a single CV in one TF).

Contrast this with the performances turned in by the fast carrier groups in their raids during the last 6 months of 1943, and in operations Galvanic (Gilberts) and Flintlock (Marshalls). Clearly they had learned some things in the interim. Equally clearly, the lessons were dearly bought at the cost of 4 CVs lost in 1942.

I would go so far as to submit that had there been no Coral Sea, no Midway, no Eastern Solomons, no Santa Cruz, there could have been no Turkey Shoot. An epic CV battle fought in mid-1944 without the benefits of the experiences (as well as the attrition) of the 1942 battles might have had just about any result imaginable....add CarDivs 1&2 to the IJN OOB at Philippine Sea.....yes, USN would still have incorporated the great technological advances, but would its doctrine have evolved to use these to the great advantage as IRL?

Yes and no. One of the primary reasons for the US to use single carrier TF's was that CV's were in short supply and it made sense to provide each the best "escort" possible. Also the matter of puting all your limited supply of eggs in one basket. By the end of 1943 this was no longer the case, and massing more CV's together to combine the air groups made a lot more sense. The US HAD practiced with combined CV's pre-war (under Ernie King's command), but with PH devestating the "battleline" each CV became a precious commodity. I don't think you can make any sweeping generalizations in this area...

I wouldn't call Irrelevant's generalizations sweeping. They are general, but based on sound criteria. Specifically the battles of 1942 which you yourself use as qualification for your post above (1943). In fact you and Irrelevant agree that the TF's were single CVTFs except for the one at Midway.

But this is irrelevent[;)]. The Coordination failures did not happen at the TF level or due to the composition of the TFs. They were unit level (CAG) failures. Single TF Strikes don't even attempt to coord inate with other CVs. They are self-contained.

It came down to the planners and the experience/discipline of those who executed the plans. And whether the battle group leaders dabbled in tactical level decisions or they let their Airdales work unhindered and supported them operationally.

EDIT: I realize that the TFs at Midway attempted to coordinate in the sense they launch in a fashion that tried to bracket the supposed position of KB, but that is not the coordination we are talking about in the Game. That is tactical level coordination done on a scale not present in the current code so put that out of your head now.

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: spence

The basic idea isn't bad. Certainly only the target ship itself can fire all its AAA weapons. [A big problem is that you cannot shoot on many bearings if there are friendly ships close by] The idea that a target ship and one screening vessel in good position is also a good simplification - and greatly reduces the amount of work figuring out what happened too.
But for more than a tiny task group - the number of screen ships able to fire should probably go up - perhaps on a ratio of 1 in 6, or better - 1 for 1 to 6 escorts, 2 if 7-18 escorts, 3 if 19 plus escorts. Still - not many get to shoot. And the COMPUTER picks who shoots - just as computer deck officers pick the formation (and try to spread it so things average out from all bearings - but won't be able to do it perfectly with odd ships present). Here we are assuming that the officers are screening for AAA properly. To which add: divide the screen vessel AAA by

The whole proposal I made was for the IJN only and was hopefully simple enough that it could be implemented "without designing a new game". It was the doctrine of the IJN to spread their ships over a 30000 - 40000 meter radius in 1942 with even the heavy units 8-10000 meters off from the CVs. That essentially made most of the AAA of all the ships in the screen irrelevant. Just look at photos of Japanese carriers under attack in 1942 (nice shot of Shokaku afire at Coral Sea where one can see a single DD within a 1500-2000 yds astern but a screening cruiser is just the faintest smudge on the horizon behind Shokaku). As you've already mentioned the early IJN DD had next to nothing for AAA anyways so it can be ignored. The Japanese didn't finally adopt a ring defense similar to the Allies until 1944. In the meantime they started upgrading the AAA suites of their DDs so for 1943 I propose to allow them to use the AAA of the target and one screening DD (selected at random (?) but by careful selection of the ships in a TF it could provide a small boost in the flak).

