Allied Tactics
Moderators: Joel Billings, wdolson, Don Bowen, mogami
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madflava13
- Posts: 1501
- Joined: Wed Feb 07, 2001 10:00 am
- Location: Alexandria, VA
I've got to agree with mdiehl here -- although the Zero was in a completely different class than the F4F series when it came to maneuverability, it only took a couple hits and the Zero went up like a Roman Candle. Combined with US tactics (Thach Weave, slashing attacks, etc.) and the durability of the Wildcat, and its not hard to see how those ratios were feasible. (assuming all other factors, such as pilot skill, are equal).
"The Paraguayan Air Force's request for spraying subsidies was not as Paraguayan as it were..."
Comments
As a note, the most common load for B-17E/F/Gs enagaged in strategic raids into Germany was 8 x 500lb GP bombs (4,000 lbs) versus a maximum bomb load of over 8,000lbs.
The difference between the VS and VB squadrons in WW2 became very minor, but the doctrine was that VS VSBs would launch with 500lb bombs for greater range to scout for a fix enemy forces, attacking targets of opportunity, while the VB a/c would make the main attack with 1,000lb bombs when the range shortened.
I quote Capt (RN) Eric Brown from his book "Wings of the Navy: Flying Allied Carrier Aircraft of World War Two", (USNI, 1987)"I was to engage in many mock combats with RAF Hurricanes and Spitfires (this was Nov-Dec 40 in the Martlet I (G-36A) an export equivalent) of the F4F-3) and was soon convinced that the Martlet was a formidable fighting aircraft, capable of holding its own in every phase except that it was slower than its RAF opponents in the dive. However, this shortcomming was more than compensated for by its steep climb, excellent turning circle and completely innocuous stalling characteristics." He gives the G-36A with the 1,000hp (at 13,500ft) R1820-G205A an initial climb rate of 3,300 ft/min., with top speed at 248 kts (281mph) at S/L and 265 kts (301mph) at 15,000 ft in service conditions with a good rate of roll. The manual carriage handle was a problem causing an undulating climb profile as the pilot cranked in the gear and at least once, apilot cranked his head into the cockpit when the radio cord got caught in the handle.
"The Martlet Mk.II (F4F-4B) had been tested at Boscombe Down where it had been found to weigh about 1,000lb more than the Mk.I... Understandably, this extra weight had some affect on performance..." He mentions longer take-off distance and higher landing speed as impacting operations from smaller escort carriers, especially MACs. The weight increase was 13% over the F4F-4 w/o a compensating increase in engine power or wing area. He says the tested top speed of the Martlet II was 254 kts (288 mph) at 5,400 ft and at 13,000 ft. Range was 773 nm at 143 kts (163 mph) at 15,000 ft.
He says the FM-2 version was the best, being able to be spun with impunity, whereas deliberate spinning of all earlier versions was not authorized. The FM-2 was 500lb lighter than the F4F-4 and mounted the 1,350hp R-1820-56. He also says the F4F had the best landing charateristics he experienced from a shipboard carrier aircraft, this from a man who flew everything from Swordfish to Phantom IIs of British carriers.
His book gives a notional top speed for the F4F-4, clean at 7,975lb of 274 mph at S/L and 320mph at 18,800ft. Range at 830 mi at 161 mph at 5,000 ft. ICR 1,950 ft/min. Green & Swanborough in "The Complete Fighter Book" say the same. Wagner in "American Combat Planes" gives the FM-1 at the same weight the same performance except 284 mph at S/L. Green in the "Warplanes" series, Fighters vol.4, gives 318 mph at 19,400 ft, 275 mph at s/l, 1,950 ft/min and 770 mi. at 7,406lbs. Swanborough & Bowers in "USN Aircraft since 1911" gives 318mph at 19,400ft, 155 mph cruise, 1,950 ft/min ICR and 770 mi range.
Green also gives the F4F-3 328mph at 21,000 ft; 281 mph at s/l; 2265 ft/min and 845 mi. at 7,002 lbs. Wagner gives the F4F-3 as 330 mph at 21,100ft, 281 mph at S/L; 845 mi at 147 mph and 2265 ft/min at 7,002lb and the F4F-3A as 312mph at 16,000ft; 2430 ft/min and 825 mi at 6876 lbs. The Aircraft in Profile No.53 by Greene gives the same figures for the F4F-3A, weight unknown and the F4F-3 as 331 mph at 21,300ft; 2,300 ft/min from s/l and 860 mi range at an unknown weight.
Weight impacts performance and an F4F-4 at maximum combat RADIUS will have superior performance over an F4F-4 just launched on an escort mission or perhaps at the beginning of a CAP turn.
AS a comparison, Francillon in "Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific War" gives the A6M2 Mod.21 as 288 kts (331 mph) at 14,930 ft; cruise at 180 kt (207 mph), normal range at 1,010 nm at 5,313lb.
Wagner gives the F2A-3 as 321 mph at 16,500 ft; 284 mph at s/l; climb at 2290 ft/min and range at 965 mi.
The difference between the VS and VB squadrons in WW2 became very minor, but the doctrine was that VS VSBs would launch with 500lb bombs for greater range to scout for a fix enemy forces, attacking targets of opportunity, while the VB a/c would make the main attack with 1,000lb bombs when the range shortened.
I quote Capt (RN) Eric Brown from his book "Wings of the Navy: Flying Allied Carrier Aircraft of World War Two", (USNI, 1987)"I was to engage in many mock combats with RAF Hurricanes and Spitfires (this was Nov-Dec 40 in the Martlet I (G-36A) an export equivalent) of the F4F-3) and was soon convinced that the Martlet was a formidable fighting aircraft, capable of holding its own in every phase except that it was slower than its RAF opponents in the dive. However, this shortcomming was more than compensated for by its steep climb, excellent turning circle and completely innocuous stalling characteristics." He gives the G-36A with the 1,000hp (at 13,500ft) R1820-G205A an initial climb rate of 3,300 ft/min., with top speed at 248 kts (281mph) at S/L and 265 kts (301mph) at 15,000 ft in service conditions with a good rate of roll. The manual carriage handle was a problem causing an undulating climb profile as the pilot cranked in the gear and at least once, apilot cranked his head into the cockpit when the radio cord got caught in the handle.
"The Martlet Mk.II (F4F-4B) had been tested at Boscombe Down where it had been found to weigh about 1,000lb more than the Mk.I... Understandably, this extra weight had some affect on performance..." He mentions longer take-off distance and higher landing speed as impacting operations from smaller escort carriers, especially MACs. The weight increase was 13% over the F4F-4 w/o a compensating increase in engine power or wing area. He says the tested top speed of the Martlet II was 254 kts (288 mph) at 5,400 ft and at 13,000 ft. Range was 773 nm at 143 kts (163 mph) at 15,000 ft.
He says the FM-2 version was the best, being able to be spun with impunity, whereas deliberate spinning of all earlier versions was not authorized. The FM-2 was 500lb lighter than the F4F-4 and mounted the 1,350hp R-1820-56. He also says the F4F had the best landing charateristics he experienced from a shipboard carrier aircraft, this from a man who flew everything from Swordfish to Phantom IIs of British carriers.
