Manila or Pearl-new paradigm?

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: FatR

ORIGINAL: herwin
See Mark Herman's study on this.

The problem is... this study fails to disprove my statement. The author says things to this effect, but fails to prove his viewpoint. The fact is, the key factor in elimination of Truk was the carrier attack in February. (Not only that, this attack also indirectly ended the existence of Rabaul as an effective base, by eliminating aircraft reserves and demonstrating that it is already bypassed.) This study does not offer any evidence that Truk was anything but an empty shell of a base, with important air and naval assets already destroyed or evacuated, by the time American LBA started raiding it. The author also tries to prove his point by quoting an interrogation excerpt, which stated that Japanese evacuated Truk because they feared an air attack. Except, an air attack can be launched from carriers too, as it indeed happened, and the quote provided does not point what sort of air attack they were expecting.

The Southwest Pacific axis of advance did not make use of carriers. Even in the Central Pacific, count sorties.

[LoBaron]

Herwin sorry but its obvious what you need to sustain "a sustained moderate-sized air offensive".

Aviation fuel, spare parts, ammunition, bombs, replacement planes, runway equipment, trucks, food, medical supply, clothing,...

How do you think that came there? Air transport?

[JWE]

The arguments are getting a bit circular.

No leg of the triad is paramount. Where the transport/maneuver medium is somewhat damp, the truck and leg is replaced by something that could move on the medium (ships). Where the targets are hundreds of miles apart, and guns couldn’t reach quite that far, targets were serviced by a long range ordnance delivery system (airplanes). Everything was predicated on putting a man on the ground at the objective. Each had its proper place in the spectrum of force application. The nature of the medium and the distance between objectives, required the force structure to be adjusted accordingly; longer ranged power projection systems to accommodate the distances. In the ETO, where these conditions did not obtain, air was extremely useful, but the German army fought quite efficiently in the face of Allied air superiority.

Sequencing is not particularly relevant. One should always attempt to suppress the opposing forces in order to easy the way for the ground troops to take the objective. The artillery should fire on the objective “before” the troops get there. That doesn’t make artillery “higher” than infantry. A place for everything and everything in its place according to conditions.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: LoBaron

Herwin sorry but its obvious what you need to sustain "a sustained moderate-sized air offensive".

Aviation fuel, spare parts, ammunition, bombs, replacement planes, runway equipment, trucks, food, medical supply, clothing,...

How do you think that came there? Air transport?

I'm not sure I understand the point you're making. My point is that the campaigns in the Central and Southwest Pacific theatres were about the maintenance and extension of air superiority.

In response to your comment: actually there were a number of air campaigns in WWII sustained by air transport.

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: herwin
My point is that the campaigns in the Central and Southwest Pacific theatres were about the maintenance and extension of air superiority.

That is true, Harry. Given the nature of the operating medium, and the discontinuous nature of the objectives (time and distance), only long range force delivery systems were effective. Thus airplanes. They were the only ordnance delivery system that effectively disrupt, disperse, suppress, an objective, or provide defense against the OpFor's long range systems (kinda, sorta, premptive counterbattery, yeah?). Makes a lot of sense to say that acquisition and maintenance of air superiority over an objective was a primary operational concern in the Pacific.

Conceptually, I equate the establishment and advance of LBA bases, to the "creeping barrage" of War-I. Establish a superiority of local firepower and use it to advance the ground forces.

[xj900uk]

I'm not sure I understand the point you're making. My point is that the campaigns in the Central and Southwest Pacific theatres were about the maintenance and extension of air superiority

That is actually a very valid point. The US were far more adapt at making and maintaining bases especially on the more remote & inhospitable Pacific islands, especially with their 'fighting seabees', earthmoving vehicles and pierced steel planking for laying down a runway quickly. The Japanese had nothing like this and often their 'pioneers' had to make do with pick-axes and shovels at best (and their bare hands if none were available!)

[JWE]

But wouldn't it be better to think of these as integrated weapon 'systems'? An airplane ain't squat without an airbase or a carrier. A carrier is just a cruise ship and an airfield is just a parking lot without airplanes. One requires the other; so perhaps the 'tooth' and the 'tail' should be viewed as a unit, rather than separate, competing, entities.

