Jap ASW forces

[Dixie]

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

Jeeeez. Let's all just play awile before making any huge assumptions.

What? Base opinions on actual facts? Never going to happen [:'(]

[bklooste]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: bklooste

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl





But having competent Japanese ASW from the start of the game doesn't? Face it..., the same arguements apply to both sides. The only difference is that the US eventually fixed all the torpedo problems (it was still scandalously slow to do so)..., but Japanese ASW only managed to work their way up from lousy to mediocre.

The problem is you cant limit technical issues as there is no stop , if You fix the US torpedos you fix the Japanese Depth Charges ( yes the first is crap) , Japanese Engines in the Hien , B29s etc there is no end to it. Putting the straight jacket on tactics and strategy is the the domain of the player and i doubt you will have many if any Japanese players who will play a game with unescorted ships

Didn't ask to limit "technical issues"..., only to be fair with both sides. US had technical problems with the Mk XIV, and they are in the game that way with an option to "fix" them if the player(s) desire to do so. Japanese ASW was technically crap, but that's not the way it is in the game. Why not make it the garbage it historically was in the game..., with an option to "fix" it if the player(s) desire to do so?

Now that would be FAIR.

1. The main reason Japanese ASW was crap was ships were unescorted. That is not the case in any PBEM game,
2. Japanese ASW is still crap unless you start putting the best TF comanders ( ie Rear Admirals ) onto ASW.
3. Both allied and Japanese players seem to be far more aggresive with their subs than historical using them in well patrolled straits and on well protected convoys with aggresive commanders. Losses should be much higher.

Note the loss ratio compared to active boats in 41 and 42 between Japan and US were very similar US 1 in 41 Japan ~3 , US 6 in 42 Japan 12 ( rough figures) .

[bklooste]

The Glen wasn´t there to find targets for subs, that´s how it´s used in the game but this is not at all comparable to what it was capable in real life. Glens weren´t used on naval search.

Are you sure about this ? It seems quite silly since the horizon is not far from a sub to not use a recon aircraft with vastly better sighting to spot for ships , a single 100 mile trip from 15000 feet can see a lot in good weather , ....4 hexes by 3 hexes is possible. Didnt they hunt for the Doolittle raid TF with some Glens ?

If it is the case they should be resricted to recon only ( type recon ?) if the game engine allows or HR.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: spence

The USN did not have a flawed strategic vision of how submarines would contribute to final victory; only flawed weapons. The IJN was the proud possessor of the opposite.

At the start of the war there was little to choose between the sub doctrines of the two parties. Difference was that the USN view evolved and adapted over time while the IJN became saddled with unproductive and very hazzardous new priorities.

[Canoerebel]

I'm in mid-43 in my PBEM game.  One observation about Allied ASW that continues to be reinforced almost on a daily basis is that combat TFs are far more effective at ASW than are ASW TFs. 

[Nikademus]

1943 onward, Allied player ASW gets a substantial boost in quality as well. IJN will increase slightly too

[spence]

Are you sure about this ? It seems quite silly since the horizon is not far from a sub to not use a recon aircraft with vastly better sighting to spot for ships , a single 100 mile trip from 15000 feet can see a lot in good weather , ....4 hexes by 3 hexes is possible. Didnt they hunt for the Doolittle raid TF with some Glens ?

Landing any plane on the surface of the sea is rough on the plane's structure. Metal fatigue cracks in the struts and frame can not be corrected in the tin can storage facility on the IJN's submarines. An even more critical maintenance problem unavoidable on any submarine of the time would have been an inability to wash the salt spray off the frame after each flight. Corrosion of the airframe would render the plane not airworthy after a very limited number of flights.

The problem would have been much less severe on a cruiser, battleship or tender where the maintenance facilities and ability to make fresh water were several orders of magnitude better than any submarine could accomodate. The US experimented with a couple of DDs carrying seaplanes but those ships were unsuitable because they couldn't really support the seaplanes properly without compromising their ability to perform regular DD missions. And a DD had a lot more space (potentially) than a sub to provide maintenance facilities (though fresh water for washdowns would still be problematical).

[Nikademus]

Glens have a very short shelf life in AE, esp if used on recon. They are easy meat for CAP's. My standard policy in current PBEM is to set them to stood down and only use them for very specific ops, otherwise they die quickly.

