Coastal Defense Guns

[Charles2222]

ORIGINAL: Monter_Trismegistos

Dont forget that bombardment TF to be succesfull must see what is aiming for. It is far harder to spot camouflaged CD guns than to see a ship in open waters. Actual leser maximum range of 6 inch CD guns than those 16 inch put on BB doesn't matter, as land based guns have greater effective (I mean range of seing results of its own fire) range of fire while aiming at ships, than ships aiming at land targets.

I'm not sure I brought up this point before, though I had certainly thought it, and it is this, just what makes us think that bombard missions are focusing on CD's? I know it may seem natural to assume that, given how we often see one unit attacking every other opposing unit, but we can't be too sure it was programmed that way, can we? Especially when these are mobile guns isn't it entirely possible that the bombardment group has no idea of their density and therefore may only fire sporadic fire to the usual places and instead concentrate fire, at least early on, on airfields or buildings, etc?

[el cid again]

Funny, I've been reading about military history since I could sit on the toilet and I can't come up with historical examples to match anything near what is going on in the game that does not predate ironclad ships. I'd like to see your examples that prove me "completely wrong".

One problem we may have is this "show me examples." I am not particularly interested in examples - which in the case of these exotic systems are very rare. Few coast defense battles were fought against proper modern coast defense systems - and those that were didn't get fought in terms that the systems were designed for (see Fort Stevens).
You are missing the big point, which is WHY this is the case: it is because these defenses were too effective to challege with ships - even battleships. You can hardly find an example when real world admirals were not stupid enough to sail into a trap. But you will be hard pressed to find a coast gunner from anywhere who was not confident he could hit a target. And the data supports the gunners.

I am saying you are completely wrong in the sense of believing that coast defense guns would not produce results like you observe in the conditions you observed them. GIVE them targets they will hit them and hurt them.
I am a person used to analysing technical matters professionally, and using theory to create a model of what would happen in various circumstanes. I attempt to understand the physics, and also the organization involved. We never challenged the Tsu Shima Straits. Italy never challenged Gibraltar - except with submarines. Japan never challenged the Hawaii Separate Coast Artillery Brigade. But I can still tell you to expect results like you don't like if anyone did try such a thing. We long planned to invade Rabaul - but in the end did not - in part because to do so was going to be expensive. Landing elsewhere and going overland is not much better - it is worse for the troops in malarial country - and it gives you no proper line of supply. [Real world supplies do not instantly move over trails]. We long planned to Nuke Truk (too bad for the Trukese) - but the fleet was no longer there by the time we had a bomb to do it. The only major study of a challenge to a major defended place was the Japanese plan to invade Hawaii. And that plan is not understood in detail. But IF it had been attempted, and IF the fleet had arrived in Hawaiian waters strong enough to attempt it, it was clearly going to be a big problem. The only weakness was from the air - so presumably the plan was to exploit that by bombing the defenses - at least those in range of the landing area.

[el cid again]

There is no chance to hit something (with exception of hitting "forest") at maximum range of BB's! You must came closer to watch effects of your firing. And then range of 6 inch guns is enough. While bombardment there is no such thing as range advantage. This is the reason why some nations ever bother to create CD guns.

Another issue is tactics: Coast defense guns do not usually shoot at maximum range. IF the target is closing they wait until a number of batteries bear and are in effective range. The object at first is to disable steering/and or propulsion - THEN the object shifts to one of pounding the disabled ship(s). It is in this phase that many hits are probable. No navy before Viet Nam devised a scheme to deal with a ship disabled by CD guns. And that scheme was very dangerous!

[el cid again]

Allied battleships bombarded several ports and other installations in the Japanese Home Islands in July/August 45. I haven't found much more than sketchy descriptions of the bombardments other than that they were credited with inflicting some damage to steel mills and oil installations. In what I've seen there was no mention whatever of being engaged by any coastal defenses. The Allies were not apparently intimidated by whatever coastal defenses may have been present.

This is quite correct. Many ports had only obsolescent defenses. And many defenses were damaged in air raids - which left little of military value in most cities. Numbers of the wartime coast defenses (as opposed to the pre war ones) were dual purpose guns - and these were actually inflicting more damage on our raiders than any other asset in Japan - so naturally they were themselves subject to targeting. But the most severe problem was ammunition. Japan had a severe problem with ammunition by that time, and THEN Japan issued orders NOT to use it - to save what there was for the coming invasion battles. This is not altogether different from the decision not to permit the guns to fire at Fort Stevens. Coast defense that don't shoot are not going to hit much! In both cases, the officers were wrong: a bird in the hand: if you have a target you have been waiting years to see - shoot!