His book gives a notional top speed for the F4F-4, clean at 7,975lb of 274 mph at S/L and 320mph at 18,800ft. Range at 830 mi at 161 mph at 5,000 ft. ICR 1,950 ft/min. Green & Swanborough in "The Complete Fighter Book" say the same. Wagner in "American Combat Planes" gives the FM-1 at the same weight the same performance except 284 mph at S/L. Green in the "Warplanes" series, Fighters vol.4, gives 318 mph at 19,400 ft, 275 mph at s/l, 1,950 ft/min and 770 mi. at 7,406lbs. Swanborough & Bowers in "USN Aircraft since 1911" gives 318mph at 19,400ft, 155 mph cruise, 1,950 ft/min ICR and 770 mi range.
Green also gives the F4F-3 328mph at 21,000 ft; 281 mph at s/l; 2265 ft/min and 845 mi. at 7,002 lbs. Wagner gives the F4F-3 as 330 mph at 21,100ft, 281 mph at S/L; 845 mi at 147 mph and 2265 ft/min at 7,002lb and the F4F-3A as 312mph at 16,000ft; 2430 ft/min and 825 mi at 6876 lbs. The Aircraft in Profile No.53 by Greene gives the same figures for the F4F-3A, weight unknown and the F4F-3 as 331 mph at 21,300ft; 2,300 ft/min from s/l and 860 mi range at an unknown weight.
Weight impacts performance and an F4F-4 at maximum combat RADIUS will have superior performance over an F4F-4 just launched on an escort mission or perhaps at the beginning of a CAP turn.
AS a comparison, Francillon in "Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific War" gives the A6M2 Mod.21 as 288 kts (331 mph) at 14,930 ft; cruise at 180 kt (207 mph), normal range at 1,010 nm at 5,313lb.
Wagner gives the F2A-3 as 321 mph at 16,500 ft; 284 mph at s/l; climb at 2290 ft/min and range at 965 mi.
Re: Strategic Surprise
Originally posted by LTCMTS
Unless you remove MacArthur from the equation, you would also still have operational and tactical surprise and operational failure in the Philippines. It was MacArthur's vacililations that prevented a bomber recon-strike on Taiwan and the mishandling of the air defenses, which included radars that gave early warning of Japanese approachs. Worse, you would still have an egotistical battle plan which sought to stop the Japanese on the beaches with the under equipped, under trained PA divisions. The result was a precipitate retreat which prevented the proper movement of combat sustainment resources into Bataan.
An interesting Allied strategy would be to retire most Philippine/US ground forces into Bataan, leaving the 26th CAV and some PA assets in the San Carlos mountain area to strike into the IJA's rear. Even with the mistakes MacArthur made, the Philippines held out until May 42. With the supplies that had to be abandoned historically available to the defenders, that defense could have lasted 3-6 more months. What impact would that have had on US strategy in the Pacific, specifically the commitmant of major naval forces to combat in the Mandates?
OK LCMTS I respect your opinion, but I cant resist biteing on this one.
First regarding vacilations. IMO this has been completely over blown. The FEAF had virtually no intel of the number and locations of the Formosa airodomes. Which is why the only mission contemplated on the morning of the 8th was angainst Takao Harbor. It is highly unlikely an attack of 18 B-17Ds on shipping in the harbor would have had any appreciable effect in the campaign. An attack on the aireodromes could not be even considered until the recon flights and then again it is highly doubtful that the 18 B-17s would have much effect. Particularly when you consider that the IJN and IJA air units were dispersed over a dozen airfields and that the bulk of the aircraft would no longer be their by the time the attack took place. About the only positive outcome from an immediate attack on Formosa would be that the B-17s would not have been destroyed on the ground. However when you consider that they would be flying unescorted and they would be returning to a completely destroyed Clark field, a combat/operational loss of 50% is not unreasonable IMO. Under these circumstances the only realistic option was to concentrate the B-17s at Delmonte Field on Mindanao until which time an accurate assessment of the situation could be obtained. MacArthur does bare responsibility that this was not done but to state the he also somehow is responsible for the mishandling of the air defence and early warning systems is a stretch. Could you please elaborate.
Regarding egostical battle plan. It was a battle plan approved by the War Dept and chief of Staff Gen. George Marshall. It was based on an expected attack no sooner than April 1942 and given the reinforcement schedule of USAFFE, had very good chance of succeding by that date. You can fault him for trying to implement with the insufficient means at his disposal in Dec 41, but, what real choice was there? True he could have he could have reverted back to Rainbow5 immediately and withdrawn into Battaan with much more supplies than were historical, but to what end? The Battaan defence would have lasted months longer but ultimately could only end in defeat. Its understandable that such a dead end defeatist strategy would be distasteful if not unthinkable to an egostical personality as MacArthur. Actually there is sound strategic reasoning to defend the beaches. USAFFE knew that they could not count on the navy comming to the relief. The only chance was for massive air reinforcement, which required holding Clark and the other major airfields. Given the reinforcements promised by Marshall and FDR it is not an unreasonable strategy.
Where I agree, where MacArthur failed was trying to defend the beaches with the poor quality PA divisions. It would have been better to commit his best troops the Pilipine division, 27th Cav PS, and concentrated the two Light tank Bns. at Linguyen, which USAFFE knew full well, was were the main attack was to come. The Japanese landings were a messy affair and took several days to complete. Had he counterattacked with his best troops when the enemy was most vulnerable, there stood a good chance of success.
Mdiehl - I'll copy that information on the F4F-3 to the development board and see if they want to put it into an upcoming alpha build for WitP.
"Money doesnt talk, it swears. Obscenities, who really cares?" -Bob Dylan
"Habit is the balast that chains a dog to it's vomit." -Samuel Becket
"He has weapons of mass destruction- the world's deadliest weapons- which pose a direct threat to the
"Habit is the balast that chains a dog to it's vomit." -Samuel Becket
"He has weapons of mass destruction- the world's deadliest weapons- which pose a direct threat to the
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madflava13
- Posts: 1501
- Joined: Wed Feb 07, 2001 10:00 am
- Location: Alexandria, VA
To piggyback on something TIMJOT said:
Even if the B-17s had raided the Japanese airfields on Formosa, beyond the (I think good) arguments against success that TIMJOT laid out, there was also the weather. In his book "Samurai!", Saburo Sakai describes incredibly thick fog obscuring his (and other) airfields on Formosa - that was why the aristrikes on Clark Field didn't coincide with the Pearl Harbor strike as originally had been planned. So even if the B-17s were committed, it's doubtful they could have hit anything...
Even if the B-17s had raided the Japanese airfields on Formosa, beyond the (I think good) arguments against success that TIMJOT laid out, there was also the weather. In his book "Samurai!", Saburo Sakai describes incredibly thick fog obscuring his (and other) airfields on Formosa - that was why the aristrikes on Clark Field didn't coincide with the Pearl Harbor strike as originally had been planned. So even if the B-17s were committed, it's doubtful they could have hit anything...
"The Paraguayan Air Force's request for spraying subsidies was not as Paraguayan as it were..."
In his book "Samurai!", Saburo Sakai describes incredibly thick fog obscuring his (and other) airfields on Formosa
Just finished reading this myself, great read! I especially liked the part where the doctor was cutting glass out of his eyes with no anesthetic. Ouch!
