Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing?

[Capt. Harlock]

So if Britain and France had taken the role of the aggressor prior to (and then instead of) Munich, would the US really be as inclined to assist or would they have taken a truly neutral stance?

But would US assistance have been needed? I think the most logical date for intervention by the Western Allies would have been September 18, 1938, after the formation of the Sudetendeutsches Freikorps and the beginning of the undeclared German-Czechoslovak war. True, the British army wasn't up to snuff at that point, but from what I've heard, the French army was still superior to the Wehrmacht. Germany gained a rich haul of armaments after seizing Czechoslovakia. If the French had moved before that had happened, I think the result would have been a Nazi defeat. More, France could certainly have gotten assistance from the Czechoslovaks, and quite possibly from the Poles.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Capt. Harlock

So if Britain and France had taken the role of the aggressor prior to (and then instead of) Munich, would the US really be as inclined to assist or would they have taken a truly neutral stance?

But would US assistance have been needed? I think the most logical date for intervention by the Western Allies would have been September 18, 1938, after the formation of the Sudetendeutsches Freikorps and the beginning of the undeclared German-Czechoslovak war. True, the British army wasn't up to snuff at that point, but from what I've heard, the French army was still superior to the Wehrmacht. Germany gained a rich haul of armaments after seizing Czechoslovakia. If the French had moved before that had happened, I think the result would have been a Nazi defeat. More, France could certainly have gotten assistance from the Czechoslovaks, and quite possibly from the Poles.

warspite1

Well those keen to see the worst in the actions of Chamberlain and Daladier – have the ‘certainty’ they can never be wrong, whereas we know, with hindsight, what the policies of the key players actually led to; WWII, The Holocaust, The Atomic Bomb, The Iron Curtain, The Cold War and whole manner of death and destruction in between.

Those who say other action should have been taken can be comforted by the fact that, had that action been taken, everything would have worked out splendidly….

1. The most logical date for intervention.
You have ignored all the practical arguments that have been exhaustively laid out for Britain and France not intervening (which I’m not going to repeat again); very real and very practical issues, and haven’t sought to argue against them, but instead blandly state a ‘logical date’ based on hindsight. You know that Roosevelt, even once he realised that Hitler needed stopping, was limited by public opinion. But you ignore that Chamberlain and Daladier were so constrained. As leaders of democratic countries they had the same problems as Roosevelt.

2. The British Army wasn’t up to snuff.
What does that actually mean? Just how many fully trained and equipped divisions do you believe the British could field at that time? It wasn't simply a case of not being up to snuff, but that in 1938 the French would have been pretty much on their own.

3. The French Army was still superior to the Wehrmacht.
Well that rather depends on what you mean by superior. The same was being said of the French army a year later – although there are also comments made at the time by British officers and others that things were not all as they appeared when it came to French preparedness. The army was not in a good way from a leadership perspective (as was proven 2 years later), defence was the watchword, not offence, there was no will to go to war, and financially France was in no state to go to war either.

4. Would US assistance have been needed?
Well that is a key question isn’t it? No one, and certainly not me or you, knows how Case Green would have panned out, and what it would have led to. But you can simply assume it would have all worked out fine. You assume that the German Army could not have overcome the Czechs, that France would have been in a position to undertake an offensive in the West (that it couldn’t a year later) – you ignore the possibility that France would simply have adopted the same sit and wait strategy as was actually employed from September 1939, that the German generals would have grown a set (that they didn’t in 1938 and when they (too late) did, they weren’t successful), that Poland may have piled in, regardless that they had concerns of their own to the east.

What we DO know however, is that if 1938 doesn’t pan out as you think, then how does the rest of the world see Britain and France now? It’s not difficult to imagine the headlines in Washington and elsewhere. These two old crumbling empires have started yet another war in Europe, and for what? Because Germany – so desperately wronged in 1919 was simply trying to right the wrongs of Versailles, because 3m Sudeten Germans, wanting Wilson's right to self determination, wanted to live under German rule. If those are the headlines in Washington, one can only imagine the ‘I told you so’ attitude in Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington and Pretoria.

