Manila or Pearl-new paradigm?

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: FatR

ORIGINAL: herwin

The Southwest Pacific axis of advance did not make use of carriers. Even in the Central Pacific, count sorties.

Really? Then what chased Japanese warships out of Rabaul and what, as mentioned above, effectively ended the entire Rabaul campaign? Also, the effect on the enemy (i.e. planes/ships destroyed or damaged) should be counted first. Sorties that don't hit anything that has a remote chance of being important have little meaning.

Land-based airpower. See this and this. "Aircraft carriers might have made longer advances possible, but during much of the time they were not available and doctrines then current warned against using carriers to support the invasion of air and naval bases."

[mike scholl 1]

ORIGINAL: herwin
The Southwest Pacific axis of advance did not make use of carriers. Even in the Central Pacific, count sorties.

While you are basically right that Kenney's Fifth Air Force was the backbone of MacArthur's advance, he did get the use of TF 58 (which became TF 38 when attached to the SW Pacific Theatre) on a number of occasions. It enabled Mac to make some longer jumps than he otherwise could have.

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: herwin

Land-based airpower.

Except, that's not true, and demonstrably so. Despite the large LBA raids in October and on November 2, Japanese continued to use Rabaul as a fleet base until carrier raids on November 5 and 11 caused major damage to five CAs (as opposed to pretty much zero damage to capital ships from LBA raids, including the raid on the same November 5) and forced Japanese warships out of Rabaul's harbor.

[offenseman]

This, interesting as it may be to some, has really gone FAR off the topic of this thread.

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: offenseman

This, interesting as it may be to some, has really gone FAR off the topic of this thread.

Thanks, offenseman for keeping the thread real. [8D]

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: offenseman

This, interesting as it may be to some, has really gone FAR off the topic of this thread.

Yeah, I brought up the subject of airpower in defending the WPO limited war rules. Too many years designing command and control systems. When you work on USMC and naval systems, you tend to absorb doctrine, tactics, and the historical analysis that led them there. When you get challenged, you sometimes find yourself wrong-footed. And sometimes you're simply wrong.

[Ametysth]

I always go after Manila.

My rationale is based on several points;

1) I get KB smack in the middle of main area of operations, instead of waiting for it to cross the Pacific.

2) Vals are actually useful in Manila as 250 kg bomb on a BB is known as "paint removal", while on sub it really ruins a day.

and last, but in my mind most important;

3) I don't think the BB's can seriously sortie out of Pearl. All together the BB's and their escorts take about 40000 or 50000 units of fuel to top their tanks (depends on escort force). If allied player actually takes them out, they will certainly make an impression as they will suck Australia dry of fuel in one go.

AO support is possible, but that takes around quarter of his TK/AO capacity in West Coast and no sane allied player will do that while every Pacific base of his screams for fuel.

Only bases that can actually support those fuel hogs are places like Sorebaja, Batavia, Singapore and of course Manila, but sail them there? Let him try...

So bomb them or don't, they are out of action for first 3 months of the game.

[mike scholl 1]

Sending KB to Manila instead of PH is really an exploit of hindsight by the Japanese player.  KB went to pearl to cripple the US Pacific Fleet at the outset of the war.  They didn't know until the 6th that the US Carriers were not in port..., too late to change the objective.  To me it seems just as "gamey" as sending KB out hunting Enterprise and Lexington just because in the game the Japanese Player knows where they will start.

[offenseman]

The problem is that there are many things players of both sides do, that could be considered gamey, if doing something that was not done historically is the barometer.

Waiting to take PM until May 42 is an example.  Should players avoid getting something done earlier than historical because they know that it will be harder later?  
Playing this game is part game and part using hindsight to do "better" than the real admirals and generals involved. 

[mike scholl 1]

ORIGINAL: offenseman

The problem is that there are many things players of both sides do, that could be considered gamey, if doing something that was not done historically is the barometer.

That's not quite the point I was making. Historically there was a very legitimate reason KB went to PH. Gamers KNOW what the Japanese DID NOT..., that the US CV's won't be there. That's what I consider "gamey". Taking advantage of "hindsight" before your opponent has a chance to do anything about it. Does anyone really think that every Japanese player wouldn't send KB to PH every time if he knew that 2-3 American CV's would be there? That's what the historical Japanese commanders believed.

[Q-Ball]

Fuel Support isn't an issue for the Allies after the first couple months. You have more than enough tankers to keep BBs at sea. Not really an issue there IMO.

[offenseman]

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1


That's not quite the point I was making. Historically there was a very legitimate reason KB went to PH. Gamers KNOW what the Japanese DID NOT..., that the US CV's won't be there. That's what I consider "gamey". Taking advantage of "hindsight" before your opponent has a chance to do anything about it. Does anyone really think that every Japanese player wouldn't send KB to PH every time if he knew that 2-3 American CV's would be there? That's what the historical Japanese commanders believed.

point understood, this time. I agree, if a player knew that 2-3 CVs would be in PH, there would be no reason to go elsewhere. However as the game sets things up with Big E and Lex, it is entirely possible to corner and sink at last one of them if a concerted effort is made to do so. That might be reason enough to go to PH over Manila anyway.

