Modeling of Carrier Battles

[TheElf]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: TheElf
The flip side to that is that the IJN CARDIVs still have their other component left to arm, warm up, spot and launch. The alternate units that was not launched in the first wave. If we were to do the IJN doctrine right we'd only see HALF the total Strike A/C available in the AM phase and the other half in the PM.

Actually, both strikes would fly in the AM, and might possibly fly again in the PM. They certainly did at PH. But no more than half of KB's planes should ever be in the SAME strike. Japanese doctrine should never produce a full strike, but two half strikes.

Correct, but how many Air Phases do we have???

[TheElf]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

ORIGINAL: TheElf

The flip side to that is that the IJN CARDIVs still have their other component left to arm, warm up, spot and launch. The alternate units that was not launched in the first wave. If we were to do the IJN doctrine right we'd only see HALF the total Strike A/C available in the AM phase and the other half in the PM.

Wait a minute - then the same would apply to a single CV TF, yes? I do understand when you say that the strike might be split into 2 sub-strikes (for lack of a better term). However, if 1 CV can launch all it's aircraft in AM then surely 2 CV's can launch all their aircraft in AM.

Yes, but the strikes would be small and Not of Combined arms which was a hallmark of IJN Doctrine.

The problem we begin to run into is that there are two Air Phases (AM, PM) That includes EVERYONE. CV based, land-based, A/C in China, A/C in DEI, The US West coast...everyone. To accomodate two waves in the AM and two waves in the PM for just the IJ CVs would be problematic to say the least.

To increase that to 4 phases you are talking about breaking things bigger than CV combat. If you say well limit it to the IJN CV TFs then you open the Axis Fanboi can...

Where do you draw the line?

All that said we are discussing options. We've surmounted some pretty big obstacles already so I am optimistic, but we can't devote any time to it right now. It'll have to wait. Til then spout on...

[witpqs]

We do not need additional phases.

There already are multiple strikes per phase. That's the whole point of the strike coordination rules - sometimes there is one coordinated strike that is more effective as a result, sometimes there are multiple strikes that are less effective.

In terms of effect within the game, having all the planes from one carrier - FF, TB, DB attack, then having all the planes from another carrier attack - FF, TB, DB, is the same as having half the planes from each attack, followed by the other half then attacking.

You are saying that in real life it's (essentially):
1/2 CV1 FF + CV1 TB + 1/2 CV2 FF + CV2 DB

followed a bit later (in same phase by):
1/2 CV1 FF + CV1 DB + 1/2 CV2 FF + CV2 TB

In the game it works out the same just by having the strike be broken up. First:
CV1 FF + CV1 TB + CV1 DB

followed a little later (in same phase by):
CV2 FF + CV2 TB + CV2 DB

So it's way less complicated than needing to add new phases and so on. You just need the code to break up the strike into single carriers (or have a percentage chance of doing so). That might be a whole lot easier to do in code than what you were proposing.

[TheElf]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: TheElf
The flip side to that is that the IJN CARDIVs still have their other component left to arm, warm up, spot and launch. The alternate units that was not launched in the first wave. If we were to do the IJN doctrine right we'd only see HALF the total Strike A/C available in the AM phase and the other half in the PM.

Actually, both strikes would fly in the AM, and might possibly fly again in the PM. They certainly did at PH. But no more than half of KB's planes should ever be in the SAME strike. Japanese doctrine should never produce a full strike, but two half strikes.

PH was a set piece. Launching vs. a stationary object with suprise on your side is fairly easy. Spot, Arm, Warm up, launch - rinse - repeat.

And I agree. If every CV action was as simple as this I'd say sure, but in reality CV vs. CV combat embodies a lot of misinformation that needs sorting, descisions have to be made and long distances are flown while searching out targets.

Also consider depending on the time of the year these large scale strikes occur mostly during the day, so while the Air phases may absolutely occur on a 12 hour scale you are really talking about 6 hours of day light in each phase, less in the winter depending on lattitude, but man are we in the weeds now!