So, Case Green goes better than expected (or worse from the French point of view), the French and British adopt the same wait plan as 1939 as they build up, seeing the way the wind is blowing, the Poles (who in reality eagerly gobbled up some of Czechoslovakia at Munich) take advantage of the Czech’s position and grab those territories instead of attacking Germany. Hungary, seeing the weakness of the West, does the same. The Soviets can’t help the Czechs directly without attacking Poland and, seeing the inadequate response of the French and British, decide to sit tight.

In a scenario where the Germans defeat the Czechs, then yes, damn right the US will be needed, but in this scenario the French and British are the villains of the peace, not Adolf Hitler who only ever wanted peace.....

[ncc1701e]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

Poles (who in reality eagerly gobbled up some of Czechoslovakia at Munich)

Indeed! Something often forgotten but important to mention. Alliances are easily shifting...

[philabos]

There was a letter to the editor in the WSJ today in response to the Appeasement review.
The writer admits Britain and France did little after 1938 to prepare for war, but one notable exception was the RAF focus on production of more Hurricanes and Spitfires which later stood them well.
As for France making a move in 1938 without Britain, Watts in his book maintains Lord Halifax had to drag the French kicking and screaming into war in 1939. Highly unlikely they would have acted differently in 1938.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: philabos

There was a letter to the editor in the WSJ today in response to the Appeasement review.
The writer admits Britain and France did little after 1938 to prepare for war, but one notable exception was the RAF focus on production of more Hurricanes and Spitfires which later stood them well.
As for France making a move in 1938 without Britain, Watts in his book maintains Lord Halifax had to drag the French kicking and screaming into war in 1939. Highly unlikely they would have acted differently in 1938.

warspite1

Hi philabos, is there any chance you can copy and paste the letter. I'd be interested to hear what he says.

[altipueri]

Decisions - Good vs Bad vs Wrong vs Correct

A good decision is one taken at the time based on the best information available. It may later be judged wrong.


If the weather forecast on radio, television and internet all tell me it is going to rain this afternoon a good decision would be take an umbrella if I go out. I may take an umbrella and it doesn't rain but clears up and I look bit of a wally wandering round with an umbrella.

The settlement at Munich was a triumph for British policy, not a triumph for Hitler.It was a triumph for those who had denounced the harshness and short-sightedness of Versailles.

It was a catastrophe.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: altipueri

Decisions - Good vs Bad vs Wrong vs Correct

A good decision is one taken at the time based on the best information available. It may later be judged wrong.


If the weather forecast on radio, television and internet all tell me it is going to rain this afternoon a good decision would be take an umbrella if I go out. I may take an umbrella and it doesn't rain but clears up and I look bit of a wally wandering round with an umbrella.

The settlement at Munich was a triumph for British policy, not a triumph for Hitler.It was a triumph for those who had denounced the harshness and short-sightedness of Versailles.

It was a catastrophe.

warspite1

A good decision is one taken at the time based on the best information available. It may later be judged wrong.

Yes, and that is the whole point of these types of debate. It’s trying to work out whether the person used the information available and judged the circumstances in the right way.

But in appraising the decisions and actions of historical characters one should also look at whether the alternatives would have been better or worse.

Whether the decision was right or wrong with hindsight offers little itself other than perhaps a starting point for the above.

Was it the wrong decision? Well with hindsight WWII happened so yes it appears so, but in line with the above, that does not mean necessarily that another course of action could reasonably have been taken, nor does it mean that another course of action may not have actually ended up with something worse.

So in your Umbrella analogy life may be more complicated. Yes you’ve heard the forecast – and from a variety of sources. You go out and you get soaked. So are you dumb or what? Well maybe. Maybe, despite your well laid, and eminently sensible, plans it broke when you first put it up, or maybe the only umbrella available to you was full of holes so going out would be a considered risk. Or maybe you didn’t actually have an umbrella - in which case you could be considered stupid....Well maybe not because in actual fact you had to go out, you didn’t actually have a choice.

