Oct 44 Summary
A relatively fairly quiet month, more focused on consolidating gains and the starting the strategic air campaign than large territorial gains. The exception there of course is the significant ground gains in China. Still, a productive month! The strategic bombing campaign is off to solid start, although trial and error has been the way forward, sometimes at significant costs. Other than the recent rear area carrier raid in CENPAC, there has been little significant naval activity. The landings at Kume-jima did not trigger a response…major or otherwise, and will look to seizing Amami Oshima next month. The major US ground activity has actually been shifting forces out of Formosa and the PI and beginning their transit to the Hawaiian islands to prepare for the invasion of Japan in ’45. China has remained fluid, with significant gains in the north, east and south and hope to culminate this advance next month with seizing Chengtu and then focusing on Chungking. SE Asia’s main effort has successfully concluded its Indochina campaign and is progress of transitioning to SE China to focus on Hong Kong, Canton and SE coastal bases, while its secondary effort in Malaysia has approached the gates of Singapore. Naval losses for the month are fairly minor for both sides, the IJN losses spiking the last two days; the IJN reportedly lost a CVE, CL, DD, E, 5SS, and 11 ML, compared to the Allies losing an SS and 3PT. In the air, for the first time in a long, long while, Allied losses exceeded Japans, largely due to operational losses: 384 for Jpn to 402 Allied for the month’s tallies.
INTEL: I thought Kume-jima would have triggered a response. It didn’t. Gotta think the upcoming Amami Oshima landings will as it will likewise exposed, and even closer to the Home Islands. I’m also surprised at the continued withdrawal in China - even with supply issues, a lot of ground is being relinquished without a fight. Air recon is now able to range most of China and western Japan, and so far, the recon has come up empty in finding any indication of where the IJN and merchant fleets are holed up. Lastly, the rear area carrier raid was surprising that it did get so far into the Allied shipping lanes without detection, but truthfully, a rear area raid was not out of the question. Dealing with it is always the challenge, and will need to boost air and naval search (small naval patrols) where there are gaps in air search. The rear area shipping though will remain vulnerable as I’m not ramping up escorts to deal with a carrier raid. Will deal with threats as they occur.
Strategic Bombing Campaign: A good first month for the bombing campaign! Even with trial and error in discovery learning, the campaign is taking shape and looks to be a war winner with about 6500 strategic VPs gained. B-29s conducted a total of nine city attack raids, hitting a total of six separate cities during the month, all but one at night. Osaka was targeted the most, with four separate raids. A couple of the lessons learned: 1) The Luzon AFs aren’t needed with three excellent AFs now available in Formosa which completely changed the tempo and effects of the bombing campaign. The Formosa basing allows B-29s to range to central Japan effectively. 2) Night bombing can be effective and daylight bombing is suicide until fighter superiority can be achieved. 8000ft seems to be the sweat spot for night attacks, balancing bombing accuracy against AA effectiveness. 3) Extended range missions, even at night, are extremely risky. Guam based bombers are limited to a “Fleet in being” role, more than an effective striking element. 4) Japanese defenses are fairly robust, all cities attacked so far have had both CAP and AA protection. I am surprised that certain major industrial cities, such as Osaka, haven’t had max protection with the best radar equipped night fighters flying. 5) Targeting manpower has been effective in large cities. Will need more runs against smaller cities to see best effects. November will see a similar pattern of B-29 raids, limited by operational readiness and weather more than anything else. Even with increasing numbers of B-29s becoming available with the introduction of the B-29-25 starting production in Nov, the number of raids will be limited. What also will help is the increasing numbers of long range recon aircraft becoming available, keeping numerous cities under threat.