[el cid again]

Japanese Fire Control certainly doesn't seem to have impressed the US Seacoast Artillery Research Board that analyzed it after the War.
"Obsolescent" is the most prevelant word in their study of the subject. They are much kinder than the board studying Japanese military electronics, who described it as being composed of the kind of materials that anyone could have bought in a radio shop in the States in the 30's.

This reminds me of a long standing argument between me and an academic named John W Dower. He writes - in proper documented scholarly fashion - that Japan deliberately destroyed almost all its records. Then he goes on to argue there was no important technology at all of the sort we debate (which is atomic technology) - because we cannot cite the documents he says were destroyed. [When some of them turn up, he says "it is a deception" because he knows, in advance, it cannot be true! But I submit that a classified document in wartime intended for a tiny, official audience was not written to decieve us decades later.] These boards had very little to study - and what they did have was the stuff regarded as not particularly important to destroy. I do think their views of what they saw are valuable. But to assume this is anything like a complete picture is pretty unwise. Over time a good deal of material - written and testimonial and physical - has come to light - and these conclusions do not stand up well against the test of time. There was nothing at all wrong with Japan's air warning system - air raid sirens routinely gave two hours notice - according to many sources - including American POWs. Japan's effective state of air defense was affected by that most basic of military sciences: logistics. A lack of fuel for fighters or a lack of ammunition for guns does not mean that the fighters or the guns were not effective. We have specific examples that show the opposite. Had Japan not been so constrained in fuel and munitions, and had it not decided NOT TO USE BOTH in order to have stocks for an anticipated major battle, we would have suffered worse casualties. You are confusing operational factors with capability. Not the same thing.

[el cid again]

But the problem is the sheer volume and accuracy of the fire...don't you see a problem with a CL getting hit 90 times!!!?

Nope. But I have the advantage of being trained to fight coast defenses.
We were told the Vietnamese trained (under Soviet doctrine) to get a disabling hit if they could - on ANY ship. To this end they would use "pattern fire" - patterns designed so that, given your course and speed, there was NO maneuver you could use that would take you out of the risk field. All they wanted was ONE lucky hit. THEN they would concentrate fire on the disabled ship - and were expected "to achieve dozens of hits in a matter of minutes, with a high probability of fatal damage in less time than it takes to rig a normal tow." To deal with that we were taught to do something very scary - rig a tow before the disabled vessel stopped - during the passage along side of her - AND (the tricky part if you could rig the lines that fast) PERFECTLY match speed with her at the moment the hawser went taught (else the line will part - and its energized parts will be killing men - not to mention that the target will then get pounded exactly as you don't think is possible). We actually did this - except not under fire - in drill - and got to the point we had a fair chance of pulling it off. It is fantastic seamanship - and as far as I know not even IJN (with the best seamen in the world, in a military sense, due to adverse condition training) attempted it. [NO other nation, then or now, trains in bad conditions for difficult evolutions at sea to the degree Japan does - an no other nation, then or now, loses more lives in peacetime doing such training].

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Japanese Fire Control certainly doesn't seem to have impressed the US Seacoast Artillery Research Board that analyzed it after the War.
"Obsolescent" is the most prevelant word in their study of the subject. They are much kinder than the board studying Japanese military electronics, who described it as being composed of the kind of materials that anyone could have bought in a radio shop in the States in the 30's.