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

Sending KB to Manila instead of PH is really an exploit of hindsight by the Japanese player.  KB went to pearl to cripple the US Pacific Fleet at the outset of the war.  They didn't know until the 6th that the US Carriers were not in port..., too late to change the objective.  To me it seems just as "gamey" as sending KB out hunting Enterprise and Lexington just because in the game the Japanese Player knows where they will start.

Eh? Come again? Sorry, this makes no sense. Even if the IJ didn't know where the USN carriers were, they could have reasonable surety where they WEREN'T. I think if the allied carriers were operating anywhere around the Phillipine islands, the IJ would have caught wind of it, just as if the KB were monkeying about off of Vancouver.

Just cause KB went to Pearl to cripple whatever was there, doesn't mean that I have to follow suit. Because I do something different from historical makes it neither gamey, nor an exploit. Change your terms.

[mike scholl 1]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

Sending KB to Manila instead of PH is really an exploit of hindsight by the Japanese player.  KB went to pearl to cripple the US Pacific Fleet at the outset of the war.  They didn't know until the 6th that the US Carriers were not in port..., too late to change the objective.  To me it seems just as "gamey" as sending KB out hunting Enterprise and Lexington just because in the game the Japanese Player knows where they will start.

Eh? Come again? Sorry, this makes no sense. Even if the IJ didn't know where the USN carriers were, they could have reasonable surety where they WEREN'T. I think if the allied carriers were operating anywhere around the Phillipine islands, the IJ would have caught wind of it, just as if the KB were monkeying about off of Vancouver.

Just cause KB went to Pearl to cripple whatever was there, doesn't mean that I have to follow suit. Because I do something different from historical makes it neither gamey, nor an exploit. Change your terms.

I don't think I will. The Japanese KNEW that 3 US carriers (Lexington, Saratoga, and Enterprise) were attached to the Pacific Fleet and based at PH. They KNEW that the Pacific Fleet was normally in port over the weekends. This was an integral part of the planning for the PH strike. It was pure good/bad luck (depending on the side) that for various unexpected reasons all three were absent on December 7th.

So I will continue to consider making use of hindsight to go to Manila a gamey exploit. If you want to avoid the charge, give your opponent freedom to move on the 7th as well. Then you will have to face the same uncertainty the real Japanese faced.

[witpqs]

Mike, even from that perspective it's only gamey if your opponent does not agree to it and you do it anyway. We are dealing with the first turn here, and PBM opponents do discuss these things.

On the technical side what you are saying is certainly true.

[bradfordkay]

Suppose that Yamamoto's plan to attack Pearl Harbor had not been conceived or accepted. In that case, how would the Japanese have used the Kido Butai? Not attacking Pearl Harbor is a viable option in a game, though in a PBEM one would want to discuss things beforehand. 

[LoBaron]

I think it does not make sense to base any discussion about this topic on "gameyness" because of 20/20 hindsight issues.
You can´t even start playing if you want to avoid sitations occuring because everybody knows how the war went.

We know:
- that the IJN night experience is higher than the Allies for a year
- the Zero won´t dominate the skies forever
- Singapore will fall
- The Japanese oil comes from the DEI´s
- the Allies will get better ship upgrades than the Japanese
- Allied torps will stop failing in Jan ´43
- the Kamikaze activation date
- the worse Japanese damage control
- .......
- ...
- ..

[mike scholl 1]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

Mike, even from that perspective it's only gamey if your opponent does not agree to it and you do it anyway. We are dealing with the first turn here, and PBM opponents do discuss these things. You are correct Sir. It is only "gamey" if you insist the Allied player be historical, while allowing the Japanese player rampant use of "hindsight". Unless this is what both have agreed to.

On the technical side what you are saying is certainly true.

[mike scholl 1]

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

Suppose that Yamamoto's plan to attack Pearl Harbor had not been conceived or accepted. In that case, how would the Japanese have used the Kido Butai? Not attacking Pearl Harbor is a viable option in a game, though in a PBEM one would want to discuss things beforehand. 

Now that is an interesting point. But then again, suppose Roosevelt had not insisted on moving the Pacific Fleet to Hawaii? Or suppose the US commanders there had been conducting a live fire preparedness exercise that Sunday AM? "Suppose" is a lot of fun..., but only when the "suppositions" work both ways. Back in board game face-to-face days, a friend and I used to come up with things like this and have the result determined by the other side's die roll. Neither side could look at the other's options list until after the game was over.

[castor troy]

ORIGINAL: Q-Ball

Fuel Support isn't an issue for the Allies after the first couple months. You have more than enough tankers to keep BBs at sea. Not really an issue there IMO.

Really? I´m 12 months into the war, haven´t lost more than a couple of tankers and have used them non stop. Fuel is a BIG issue for me and no, I have not used my fleet all the time, in fact I rarely use my carriers for example (got ample SBDs in the pool, guess that says enough about how often I used my carriers [:D]). It´s not the problem of not having enough fuel on the map it´s the problem to move it to the place you need it.