SUBWAR: Targets continue to be rare for Allied subs and that doesn’t look like it will change unless the IJN conducts a major sortie. What did change is an increase in Allied subs at sea, blanketing the East China Sea approaches to the Ryukyus to interdict a potential IJN sortie…one that so far, hasn’t developed. Nevertheless, will continue pushing subs to sea, just in case. IJN subs made an increased amount of appearances in two areas. First, the usual trying to target the US Fleet when fairly stationary supporting the Kume-jima amphib. Second, the “black gap” between the US West Coast and Pearl has seen the occasional sub. Both of these so far haven’t been effective, although one or two subs have gotten a bit too close for comfort. What I am a bit surprised at, is that L_S_T didn’t send subs to scout for this rear area CV raid. So far, no sub has been sighted anywhere near the offending carrier raid.
West Coast/USA/Rear Areas: Fighter production increases to 1135 in Nov as the P-51D comes into production and replaces the P-51B. Also significant is that the C-46D transport starts cranking out 100 planes a month, and the already mentioned B-29-25 coming on line with 40 a month compared to the previous 18. Pilot pools are in fairly good shape, a little short for US bomber pilots, and USMC fighter pilots, but that was to be expected.
NOPAC. Still quiet and staying quiet.
CENPAC. A bit of excitement at the end of the month with the IJN carrier raid, but otherwise quiet. The CV raid has snarled the smooth running convoy routes west of Pearl, but so far only managed to strike one convoy. Those convoy routes have been extra busy moving the US 10th Army from Okinawa to Pearl, so this could have been much worse. Convoys will continue to be either delayed or re-routed south to avoid the raid, so can expect continued delays for at least the first two weeks of Nov or until the IJN raiding force is dealt with. Since I don’t plan on invading Hokkaido until 1945, as long as a troop convoy isn’t directly affected, the CV raid won’t impact.
SOPAC. Nothing major with the Fleet this past month, the first part of which was healing and repairing. Supporting Kume-jima wound up taking longer than expected, but nothing came of it, although a few IJN subs made attempts. Surprisingly, no kamikazes made an appearance. November will see The Fleet in support at Amami Oshima, and again, I expect a full response from L_S_T to make this a costly venture. While the ground troops actually are assigned to SOPAC (US and NZ troops), the ground operation and LBA support will remain with SWPAC while SOPAC remains responsible for naval and naval air operations in support.
SWPAC. While the Kume-jima landings took longer and were more costly than anticipated, eliminating the remaining IJA defenders at Manila was much quicker and less expensive than I thought it would be. Both Manila in the PI and Takao in Formosa have become a major port to the Allied effort, sustaining both the strategic (city attacks), operational (port and airfields) and tactical (troops) bombing efforts with enough supplies. Frankly, I’m surprised at that. SWPAC’s main effort will focus on seizing Amami Oshima, and like Kume-jima in Oct, I expect this to be a tough fight. Secondary efforts will include taking Karenko and laying siege to Taihoku on Formosa. Depending on the situation at Amami Oshima, troops may be landed on the other minor Ryukyus of Tokunoshima and Okinoerabushima once they have completed sufficient preparation which should happen by mid month.
China. Still surprised at the advances in China which are just starting to encounter the IJA defensive lines near Changsa. Both Chengtu and Chungking are isolated and under siege by Chinese forces, and can expect attacks to seize first Chengtu and then Chungking. While Chinese forces have also laid siege to the isolated cities of Canton and Hong Kong, taking these two bases will be accomplished by SE Asia troops with Chinese troops in support. I don’t expect much further advance in the center, around Changsa, as some of the needed air support will be shifted back to SE Asia’s use in Malaysia in Nov.
SE Asia. The Indochina campaign concluded quickly, and I didn’t commit the majority of the large 14th Army into SE China until the rail link to Kukong was cleared. Moving significant combat units by sea to Swatow was not practical with available naval transports, but with the rail link, both the large IV and XXXIII Corps have been committed, and have largely completed their transit via strategic movement to Kukong. In Nov, IV Corps will focus on taking both Hong Kong and Canton while the XXXIII Corps will focus on clearing coastal bases. In Malaysia, the XV Corps has done well in liberating most all bases on the peninsula, leaving it to focus on Singapore in Nov. III Corps and a few Army units remain uncommitted in the Hanoi-Haiphong area and are available to commit as the situation requires.