This reminds me of a long standing argument between me and an academic named John W Dower. He writes - in proper documented scholarly fashion - that Japan deliberately destroyed almost all its records. Then he goes on to argue there was no important technology at all of the sort we debate (which is atomic technology) - because we cannot cite the documents he says were destroyed. [When some of them turn up, he says "it is a deception" because he knows, in advance, it cannot be true! But I submit that a classified document in wartime intended for a tiny, official audience was not written to decieve us decades later.] These boards had very little to study - and what they did have was the stuff regarded as not particularly important to destroy. I do think their views of what they saw are valuable. But to assume this is anything like a complete picture is pretty unwise. Over time a good deal of material - written and testimonial and physical - has come to light - and these conclusions do not stand up well against the test of time. There was nothing at all wrong with Japan's air warning system - air raid sirens routinely gave two hours notice - according to many sources - including American POWs. Japan's effective state of air defense was affected by that most basic of military sciences: logistics. A lack of fuel for fighters or a lack of ammunition for guns does not mean that the fighters or the guns were not effective. We have specific examples that show the opposite. Had Japan not been so constrained in fuel and munitions, and had it not decided NOT TO USE BOTH in order to have stocks for an anticipated major battle, we would have suffered worse casualties. You are confusing operational factors with capability. Not the same thing.

I would say offhand that your Mr. Dower sounds like a bit of a putz. Won't be the first or last you meet in the academic world either. The board I refered to had free access to EVERYTHING concerning Japanese Coast Artillery. The war was over, the Japanese had lost, and they were being quite cooperative. While they might have destroyed evidence concerning Germ Research in Manchuria and the like, they had nothing to hide regarding Coast Artillery or AAA or Radar and other regular weapons. With the whole country living from hand to mouth on whatever the US brought in after the war, failure to cooperate might bring starvation. Why risk that to hide the range-finding gear on your unused CD guns?

And I can't buy your arguments about the Tokyo AAA. With the whole city and 100,000+ of their countrymen going up in flames around them, what would they be saving the ammunition for? To defend the rubble? Sometimes you just have to look at things from the viewpoint of common sense. Japanese AAA wasn't very goodl Their Fighters were OK when they had trained pilots and fuel, but their AAA just didn't cut the mustard. They didn't have nearly enough of the one "good to excellent" AAA gun they designed (the 100mm/65) and their fire control lagged behind as well. They HAD to resort to Kamikazes just to have a chance to get through US CAP and Flak. We had trouble with their CAP once in a while, but never with their AAA.

[Dereck]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

But the problem is the sheer volume and accuracy of the fire...don't you see a problem with a CL getting hit 90 times!!!?

Nope. But I have the advantage of being trained to fight coast defenses.
We were told the Vietnamese trained (under Soviet doctrine) to get a disabling hit if they could - on ANY ship. To this end they would use "pattern fire" - patterns designed so that, given your course and speed, there was NO maneuver you could use that would take you out of the risk field. All they wanted was ONE lucky hit. THEN they would concentrate fire on the disabled ship - and were expected "to achieve dozens of hits in a matter of minutes, with a high probability of fatal damage in less time than it takes to rig a normal tow." To deal with that we were taught to do something very scary - rig a tow before the disabled vessel stopped - during the passage along side of her - AND (the tricky part if you could rig the lines that fast) PERFECTLY match speed with her at the moment the hawser went taught (else the line will part - and its energized parts will be killing men - not to mention that the target will then get pounded exactly as you don't think is possible). We actually did this - except not under fire - in drill - and got to the point we had a fair chance of pulling it off. It is fantastic seamanship - and as far as I know not even IJN (with the best seamen in the world, in a military sense, due to adverse condition training) attempted it. [NO other nation, then or now, trains in bad conditions for difficult evolutions at sea to the degree Japan does - an no other nation, then or now, loses more lives in peacetime doing such training].

We're not talking VIETNAM El Cid ... we're talking World War II ... many years BEFORE Vietname and where the lessons learned during WWII were applied to Vietnam. Stick on subject and don't muddy the waters.

[Dereck]

ORIGINAL: Monter_Trismegistos

ORIGINAL: adamc6
I am asking how he hell those pop guns could it me, with the range advantage, that many times.

There is no chance to hit something (with exception of hitting "forest") at maximum range of BB's! You must came closer to watch effects of your firing. And then range of 6 inch guns is enough. While bombardment there is no such thing as range advantage. This is the reason why some nations ever bother to create CD guns.

Spotting aircraft and forward observers. There IS a chance. Don't say something that is possible, even if it isn't 100% is impossible. Battleships could stand off out of range and with the use of spotting aircraft and/or forward observers, and later on in the case of American ships, with radar controlled gunfire COULD and most probably DID hit targets at ranges you would think couldn't be done. But then again we're talking about the Americans/Allies being able to do something better than the Japanese so once again that flies in the face of the standards of posting in this thread.