So to remain within the confines of our current box, the WitP Code, the CV combat day begins before first light. In some cases strikes could be launched before sunrise (Targeting land) but CV vs. CV requires a day search phase so the kick off is later. Depending on the length of the day the second one may be prepped, but who would launch before hearing the assessment of his 1st Hikotaicho? These things take time.

It isn't ALWAYS a matter of Spot, Arm, Warm up, launch - rinse - repeat. If that were the case then all KB strikes would look like PH. So realistically each CARDIV would be launching an early strike, post dawn best case for CV vs. CV. The strike has to find, fix, and target the enemy, execute and then report. Comms were problematic, it may be that report has to be face to face. So your reserve gets airborne at 1300 for the sake of arguement. That is the PM phase. It still has to return update the sitrep and need for continued ops. Could a third launch occur? sure, but it would be subject to limitations from a myriad of factors. State of the Airgroup, state of the CVs (are they afloat?), fatigue, daylight, misinformation, a reatreating enemy etc.

The 90% solution is 1 AM raid, 1 PM raid. With a random chance for an ad hoc last ditch effort.

As it was the Midway example is a combination of Land Primary, CV secondary. So it benefited from an early kickoff. The main attack against Midway was airborne before dawn and after all the hulabaloo the second wave was still not spotted at 1020-1030. That is an hour and a half prior to our game's PM phase beginning, and with the "headstart" afforded by the early Midway strike.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

Actually, both strikes would fly in the AM, and might possibly fly again in the PM. They certainly did at PH. But no more than half of KB's planes should ever be in the SAME strike. Japanese doctrine should never produce a full strike, but two half strikes.

Japanese doctrine stressed a balanced combined arms "strike." To acomplish this, they litterally built combat groups (strikes) from each carrier in the current KB incarnation. (It could be 2, it could be 4, or all 6 KB original flight decks. The usual procedure involved single "deckload" strikes from each carrier. This would roughly equate to around half of the planes of each carrier. If another strike was needed, they'd form another most likely as building a bigger mass would just consume time for little benefit. (another balanced strike would be just as effective after all). For the early carrier raid ops another reason for keeping half or so of the planes back was either for a 2nd strike (if needed) against the land base or as a reserve against naval targets.

Multple deckload strikes in a short period were also possible but this occured "after" Midway and "speed of launch" was now considered a priority in order to avoid another "midway". Nagumo was ever after, overly cautious about getting caught flat footed again. So cautious that in effect, the Japanese resurrected the idea of "dispersal" a tad and operated KB in multiple TF's for Santa Cruz (ES saw Ryujo operating detached to preform a raid on Lunga). Another consequence of his caution was the holding back of the torpedo bombers at ES for a later strike to reduce the possibiity of losses. This may have been the key that lost them the battle. (That and the KB second wave strike missed a helpless Enterprise after the strike leader failed to receive a navigational update from Nagumo on the TF's locaton) This error was not repeated at Santa Cruz.

At Santa Cruz the Japanese still built combat groups same as in the last three carrier battles but for the sake of speed again opted for mutliple strike waves. Shok and Zuik launching two strikes quickly in the AM, Zuikaku launched a third strike in the PM. Junyo followed suit in similar manner operating from her own TF (she was supposed to have had Hiyo with her but that latter developed engine problems). Again for the sake of the quick strike, she launched 3 waves.

As far as the game is concerned.......having carriers strike with their full strength in the AM or PM phase tends to lead to the saturation effect. Limiting the sortie #'s by half might be a lesser of two evils. Not completely accurate but it would reduce the PULSE effect of resolving a mass wedge of airpower against a target.

That or set a strike size limit. Japan is easy...they did tend to limit strike size to a single full deckload or less as they built their strikes using elements of whatever carriers were present. The US leaned towards full strikes initially...but that helped lead to coord problems and limited range.

[TheElf]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

We do not need additional phases.

There already are multiple strikes per phase. That's the whole point of the strike coordination rules - sometimes there is one coordinated strike that is more effective as a result, sometimes there are multiple strikes that are less effective.

In terms of effect within the game, having all the planes from one carrier - FF, TB, DB attack, then having all the planes from another carrier attack - FF, TB, DB, is the same as having half the planes from each attack, followed by the other half then attacking.