[Mike Scholl]

Another big problem is that once they get the hanger open and start assembling the Glen, the subs dive time goes way up.  Which makes it very vulnerable to Allies ASW aircraft also flying in that good weather.  Floatplanes on submarines are one of those ideas that sound good to people that don't have to sail on those submarines.

[Shark7]

On the Glen carrying subs, they were also used historically to refuel flying boats and floatplanes in a manner similar to AVs.  In these cases, the Glen was removed and fuel tanks installed.
 
So, if we limit the Glen to a Recon only plane, then I say it would only be fair to add in the AV type refueling capabilities so the subs can be used in a historical manner.
 
See where this can end up going?  If one side demands historical limits, then the other will counter, ad naseum.
 
May be best to just leave this be and make house rules if you and your opponent don't like something.

[Skyros]

I found this at:
http://www.subsim.com/radioroom//archiv ... 09413.html
Seems to be along the lines of the conversation we are having.


joea04-06-2007, 12:33 PM
Great thread here: http://www.subsim.com/radioroom/showthread.php?t=110840

Links here:

http://groups.msn.com/HistoryWarPolitic ... 9078913248


Japanese ASW Efforts


In their overall war plan, the Imperial Japanese Navy strategists overlooked the U.S. submarine fleet. In the 1930s, as the new fleet-type submarines were replacing the older S-boats, Japanese Foreign Minister Shidehara declared, "The number of submarines possessed by the United States is of no concern to the Japanese inasmuch as Japan can never be attacked by American submarines." His view appears to have been shared by the IJN's leaders, who failed to see that an island is a body of land completely surrounded by a submarine's favorite element. Their underestimation of the submarine is a strategic error difficult to comprehend. In World War I, Japan's naval observers had seen the U-boat blockade bring England to the verge of defeat. Again, in 1940, the undersea fleet of Nazi Germany all but sank the UK. The similarity of Japan's insular position to that of the British Isles is apparent on any map. Certainly the U.S. Navy was aware of the analogy.

By the beginning of 1943, the U.S. submarine force knew just about what to expect in the way of Japanese antisubmarine measures. The Japanese Grand Escort Fleet, organized convoying, and aircraft equipped with radar and a magnetic airborne submarine detector were still in the future. However, the basic ingredients of the Japanese antisubmarine effort were in the pot.

Japanese ineptitude in this field of undersea warfare was, of course, recognized by the submariners and exploited. The war was not many weeks old before the Americans realized "those guys up there" were setting their depth charges too shallow, breaking off their ASW attacks too soon, and indulging in heady optimism concerning the results. Japanese airmen were not the only wishful thinkers. Imperial Navy men aboard destroyers, gunboats, sub-chasers and escort vessels frequently secured and sailed away in a glow of triumph entirely unjustified by the facts. A cheerful battle report always made good reading at Headquarters and enabled Tokyo Rose to broadcast an auspicious list of U.S. submarine obituaries. Many an embattled submarine owed its deliverance to Japanese presumption. And more than one submarine skipper could have quoted Mark Twain's, "The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated."

Although the Japanese antisubmarine effort was haphazard and, at times, almost lackadaisical, it managed to exact a punishing toll. Inferior though they were in many respects, the component ASW forces constituted a menace that meant trouble whenever encountered. The heavily armed destroyer, the ugly Chidori "pinger," the lethal mine and zooming plane, could be as deadly as lightning which strikes at random but kills when it hits.

While the Japanese did not have American sonar they did have their own echo-ranging system, and it was accurate to 3,000 meters. Additionally, the hydrophones were able to obtain a bearing at 5,000 meters. In 1942 the standard Japanese depth-charges were three hundred and fifty pounders (160 kilograms). These depth charges were built to explode at not over two hundred and fifty feet and they were not powerful enough to do great damage unless the attacking vessel achieved very nearly a direct hit.

Depsite its early inefficiency, as 1943 began the antisubmarine patrols of the Japanese Navy were becoming more effective. As the Americans were improving its air and surface search radars, the Japanese countered with devices that could detect radar emissions. In other words, the radar became a beam for the Japanese antisubmarine patrols. Progressively, as the Japanese patrols became more effective they were more aggressive.