The same IJN that spread the ships in a TF out all over the ocean provided a ship's captain with unlimited sea room for radical manuevers. Although a US CV gave up a little of this ability to manuever while under attack the AAA support from the screening ships keeping station only 1000-1500 away tended to make up for such minor restrictions as the CV captain operated under. To simulate this slight manuevering advantage accorded an IJN ship under air attack I felt a slight manuever rating enhancement ((?)not sure exactly how manuever figures into attack resolution since merchies seem to have higher manuever ratings than warships which makes no intuitive sense to me (?)). In any case I sorta picked a -5% modifier to hit probability as the effect sought by whatever programming is needed.

AAA resolution for Allied TFs would essentially be handled identically to how they're handled now as would Japanese TFs starting in 1944.

The first problem with this approach is it requires players to use the same formations - which is stuff and nonsense. ["When you are in command, command" said Halsey to Nimitz] A game should not attempt to say "you can only do it one way" - and if it does - it does not permit us to learn what could have happened if it was not done the same way.

The second problem is that it ignores technical facts: Japanese AA destroyers were building BEFORE the war began - entered service BEFORE 1943 - and matter no matter what the radius is (although they matter more at GREATER radius - when they may more safely fire and there is more time for that fire to take effect). It would be much better to let the virtually nil value of the guns negate AAA for most ships early than to structurally prohibit the ships that have good guns from doing so - if they are actually present. That IJN didn't put these particular destroyers in the carrier formations until later does not mean a player should not be able to do so. Related to this - the later versions of Yamato were designed with 100 mm guns - and they also won't count (if say Shinano as BB is an escort) unless we let screening vessels count.
Similarly, there were AA modifications of Isuzu, Mogami, etc - and even strictly historical games should not structurally say "they won't matter." Because these used good 5 inch weapons with directors, they count - no matter the range.

A more typical US screening range is 2000 to 4000 yards - and going in at 1000 yards is very dangerous: it is normal to sound collision alarm at 1000 yards - and only formations in line ahead might use spacings that small or smaller - in which case there is no screen - or the screens are also line ahead - thousands of yards to port or starboard. Maneuvering a large formation in ring format requires ALL ships turn together - and that requires they all get the word - both the order and the EXECUTE to time it right. It is common for this to fail - and things get dicy if you are in close.
Worse - in a fight - you also render your ships AAA useless - else dangerous - in that close. Are you going to order the screens NOT to shoot? If not, you are going to be hit by their fire. Not nice either way. [In practice IRL it is more complicated than that: the ships have orders not to shoot on certain bearings, and the closer you are, the bigger the fraction of the arc you cannot shoot in - also the greater the risk some mount captain screws up and shoots anyway in excitement.]

The plane behind a carrier - up tight - is a "plane guard" - its job is to pick up pilots in the drink. But it ALSO is a screen - and if alone - free to shoot on most bearings freely.

The inner screen should be 2 nautical miles from the carrier/battleship/etc.

The outer screen should be 4 to 8 nautical miles from the carrier/battleship/etc.

Pickets should be over the horizon - 16 nautical miles or so - on all potential threat axis - ideally in all directions. And yes - pickets can shoot too - although only the one on the axis of the attack. Screens usually permit about 3 ships to "gang up" on a single incoming raid. Sometimes more. But in practice it rarely works out that way. Not everybody can see and understand the situation properly. There may be more raids in range than one. Some mounts which bear may be momentarily down because of injury, damage or need to restock ready ammunition. Rules of engagement may specify which ships fire - being just barely in range may not be worthy of expending your ammunition - etc.

Cid...unless we are provided with a variety of formation options, I submit that we be provided with the historical practice, not an imaginary one.

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

As I'm still unable to access my old PC (gave it to my mummy![;)]) for a few more days I'll just bounce a few ideas which might be easily added to improve the carrier ops in AE.