Alternatively of course you go out anyway and the rain holds off…. Well without looking at what may have happened had you not been so lucky, despite your foolhardy approach, you appear the bloody genius. In fact, of course, you were nothing of the sought and were saved from drenching not by exercising any skill, but because you were simply lucky.

It was a catastrophe.

Well it was one of many, by a great many politicians – starting with Hitler - that led to a catastrophe.

[altipueri]

So Warspite; if you were on a first date with a lady - would you take an umbrella?

[Capt. Harlock]

ORIGINAL: altipueri

Decisions - Good vs Bad vs Wrong vs Correct

A good decision is one taken at the time based on the best information available. It may later be judged wrong.


If the weather forecast on radio, television and internet all tell me it is going to rain this afternoon a good decision would be take an umbrella if I go out. I may take an umbrella and it doesn't rain but clears up and I look bit of a wally wandering round with an umbrella.

The settlement at Munich was a triumph for British policy, not a triumph for Hitler.It was a triumph for those who had denounced the harshness and short-sightedness of Versailles.

It was a catastrophe.

Even if we accept that "the settlement at Munich was a triumph for British policy", that does not necessarily mean that British policy was based on the best information available. The question boils down to whether Hitler could be trusted to keep the agreement. Even as early as the Autumn of 1938, there was evidence indicating that he could not. (e.g. Germany and Czechoslovakia were supposedly at peace, but bullets were flying.) I would therefore argue that, under the above definition, Munich was a bad decision.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: altipueri

So Warspite; if you were on a first date with a lady - would you take an umbrella?

warspite1

You mean protection? A gentlemen never tells... [:-]

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: warspite1
A gentlemen never tells... [:-]

Aye. But what about you? [:'(]

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Capt. Harlock

ORIGINAL: altipueri

Decisions - Good vs Bad vs Wrong vs Correct

A good decision is one taken at the time based on the best information available. It may later be judged wrong.


If the weather forecast on radio, television and internet all tell me it is going to rain this afternoon a good decision would be take an umbrella if I go out. I may take an umbrella and it doesn't rain but clears up and I look bit of a wally wandering round with an umbrella.

The settlement at Munich was a triumph for British policy, not a triumph for Hitler.It was a triumph for those who had denounced the harshness and short-sightedness of Versailles.

It was a catastrophe.

Even if we accept that "the settlement at Munich was a triumph for British policy", that does not necessarily mean that British policy was based on the best information available. The question boils down to whether Hitler could be trusted to keep the agreement. Even as early as the Autumn of 1938, there was evidence indicating that he could not. (e.g. Germany and Czechoslovakia were supposedly at peace, but bullets were flying.) I would therefore argue that, under the above definition, Munich was a bad decision.

warspite1

So again, what you are saying is that if you ignore the manifold serious, and very sensible, reasons for the British and French not going to war (which you don't seem to want to address), but simply concentrate on an ideal time (based on hindsight) for going to war regardless of the real world situation, it was a bad decision?

Historians and students of history the world over rue that politicians, leading up to WWI, weren't less trigger happy and weren't keener on finding a non-violent solution. How we all regret that they didn't. But Chamberlain and Daladier get it in the neck for doing just that. Hindsight.... What a wonderful thing....

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: warspite1
A gentlemen never tells... [:-]

Aye. But what about you? [:'(]

warspite1

Oh me? Oh that's easy, I never leave home without a...ahem.... 'raincoat' or two..... although that might be because I live in England..... [:D]

[Capt. Harlock]

So again, what you are saying is that if you ignore the manifold serious, and very sensible, reasons for the British and French not going to war (which you don't seem to want to address), but simply concentrate on an ideal time (based on hindsight) for going to war regardless of the real world situation, it was a bad decision?

Well, no, that isn't what I'm saying. What I'm saying is what I said.

I freely grant that there were sound reasons for not going to war. War is an ugly business, with a terrible cost in blood and treasure, and can lead to defeat with grave consequences, or an indecisive result which leaves both parties worse off. That being said, none of that matters if war is inevitable. The two questions that really need to be addressed are 1) Could Hitler have been stopped short of war? 2) If no, could the Western Allies have realized it earlier?