Also, as 1943 began, the Japanese were developing radar. It was not yet installed on ships, but it was coming. They were adept, however, at the use of radio detection finders. The submarine that came to the surface and made a long transmission to Pearl Harbor might find that it had raised a nest of hornets. The Japanese had another device not duplicated in the United States, the jikitanchiki, a magnetic detector used by Japanese aircraft. It sensed the presence of a large metal object below the surface of the sea, so that low-flying pilots could sometimes find and track a sub that was submerged. However, at this stage of the war, the major Japanese ASW weapon was the sonar system. The Japanses sonar was technically superior and their employment of the echo-ranging techniques excellent. Also, as the war continued, more Japanese merchant ships were armed with deck guns that were a constant threat to any submarine trying to attack on the surface.

Most important at this stage of the war was the increase in Japanese production of antisubmarine vessels. The most effective of these were the kaibokans. These vessels were small, under 1,000 tons. At first the Americans thought they were only coastal frieghters, but they carried highly trained ASW crews and three hundred depth charges.

Still, the Japanese were so short of antisubmarine vessels that escorts were unavailable for most runs. The exception in the early months of 1943 was the shipping between the Dutch East Indies, Singapore, and Japan. Ships coming from that area brought rice, rubber, tin, and oil, all vital to the Japanese war effort. From the beginning, these convoys were protected by warships. Early in 1943, most other shipping had to depend almost entirely on locally supplied patrols and on air patrols. Supposedly, any alert would bring air protection to Japanese ships under attack, but in fact the air force protection didn't work very well. The Japanese had also begun to sow mines in the open waters, and as the war progressed these offered more danger to the submarines than the ASW devices.

In mid-1943, for the first time, sinkings by U.S. submarines went up to a rate of more than a million tons per year. The Japanese had counted on the sinking rate to come down as they won the war. The Imperial Japanese Navy began to concentrate more on antisubmarine warfare and asked its shipyards to produce more ASW vessels. But the Japanese production machine was already feeling the pinch of replacement. The Combined Fleet asked for carriers to replace the five lost in battle. Destroyers were needed to replace those lost in the continuing South Pacific battles. Admiral Yamamoto was dead, but his dire prediction was becoming fact: skill, courage, and determination notwithstanding, the Japanese were starting to fail beneath the heavy weight of American war production.

Still, in the month of September, the first of the new antisubmarine vessels were being delivered. Brash souls in high places were comforting themselves with the knowledge that the American submarine torpedoes were faulty and often did not explode — just at the time when the torpedo problems were being fixed and the rate of sinkings was about to jump.

In the closing weeks of 1943, Japanese ASW efforts were growing more effective. The IJN did have one superior weapon: the remarkably efficient radio-detection system. Admiral Lockwood, Commander Submarines Pacific, was quite rightly concerned about the enemy ability to locate a submarine by its radio transmissions.

As 1944 began, Japan employed the first of its new hunter-killer teams of ASW vessels. A convoy taking troops to the Marianas was attacked by the submarine Trout. The sub sank one transport and damaged another. Then three Japanese destroyers began a combined attack on the Trout and sank her. The experience was an indication of the changing nature of the submarine war in the Pacific: the American submarines were growing more aggressive and skilled in their task, but so were the Japanese ASW vessels.

In the meantime, Admiral King responded to the increased Japanese antisubmarine patrol and escort services with a new directive to the submarine fleet to concentrate on destroyers and escort craft rather than carriers and battleships. It was a reflection of the success of the Japanese efforts.

A real struggle was developing between the submarines and the escorts in the middle of 1944, one that transcended the usual. The Japanese were constantly devoting more resources to antisubmarine warfare. The number and size of the Japanese minefields were increasing, and the IJN was learning more about the American submarines. One source of information, unsuspected by the Americans, was the talk-between-ships carried on by the wolfpacks and by sub skippers who happened to encounter a friendly boat at sea. The Japanese antisubmarine command scoured their universities and business firms and put together and intelligence team of experts in American vernacular speech; they also secured a good deal of information about submarine operations by monitoring voice broadcasts.