Pardon the intrusion, I just really enjoy discussions about the nature of operations. Probably a hormonal imbalance somewhere.

[xj900uk]

IMO the development of island bases in the Pacific (particularly the SW Pacific) has been somewhat overlooked in recent years as attention shifts back to carriers & their capabilities.
Why was Henderson Field at Guadalcanal so heavily fought over in late '42? Because although neither side really wnated it (it was a semi-primeval, maleria-infested nightmare with enormous and vulnerable supply problems to boot), neither could they afford to cede it to the enemy. BOth sides regarded it as an 'unsinkable' aircraft carrier - witness the damage the aircraft based at Henderson (particularly in the absense of the US carriers) could do to the IJN warships and supply transports in daylight and why the IJ tried to knock it out by both shore bombardment as well as constant airial bombardment.
There has also been a lot of criticism over the IJ's failure to develop/finish the landing strip that had been marked at at Shortlands, even if just for emergency landing/refueling (for damaged planes returning after combat over Guadalcanal, no doubt it would have saved countless valuable trained pilots & aircrews). One train of thought is that it never occurred to them. A second is that they simply lacked the facilities to do so (unlike the US, who had the excellent CB's on call and prided themselves on how quickly they could develop an island base, particularly knocking up even a small airstrip where it was deemed virtually impossible for one to be built).
Also, not only the supply network and chain caused extensive problems for both sides - the US had big headaches with supply in the Pacific well into '44, not only because of the distances involved, but of the geographical problems in lack of deep water ports and harbour facilities, which took a lot longer to knock up than a small airstrip, and in their absence a total lack of small lighter craft to unload the bigger ships which were sitting offshore at anchor twiddling their thumbs waiting for a free potshot from some passing Jap sub.
There was a very interesting article written by an Aussie Quartermaster in early '44 who had been asigned to Milne Bay and charged with clearing the bottleneck of large ships sitting outside port (some had been there for literally months) waiting for assistance in unloading. The shortage of lighters and small boats was so serious (it didn't seem to effect the IJ so much as they had their excellent barges on hand) he and his colleagues had taken to employing locals (when they could catch them) to try and build native-type fishing boats to ferry supplies back and forth...

[JWE]

All these things are true. I'm only suggesting that people view the pieces as component parts of an integrated system; no one part more fundamentally important than another. The whole paradigm of military operations is to put a sufficient number of healthy, well armed and motivated grunts on the start line, and to provide a sufficient preponderance of firepower to ease their way over "the last 200 yards" to closure (the last 200 miles, in the Pacific context).

Building the infrastructure allows one to deploy sufficient numbers of the poor dumb ba$tard$ on the LOD. Building the infrastructure also allows deployment of the supporting firepower elements. One portion is not particularly effective without the other.

I'm a pretty serious logistics puke, but logistics without grunts are just dinner opportunities for the OpFor. And grunts without that sufficient preponderance of firepower (logistics, in support of the weapon systems) are just ducks in the gallery. Simply can't have one without the other; and each requires the other to function efficiently. No one part is fundamentally more important than another. That's my only point.

Ciao. J

[Nikademus]

in other words.....its Chicken and the Egg.

[:)]

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus
in other words.....its Chicken and the Egg.

[:)]

Yep. All I'm trying to do is encourage people to think in terms omelets, or maybe a paella. In MilOps, as in cooking, you gots to have all the main ingredients. Otherwise it's a thin sour soup and not a paprikosh.

And, like a good Spanish paella, Irish stew, or Hungarian goulash, the result is always greater than the sum of the parts. [;)]

[AcePylut]

ORIGINAL: LoBaron



Ok you really did not get it. [;)]

You are beginning 15 steps late.

Build transports ships.
Import raw materials.
Build tankers.
Import oil.
Take oil and ressources and get an industrialized nation running.
Build airplanes.
Build transport ships.
Build combat fleet to protect transports against any threat.
Load forward baseforce and troops on transport.
Unload at desired destination.
Build Port
Build AB
Supply both with transport ships.
Fly in aircraft.
Establish Air Superiority.