[Dereck]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

One problem we may have is this "show me examples." I am not particularly interested in examples - which in the case of these exotic systems are very rare. Few coast defense battles were fought against proper modern coast defense systems - and those that were didn't get fought in terms that the systems were designed for (see Fort Stevens).
You are missing the big point, which is WHY this is the case: it is because these defenses were too effective to challege with ships - even battleships. You can hardly find an example when real world admirals were not stupid enough to sail into a trap. But you will be hard pressed to find a coast gunner from anywhere who was not confident he could hit a target. And the data supports the gunners.

Funny El Cid. So many other people are willing to post hard facts to back up what they say. People may not necesarily agree with them but they at least have the facts to back up their interpretation. What "facts" do we ever get from you other than you standard rhetoric.

When somebody doesn't swallow your rhetoric happily and ask for more your standard response is to flood the thread with multiple posts that basically don't do much other than to try to show that person how little they know and that you know all it seems.

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Funny, I've been reading about military history since I could sit on the toilet and I can't come up with historical examples to match anything near what is going on in the game that does not predate ironclad ships. I'd like to see your examples that prove me "completely wrong".

One problem we may have is this "show me examples." I am not particularly interested in examples - which in the case of these exotic systems are very rare. Few coast defense battles were fought against proper modern coast defense systems - and those that were didn't get fought in terms that the systems were designed for (see Fort Stevens).
You are missing the big point, which is WHY this is the case: it is because these defenses were too effective to challege with ships - even battleships. You can hardly find an example when real world admirals were not stupid enough to sail into a trap. But you will be hard pressed to find a coast gunner from anywhere who was not confident he could hit a target. And the data supports the gunners.

I am saying you are completely wrong in the sense of believing that coast defense guns would not produce results like you observe in the conditions you observed them. GIVE them targets they will hit them and hurt them.
I am a person used to analysing technical matters professionally, and using theory to create a model of what would happen in various circumstanes. I attempt to understand the physics, and also the organization involved. We never challenged the Tsu Shima Straits. Italy never challenged Gibraltar - except with submarines. Japan never challenged the Hawaii Separate Coast Artillery Brigade. But I can still tell you to expect results like you don't like if anyone did try such a thing. We long planned to invade Rabaul - but in the end did not - in part because to do so was going to be expensive. Landing elsewhere and going overland is not much better - it is worse for the troops in malarial country - and it gives you no proper line of supply. [Real world supplies do not instantly move over trails]. We long planned to Nuke Truk (too bad for the Trukese) - but the fleet was no longer there by the time we had a bomb to do it. The only major study of a challenge to a major defended place was the Japanese plan to invade Hawaii. And that plan is not understood in detail. But IF it had been attempted, and IF the fleet had arrived in Hawaiian waters strong enough to attempt it, it was clearly going to be a big problem. The only weakness was from the air - so presumably the plan was to exploit that by bombing the defenses - at least those in range of the landing area.

If Gibralter was in this game the CDs would obtain a better result than Jutland and Pearl Harbor combined. Cid, i respect your opinions and lots of your ideas and effort have merit but if you think that CDs are underpowered in the game I think I'll pass on RHS because it casts a shadow of suspicion on everything.

[Charles2222]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Japanese Fire Control certainly doesn't seem to have impressed the US Seacoast Artillery Research Board that analyzed it after the War.
"Obsolescent" is the most prevelant word in their study of the subject. They are much kinder than the board studying Japanese military electronics, who described it as being composed of the kind of materials that anyone could have bought in a radio shop in the States in the 30's.

This reminds me of a long standing argument between me and an academic named John W Dower. He writes - in proper documented scholarly fashion - that Japan deliberately destroyed almost all its records. Then he goes on to argue there was no important technology at all of the sort we debate (which is atomic technology) - because we cannot cite the documents he says were destroyed. [When some of them turn up, he says "it is a deception" because he knows, in advance, it cannot be true! But I submit that a classified document in wartime intended for a tiny, official audience was not written to decieve us decades later.] These boards had very little to study - and what they did have was the stuff regarded as not particularly important to destroy. I do think their views of what they saw are valuable. But to assume this is anything like a complete picture is pretty unwise. Over time a good deal of material - written and testimonial and physical - has come to light - and these conclusions do not stand up well against the test of time. There was nothing at all wrong with Japan's air warning system - air raid sirens routinely gave two hours notice - according to many sources - including American POWs. Japan's effective state of air defense was affected by that most basic of military sciences: logistics. A lack of fuel for fighters or a lack of ammunition for guns does not mean that the fighters or the guns were not effective. We have specific examples that show the opposite. Had Japan not been so constrained in fuel and munitions, and had it not decided NOT TO USE BOTH in order to have stocks for an anticipated major battle, we would have suffered worse casualties. You are confusing operational factors with capability. Not the same thing.