Only thing that bugged me was some typographical errors that the editors didnt catch.. That irritates the hell out of me, what are these editors and spell checkers getting paid for but to avoid that sort of thing?
Just finished reading this myself, great read! I especially liked the part where the doctor was cutting glass out of his eyes with no anesthetic. Ouch!
Only thing that bugged me was some typographical errors that the editors didnt catch.. That irritates the hell out of me, what are these editors and spell checkers getting paid for but to avoid that sort of thing?
"Money doesnt talk, it swears. Obscenities, who really cares?" -Bob Dylan
"Habit is the balast that chains a dog to it's vomit." -Samuel Becket
"He has weapons of mass destruction- the world's deadliest weapons- which pose a direct threat to the
"Habit is the balast that chains a dog to it's vomit." -Samuel Becket
"He has weapons of mass destruction- the world's deadliest weapons- which pose a direct threat to the
Defense of the Philippines
I agree on the probable ineffectiveness of B-17 strikes on TAiwan except for the comments by the Japanese that such a strike might have caught their a/c on the ground as the fog lifted in interviews with the SBSS. And Kearny had his own ax to grind. Besides, use them before you lose, them, which was the eventual fate.
As far as holding as much of the Philippines as possible, the main island Luzon had more landing sites than any force could have covered, especially an organization as understrength as the 26 Cav (PS) and the Philippine Div. The Japanese would have found a lightly or undercovered beach, gotten troops ashore and proceeded to pry the US/PA defenders out of every blocking position they assumed and forcing them to fight through IJA blocking positions on their retreat to Bataan, which is what historically happened. Supplies positioned forward to support the OPLAN were lost to the Japanese who used them to support their own ops. Remember that the Japanese had to invade the Philippines between OCtober and December, when the rice crop was harvested, allowing the IJA to "live off the land" through foraging from commercial storage sites.
If the Japanese had waited until 1942, then the situation would have been better for the US. But as indicated before, the Japanese strategic situation couldn't wait till Oct-Dec 42 for the next years harvest. Yet if they had, the 32d ID (ARNG), a medium tank battalion and enough equipment to bring the Philippine Division to the 1941 triangular MTOE would have become available by Feb 42 and the PA would have been further along in its training program. Of course, any reading of the official history would bring some doubt on whether the PA divisions other than the 1st and 2d would have reached a sufficient level of readiness by even May 42. A larger force, however, would still, with Japanese control of the air and sea, only add to the "bag" if not relieved by the USN.
Once the US lost any ability to contest air superiority by the Japanese, and with the freedom represented by control of the local seas, the Japanese could pick and chose their landing areas outside the coverage of US coastal defenses, or even invaded the surrounding islands like Visayen and Mondanao to set up air bases to stage to from Taiwan and French Indo China. A larger, better prepared force could have caused more casualties, but the combined wisdom of Army officers in the Philippines from 1902 to 1941 was that the shores could not be held. Additions to the force structure would only allow the US to extend the size of its perimeter of defense beyond Bataan. In TOAW-COW, with the forces that would have been available in Feb 42, I have been able to hold the Japanese north of Manilla across the northern neck of Luzon, but eventual they come ashore in the south and flank me.
Notice that the Japanese solution to the problem by Yamashita, who had far more effective and numerous ground forces in 1944 on Luzon than MacArthur in 1941, but had also lost control of the air and seas around Luzon, was to concede the beaches to the US and fall back into the San Carlos mountains as a redoubt area, intending to deny the US free use of the nearby airfields and force the commitment of ground forces to the Philippines to cover him that would become unavailable for further offensive actions.
A final sidebar. There could have been a far more effective garrison available in the Philippines. The US could have created a larger Philippine colonial army, along the lines of the British and French. They could have supported creation of a Philippine National Guard from 1902 (remember that Puerto Rico was a former Spanish colony and future Commonwealth, and was allowed an ARNG), and accepted Philippino voluteers for service in Europe and elsewhere (Quezon offered to raise 15,000 in 1917)during WWI who could have been incorporated in an Organized Army Reserve (PS) in 1921 (which would have provided a cadre of officers and NCOs, along with the PARNG to build a PA around). There was a move to "exile" the four "colored" regiments (9th, 10th Cav & 24th,25th Inf) to overseas duty (These rgts had the fewest AWOLS and desertions and the highest readiness ratings of any rgts in the Army between the wars). Finally, in the late 20's, the War Department made a massive shipment of surplus arms and equipment to the Philippines, Panama and Hawaii. Unfortunately, the action wasn't properly coordinated and the resources were not on hand to receive and properly store the equipment , most of which ended rotting and rusting away on the Manilla docks. With proper preperations, some of the massive numbers of artillery and MGs (M1915 Colt-Vickers, M1917 Lewis, M1918 Marlin-Savage) available at the time and as good as anything the Japanese brought to the Island in 1941 could have been available to support a more potent force of 2-3 US Army (combined RA/AR) divisions, 1-2 Philippine ARNG divisions and 2-3 Philippine AR (PS) or PA divisions, all built on the 1923 "square" MTOE and properly equipped. In 1922, the US Army had on hand 102 2.95" Mtn Gun M1911, 490 3" Gun M1902, 54 4.7" Gun M1908, 271 75mm Gun M1916, 832 75mm Gun M1917, 1644 75mm Gun M1897, 135 120mm Gun M1917, 36 6" How M1908, 108 5" Gun M1917, 54 6" Gun M1917, 832 155mm How M1917, 388 155mm Gun M1917 and 244 8" How M1918. All these weapons would be more or less obsolescent in 1941, but other than a handfull of designs such as the 75mm Gun Type 90, the Japanese artillery park would be in no better shape.
As far as holding as much of the Philippines as possible, the main island Luzon had more landing sites than any force could have covered, especially an organization as understrength as the 26 Cav (PS) and the Philippine Div. The Japanese would have found a lightly or undercovered beach, gotten troops ashore and proceeded to pry the US/PA defenders out of every blocking position they assumed and forcing them to fight through IJA blocking positions on their retreat to Bataan, which is what historically happened. Supplies positioned forward to support the OPLAN were lost to the Japanese who used them to support their own ops. Remember that the Japanese had to invade the Philippines between OCtober and December, when the rice crop was harvested, allowing the IJA to "live off the land" through foraging from commercial storage sites.
If the Japanese had waited until 1942, then the situation would have been better for the US. But as indicated before, the Japanese strategic situation couldn't wait till Oct-Dec 42 for the next years harvest. Yet if they had, the 32d ID (ARNG), a medium tank battalion and enough equipment to bring the Philippine Division to the 1941 triangular MTOE would have become available by Feb 42 and the PA would have been further along in its training program. Of course, any reading of the official history would bring some doubt on whether the PA divisions other than the 1st and 2d would have reached a sufficient level of readiness by even May 42. A larger force, however, would still, with Japanese control of the air and sea, only add to the "bag" if not relieved by the USN.