With hindsight, it seems fairly clear to me that the answer to the former is no. Hitler dreamed of a thousand-year Reich, and nothing short of armed force was going to achieve that. He, and a number of other Germans, also wanted revenge for the defeat of WWI, and even a full abrogation of Versailles would not have satisfied that itch.

The answer to the latter is more difficult. Certainly Churchill and others believed that a resurgent Germany meant war sooner or later, but were they wise or just lucky? I would argue that they were wise. Hitler made demand after demand, and at some point it should have been clear he was never going to be satisfied.

Going back to question of timing, it's important because, when Hitler first became Chancellor, Germany's armed forces could easily have been beaten. By June 1940, that was clearly no longer the case. So, if we decide that Chamberlain did the wrong thing and the Western Allies should have declared war earlier, when was the optimal time to do it? Invading Germany in 1933 would obviously have been politically unacceptable, and would have caused the downfall of any democratic government that did it. As the saying goes, timing is everything.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Capt. Harlock

I freely grant that there were sound reasons for not going to war. War is an ugly business, with a terrible cost in blood and treasure, and can lead to defeat with grave consequences, or an indecisive result which leaves both parties worse off. That being said, none of that matters if war is inevitable.

warspite1

Well if the state of a nations finances, an unwillingness of the population to go to war (because they’ve suffered – and are still suffering - those horrors from less than a generation before), an unpreparedness for war and a lack of friends (Empire and the US) that support such a move, the government of the day needs to be pretty damn sure that war is inevitable – and they are not just making it a self-fulfilling prophecy by being the aggressor party.

ORIGINAL: Capt. Harlock

The two questions that really need to be addressed are 1) Could Hitler have been stopped short of war? 2) If no, could the Western Allies have realized it earlier?

warspite1

To answer question one you said

With hindsight (my italics), it seems fairly clear to me that the answer to the former is no. Hitler dreamed of a thousand-year Reich, and nothing short of armed force was going to achieve that. He, and a number of other Germans, also wanted revenge for the defeat of WWI, and even a full abrogation of Versailles would not have satisfied that itch.

…except Daladier and Chamberlain did not have the benefit of hindsight…. In any sensible, meaningful debate of this type, hindsight is not allowed as part of the analysis – it’s irrelevant. Yes we know all the above now. But the politicians did not know it then. There was worldwide sympathy for the German position post WWI. Well meaning, well intentioned politicians tried to put things right but they were dealing with someone the like of which they had never encountered.

Their well-meaning efforts proved in vain but if they are to be blamed for not realising Hitler could only be stopped by war, then they were in pretty large company…..


To question two you said

The answer to the latter is more difficult.

I am glad you’ve acknowledged that. Indeed one will find many, like Churchill, who were counselling against Hitler, and many who believed he could be stopped without the need for a ruinous war. One question for you; if you earnestly believe that war was inevitable and it was all so obvious that it was inevitable (with all that would mean for the world) why did Roosevelt say nothing?

You said in your opening paragraph above that nothing matters (including public opinion) where war is inevitable. Washington would have surely been acutely aware that a fighting war in Europe (based on WWI) would not be limited, not be localised and would have the potential to drag in the US. So why was the Roosevelt administration not more vocal? Just curious.

Moving away from Europe for a minute, I am presuming, based on what you’ve suggested here, that you believe Roosevelt did the wrong thing re the Pacific War for the same reasons? Japan had been in Manchuria since 1931(?) and then the war erupted in China (1937), then moving into French Indo China (1940). So she was ramping up the ante, her actions in China had sparked outrage, she was building up her navy…. So the US tried sanctions to make them stop. Roosevelt knew the Japanese were a proud people, they weren’t going to accept any of the economic actions designed to make them quit. So he must have known there was going to be a war. Japan was simply not going to back down – but the oil position they found themselves in meant they would have to back down – or go take oil for themselves. So if war was inevitable why wait to be attacked and have Pearl Harbor and the PI inflicted on American forces? You said above that none of the reasons for the British and French not going to war count if war is inevitable. Japan had no oil but were making no plans to quit, how could he have not realised Japan was not going to stop at war? Why didn’t Roosevelt attack Japan? Well because like Chamberlain and Daladier he didn't know. He, like they, probably feared it was possible, dreaded that it may be possible - but he didn't know.