I would say offhand that your Mr. Dower sounds like a bit of a putz. Won't be the first or last you meet in the academic world either. The board I refered to had free access to EVERYTHING concerning Japanese Coast Artillery. The war was over, the Japanese had lost, and they were being quite cooperative. While they might have destroyed evidence concerning Germ Research in Manchuria and the like, they had nothing to hide regarding Coast Artillery or AAA or Radar and other regular weapons. With the whole country living from hand to mouth on whatever the US brought in after the war, failure to cooperate might bring starvation. Why risk that to hide the range-finding gear on your unused CD guns?

And I can't buy your arguments about the Tokyo AAA. With the whole city and 100,000+ of their countrymen going up in flames around them, what would they be saving the ammunition for? To defend the rubble? Sometimes you just have to look at things from the viewpoint of common sense. Japanese AAA wasn't very goodl Their Fighters were OK when they had trained pilots and fuel, but their AAA just didn't cut the mustard. They didn't have nearly enough of the one "good to excellent" AAA gun they designed (the 100mm/65) and their fire control lagged behind as well. They HAD to resort to Kamikazes just to have a chance to get through US CAP and Flak. We had trouble with their CAP once in a while, but never with their AAA.

You might want to be careful that you don't venture into the "the USA AA was weak too, as PH proves". The Tokyo bombing at 6000 was every bit as much as surprise move as PH was in that they were so radically low and at night. Who would expect it? So why didn't they wipe all of Tokyo out then? You talk abotu saving ammo, and what better time to use it, right? Only problem is, if they were reacting poorly for that reason, what makes you think they knew it was such a great raid before it happened? Just like with PH being largely asleep at the time of that attack, isn't it possible that the AA crews were asleep or some such, resting up for the expected day attacks? Remember too, the USAAF wasn't doing night bombing in Europe by 4E's, so surely it's a big surprise, yes? The attack was planned as to achieve the maximum surprise and the maximum effectiveness. If this were any indicator of USAAF strategy, the reaction of the post-Schweinfurt raids would have been for the Germans to double up on night operations. I don't think either the Germans or Japanese had any idea whether the USA considering their raids successes or not. Sounds pretty reasonable aye?

[el cid again]

Japan diodn't have any 4" AAA guns. They had a fairly effective 3.9" (100mm) AAA gun with a good reach and Rate of Fire, but poor Fire Direction compared to the US (who were mounting Radar Fire Control on their 40mm mounts by late in the war)

We are talking about the same gun. You are being a bit too precise and thus assuming it is not the same gun. Actually, Japan did have fine fire direction for its modern AAA guns - there were two versions of the set - one for the new 3 inch (a very rare weapon) and one for the new 4 inch.
The 3 inch was sort of a "Japanese 3 inch 50" - something we didn't get operational until after the war - but it is in the same class - actually slightly better as well as much sooner into operational service. [But foolishly, they didn't mass produce it.] The 4 inch they did mass produce, although in the event most were mounted on land, in spite of their design for shipboard use. These weapons were the ones on the rather outstanding AA destroyers - which were scaled down AA cruisers - a rather better idea than the Altanta class. These guns could elevate and traverse faster than other heavy dual purpose guns - certainly better than other Japanese guns and also better than virtually all foreign guns. They had high performance in terms of altitude, range and rate of fire.
But their greatest advantage was in fire control - both in the immediate sense and in the operational sense - because for the first time they were associated with proper specialist fire direction centers (or what at sea we would call a combat information center) - which in the case of the destroyers was located behind the bridge - a practice we later adopted and used on my own ship a generation later. The systems involved are rather different than ours, and neither the machines nor the terminology is understood by most Americans - including those who reported on them.
But "different" is not synonomous with "worse." Put another way, you don't want to be sailing or flying in range of these guns.