You are saying that in real life it's (essentially):
1/2 CV1 FF + CV1 TB + 1/2 CV2 FF + CV2 DB

followed a bit later (in same phase by):
1/2 CV1 FF + CV1 DB + 1/2 CV2 FF + CV2 TB

In the game it works out the same just by having the strike be broken up. First:
CV1 FF + CV1 TB + CV1 DB

followed a little later (in same phase by):
CV2 FF + CV2 TB + CV2 DB

So it's way less complicated than needing to add new phases and so on. You just need the code to break up the strike into single carriers (or have a percentage chance of doing so). That might be a whole lot easier to do in code than what you were proposing.

like I said we are discussing options [;)]

But not for initial AE release.[:-]

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: TheElf

But not for initial AE release.[:-]

But you did say 'spout on'. [:)]

[TheElf]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

ORIGINAL: TheElf

But not for initial AE release.[:-]

But you did say 'spout on'. [:)]

Aye...I did. Proceed...

[Local Yokel]

ORIGINAL: TheElf

My answer to this is still in the works, but suffice it to say there is one control that is missing from the game as it is right now in Stock and at least initially in AE...

...CAG

I won't go into any details as this may never see the light of day, but at least for the CV Air Combat piece of this puzzle I intend to make use of a HQ unit called "CAG" (CAG-1, CAG-2, CARDIV 1 Buntachio etc) that has several of the controls or "priority tasking" some people have astutely called it, rolled into a leader, whose values have a meaningful effect on the outcome of the battle.

Intriguing idea. Do you envisage a capability to embark into a carrier TF a leader element in the same way as an amphib. force HQ can be embarked into an AGC?

ORIGINAL: TheElf

Add to this one of the most important facet of the development of carrier power, culture, not to mention continuing evolution and refingin of the assumptions that were norm on Dec 7, 1941 and you have a bang up job trying to turn 1s & 0s into a facsimile of it. For instance if you are the Allied player and you Avoid KB til 1944 how can you reasonably expect your CV force to function the same way it did after it evolved to the killing machine it was IRL 1944? You can't because none of the RL experiences that forced that evolution aren't present in you game!!

Something the latest version of Woos' utility has brought home to me is the extent to which leaders' attributes get enhanced on a turn by turn basis. Does this offer a basis on which both sides can learn from experience? - e.g. leaders taking part in a carrier battle might receive a significant increment to their skill rating.

Actually I fear there's a danger of attributing too much significance to the opposing skill sets in a carrier battle. I'm leery of drawing too many conclusions about the significance of skill and/or doctrine from the outcome of just five such engagements. I suspect in some of them the outcome depended far more upon such factors as luck, Lanchester, and lethality of hardware - with the Japanese suffering progressively more severely from the last two.

[spence]

The Japanese KB was, through the use of carrier divisions able to coordinate large airstrikes against land targets well. Engaging ships seems to have caused some flys to appear in the ointment though. The disaster at Midway is well known but the same sort of SNAFUs appear to have occurred at least twice before. The difference was that no enemy was in a position to or even attempting to take advantage of the situation.

The first situation involved the sinking of the Langley off Java.
The second involved the sinking of the cruisers Dorsetshire and Cornwall off Ceylon.

Both situations involved the "Reserve" torpedo bombers. Both situations were redeemed by KB's dive bombers. In both situations the "Reserve" torpedo bombers never got off the decks.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

a more proper example of a "cake and eat it" would be from the Fleet Defense standpoint. The Japanese ability to strike in my mind is well documented. Fleet Defense....is a more chancy matter. Midway, ironically, showed that the Japanese CAP was capable of defending KB and inflicting large scale losses on the enemy. However this does not mask the fact that their defensive measures were more dependant on outside factors than the US because they had no radar, and even when they did, they had no FDO established to help vector in the fighters to the threat. As a result, they were pretty much restricted to visual cues.