Well I personally don’t believe Chamberlain and Daladier were wrong to at least try the measures they took to restore Germany her pride after Versailles – certainly given the potential consequences – and maintain peace through the carrot, and I don’t believe Roosevelt was wrong to at least try and get Japan to follow a peaceful path through the economic stick.

Sadly both failed in their task, but responsibly run democratic nations can’t just go around declaring war at the drop of a hat – and to do so when unprepared and without support of their own people can be fatal. By taking the action they did Chamberlain and Roosevelt (sadly for the French that didn’t work out) had their nations behind them – Hitler and Hirohito had shown their true colours and so there could be no question of why the war was being fought in Britain and the US.

Finally you asked

if we decide that Chamberlain did the wrong thing and the Western Allies should have declared war earlier, when was the optimal time to do it?

Well I don’t believe he was wrong (based on all circumstances at the time) but let’s look at this anyway.

The simple fact is that even with that wonderful instrument of hindsight, none of us can know when – or even if – there was an optimal time that would allow the Western Allies to defeat Hitler.

We need to keep that time within the bounds of acceptability as you quite rightly said. So 1933 would not be worth entertaining, but then nor would any time before 1936. If one then takes 1936 - up to Summer 1938 as being the revision of Versailles period and a British/French attack would equally be unpalatable from a world public opinion point of view, then we are left with September 1938 – March 1939. Any attack earlier than 1936 and Britain and France are essentially invading Germany to invoke regime change – and this could be argued is what was happening (in the court of public opinion) even for an attack by the French and British in place of Munich – as at that time the question was still ostensibly about Sudeten Germans.

But regardless, you have taken the view that early autumn 1938 was when the British and French should have attacked so let’s go with that and worry about the moral issues another day. To your mind this attack should have been carried out in order to stop Hitler and to rid the world of the carnage of WWII (nothing wrong with either aspiration by the way!). But the fact remains, there is no action that could have been launched by the British and French in September 1938 that would in any way shape of form be guaranteed to succeed on either count. There is absolutely no guarantee that such an attack wouldn’t simply have given us World War II 2.0.

I’ve described earlier how this may well have panned out in the initial stages. If so, there would still be nothing to stop a Nazi-Soviet pact after Stalin saw, with horror, the woefully inadequate performance of the French and (practically non-existent) British armies.

There is nothing to suggest the French would not have simply sat and waited for the British – and then for both to sit and wait while they build up. That was the plan in 1939, so what makes you believe it would have been different a year earlier? What makes you believe Gamelin was more offensively minded – and the French army more offensively capable – 18 months earlier?

As said Polish, Hungarian, Soviet and Italian action at this time is unknown. But unless the Germans suffer immediate reverse against the Czechs, Mussolini is not going to join against Germany (and certainly not while Hitler is alive). If Britain and France are sitting back to build up, the Soviets (given their actual MO) aren’t going to put themselves in the frontline and fight the Germans on behalf of the British and French (even if they could get past Poland). Meanwhile Poland and Hungary are just as likely to take morsels from the Czechs as fight the Germans.

How many assassination attempts were actually made on Hitler’s life? But in this scenario you are assuming that it succeeded… well maybe it would have been like the rest and didn’t….

As said, much is made of the Czech defences and it is of course possible that the Germans could have been defeated, Hitler purged in a coup and no need for the French to even cross the border… all back home in time for tea and medals. But we simply don’t know what would have happened. And if you question that then you only need to look at one example, from just 18 months later. Had World War II not happened who would have listened to anyone who suggested that the Belgian, British, Dutch and French armies (with more men, more tanks and only aircraft in inferior numbers) would be annihilated in less than two months. Had it not happened, there is no one that would suggest something so dumb would be possible.

But frankly my money would be on the aerial artillery of the Luftwaffe – just as it was 18 months later in France. I strongly suspect however that a few quick wins for Germany would start to see Sudeten Germans disappearing from the Czech ranks….