Once the US lost any ability to contest air superiority by the Japanese, and with the freedom represented by control of the local seas, the Japanese could pick and chose their landing areas outside the coverage of US coastal defenses, or even invaded the surrounding islands like Visayen and Mondanao to set up air bases to stage to from Taiwan and French Indo China. A larger, better prepared force could have caused more casualties, but the combined wisdom of Army officers in the Philippines from 1902 to 1941 was that the shores could not be held. Additions to the force structure would only allow the US to extend the size of its perimeter of defense beyond Bataan. In TOAW-COW, with the forces that would have been available in Feb 42, I have been able to hold the Japanese north of Manilla across the northern neck of Luzon, but eventual they come ashore in the south and flank me.
Notice that the Japanese solution to the problem by Yamashita, who had far more effective and numerous ground forces in 1944 on Luzon than MacArthur in 1941, but had also lost control of the air and seas around Luzon, was to concede the beaches to the US and fall back into the San Carlos mountains as a redoubt area, intending to deny the US free use of the nearby airfields and force the commitment of ground forces to the Philippines to cover him that would become unavailable for further offensive actions.
A final sidebar. There could have been a far more effective garrison available in the Philippines. The US could have created a larger Philippine colonial army, along the lines of the British and French. They could have supported creation of a Philippine National Guard from 1902 (remember that Puerto Rico was a former Spanish colony and future Commonwealth, and was allowed an ARNG), and accepted Philippino voluteers for service in Europe and elsewhere (Quezon offered to raise 15,000 in 1917)during WWI who could have been incorporated in an Organized Army Reserve (PS) in 1921 (which would have provided a cadre of officers and NCOs, along with the PARNG to build a PA around). There was a move to "exile" the four "colored" regiments (9th, 10th Cav & 24th,25th Inf) to overseas duty (These rgts had the fewest AWOLS and desertions and the highest readiness ratings of any rgts in the Army between the wars). Finally, in the late 20's, the War Department made a massive shipment of surplus arms and equipment to the Philippines, Panama and Hawaii. Unfortunately, the action wasn't properly coordinated and the resources were not on hand to receive and properly store the equipment , most of which ended rotting and rusting away on the Manilla docks. With proper preperations, some of the massive numbers of artillery and MGs (M1915 Colt-Vickers, M1917 Lewis, M1918 Marlin-Savage) available at the time and as good as anything the Japanese brought to the Island in 1941 could have been available to support a more potent force of 2-3 US Army (combined RA/AR) divisions, 1-2 Philippine ARNG divisions and 2-3 Philippine AR (PS) or PA divisions, all built on the 1923 "square" MTOE and properly equipped. In 1922, the US Army had on hand 102 2.95" Mtn Gun M1911, 490 3" Gun M1902, 54 4.7" Gun M1908, 271 75mm Gun M1916, 832 75mm Gun M1917, 1644 75mm Gun M1897, 135 120mm Gun M1917, 36 6" How M1908, 108 5" Gun M1917, 54 6" Gun M1917, 832 155mm How M1917, 388 155mm Gun M1917 and 244 8" How M1918. All these weapons would be more or less obsolescent in 1941, but other than a handfull of designs such as the 75mm Gun Type 90, the Japanese artillery park would be in no better shape.
I hate to disagree with someone who I find so agreeable, but that's exactly the point against which I am arguing. Without disputing that the Jpns pilots had more air time and combat experience, USN pilots came out equal or better despite such factors as "pilot skill." The reasons are a combination of better USN tactics (even before the Thach Weave became common), a harder hitting armament, fairly soft targets (in that the Jpns planes were unarmored), and an aircraft that was in some ways much more maneuverable than the Zero. Ericson Shilling (a P40 driver), for example, placed a high degree of value on roll rate. A good roll rate allows, for example, a pilot to maneuver out of a disadvantageous situation without an enemy pilot, sitting for example in the 6 o'clock, being able to react to the maneuver. The F4F had a faster roll rate than the A6M. At speeds above 310 mph the F4F was as maneuverable [time to 180 degree course change] as the A6M. At 350 mph, which both planes could only achieve in a dive, the F4F could turn much faster than an A6M.I've got to agree with mdiehl here -- .... (assuming all other factors, such as pilot skill, are equal).
The F4F was only "less maneuverable" when the driver let the airspeed drop. This could happen if the F4F was still climbing to its position, was caught landing or straggling with damage, or had engaged in sustained maneuvering that bled off airspeed. It could also happen if an F4F had insufficient time to accelerate from cruise to combat airspeeds before being engaged. The superior maneuverability of the F4F at high speed had little to do with any special properties of the F4F, but instead because of limitations on the A6M. This is one of the reasons why, as the war progressed and combat speeds increased with new a/c designs, the Zeke became increasingly dangerous to fly.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
F4F and others
Further notes:
F2A-3 performance was at 6321lbs, when wing loading was 30.25 lbs/sq.ft.
At 7002lbs, a F4F-3 was at 26.9lbs/sq.ft
At 7975lbs, a F4F-4 was at 30.67 lbs/sq.ft.
At 5313lbs, a A6M2 Mod.21 was at 22lbs/sq.ft.
At 5599lbs, a P-35 was at 25.45lbs/sq.ft, P-35A at 27.8lbs/sq.ft
At 5650lbs, a P-36A was at 24lbs/sq.ft
At 7325lbs, a P-40B was at 31lbs/sq.ft
At 7500lbs, a P-39D was at 35.21lbs/sq.ft.
At 4,515lbs a Ki-43-Ia was at 19.1lbs/sq.ft.
Wing loading isn't every thing but it does corespond to manueverability (turn ratio) at low to mid altitude at normal combat speeds. It becomes less important as speed and altitude increase.
For some interesting takes on combat aircraft comparisons, see Eric Brown's "Duels in the Sky: World War II Naval Aircraft in Combat", USNI, 1988. Capt ((RN) Brown does demonstrate a partiallity for the "small, corpulent" Wildcat though.
F2A-3 performance was at 6321lbs, when wing loading was 30.25 lbs/sq.ft.
At 7002lbs, a F4F-3 was at 26.9lbs/sq.ft
At 7975lbs, a F4F-4 was at 30.67 lbs/sq.ft.
At 5313lbs, a A6M2 Mod.21 was at 22lbs/sq.ft.
At 5599lbs, a P-35 was at 25.45lbs/sq.ft, P-35A at 27.8lbs/sq.ft
At 5650lbs, a P-36A was at 24lbs/sq.ft
At 7325lbs, a P-40B was at 31lbs/sq.ft
At 7500lbs, a P-39D was at 35.21lbs/sq.ft.
At 4,515lbs a Ki-43-Ia was at 19.1lbs/sq.ft.
Wing loading isn't every thing but it does corespond to manueverability (turn ratio) at low to mid altitude at normal combat speeds. It becomes less important as speed and altitude increase.
For some interesting takes on combat aircraft comparisons, see Eric Brown's "Duels in the Sky: World War II Naval Aircraft in Combat", USNI, 1988. Capt ((RN) Brown does demonstrate a partiallity for the "small, corpulent" Wildcat though.
Posted by Mdiehl
OK, Lundstrom was what you were referring to. There was no Glanz/Glantz? Any extra references are always useful.
USN fighter pilots "consistently" shot down more fighters than they lost? Head to head engagements only?
If your talking about the first 6 months (Coral Sea and Midway), Lundstroms losses for Coral Sea were - May 7's overwhelming of the Shoho, 1 A6M and 2 A5Ms - May 8's IJN strike on USN CVs, 4 F4F's downed - May 8's USN strike on IJN CVs, 2 F4Fs for 1 A6M.