[el cid again]

a Coastal Artillery BN that has been in place for maybe a month (this does not make me think of a sophisticated system) can pull that off? Just seems like a stretch.

No stretch. A mobile Coast Defense Gun unit should be able to emplace and be operational - fully operational - in a matter of hours. It should be able to shoot even faster, but under local control, with less accuracy.

The reason major coast defense installations took years to make are two fold:

1) The really big weapons were fantastic. The US M1919 16 inch gun took about 30 months to cast - and was balanced to a degree it is difficult to express in lay English. Many more US and Japanese super heavy mountings used surplus naval guns, which were not quite so perfectly made, but which nevertheless took a very long time to build.

2) Partial or complete fortification and use of tunnels and underground excavations take time to make.

Such systems are inherantly not wartime ones - they can only be built in peacetime. Mobile CD units, on the other hand, are just that. They depend on concealment, not fortification, for protection. And they do not need the really elaborate rangefinders super guns do - since they don't shoot 15-20 nautical miles.

Note that effective ranges are always less than maximum ranges, and coast guns will tend not to engage until they sense a tactical advantage in doing so. Opening fire tends to disclose your position - so you don't do it for a small chance shot. You wait until it is a good chance shot - then you roll the dice - and keep shooting more good shots - accepting the risk that they may shoot back in the context you are likely to win the bet.

[el cid again]

There is no chance to hit something (with exception of hitting "forest") at maximum range of BB's! You must came closer to watch effects of your firing. And then range of 6 inch guns is enough. While bombardment there is no such thing as range advantage. This is the reason why some nations ever bother to create CD guns.

Monter is right. At point blank range when you have good target information and can spot the fall of your shot, you might expect to score 5-6% hits. At long (not maximum, just long) range, under the most ideal conditions, you never get close to half a % hits. Anything less than ideal conditions means you NEVER hit. Hit rates on the order of 0.2% are common. This is 2 hits per THOUSAND shells fired. Naval gunnery combat is a very chancy thing - which is one reason sailors risk it. [You would find few willing to sail into battle if the odds were as good as ivory soap purity each shot would hit them!]

[el cid again]

The board I refered to had free access to EVERYTHING concerning Japanese Coast Artillery. The war was over, the Japanese had lost, and they were being quite cooperative.

This is either poor wording or it is completely false and you are dead wrong. While such bodies did have access to everything we captured, they by defintion did not have access to things we didn't see at all. Having personally found 8 cubic meters of documents more than 30 years later, I can testify with certainty they could not have "had free access to EVERYTHING concerning...(whatever subject)." It is also true that SOME Japanese were cooperating. I have a fine book - written by hand by an IJN commander and naval architect - a fabulous report on the state of the captured ships and their histories. But I have TWO books written by an IJA colonel who UNDER ORDERS evaded all contact with us until the amnisty was granted and who NEVER reported anything to us. After two terms in the Diet leading a nationalist party, he went undercover again in his area of expertise (SE Asia) and has totally disappeared from history.
For a good sense of this sort of thing, read the just published history of the Nakano school.

[el cid again]

While they might have destroyed evidence concerning Germ Research in Manchuria and the like, they had nothing to hide regarding Coast Artillery or AAA or Radar and other regular weapons.