If the weather was good, and the lookouts of the TF sharp....they could respond effectively. If the weather was bad and/or if fatigue was high or they were just plain unlucky....they might miss the strike almost completely. Further, they might be very effective against a strike that attacks along a single vector....but could be overwhelmed by a multi vector attack. Case in point...and one of the most interesting factoids of the Battle of Midway that almost never gets mentioned.

Attack on the Hiryu. The Japanese do learn from their mistakes. (often its their leaders who bone-headedly continue doing things the old ways costing lives) They instituted a doctrinally more correct and better organized multi-tier CAP to protect against high and low threats. Despite this....the two CV worth of SBD's virtually cruised in unopposed and were actually beginning their dives before the CAP reacted. It was too late. The CAP got three bombers eventually...but it mattered not....Hiryu was doomed. Ditching was in their future.

What was the difference? Technically and doctrinally...the Hiryu CAP should have been more effective than the prior CAP's. It wasn't. Radar could have been a vital key along with better radios unless a SNAFU like what hit Enterprise at Santa Cruz occured. But restricted to visual aids only...and fatigued from one of the most intense days of combat seen in the PTO...the CAP was caught napping.

WitP tends to treat CAP in absolute matters. The only real rule in place is diminishing returns for each additional strike during one phase (AM and PM). CAPs also cover a whole hex when in fact they should be restricted to the TF they either originate from or are assigned to cover via LRCAP.

For the Japanese, there needs to be more dependance on weather and rolls for visual response and # of responders since there isn't any organzied vectoring from the ground. That way there's a chance for Midway type efficiency...but also provision for times like in the other carrier battles when CAP was more a nusience than threat. In 42, USN CAP should also not be absolute. They still had kinks to work out...but on average, their ability to vector and concentrate and respond should improve quickly. USN TF's with radar should also be very good at shooting down intruder search planes. A facet distinctly missing from WitP. As it stands right now search planes are largely invulnerable, esp over TF's.

God.....i promised i wouldn't get sucked into this thread. Bad Nik......bad.

OK - look - Midway "prooves USN CAP was incapable of defending and inflicting even small scale losses on the enemy" - else we would not have lost Yorktown. And that WITH radar on the ships and radios in the fighters.

CAP should fatigue - I thought it did - and it should be weather dependent - even if there is radar. You cannot shoot a target you cannot see. Radar should give a better CHANCE of getting on the right vector. And it should always only be a chance - you can play games with enemy radar - sucking his CAP in the wrong direction. That is too tactical for us - but it does mean there is a chance of failure to intercept.

[jwilkerson]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

Allied AAA Bonus:

The right way to implement the VT Fuse (in the current game) would be to add an "VT Effective Date" field to the device. If this was 9999 then no VT ever, but if like 4301 then in Jan 43, this device would start firing VT Fused AAA ammo. I doubt we will get that, maybe in a patch, but probably not for initial release.

For purposes of WITP II (or III or ...) - hey, I think ahead! - we have to account for the fact that the VT ammo was not unlimited. Under really intense combat and resupply cycles, stocks in a area could (did IIRC) run low, but non-VT was available to fill in. Possibly (I don't know) some ships with the same weapons might not have been issued the ammo (AK's, etc?).

Maybe tuck that away in your "If I ever get to work on a WITP II" file for later consideration.

IIRC we made over 22 million VT fuses during the war, so by late '44 when the shackles came off, we probably had enough to use it when needed. In '43 in the Pacific there might have been some spot shortages. For WITP/AE I'd ignore this - so many other things are approximated as well.

For WITP II or III we can probably track ammo levels for everything!

[okami]

Could not strike coordination be linked to experience? First the carriers experience(planning the strike) end result modifier. The strikeleaders rating(leading the strike) end result modifier. Finally squadrons experience(executing the strike) end result modifier. Would this approach better model the strike coordination abilities of both sides. It would also differentiate between carriers on the same side. So that while the KB of 1941 may have a better coordination than it's opponents, war loses in pilots and the gaining of experience by the allies will eventually even the playing field.

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

Doctrine being the reason for the Japanese co-ordination rule...whatever. I can deal with this. What I really have a problem with is that not only do they get the cake, they get to eat it and everybody elses too given there is no range loss penalty for achieving it.