In mid-1944, the American campaign against Japanese merchant shipping emerged as a major factor in slowing the ability ot the Imperial forces to prosecute the war. So many ships were sunk in the East China Sea and the waters of the East Indies that war production was affected. To meet the threat the Japanese were constantly improving their ASW methods. One major change was the gathering of the Grand Escort Force under the direct control of the Combinded Fleet. Much of the strength of the escort force was located at the southern Formosa port of Takao, which gave access to the Formosa and Luzon straits, the two greatest danger spots.

The Japanese used their aircraft to sweep an area thirty miles ahead of a convoy. If enemy submarines were encountered the planes sent word to the escorts or to one of the four auxiliary carriers assigned to the force. They made many attacks on U.S. subs in the next few months and operated under the misapprehension that they were sinking submarines at a rate of several each month — but actually they were not. In fact, the increased number of American submarines in the area continued to score often in spite of the Japanese vigilance.

The loss of the Harder, which had sunk a good many Japanese destroyers, gives a glimpse of the growing effectiveness of the enemy's ASW efforts. On August 24, the Hake saw two ships emerge from Dasol Bay. These ships were a kaibokan and the other the former American four-stack destroyer Stewart, which had been captured after it was damaged and put into drydock in Java. The Japanese had rebuilt the Stewart and renamed her Patrol Boat No. 102.

The Hake went deep to evade. The two patrol vessels, joind by an airplane, were on their way to search for the submarine that had sunk the destroyer Asakaze earlier that day. The plane diverted the Harder by dropping a depth bomb, forcing the sub to dive. Then Patrol Boat No. 102 moved in. The old destroyer had been turned into an effective antisubmarine vessel. She had 72 depth charges: 220-pound charges effective to a radius of 150 feet. She began dropping them in patterns of six charges as she ran across the spot where sonar reported that the Harder was lurking. The first set of charges exploded at 150 feet, the second at 180, the third at 270, the fourth at 360, and the fifth at 450. After the fifth run, oil began coming to the surface, followed by wood splinters and large pieces of cork. The old destroyer stayed in the area and made a sounding. It seemed that the sub had sunk in 900 feet of water. As they remained in the area other bits of debris came to the surface and the crew knew that they had killed the sub for sure.

But time was against the Japanese as American forces began to close the ring around Home Islands. The vigorous struggle between the subs and the escorts would continue, even as the squeeze on Japan tightened. So desperate was the Japanese need for oil that they began sending many escorts with single tankers from the oil fields all the way to Tokyo Bay. On October 30, south of Kyushu, the Trigger torpedoed a ten-thousand ton tanker; it didn't sink. Later that day the Salmon caught up with the same tanker and attacked — even though it was protected by four kaibokans. The sub sank the tanker and was then attacked by the escort vessels. They damaged her so severely that she had to surface to avoid sinking. The Salmon spotted a single escort and charged in with guns blazing, and then ducked into a convenient rain squall and escaped. The sub made it back to base in the Marianas, but she was damaged so badly that she never went out on another war patrol.

As 1945 began, more U.S. submarines were at sea, but they were sinking fewer ships, and the vessels they did attack were much smaller. The campaign against the Japanese marine had been so effective that the Americans were running out of targets. Lucky was the skipper who found a two- or three-thousand-ton frieghter in his path. Most of them were already on the bottom.

But the Americans were also becoming aware of an enormous improvement in Japanese ASW techniques. An improved radar was the answer, in systems used by planes and escort ships. As deadly as this improvement was, it was too little, too late for the Empire of Japan.


[Sources: Pig Boats: The True Story of the Fighting Submariners of World War II by Theodore Roscoe (US. Naval Institute: Annapolis, MD, 1949) and Submarines At War by Edwin P. Hoyt (Stein and Day: New York, 1983).]
Thanks to member DanielMcintyre.

[Skyros]

Here is another interseting site:
http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WAMJAP_ASW.htm

[Brady]

If you read through the TROMs prety much all the Glen recon flights over know enemy strongholds were conducted at night. And in all but one or two ocashiuons were their any operational losses. So in game terms we cant model that, as a result the game exacts a far higher price than history did for the type.

Operations at sea away from land bases to spot enemy shiping again can be found in the TROMs.

Launching a Glen took about 10 minutes.