This is an assumption, and while it sounds reasonable, it just is not true.
The situation is complicated (EVERYTHING about Japan is ALWAYS complicated - if it isn't someone is making a mistake - complicated is the nature of Japanese culture). And some of it is our fault! When we issued surrender instructions, we ORDERED units surrendering to destroy their weapons!!! Thus, the First Submarine Flotilla, which was at sea with a combat mission, jettisoned ALL its aircraft and fired all of its torpedoes - and we didn't get to examine any of them. More significantly, orders were issued to destroy records BEFORE the surrender could be executed, and the vast majority of records were so destroyed. Study of specific matters has revealed that some things were concealed too - in shrines - burried in yards - lots of places. Some documents were sealed in tunnels and caves which had the entrances collapsed in such a way it was not clear there had been anything there. Some were captured en route to Soviet agents, who were buying them - and presumably others were NOT captured but actually delivered. Still others were assigned to special teams which went to remote places in China to continue working. And I regret to say that more than a few were indeed captured or turned over to us, but NOT given to the regular boards to see - and worse NOT turned over for scholarly examination either. Sometimes these records were destroyed - officially due to "lack of funding" to preserve them - but really to insure they do not become available for examination at all. [In 2005 a US intelligence contractor heading an official eight man team ran into significant opposition by DOE and DOD in spite of having EVERY POSSIBLE clearance and nominal "total access" authority. He ended up working with some of us who have experience getting the archives out. He wanted to know WHY we are still hiding this stuff? We must guess - but (a) after WWII we didn't want some things in Soviet hands and (b) today we don't want those same things in terrorist hands - so some of this may have a reasonable motive associated with it - even if the methods are excessive - hiding it even from those with classified access!] IF TODAY those with a mission assigned by the White House and total access cannot get at wartime materials related to Japanese technology, you can bet no one did in 1946. I have helped some authors, and served on one joint committee, and so have a small clue how high the brick wall is around Japanese technologies. I think there are aspects of it that are quite financial - and I have other experiences which suggest that a good deal of what is not allowed to be declassified is related to what is embarassing - although that officially is not supposed to happen. There are also machines NOT described in ANY records. For example, a "reconnaissance type Kaiten" was captured in July 1945 near Panama City. There is NO record of any submarine or other vessel delivering it or even being available to reach those waters. There is NO record of such a kaiten being built in any shipyard or naval source. Yet this midget - it had a two man crew and 600 pounds of cargo (raw silk) - was for many years at a US museum on Oahu and today is available for inspection in Japan. It is not unusual to find information on things like radar or other electronics, fire control computers (which tend to be electromechanical in that age, but which can be electrical, fluidic, mechanical or even electronic), weapons and vehicles which contradict what you read in reports allegedly comprehensively reviewing the same subject.

[el cid again]

And I can't buy your arguments about the Tokyo AAA. With the whole city and 100,000+ of their countrymen going up in flames around them, what would they be saving the ammunition for?

Long before I had any opinion on this subject, I met an American demographer in Tokyo who was studying the great firebombing raid in April (it was two days long). The city had been reduced to a population of 3,200,000 by wartime evacuation (it had been around 7 million). After those two days of raids 1,200,000 were left. Surrounding districts reported that 1,200,000 people had made it from the city to safety in those areas. This left a difference of exactly a million - which the demographer felt might still have problems. All the birth records were destroyed. All the civil infractructure that normally would issue death records were destroyed. Most of the bodies were consumed - not even bones survived from people who jumped into rivers. [The same thing was reported at Dresden - people in basements were turned into soup].
There is little possibility that only 100,000 died - even in just that one raid.
And that was not the first major raid on Tokyo.

I am sympathetic with your reasoning. But we are talking about wartime Japan, not London. The IJA ran things, and it knew that we were planning to invade. They ordered fuel and ammunition conserved to fight the battle - in the hope of inflicting so many casualties we would give up.

[el cid again]

Sometimes you just have to look at things from the viewpoint of common sense. Japanese AAA wasn't very goodl Their Fighters were OK when they had trained pilots and fuel, but their AAA just didn't cut the mustard

I am a US Navy anti-air warfare specialist who became interested in history and studied the history of this subject. I refer you to official USAAF analysis which indicates that Japanese AAA which "wasn't very good" cause MORE casualties than "their fighters" which "were OK." This is not a historical curiosity. In spite of the great publicity given to fighter pilots, the same thing can be said of the PLA in China - its anti-aircraft units (SAM and AAA) have had far more success than its fighters. The same thing was true in Germany. And for that matter in the UK. This is the NORMAL case - so if you are using "common sense" you might want to consider that when deciding what to believe.

[el cid again]

We're not talking VIETNAM El Cid ... we're talking World War II ... many years BEFORE Vietname and where the lessons learned during WWII were applied to Vietnam. Stick on subject and don't muddy the waters.

I AM on the subject and the water is perfectly clear. Vietnam was using WORLD WAR TWO era weapons - some of them actually were made during the war but all of them were designed then. It was also using WORLD WAR TWO era tactics and doctrine. We tended to forget the basics of army type artillery in a secondary coast defense role - but the Vietnamese (with uniformed Soviet and Chinese advisors and sometimes actual units) taught me to study the basics. The basics work. Today I belong to a (state) regiment which has ancient PRE WWI artillery - but I assure you that they not only work, they have missions.