End of the day there are no guarantees as to what would have happened or that the world wouldn’t be in an even bigger mess now. That being the case the idea that Chamberlain and Daladier were wrong because they would have stopped World War II is, at best, simply unproven.

[Curtis Lemay]

My understanding has always been that Munich was an over-reaction to 1914 (where there was far too little resistance to war). It's only natural that the pendulum would swing too far the other way. To find a better example of handling such a situation you have to look at the Cuban Missile Crisis.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

My understanding has always been that Munich was an over-reaction to 1914 (where there was far too little resistance to war). It's only natural that the pendulum would swing too far the other way. To find a better example of handling such a situation you have to look at the Cuban Missile Crisis.

warspite1

I certainly agree that humans – and human reaction - can swing like a pendulum. This is something we see every day in every walk of like and is natural. Wouldn't it have been better - in humanitarian terms - if the Emperors, Kings, Chancellor's, Prime Ministers and Presidents in 1914 had had practical experience of what a war would mean. Instead a few local conflicts, some colonial wars and, further back, the US Civil War, didn't even begin to move that pendulum away from choosing war.

But I disagree for the reasons laid out previously, that Munich was a simple ‘over-reaction’.

Not wanting to go to war against x because world public opinion is actually supportive of x, not wanting to go to war with x because the last war cleaned out the coffers, not wanting to go to war with x because your own friends won’t support such a move, not wanting to go to war because (thanks to the Spanish Civil War) you've had a glimpse of what that could mean to the civilian population, not wanting to go to war with x because one’s own broken populace have no appetite for another one while still recovering from the last, not wanting to go to war because the armed forces, run down after the last charnel house, are in a mess…. This isn’t an over-reaction. These are very real, very big and very pressing concerns.

Over reaction? A little look back in the history books – the last 500 years of European history will more than suffice – will show what going to war without the finance, the support of key allies, the support of your populace, without up to date armed forces can do. And all that wrapped up in being seen as the aggressor state by others who may ultimately have to choose whether to help or support the opposition.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

I certainly agree that humans – and human reaction - can swing like a pendulum. This is something we see every day in every walk of like and is natural. Wouldn't it have been better - in humanitarian terms - if the Emperors, Kings, Chancellor's, Prime Ministers and Presidents in 1914 had had practical experience of what a war would mean. Instead a few local conflicts, some colonial wars and, further back, the US Civil War, didn't even begin to move that pendulum away from choosing war.

But I disagree for the reasons laid out previously, that Munich was a simple ‘over-reaction’.

Not wanting to go to war against x because world public opinion is actually supportive of x, not wanting to go to war with x because the last war cleaned out the coffers, not wanting to go to war with x because your own friends won’t support such a move, not wanting to go to war because (thanks to the Spanish Civil War) you've had a glimpse of what that could mean to the civilian population, not wanting to go to war with x because one’s own broken populace have no appetite for another one while still recovering from the last, not wanting to go to war because the armed forces, run down after the last charnel house, are in a mess…. This isn’t an over-reaction. These are very real, very big and very pressing concerns.

Over reaction? A little look back in the history books – the last 500 years of European history will more than suffice – will show what going to war without the finance, the support of key allies, the support of your populace, without up to date armed forces can do. And all that wrapped up in being seen as the aggressor state by others who may ultimately have to choose whether to help or support the opposition.

I'm still skeptical. Yes, you have a laundry-list of reasons, but Chamberlain, while not exactly a passivist, was hardly the most belligerent sword in the scabbard. Would that laundry-list have appeared as daunting to someone more so? There was certainly no US lust for WW-III in 1962, yet Cuba was still de-missiled by a blockade. Two superpowers on the verge of Armageddon managed to escape without war and without appeasement. A blockade might have been an option in 1938 as well.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: warspite1

I certainly agree that humans – and human reaction - can swing like a pendulum. This is something we see every day in every walk of like and is natural. Wouldn't it have been better - in humanitarian terms - if the Emperors, Kings, Chancellor's, Prime Ministers and Presidents in 1914 had had practical experience of what a war would mean. Instead a few local conflicts, some colonial wars and, further back, the US Civil War, didn't even begin to move that pendulum away from choosing war.