Just a few examples from the TROM's:


I-21:

19 May 1942:
Early in the morning, Warrant Flying Officer Ito conducts a recce flight over Suva. He sights a Glasgow-class light cruiser and seven submarine chasers in the harbor and returns to the submarine one and a half hours later.

24 May 1942:
The I-21's Glen reconnoiters Auckland, New Zealand. As a result of a heavy squall, Ito fails to detect any vessels in the harbor. When flying over the Auckland airfield at 1,315 feet, landing lights are switched on for him by the New Zealanders.

29 May 1942:
35 miles NE of Sydney, Australia. WFO Ito is launched from the I-21 to make a pre-midget submarine attack reconnaisance in his Glen. Ito is caught by three searchlights over Cockatoo Island, but manages to escape.

At 0420, a floatplane with its navigation lights on is sighted as it circles twice over the harbor near where the heavy cruiser USS CHICAGO (CA-29) is anchored. It is thought to be an American plane, but eventually RAAF fighters are sent up to intercept, but they are unsuccessful. While landing in heavy seas, Ito's plane capsizes and is later scuttled. Ito reports sighting a "battleship". He also spots the converted hospital ship ORANJE. Captain Sasaki orders an attack on Sydney harbor by his midget submarines.

25 January 1943:
The I-21 launches her plane for a recce flight over Sydney. The pilot reports the presence of a heavy cruiser and some ten smaller vessels stationed at the harbor entrance.

19 February 1943:
WFO Ito makes another recce flight, taking photos of the New South Wales coast. His plane is detected by radar but is not attacked.

30 May 1943:
The I-21 evacuates 10 midget submarine crews from Kiska. (This is interesting because in another TROM it is mentioned that Several Midget Crews were evacuated from Guadacanal by Sub as well, which is interesting because I presumed that the crews of those midgets were lost while operating off Guadacanal).

8 October 1943:
The I-21 launches her plane for a flight over Suva.

..................

I-36 This is only the second OP loss I have read about, and at Night!

10 August 1943:
Returns to Yokosuka for overhaul. The I-36 is fitted with an E27 Type 3 radar detector.

31 August 1943:
Cdr Inaba receives a verbal order to reconnoiter Pearl Harbor from HQ, SubRon 1. The I-36 commences Yokosuka E14Y1 "Glen" floatplane launch and recovery tests in Inland Sea.

8 September 1943:
Departs Yokosuka to patrol off Hawaii.

19 September 1943:
The I-36 arrives W of Hawaii. Her radar detector registers the work of numerous American ship-based radars.

21 September 1943:
The I-36 is transferred E of Hawaii to avoid detection, but numerous contacts are still made.

16 October 1943:
After sunset, the I-36 surfaces 120 nms S of Pearl Harbor. Her E14Y1 floatplane is assembled in ten minutes and launched from the catapult.

One hour and twenty minutes later Cdr Inaba receives the signal from the returning floatplane. The partially submerged I-36 heads for the rendezvous point while maintaining contact with the pilot on a long-wave channel. The fliers report sighting four carriers, four battleships, five cruisers and 17 destroyers at anchor.

By 2330, the pilot of the Glen reports that his plane is low on fuel and that he has lost the bearing to the submarine. The I-36 surfaces and heads towards the location of the aircraft at full speed, with navigation lights switched on. Contact with the Glen is lost.

Aprial 22(ish) 1944(Third OP Loss I have found)

Majuro. At 1455 (JST), the I-36 launches her Glen floatplane that flies over the anchorage at 3,900 feet. The observer reports sighting 11 carriers and three battleships. Upon return, the pilot of the E14Y1 fails to locate the submarine. Contact is re-established only by dawn the next morning. The aircraft is scuttled, rather than recovered, to escape detection.

I-30:



AT SEA:

6 May 1942:
The I-30's "Glen" floatplane sights elements of the British Fleet en route from Durban to Madagascar.

Look at all these Sorties flow by her Glen on this patrole, and they repaired the Glen as well:

7 May 1942:
Indian Ocean. Gulf of Aden. The I-30 launches her floatplane to reconnoiter Aden.

8 May 1942:
Indian Ocean. Gulf of Aden. The I-30 launches her Glen to reconnoiter Djibouti.

19 May 1942:
The I-30 launches her floatplane to reconnoiter Zanzibar and Dar-es Salaam. The pilot sights one merchant in the harbor and one 4,000-ton vessel departing. During landing, one of the Glens floats is damaged, but it is hoisted aboard.