I am not aware of any range limitation on the Japanese ability to form an integrated strike.

Japanese doctrine stressed a balanced combined arms "strike." To acomplish this, they litterally built combat groups (strikes) from each carrier in the current KB incarnation. (It could be 2, it could be 4, or all 6 KB original flight decks. The usual procedure involved single "deckload" strikes from each carrier. This would roughly equate to around half of the planes of each carrier. If another strike was needed, they'd form another most likely as building a bigger mass would just consume time for little benefit. (another balanced strike would be just as effective after all). For the early carrier raid ops another reason for keeping half or so of the planes back was either for a 2nd strike (if needed) against the land base or as a reserve against naval targets

Nikademus

Heyho Steve. Not just time is being burned here, fuel is too, reducing the endurance of and therefore the range of the strike. But we are already getting full air group co-ordinated strikes. That was my basic point. Applies to all. I'm totally Ok with the twin strikes you described.

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: TheElf

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: TheElf

A couple OTBWs...

1. Air Search has been modified a bit, but testing still needs to bear out whether the desired effect has occurred.

2. Naval TF AAA has been tweaked to account for the DOA (Direction Of Arrival) of attack. So a torpedo bomber making a run from the beam(most desirable angle)

The "most desireable angle" is on the bow - navy talk for about 45 degrees ahead of the beam.

The ideal torpedo attack is an "anvil" - two different attacks 45 degrees off the bow in both directions. If the ship turns one way - to "comb the wakes" of one attack - it is turning broadside to the other set - and vice versa if it turns the other way. A torpedo launched from ahead of the ship tends not to have to "catch" the target and gains some time/speed from the target's own speed. If the ship wants to comb such an attack (if from just one side) - it must turn TOWARD the torpedo - and actually close the range faster - making the pattern more likely to hit. If it tried to turn stern to the attack and comb the other way - it needs much more time - and must turn broadside to at the most likely time to be hit. Not nice choices.

Yes, the Anvil. Even though I spent much time designing this attack type it will not make AE unfortunately.

A long time ago during development I mentioned anvils and simultaneous TB/DB attacks. These could simply be achieved abstractly by having those aircraft which make it through the CAP pass a series of checks (leadership, skill, percentage loss to CAP per group etc) then give them an accuracy bonus. Given, in my view anyway, that ordinance is far too accurate (vs ships at least) perhaps an overall reduction in ordinance accuracy is paramount before adding any more accuracy bonuses.

On that note...is anything being done to reduce the accuracy in AE. JWilkerson even noted recently in his flak tests that the accuracy is somewhat over the top while noting however that because near misses are not modelled perhaps this is acceptable.

On that note...[;)]any chance you guys will include near misses in AE?

[Apollo11]

HI all,

ORIGINAL: TheElf

A couple OTBWs...

1. Air Search has been modified a bit, but testing still needs to bear out whether the desired effect has occurred.

When I asked about this first few weeks ago (when WitP AE was first announced) you answered that Michael M changed the code so that aircraft do "fly" the spikes of the wheel instead of current system (that I discovered through my testing several years ago and posted here [:D]) where every search aircraft "flying" every single HEX inside his range covered (and thus with just 1 search aircraft whole area of several dozens of HEXes can be covered theoretically).

I sincerely hope that this will work!

[&o][&o][&o]

We weill all keep our collective fingers crossed... [:)]


Leo "Apollo11"

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

Heyho Steve. Not just time is being burned here, fuel is too, reducing the endurance of and therefore the range of the strike. But we are already getting full air group co-ordinated strikes. That was my basic point. Applies to all. I'm totally Ok with the twin strikes you described.

If the Japanese were attempting a launch a combined strike using all their planes....yes, additional fuel would be burned, though probably not much given their efficiency....and the Zeros had fuel to burn litterally. For normal deckload strikes....they could launch these as quickly as under 10 minutes...thus, as mentioned, I see no range impediment to their ability to form an integrated strike.

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

Heyho Steve. Not just time is being burned here, fuel is too, reducing the endurance of and therefore the range of the strike. But we are already getting full air group co-ordinated strikes. That was my basic point. Applies to all. I'm totally Ok with the twin strikes you described.