But I disagree for the reasons laid out previously, that Munich was a simple ‘over-reaction’.

Not wanting to go to war against x because world public opinion is actually supportive of x, not wanting to go to war with x because the last war cleaned out the coffers, not wanting to go to war with x because your own friends won’t support such a move, not wanting to go to war because (thanks to the Spanish Civil War) you've had a glimpse of what that could mean to the civilian population, not wanting to go to war with x because one’s own broken populace have no appetite for another one while still recovering from the last, not wanting to go to war because the armed forces, run down after the last charnel house, are in a mess…. This isn’t an over-reaction. These are very real, very big and very pressing concerns.

Over reaction? A little look back in the history books – the last 500 years of European history will more than suffice – will show what going to war without the finance, the support of key allies, the support of your populace, without up to date armed forces can do. And all that wrapped up in being seen as the aggressor state by others who may ultimately have to choose whether to help or support the opposition.

I'm still skeptical. Yes, you have a laundry-list of reasons, but Chamberlain, while not exactly a passivist, was hardly the most belligerent sword in the scabbard. Would that laundry-list have appeared as daunting to someone more so?

warspite1

Not daunting? When did Britain actually run out of cash in WWII? Was running out of money an over-reaction or a disastrous consequence of the situation the United Kingdom found itself in and that was one of the fears playing on Chamberlain's mind?

Certainly plenty of European Kings, Queens, Emperors etc that have gone to war with a half cocked laundry list in the last 500 years.....and we know what happened to them. Just one example, what happened to that French King that thought it would be a spiffing wheeze to side with the US in the American War of Independence? Now what was his name and what happened to that unprepared chappy?........ [;)]

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: warspite1

I certainly agree that humans – and human reaction - can swing like a pendulum. This is something we see every day in every walk of like and is natural. Wouldn't it have been better - in humanitarian terms - if the Emperors, Kings, Chancellor's, Prime Ministers and Presidents in 1914 had had practical experience of what a war would mean. Instead a few local conflicts, some colonial wars and, further back, the US Civil War, didn't even begin to move that pendulum away from choosing war.

But I disagree for the reasons laid out previously, that Munich was a simple ‘over-reaction’.

Not wanting to go to war against x because world public opinion is actually supportive of x, not wanting to go to war with x because the last war cleaned out the coffers, not wanting to go to war with x because your own friends won’t support such a move, not wanting to go to war because (thanks to the Spanish Civil War) you've had a glimpse of what that could mean to the civilian population, not wanting to go to war with x because one’s own broken populace have no appetite for another one while still recovering from the last, not wanting to go to war because the armed forces, run down after the last charnel house, are in a mess…. This isn’t an over-reaction. These are very real, very big and very pressing concerns.

Over reaction? A little look back in the history books – the last 500 years of European history will more than suffice – will show what going to war without the finance, the support of key allies, the support of your populace, without up to date armed forces can do. And all that wrapped up in being seen as the aggressor state by others who may ultimately have to choose whether to help or support the opposition.

A blockade might have been an option in 1938 as well.

warspite1

I don't really understand the reference to a blockade in this scenario. The UK and France don't want - for all the reasons laid out - a war with Germany. So there is no Munich and Hitler decides to attack Czechoslovakia in September 1938 ostensibly to free the oppressed Sudeten Germans. What are you saying? The UK and France don't declare war or help the Czechs directly, but instead call an immediate blockade...... so now what?

How effective is that blockade going to be? Especially if, as outlined as a possibility previously, the Germans and Soviets come up with an NS Pact 2.0.

And regardless, what do we know comes with a blockade? (even if it eventually works). Tales of starving children - look at WWI - and non-belligerents such as the US and everyone else demanding their ships be not subject to any search and seizure. Remember too the British and French in this scenario are the bad-guys, the aggressors. The Germans only wanted self-determination for their poor victimised Sudetenlanders and the British and French declared an inhumane blockade in support of the Czech oppressor state.

A blockade in 1938 looks even worse than a declaration of war.....