My main beefs with the current incarnation is that there are a few tactical details which have been included in an operational level game which impact the mechanics negatively while further, other tactical details which would go a long way to counter those currently included are glaringly absent, leaving the mechanics somewhat crippled as a result.

1) Having rigid tactical level data such as exact range figures for aircraft but having operational level 60 mile hexes often results in a/c that have a few extra gallons in the tank enjoying an extra hex range over a/c that have just a few less gallons losing a hex range. This is one of the reasons why Japan regularly gets to hit Allied CVs with strikes yet Allied CV a/c remain on deck in the game yet historically there is no example of this actually occurring. The new map with its' 40 mile hexes should alleviate this somewhat. Perhaps implementing a mechanic which rounds up the a/c range if it is closer to the next further hexside than the center of the hex (basically adding a hex in range) and rounds down the a/c range if closer to the hexside than to the hex center (basically reducing the range by a hex) might also mend the tactical with the operational level of the design.

2) The limitations of the phase/pulse design is another operational level design limitation which plays havoc with such rigid tactical data like a/c range and naval movement during non naval movement phases. Not much can be done about the necessity of the phase/pulse design approach at this point but perhaps the suggestions in (1) can augment the well intentioned but rather clunky reaction mechanism currently used as the sole design feature which attempts to allow for an abstract ability for naval forces to maneuver into/out of range during the air phases.

3) The co-ordinated strike bonus. In the current model, Japan enjoys an arguably unwarranted hard coded strike bonus. In my opinion, this should be removed and have coordination rely upon aircraft endurance, CV operational efficiency/maximums, weather and leader skill (both TF and squadron leaders).

3a) Aircraft endurance. Co-ordination of strikes relied greatly upon an aircrafts ability to loiter while further aircraft massed prior to departing for the target. Historically, the a/c with the longest endurance launched first and the a/c with the shortest launched last. The co-ordinated strike should therefore have a range equal to the lowest endurance a/c. Due to relative a/c speed, sometimes the strike would form up miles from the target to allow the slower longer ranged a/c to proceed while the faster a/c caught up after launching last, lessening the range penalty. The success rate of this latter method of coordination was less than that of those which formed up over the TF as it was much more difficult to join up enroute. These two approaches to co-ordinated strikes had an impact on historical strike ranges, yet the current model does not penalize co-ordinated strike ranges.

3b) CV operational characteristics. Seeing that strikes, CAP and search patrols are launched and recovered, refueled and rearmed per air phase, one must also assume that these varied evolutions occur within a specific portion of an air phase. Therefore, a CVs ops capacity should come into play, even on an operational level, if only to counter balance the unpenalized coodination of strikes and the CAP capability of CV TFs.

CVs had different levels of ops capability, dependent on design. Those CVs converted on the stocks, older prewar purpose built CVs and the smaller CVs had a less efficient ops capability than the larger war built CVs which benefitted from pre war experience and from combat experience. Tactical level wargames have always used these differing capabilites (ie Flattop) and Jim Dunnigan, one of the designers of many tactical carrier games, published some abstract ops capability rates in his Victory at Sea book. What I'm suggesting is that a very basic way of utilizing these abstract capabilities be included in the code to help determine strike sizes , co-ordination, and CAP percentage per CV. Would it be possible to simply use these figures as a multiplier? ie, if a CV was rated at a 70% ops efficiency rating, could this 70% figure be used to limit the max assigned air mission x .70? Therefore, 70% of the CVs airgroup assigned to strike missions can go in the first wave (the remaining 30% go in a seperate wave during the same air phase) or 70% of the a/c assigned to CAP can be aloft at any one time.

3c) I believe both weather and leader skill are factored in right now to some degree.

My answer to this is still in the works, but suffice it to say there is one control that is missing from the game as it is right now in Stock and at least initially in AE...

...CAG

The Elf

This would be great as I have no idea how leaders actually affect co-ordination right now. Really need some way to penalize co-ordinated strikes for range though...right now the situation is too simplistic and innaccurate.