If the Japanese were attempting a launch a combined strike using all their planes....yes, additional fuel would be burned, though probably not much given their efficiency....and the Zeros had fuel to burn litterally. For normal deckload strikes....they could launch these as quickly as under 10 minutes...thus, as mentioned, I see no range impediment to their ability to form an integrated strike.

Assuming half the group is on deck and the other half in the hangers, are you saying that IJN CVs could launch the deckload in 10 min and then spot those on the hanger decks and launch them in another 10 min?! Even the Shokakus could not achieve this, let alone less efficient CVs like Kaga, Akagi, Ryujo, Hiyo, Junyo etc. Got any data on this? Anyway, loitering for 20 min easily means the loss of my 40-60 nm, a full hex.

Now, if you are talking half air group integrated strikes I'm with you, but not the full CV strikes we get now.

[spence]

If the Japanese were attempting a launch a combined strike using all their planes....yes, additional fuel would be burned, though probably not much given their efficiency....and the Zeros had fuel to burn litterally. For normal deckload strikes....they could launch these as quickly as under 10 minutes...thus, as mentioned, I see no range impediment to their ability to form an integrated strike.

While I would agree that the IJN Cardiv launch doctrine posed no impediment to launching an integrated strike; the construction of the IJN carriers themselves did.
They could and did clear their decks in 10 minutes but after the decks were clear they needed another 35-45 minutes to spot and warmup the other half of their strike aircraft. Unlike US carriers which had wide doors ventilating the hangar deck the Japanese hangars were completely enclosed and starting engines therein would asphixiate the servicing crews.

In any case the 35-45 minute delay in readying the 2nd half of the strike would seriously effect the range to which the 1st half could proceed if they waited around.
Besides, a delay of only 35-45 minutes would have been completely predicated on a flight deck closed to any recovery operations (CAP and or search a/c).

IMHO this argues quite forcefully against all IJN strike a/c being combined into a single strike during any one air phase at all but particularly without a serious penalty to the range of the strike.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: spence

The Japanese KB was, through the use of carrier divisions able to coordinate large airstrikes against land targets well. Engaging ships seems to have caused some flys to appear in the ointment though. The disaster at Midway is well known but the same sort of SNAFUs appear to have occurred at least twice before. The difference was that no enemy was in a position to or even attempting to take advantage of the situation.

When the Japanese were not attempting to conduct simotanious operations against a land target, their methodology for forming a naval strike was no different. At Midway the Japanese did not react with all due haste to the naval sightings because they had been told that there would be no enemy carriers in the area and even after the sighting, it was not fully clear if the enemy force contained a carrier. Preperations for a full strike were thus institued vs. a hurried emergency launch. There was also the small problem of the constant string of attacks coming in. That would make any carrier force's job organizing a strike tough.

The first situation involved the sinking of the Langley off Java.
The second involved the sinking of the cruisers Dorsetshire and Cornwall off Ceylon.

Both situations involved the "Reserve" torpedo bombers. Both situations were redeemed by KB's dive bombers. In both situations the "Reserve" torpedo bombers never got off the decks.

Actually the latter situation showed that KB was capable of launching a quick counterstroke using whatever was available at the time. (In hindsight, this is what should have been done at Midway, but wasn't) Again, we have a situation here where KB was busy engaging a land target and was in the middle of prepping a 2nd strike when the naval target presented itself. This is not an example of "uncoordination" but rather an example showing that a carrier force isn't always in a position to immediately spot and launch a full and/or balanced strike when a naval target is spotted. I'll have to recheck my sources but I also recall Brady mentioning that the TB's were purposely held back. Torpedoes after all were limited in the magazines and reserved for VIP targets.

On the scale of a WitP however.....Does one really try to represent this? Again as Ian pointed out...you have two phases....AM and PM. I suppose one could suggest a future WitP have a provision that if a carrier force (any carrier force) is set to a dual strike mission (Naval and land attack) that it must pass a roll chk to see if available planes to strike a naval target are reduced to abstractly represent unavailability of strike planes if a target is "snooped"