20 May 1942:
The flagship I-10 catapults her Glen floatplane that reconnoiters Durban, South Africa. There are at least 40 merchant ships in the harbor, but Ishizaki is after warships. The Glen is not sighted and the Japanese make no attacks that would reveal their presence. During the week, the I-10's aircraft also overflies East London, Port Elizabeth and Simonstown.

That same day, the I-30 carries out periscopic observation of the port at Kilindini (Mombasa).

24 May 1942:
At night, the I-30 carries out a periscopic observation of Diego Suarez at the northern tip of Madagascar at Antsiranano, on the Indian Ocean.

29 May 1942:
At night, the I-10's floatplane reconnoiters the harbor at Diego Suarez. The plane sights the HMS RAMILLES, an old 29,150-ton ROYAL SOVEREIGN-class battleship, at anchor in the bay. Also in the harbor are the destroyers HMS DUNCAN and ACTIVE, corvettes HMS GENISTA and THYME, troopship HMS KARANJA, hospital ship ATLANTIS, tanker BRITISH LOYALTY, 10,799-ton merchant LLANDAFF CASTLE and an ammunition ship.

[Brady]

ORIGINAL: castor troy




The Glen wasn´t there to find targets for subs, that´s how it´s used in the game but this is not at all comparable to what it was capable in real life. Glens weren´t used on naval search.

Yes they were (used for Naval Search) as I posted above evidance of this can be found in the TROM's.

[spence]

Yes they were (used for Naval Search) as I posted above evidance of this can be found in the TROM's.

Frankly your posts are interesting but completelyn unconvincing. Virtually every example you posted includes the words "reconoitered (follow by) "name of an Allied port".

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

Didn't ask to limit "technical issues"..., only to be fair with both sides. US had technical problems with the Mk XIV, and they are in the game that way with an option to "fix" them if the player(s) desire to do so. Japanese ASW was technically crap, but that's not the way it is in the game. Why not make it the garbage it historically was in the game..., with an option to "fix" it if the player(s) desire to do so?

Now that would be FAIR.

Nevermind your historical misconceptions, Japanese ASW is already far less effective - compared to the extent of sub threat - than it historically was. That's a fact, that can only be obsctucted by poor sub deployment. Allied subs have much easier time intercepting combat taskforces, and easier time getting first shots than they had historically. I don't consider myself a sub wizard, but sinking/heavily damaging approximately 1 BB, 1 CA, about 10 escorts and 15+ transports - in addition to my subs' actual results, which include damaging 2 CLs (only one torpedo exploded in each case, with good torps both of them could have been goners), damaging 1 CVL, and sinking 1 DD, 1 DMS, plus up to a dozen of transports - would have been a tiny little bit excessive for 2 1/3 months of the war. In fact, that's more hits on large warships that Allies achieved through entire 1942.

[Brady]

ORIGINAL: spence

Yes they were (used for Naval Search) as I posted above evidance of this can be found in the TROM's.

Frankly your posts are interesting but completelyn unconvincing. Virtually every example you posted includes the words "reconoitered (follow by) "name of an Allied port".

Read the TROMs, their are other examples their of them using the Glens to look for ships at sea.

[FatR]

Also, about player hindsight and goddamn sub doctrines. In RL, Japanese admirals thought before the war that the sub threat won't matter much unless their hopes fail and the worst-case scenario comes true. In this they were correct. By the time Allied sub attacks became crippling, as opposed to annoying, Japan's situation was already hopeless.

In AE, we know beforehand that the victory is impossible for Japan (unless both sides explicitly play for points, even then, the point victory is extremely improbable against a human player), so the goal of a Japanese player is to put the best fight possible until the pre-determined period of time runs out. Or until Allies overrun Tokyo - I suppose surrendering after this woulndn't be considered disrespectful to one's opponent. The player knows that and he knows how much attrition the Allied subs can cause. The player also knows that disabling of the Pacific Fleet on the first day, Japanese victory in DEI and establishing of the defensive perimeter are practically guaranteed. So, if he's willing to devote more assets to ASW early, there no reason for him to be techically unable to do so. If he actually does so - and I believe most players do - then the increase in ASW effectiveness should only be expected. If a Japanese player, despite the best reasonable efforts, can only do as well against subs as Japanese did in RL, then the game is skewed against him to compensate for hindsight. The equivalent of that would be, just for example, an artificial weakening of Malaya Army troops, to compensate for the fact that most Allied players know better than squander them on the peninsula. Doubly so if subs are more lethal than in RL - and I believe they are.