Lundstroms Midway figures were - USN attack on IJN, 9 A6Ms for 1 F4F (the majority of IJN losses from the clash with Thatch's flight - superb stuff, especially since he only had 3 a/c effective(IIRC)) - IJN Hiryu's attack on Hornet, 7 A6Ms vs 5 F4Fs. I don't have the figures on any head to head losses from the final USN strike on the Hiryu (if there were any).
I'm supplying these figures from a set of UV beta notes that were gleaned from various sources. I've attempted to go through and pull out only Lundstrom's figures. If you have the book, feel free to correct any of the figures from my notes.
I do have a note that has Lundstrom stating on P. 4 of his Book II that he estimated the A6M/F4F (IJN vs USN only) losses in the first 6 months of '42 to be 15 to 10. I assume that is the 1.6 to 1 exchange rate you mentioned earlier. This figure shows that overall, the IJN lost more A6Ms in fighter combat than the USN lost F4Fs. However, based on his analysis of the 2 battles as seperate events, I don't see how you can say the the exchange rate was "consistently" in favour of the USN. According to the notes, Coral Sea was in the A6M's favour while Midway was in the USN's.
You also refer to the later IJN/USMC(only?) Guadalcanal total exchange rate as being in the A6Ms favour but then put it down to being so only because of the occurance of one raid that heavily favoured the A6Ms in exchange rate. If this is an attempt to soften the blow of unfavourable figures to your POV, I'd think it's a dangerous thing to do since the same logic could be applied to Thatch's standout clash on 4 June. The results of that clash was not repeated in other encounters at Coral/Midway and it could be argued that it occurred only because of the influence/ability of the man himself rather than being indicative of the overall effectiveness of USN pilots/tactics/aircraft at the time.
For clarification, the rationale behind the gathering of info from various sources on air losses in the South Pacific was to meet a request from 2x3 on having a detailed reference to compare the UV combat model's results for with historical, especially in CV vs CV clashes. I would expect that WitP will go through a similar process at the appropriate time but that is still up to 2x3. The notes I made are my own and are based on information presented in a development thread as well as exchanges between fellow testers. If you find those I presented are inaccurate, the fault lies with me and it should not be assumed that they were taken as gospel by Matrix/2x3 during testing.
In my opinion, overall exchange rates for a given period should not be used as guide to what the final game should be delivering. It is more important to look at each historical clash on an individual basis and then try to establish an expected result when similar circumstances occur in the game (ie radar, numbers, quality, weather, leadership, etc).
EXP/combat stat combinations? Are you referring to UV or PACWAR? If it's UV (since WitP air combat is still heavily based on it at this point in time) - IIRC, UV's F4F/A6M combat results were discussed in an earlier WitP thread on a related topic in which you took part. The general consensus then by UV players was that there was parity in loss rates between the 2 opposing pilot-exp/aircraft combinations. There has been a patch since then that introduced a few changes to air combat routines but should not have effected the discussed loss rates. Given this and assuming you are talking about the UV combat model, can you state why you still think it's still necessary to infer that UV's exp/combat may be flawed when it seems to be delivering parity results? Have you seen a common complaint in the forums? If you state your reasons, I'm happy to bring it up in the UV/WitP development forums.
Agree completely.
About 1.6:1. (The 2:1 was apparently my recollection of Halsey's estimates that he found to be an unacceptable loss ratio in August 1942.) My error on the reference. Lundstrom's "1st Team" pair of books is the one.
OK, Lundstrom was what you were referring to. There was no Glanz/Glantz? Any extra references are always useful.
While not wishing to bog down the thread further with endless debate on the merits of the A6M vs F4F and their head to head exchange rate, I would suggest that care be taken in the use of overall losses to back your statement on what you would expect to see in the game.When you go over the tallies in "~at Guadalcanal" the Japanese come out a little ahead in direct clashes between A6M types and F4Fs, but as Lundstrom points out, there was one surprise strike in late August that makes all the difference. In direct clashes between CVs, the USN fighter pilots consistently shot down more Japanese fighters than the Americans lost.
USN fighter pilots "consistently" shot down more fighters than they lost? Head to head engagements only?
If your talking about the first 6 months (Coral Sea and Midway), Lundstroms losses for Coral Sea were - May 7's overwhelming of the Shoho, 1 A6M and 2 A5Ms - May 8's IJN strike on USN CVs, 4 F4F's downed - May 8's USN strike on IJN CVs, 2 F4Fs for 1 A6M.
Lundstroms Midway figures were - USN attack on IJN, 9 A6Ms for 1 F4F (the majority of IJN losses from the clash with Thatch's flight - superb stuff, especially since he only had 3 a/c effective(IIRC)) - IJN Hiryu's attack on Hornet, 7 A6Ms vs 5 F4Fs. I don't have the figures on any head to head losses from the final USN strike on the Hiryu (if there were any).
I'm supplying these figures from a set of UV beta notes that were gleaned from various sources. I've attempted to go through and pull out only Lundstrom's figures. If you have the book, feel free to correct any of the figures from my notes.
I do have a note that has Lundstrom stating on P. 4 of his Book II that he estimated the A6M/F4F (IJN vs USN only) losses in the first 6 months of '42 to be 15 to 10. I assume that is the 1.6 to 1 exchange rate you mentioned earlier. This figure shows that overall, the IJN lost more A6Ms in fighter combat than the USN lost F4Fs. However, based on his analysis of the 2 battles as seperate events, I don't see how you can say the the exchange rate was "consistently" in favour of the USN. According to the notes, Coral Sea was in the A6M's favour while Midway was in the USN's.
You also refer to the later IJN/USMC(only?) Guadalcanal total exchange rate as being in the A6Ms favour but then put it down to being so only because of the occurance of one raid that heavily favoured the A6Ms in exchange rate. If this is an attempt to soften the blow of unfavourable figures to your POV, I'd think it's a dangerous thing to do since the same logic could be applied to Thatch's standout clash on 4 June. The results of that clash was not repeated in other encounters at Coral/Midway and it could be argued that it occurred only because of the influence/ability of the man himself rather than being indicative of the overall effectiveness of USN pilots/tactics/aircraft at the time.
For clarification, the rationale behind the gathering of info from various sources on air losses in the South Pacific was to meet a request from 2x3 on having a detailed reference to compare the UV combat model's results for with historical, especially in CV vs CV clashes. I would expect that WitP will go through a similar process at the appropriate time but that is still up to 2x3. The notes I made are my own and are based on information presented in a development thread as well as exchanges between fellow testers. If you find those I presented are inaccurate, the fault lies with me and it should not be assumed that they were taken as gospel by Matrix/2x3 during testing.
In my opinion, overall exchange rates for a given period should not be used as guide to what the final game should be delivering. It is more important to look at each historical clash on an individual basis and then try to establish an expected result when similar circumstances occur in the game (ie radar, numbers, quality, weather, leadership, etc).
If the EXP/combat stat combinations are leading to results that consistently put the Japanese in the victory column, then things need to be tweaked. I would expect any good simulation to engineer parity in losses or better as the expected outcome for the USN prior to September 1942 in CV engagements.