You start with strategy. A world war is about logistics.
The B17´s launching from England destroyed the German industry because of the Axis power´s inability to prevent the USA from mass producing them in the first,
supplying them in the second and replacing them in the third place. It did not make "poof" and suddently there were the heavy bombers... [:'(]

Establish air superiority comes before you can build the ships, because if you don't have air superiority, you aren't going to have the shipyards to build the ships.

Even given your example... why did the B-17's launch from England? Because the Allies had air superiority over England, and the Germans didn't.

No air superiority over England for the Allies = no working bases for the Allies to launch their bombers.

What you have to understand, is that every sound strategic decision made in WW2 was taken with the goal of gaining *Air Superiority*... because *air superiority* is what decided the war.

[AcePylut]

ORIGINAL: JWE

But wouldn't it be better to think of these as integrated weapon 'systems'? An airplane ain't squat without an airbase or a carrier. A carrier is just a cruise ship and an airfield is just a parking lot without airplanes. One requires the other; so perhaps the 'tooth' and the 'tail' should be viewed as a unit, rather than separate, competing, entities.

Pardon the intrusion, I just really enjoy discussions about the nature of operations. Probably a hormonal imbalance somewhere.

Well, that's what I've been kinda saying. In the rock paper scissors world of AE... you need the planes to control the air so the ships can bring the troops to hold the bases to fly the planes to control the air so the ships can bring the troops to hold the bases <head explodes due to repeating>

None of those ships are going to move, and none of those invasions are going to happen (successfully), if you don't, first, have air superiority. So I rate that as the "#1a" factor in regards to the ships and troops.

[JWE]

Well, you have your "#1a" factors, and that's fine. Game engine don't give much of crap about either of our opinions. So you do what ya can, or lose it all, no matter what your philosophy.

Yeah, have at it. I'm sure you are completely and utterly correct in every respect.

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

in other words.....its Chicken and the Egg.

[:)]

No. That's an incorrect metaphor.

Class Aves very clearly descended from a spur of Class Reptilia about 60 million years ago. The calcified *egg* came well before the first chicken or its predecessor the 'jungle fowl' archetype.

Hope this helps. [:'(]

[LoBaron]

ORIGINAL: JWE

ORIGINAL: Nikademus
in other words.....its Chicken and the Egg.

[:)]

Yep. All I'm trying to do is encourage people to think in terms omelets, or maybe a paella. In MilOps, as in cooking, you gots to have all the main ingredients. Otherwise it's a thin sour soup and not a paprikosh.

And, like a good Spanish paella, Irish stew, or Hungarian goulash, the result is always greater than the sum of the parts. [;)]

[:D]


The cool thing is when discussions like that get a 6 pager that often means theres no interesting bug to discuss anymore.

[JWE]

Well, gosh all hemlock, Stevie. If it ain't a bug, it ain't worth kicking the campfire over for, and what ya'll thinkin about pignuts for, anyway? Just think Hazen, Easten and Brown.

[bradfordkay]

mmmm..... paella.... mmmm.... especially when served with a good sangria.... [8D]

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: herwin

The Southwest Pacific axis of advance did not make use of carriers. Even in the Central Pacific, count sorties.

Really? Then what chased Japanese warships out of Rabaul and what, as mentioned above, effectively ended the entire Rabaul campaign? Also, the effect on the enemy (i.e. planes/ships destroyed or damaged) should be counted first. Sorties that don't hit anything that has a remote chance of being important have little meaning.

Returning to AE, the evidence available proves without doubt, that attempting to rely solely on the airforce to defend your holdings, never mind to conduct offensive operations, while neglecting surface combatants, will end in a dismal failure against a competent opponent. (I believe this was true for RL too, but AE is both far simpler to evaluate, and gives us far more experimental data to draw conclusions from.) Even Netties often fail to spot oncoming SCTFs and sortie against them before their airfield is levelled. The problem is obviously even worse in regards to covering invasions, even when you make short-range jumps.

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: AcePylut
What you have to understand, is that every sound strategic decision made in WW2 was taken with the goal of gaining *Air Superiority*... because *air superiority* is what decided the war.

Frankly, before the Allied air superiority was established and started to affect ground operations to a significant degree (saying generously, late autumn of 1942 in Europe), the outcome of WW II was already decided, and any decisions from that point onwards affected only the postwar balance of power.