[Bradley7735]

ORIGINAL: FatR

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

Didn't ask to limit "technical issues"..., only to be fair with both sides. US had technical problems with the Mk XIV, and they are in the game that way with an option to "fix" them if the player(s) desire to do so. Japanese ASW was technically crap, but that's not the way it is in the game. Why not make it the garbage it historically was in the game..., with an option to "fix" it if the player(s) desire to do so?

Now that would be FAIR.

Nevermind your historical misconceptions, Japanese ASW is already far less effective - compared to the extent of sub threat - than it historically was. That's a fact, that can only be obsctucted by poor sub deployment. Allied subs have much easier time intercepting combat taskforces, and easier time getting first shots than they had historically. I don't consider myself a sub wizard, but sinking/heavily damaging approximately 1 BB, 1 CA, about 10 escorts and 15+ transports - in addition to my subs' actual results, which include damaging 2 CLs (only one torpedo exploded in each case, with good torps both of them could have been goners), damaging 1 CVL, and sinking 1 DD, 1 DMS, plus up to a dozen of transports - would have been a tiny little bit excessive for 2 1/3 months of the war. In fact, that's more hits on large warships that Allies achieved through entire 1942.

You can't always compare historical to your game. Historically, more than half the Allied subs were placed in defensive positions in 42 (or in positions that rarely saw enemy ships. Your opponent may be ignoring a sub ring around Pearl and focusing them near high traffic areas. I'm not saying the game has it correct, or incorrect. But, there's a large difference in results if you have 50+ more subs in convoy lanes than loitering around the Aleutians, PH, WC and OZ.

[Shark7]

ORIGINAL: Bradley7735

ORIGINAL: FatR

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

Didn't ask to limit "technical issues"..., only to be fair with both sides. US had technical problems with the Mk XIV, and they are in the game that way with an option to "fix" them if the player(s) desire to do so. Japanese ASW was technically crap, but that's not the way it is in the game. Why not make it the garbage it historically was in the game..., with an option to "fix" it if the player(s) desire to do so?

Now that would be FAIR.

Nevermind your historical misconceptions, Japanese ASW is already far less effective - compared to the extent of sub threat - than it historically was. That's a fact, that can only be obsctucted by poor sub deployment. Allied subs have much easier time intercepting combat taskforces, and easier time getting first shots than they had historically. I don't consider myself a sub wizard, but sinking/heavily damaging approximately 1 BB, 1 CA, about 10 escorts and 15+ transports - in addition to my subs' actual results, which include damaging 2 CLs (only one torpedo exploded in each case, with good torps both of them could have been goners), damaging 1 CVL, and sinking 1 DD, 1 DMS, plus up to a dozen of transports - would have been a tiny little bit excessive for 2 1/3 months of the war. In fact, that's more hits on large warships that Allies achieved through entire 1942.

You can't always compare historical to your game. Historically, more than half the Allied subs were placed in defensive positions in 42 (or in positions that rarely saw enemy ships. Your opponent may be ignoring a sub ring around Pearl and focusing them near high traffic areas. I'm not saying the game has it correct, or incorrect. But, there's a large difference in results if you have 50+ more subs in convoy lanes than loitering around the Aleutians, PH, WC and OZ.

Or in port receiving maintainence, as was the case much of the time. Same for the Japanese sub fleet, but with their offensive mind-set, the Japanese did deploy their sub fleet in a manner that put them in position to hunt in enemy waters from Dec. 8 onwards.

The deployment areas and levels made a huge difference...had the Allies deployed all of their subs in Japanese home waters from Dec 8 onward would their have been more Allied sub losses in the early months? Quite possible.

Again there is no way to compare player actions in this game to history...players are not going to make the same choices Nimitz and Yamamoto did.