EXP/combat stat combinations? Are you referring to UV or PACWAR? If it's UV (since WitP air combat is still heavily based on it at this point in time) - IIRC, UV's F4F/A6M combat results were discussed in an earlier WitP thread on a related topic in which you took part. The general consensus then by UV players was that there was parity in loss rates between the 2 opposing pilot-exp/aircraft combinations. There has been a patch since then that introduced a few changes to air combat routines but should not have effected the discussed loss rates. Given this and assuming you are talking about the UV combat model, can you state why you still think it's still necessary to infer that UV's exp/combat may be flawed when it seems to be delivering parity results? Have you seen a common complaint in the forums? If you state your reasons, I'm happy to bring it up in the UV/WitP development forums.
Thereafter, improvements in Allied CAP CAC should result in the Jpns carriers being gradually left behind, regardless of pilot or carrier attrition. (Assuming that there is no "research" function or anything like that akin to, for example, Avalon Hill's "Empire of the Rising Sun.")
Agree completely.
Have no fear,
drink more beer.
drink more beer.
-
Mike Scholl
- Posts: 6187
- Joined: Wed Jan 01, 2003 1:17 am
- Location: Kansas City, MO
F4F vs A6M
One factor which needs to be recognized in reference to the
loss ratio in the Guadalcanal fighting is that it was primarily a
defensive struggle for the US. Japanese raids were generally
"spotted" by Coastwatchers a good way up the "Slot"---which
would give the defending planes ample time to ready themselves
and climb to altitude. Radar would then provide a more exact
"spot" for the CAP to be vectored in on. Such a situation would
definately favor the F4F's superiority in diving and slashing attacks. Keeping fighter losses even would be the need on the
part of the F4F's to go after the bombers first. But overall, with
any kind of equality on the parts of the participants, the defenders SHOULD be "racking up some numbers" in these circumstances.
loss ratio in the Guadalcanal fighting is that it was primarily a
defensive struggle for the US. Japanese raids were generally
"spotted" by Coastwatchers a good way up the "Slot"---which
would give the defending planes ample time to ready themselves
and climb to altitude. Radar would then provide a more exact
"spot" for the CAP to be vectored in on. Such a situation would
definately favor the F4F's superiority in diving and slashing attacks. Keeping fighter losses even would be the need on the
part of the F4F's to go after the bombers first. But overall, with
any kind of equality on the parts of the participants, the defenders SHOULD be "racking up some numbers" in these circumstances.
That's an interesting point, but I think of it this way...
At the point the incoming raid is spotted, the attacker is already at altitude, knows where it is headed, is ready more or less for combat. The defender, at that point, is either on the ground or in the air flying CAP, but most likely not vectored yet to the correct heading or altitude.
Therefore, at the point the raid is spotted by CW the attacker has the complete advantage, and things like radar, a good climb rate, etc, help the defender even up the odds if they can get into position by the time the attackers reach them. So, more than being an advantage for the defender, I think of these F4F's attributes, the CWs, and the ground radar, as equalizers.
The Japanese wouldnt know for sure what direction the Wildcats would hit from, but they knew they were there and were ready.
At the point the incoming raid is spotted, the attacker is already at altitude, knows where it is headed, is ready more or less for combat. The defender, at that point, is either on the ground or in the air flying CAP, but most likely not vectored yet to the correct heading or altitude.
Therefore, at the point the raid is spotted by CW the attacker has the complete advantage, and things like radar, a good climb rate, etc, help the defender even up the odds if they can get into position by the time the attackers reach them. So, more than being an advantage for the defender, I think of these F4F's attributes, the CWs, and the ground radar, as equalizers.
The Japanese wouldnt know for sure what direction the Wildcats would hit from, but they knew they were there and were ready.
"Money doesnt talk, it swears. Obscenities, who really cares?" -Bob Dylan
"Habit is the balast that chains a dog to it's vomit." -Samuel Becket
"He has weapons of mass destruction- the world's deadliest weapons- which pose a direct threat to the
"Habit is the balast that chains a dog to it's vomit." -Samuel Becket
"He has weapons of mass destruction- the world's deadliest weapons- which pose a direct threat to the
-
Mike Scholl
- Posts: 6187
- Joined: Wed Jan 01, 2003 1:17 am
- Location: Kansas City, MO
THINK YOU MISSED MY POINT...
Originally posted by Snigbert
That's an interesting point, but I think of it this way...
At the point the incoming raid is spotted, the attacker is already at altitude, knows where it is headed, is ready more or less for combat. The defender, at that point, is either on the ground or in the air flying CAP, but most likely not vectored yet to the correct heading or altitude.
Therefore, at the point the raid is spotted by CW the attacker has the complete advantage, and things like radar, a good climb rate, etc, help the defender even up the odds if they can get into position by the time the attackers reach them. So, more than being an advantage for the defender, I think of these F4F's attributes, the CWs, and the ground radar, as equalizers.
The Japanese wouldnt know for sure what direction the Wildcats would hit from, but they knew they were there and were ready.
Do to the range from Rabaul to Guadalcanal, a Japanese strike
had little choice but to fly "down the Slot". Coastwatchers all
the way down the Island Chain would be calling in reports of
numbers, types, speed and altitude of the raid. This gave the defenders plenty of time to prepare to meet the attack with all
the advantages of altitude and position, and to "open the fray"
with the kind of "slashing or diving attacks" that favored the
F4F. As someone pointed out earlier, an A6M flying even the
most direct route, had only about 10 minutes of "air time" over
Guadalcanal---which means trying to "spoof" the Coastwatchers
by flying out of sight of the islands wouldn't work. So I maintain
that in this particular Campaign, the US had the "edge" in the
Air-to-Air combats.
So it sounds like the range from Rabaul to Guadalcanal may have been a greater advantage for the Americans. Couldnt the Zeros simply come in at maximum altitude to prevent the diving attacks from catching them off guard? Also, you would think the Japanese would quickly learn that this would be the American tactic and try to adapt to it. I'm just speculating, I could be wrong.
"Money doesnt talk, it swears. Obscenities, who really cares?" -Bob Dylan
"Habit is the balast that chains a dog to it's vomit." -Samuel Becket
"He has weapons of mass destruction- the world's deadliest weapons- which pose a direct threat to the
"Habit is the balast that chains a dog to it's vomit." -Samuel Becket
"He has weapons of mass destruction- the world's deadliest weapons- which pose a direct threat to the
-
madflava13
- Posts: 1501
- Joined: Wed Feb 07, 2001 10:00 am
- Location: Alexandria, VA
Snigbert -
The A6M handled like a pig over 20,000 feet, so coming in at altitude wasn't an option - and they also had to lean out their mixtures to give themselves any time over Guadalcanal, so climbing for extra altitude would cut that time down as well. I naddition, the Japanese pilots didn't carry a large oxygen supply...
I think as long as the American pilots had timely warning - which they didn't always - they fought with the advantage.
The A6M handled like a pig over 20,000 feet, so coming in at altitude wasn't an option - and they also had to lean out their mixtures to give themselves any time over Guadalcanal, so climbing for extra altitude would cut that time down as well. I naddition, the Japanese pilots didn't carry a large oxygen supply...
I think as long as the American pilots had timely warning - which they didn't always - they fought with the advantage.
"The Paraguayan Air Force's request for spraying subsidies was not as Paraguayan as it were..."
Veddy interesting. Sounds like they could have done better if they developed an airbase closer to GC to launch from.
"Money doesnt talk, it swears. Obscenities, who really cares?" -Bob Dylan
"Habit is the balast that chains a dog to it's vomit." -Samuel Becket
"He has weapons of mass destruction- the world's deadliest weapons- which pose a direct threat to the
"Habit is the balast that chains a dog to it's vomit." -Samuel Becket
"He has weapons of mass destruction- the world's deadliest weapons- which pose a direct threat to the
Down the Slot
Buin was a subsidiary airfield forward on Bougainville that reached IOC on or around 11 Oct 42, receiving 30 A6M3 Mod.32. On 21 Jan 43, Buin hosted 49-69 a/c (14 A6M3 Mod.32 and 35-55 D3A2). They attempted to establish a base at Munda with 30 A6M3 Mod.32 between 20 Nov and 27 Dec 42, when the Japanese closed down the base after repeated attacks from Henderson Field and naval bombardment. The Japanes also sought to establish a base on Kolombangara (Vila-Stanmore), but the attempt was postponed after the transport carrying the construction troops was torpedoed off Rabual on 25 Dec 42 and the airfield was never completed being under continuous air and surface naval attack. Shortland and Buka were also used as bases, the IJAAF's 6th Air Div operating from these fields.
Re: Defense of the Philippines
[QUOTE]Originally posted by LTCMTS
--------------------------------------------------
I agree on the probable ineffectiveness of B-17 strikes on TAiwan except for the comments by the Japanese that such a strike might have caught their a/c on the ground as the fog lifted in interviews with the SBSS. And Kearny had his own ax to grind. Besides, use them before you lose, them, which was the eventual fate.
---------------------------------------------------
Yes if they launched an immediate dawn attack, they might have caught them on the ground, but as I said the FEAF had no idea where those airfields were and trying to find them in the fog would have been even more hopeless. Thats why the only morning raid that was considered was against Takao Harbor. I say save them, before you lose them, so you can use them. Sending all of them down to Delmonte and then useing all 35 B17s in a concentrated attack against the landings would have perhaps been the most effective use of them.
(quote)
----------------------------------------------------
As far as holding as much of the Philippines as possible, the main island Luzon had more landing sites than any force could have covered, especially an organization as understrength as the 26 Cav (PS) and the Philippine Div. The Japanese would have found a lightly or undercovered beach, gotten troops ashore and proceeded to pry the US/PA defenders out of every blocking position they assumed and forcing them to fight through IJA blocking positions on their retreat to Bataan, which is what historically happened. Supplies positioned forward to support the OPLAN were lost to the Japanese who used them to support their own ops. Remember that the Japanese had to invade the Philippines between OCtober and December, when the rice crop was harvested, allowing the IJA to "live off the land" through foraging from commercial storage sites.
-------------------------------------------------------
That isnt entirely correct. Actually their are relatively few suitable landing sites on Luzon. A jagged coast and rough terrain coupled with the Zambales Mountains in the east and the Sierrea Madres Mnts in the west prohibits any large scale landings from all but a few areas. Specifically Linguyen Gulf in the north, Subic Bay in the east and Lamon bay in the west. Linguyen was the obvious choice because it provided multiple landing sites and direct access to Luzon's central plain and thus Manila. Subic was impossible because of Fort Windt (think small Corregidore). Lamon bay, where the Japanese also landed, was not ideal because rough terrain and Leguna de Bay made defence of Manila from the south much more easier than from the north. All US army pre-war planning assumed that the main landings would be in North at Linguyen with perhaps secondary diversionary landings in the south at Lamon bay. As it turned out, it was precisely what did happen.
What I was purposeing was a formation of a quick reaction force, Combineing the PS 27 Cav, the 192nd & 194 tank Bns. 108 M3 Stuarts, the seventy-five; 75mm SPMs halftracks; with the Philipine Division. Baseing it at or near Linguyen where it could counterattack and possibly repell a landing when it was most vulnerable, ala Wake.
(quote)
-------------------------------------
If the Japanese had waited until 1942, then the situation would have been better for the US. But as indicated before, the Japanese strategic situation couldn't wait till Oct-Dec 42 for the next years harvest. Yet if they had, the 32d ID (ARNG), a medium tank battalion and enough equipment to bring the Philippine Division to the 1941 triangular MTOE would have become available by Feb 42 and the PA would have been further along in its training program. Of course, any reading of the official history would bring some doubt on whether the PA divisions other than the 1st and 2d would have reached a sufficient level of readiness by even May 42. A larger force, however, would still, with Japanese control of the air and sea, only add to the "bag" if not relieved by the USN.
-----------------------------------------
The time table had much more to do with the oil reserve situation and the monsoon seasons than any consideration to the rice crops. Remember they expected to complete the conquest of the PI in 50 days. Rice had to be an afterthought. Had the attack taken place in April then all 10 PA divisions would have been fully equiped albeit mostly with WWI surplus and had 5 months additional training. Certainly they would not been up to the level of the scouts, but they would have been suitable for at least static defence.
Quote
----------------------------------------------------------
Once the US lost any ability to contest air superiority by the Japanese, and with the freedom represented by control of the local seas, the Japanese could pick and chose their landing areas outside the coverage of US coastal defenses, or even invaded the surrounding islands like Visayen and Mondanao to set up air bases to stage to from Taiwan and French Indo China. A larger, better prepared force could have caused more casualties, but the combined wisdom of Army officers in the Philippines from 1902 to 1941 was that the shores could not be held. Additions to the force structure would only allow the US to extend the size of its perimeter of defense beyond Bataan. In TOAW-COW, with the forces that would have been available in Feb 42, I have been able to hold the Japanese north of Manilla across the northern neck of Luzon, but eventual they come ashore in the south and flank me.
------------------------------------------------------------
Yes combined wisdom between 1902-1941, but that did not take into consideration of airpower and the vulnerabilty of amphip landings to said airpower. It was the high expectations of the B17of being a force multiplier ( proven misplaced ) that brought about the about face in the first place. By April, FEAF was expected to have 4 Heavy Bmr groups consisting of 272 bombers with 68 in reserve, 2 pursuit groups of 130 fighters each and at least 1 light bomber group of 52 A-24's. Couple this with the allocation of $10,000,000 for airfield construction and the Japanese gaining initial airsuperiorty is in doubt. Also USAFFE "Inland Seas Defence Progam" had also been authorized and schedule for completion by April 42. It entailed 46 155mm guns , four 8" guns and 4 12" railway guns to be emplaced to cover the all the main entrances to the PI inland seas, virtually ensureing that interior communications would be maintained through a Japanese attack and hindering greatly the ability to simply pick and choose to attack where they pleased.
TOAW-COW is a great game, but it really doesnt model supply and terrain difficulties sufficiently enough to be truely representative of Luzon campaign. Not to mention the no air or sea interdiction of amphibious forces is a serious liability against a successful defense. I know, because I too made a TOAW-COW Hypothetical scenerio, but with forces that would be available in April 42. Im curious did you use the canned Luzon 42 scenerio oob or did you use your own? Also did you also correspondingly strengthen the IJA 14th Army or did you leave it historical? And finally did you post your scenerio anywhere? because I would be interested playing it.
Regards.
--------------------------------------------------
I agree on the probable ineffectiveness of B-17 strikes on TAiwan except for the comments by the Japanese that such a strike might have caught their a/c on the ground as the fog lifted in interviews with the SBSS. And Kearny had his own ax to grind. Besides, use them before you lose, them, which was the eventual fate.
---------------------------------------------------
Yes if they launched an immediate dawn attack, they might have caught them on the ground, but as I said the FEAF had no idea where those airfields were and trying to find them in the fog would have been even more hopeless. Thats why the only morning raid that was considered was against Takao Harbor. I say save them, before you lose them, so you can use them. Sending all of them down to Delmonte and then useing all 35 B17s in a concentrated attack against the landings would have perhaps been the most effective use of them.
(quote)
----------------------------------------------------
As far as holding as much of the Philippines as possible, the main island Luzon had more landing sites than any force could have covered, especially an organization as understrength as the 26 Cav (PS) and the Philippine Div. The Japanese would have found a lightly or undercovered beach, gotten troops ashore and proceeded to pry the US/PA defenders out of every blocking position they assumed and forcing them to fight through IJA blocking positions on their retreat to Bataan, which is what historically happened. Supplies positioned forward to support the OPLAN were lost to the Japanese who used them to support their own ops. Remember that the Japanese had to invade the Philippines between OCtober and December, when the rice crop was harvested, allowing the IJA to "live off the land" through foraging from commercial storage sites.
-------------------------------------------------------
That isnt entirely correct. Actually their are relatively few suitable landing sites on Luzon. A jagged coast and rough terrain coupled with the Zambales Mountains in the east and the Sierrea Madres Mnts in the west prohibits any large scale landings from all but a few areas. Specifically Linguyen Gulf in the north, Subic Bay in the east and Lamon bay in the west. Linguyen was the obvious choice because it provided multiple landing sites and direct access to Luzon's central plain and thus Manila. Subic was impossible because of Fort Windt (think small Corregidore). Lamon bay, where the Japanese also landed, was not ideal because rough terrain and Leguna de Bay made defence of Manila from the south much more easier than from the north. All US army pre-war planning assumed that the main landings would be in North at Linguyen with perhaps secondary diversionary landings in the south at Lamon bay. As it turned out, it was precisely what did happen.
What I was purposeing was a formation of a quick reaction force, Combineing the PS 27 Cav, the 192nd & 194 tank Bns. 108 M3 Stuarts, the seventy-five; 75mm SPMs halftracks; with the Philipine Division. Baseing it at or near Linguyen where it could counterattack and possibly repell a landing when it was most vulnerable, ala Wake.
(quote)
-------------------------------------
If the Japanese had waited until 1942, then the situation would have been better for the US. But as indicated before, the Japanese strategic situation couldn't wait till Oct-Dec 42 for the next years harvest. Yet if they had, the 32d ID (ARNG), a medium tank battalion and enough equipment to bring the Philippine Division to the 1941 triangular MTOE would have become available by Feb 42 and the PA would have been further along in its training program. Of course, any reading of the official history would bring some doubt on whether the PA divisions other than the 1st and 2d would have reached a sufficient level of readiness by even May 42. A larger force, however, would still, with Japanese control of the air and sea, only add to the "bag" if not relieved by the USN.
-----------------------------------------
The time table had much more to do with the oil reserve situation and the monsoon seasons than any consideration to the rice crops. Remember they expected to complete the conquest of the PI in 50 days. Rice had to be an afterthought. Had the attack taken place in April then all 10 PA divisions would have been fully equiped albeit mostly with WWI surplus and had 5 months additional training. Certainly they would not been up to the level of the scouts, but they would have been suitable for at least static defence.
Quote
----------------------------------------------------------
Once the US lost any ability to contest air superiority by the Japanese, and with the freedom represented by control of the local seas, the Japanese could pick and chose their landing areas outside the coverage of US coastal defenses, or even invaded the surrounding islands like Visayen and Mondanao to set up air bases to stage to from Taiwan and French Indo China. A larger, better prepared force could have caused more casualties, but the combined wisdom of Army officers in the Philippines from 1902 to 1941 was that the shores could not be held. Additions to the force structure would only allow the US to extend the size of its perimeter of defense beyond Bataan. In TOAW-COW, with the forces that would have been available in Feb 42, I have been able to hold the Japanese north of Manilla across the northern neck of Luzon, but eventual they come ashore in the south and flank me.
------------------------------------------------------------
Yes combined wisdom between 1902-1941, but that did not take into consideration of airpower and the vulnerabilty of amphip landings to said airpower. It was the high expectations of the B17of being a force multiplier ( proven misplaced ) that brought about the about face in the first place. By April, FEAF was expected to have 4 Heavy Bmr groups consisting of 272 bombers with 68 in reserve, 2 pursuit groups of 130 fighters each and at least 1 light bomber group of 52 A-24's. Couple this with the allocation of $10,000,000 for airfield construction and the Japanese gaining initial airsuperiorty is in doubt. Also USAFFE "Inland Seas Defence Progam" had also been authorized and schedule for completion by April 42. It entailed 46 155mm guns , four 8" guns and 4 12" railway guns to be emplaced to cover the all the main entrances to the PI inland seas, virtually ensureing that interior communications would be maintained through a Japanese attack and hindering greatly the ability to simply pick and choose to attack where they pleased.
TOAW-COW is a great game, but it really doesnt model supply and terrain difficulties sufficiently enough to be truely representative of Luzon campaign. Not to mention the no air or sea interdiction of amphibious forces is a serious liability against a successful defense. I know, because I too made a TOAW-COW Hypothetical scenerio, but with forces that would be available in April 42. Im curious did you use the canned Luzon 42 scenerio oob or did you use your own? Also did you also correspondingly strengthen the IJA 14th Army or did you leave it historical? And finally did you post your scenerio anywhere? because I would be interested playing it.
Regards.
That about sums it up from Lundstrom's and also Richard Franks' POV. Guadalcanal was an overreach.Veddy interesting. Sounds like they could have done better if they developed an airbase closer to GC to launch from.
The coastwatcher alert system did was helpful but did not give the Allies an edge. At most, it compensated for the advantage that the attacker necessarily has in selecting the timing, composition and circumstances of a raid. Typically it allowed the 'Canal pilots enough time to launch, move out of the combat area to gain altitude, and then return for the combat. IMO the much more significant disadvantage to the Japanese was their very poor CAC at the fight (their radios, which were poor performing pieces of junk on good days, were for the most part discarded), and the use of outdated 3-plane sections.
I don't have a problem with looking at the Midway raids as exceptional US victories along with the successful Japanese raid in August. It still bears out my point that one should expect, over the course of any campaign in this theater in 1942, rough parity in losses in direct confrontations between fighters. One would expect Japanese bomber losses to be significantly higher, since they were more vulnerable to interceptors and AAA.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
I don't know if anyone has mention this, but another major disadvantage for the IJN pilots in the GC campaign was pilot fatigue and wear and tear on the aircraft that was enivitable with continual long flights. It didnt take long before none of the pilots and aircraft were running at optimal levels.