TIMJOT
One last thing about descrepencies. I am curious of the ships logs you sited. I ask because 3 of the DDs participating in the 2 battles Pope, Pilsbury and Stewart were lost in the campaign. The Pilisbury without a trace w/ no survivors, Pope lost at sea but survivors POW, log persumably lost. Stewarts Log possibly survived but I would think destroyed to prevent capture.
Its true that action logs may contain ambiguities. Indeed, the ONI combat narratives mention these and do their best to work with the material to hand. The action logs remain the only primary source (and, if things are done properly, as accurate a sources as there can be) from the engagement written by people who ought to know how many torpedoes they fire or when they opened up with guns. I can't explain why your sources don't agree with the ONI narratives, but if they're using secondary sources for thier info I'd give preference to the ONI narratives, since I know for a fact the ONI narratives were based on the logs.
True, ONI is
to us a secondary source, but their narratives were written with the action logs (or copies of them, as is the case with Pope and Pillsbury, I suspect) to hand. I think the latter logs were available because there was a sufficient window of time, and port calls, prior to the fall of Java, for these to have been copied.
The thing that strikes me here, is how you have easily jumped in to question these action logs, even calling into question their accuracy the numbers of torpedoes fired by their own ships, whilst mere seconds before you assume that the Japanese sources are error free. It's damned hard, as you know I suspect, to count the number of torpedoes that hit *your own* ship. (Houston may have been hit by one or four torpedoes. At Savo, Canberra may have been hit by one or two. Some of Canberra's officers swear that Canberra was hit by only one torpedo and fired by Bagly rather than any shot fired from the CA line). Even in the absence of duplicity, I don't think the Japanese sources are as pure as you make them out to be.
As to claims. I think firing a weapon and seeing an explosion, whilst not perfect information is usable information. A weapon was fired and it went off prematurely, on target, on the wrong target, on a hulk, on an island, or passed inccuously aside. The enemy vessel was hit, or reacted, or was firing its own weapons and these were mistaken for an explosion. This is COMPLETELY different from post action analysis that credits whomever with so many BBs sunk and so forth. As you know, I don't think such analyses (and the others "based on your comments you six Ki-44 pilots definitely shot down 18 Hellcats) are worth a hang, although I'd say that by 1944 the US got very good at it with respect to
ships.
And I don't see why you assume that it's "highly unlikely" that some of the DDs went into action without a full complement of torpedoes. These vessels started the war based in the PI and their torpedo stores were in Cavite. As we all know, all the quartermasters' logs from Cavite survived the orderly retreat from Manila and so forth. 'nuff said.
In any case,
this
If indeed the USN DDs left the scene with 15 torps, which I do not believe BTW, then it can be said under the circumstances borders on dereliction of duty.
strikes me as a strange remark. A skipper's not going to use all his torpedoes unless he's got opportunity and a good target, generally speaking. There are plenty of incidents in these two battels alone where fire was withheld because the target was observed and moved out of arc of fire in too brief an interval to allow a shot. Since torps were a valuable commodity, dumping them injudiciously would be reason for reprimand. Returning from an engagement with unused torpedoes would not.
Drongo:
Going for the record of how many annoyed posters can be juggled at any one time?
Debated, juggled. I've had worse odds. The last time I rassled this trio (you weren't involved) it was on the subject of aircraft. I was right and they were wrong.
I would not use the term "unquestionably" definitive when referring to "facts" mentioned in the actual combat reports themselves (which we aren't privy to since we're seeing a narrative), even for number of torpedos fired in action. Too often you see those facts corrected in historical analysis by reference to other sources (including action reports from other sections of the ship). My preference would be that a ships combat log is a generally reliable guide as to what happened from the view of that particular ship. Nothing more.
True, but the ONI combat narratives are not solely based on action logs. They include interviews with crew members from otehr sections. At Savo Island for example, Patterson's skipper intended to launch a torpedo only (no guns) attack. When he gave the order to "Fire torpedos" his edgey, exhausted gun crews only heard the word "Fire" and opened up. The torp sections never heard the word "torpedoes" owing to the instant racket from the guns, and her skipper only learned after the battle that the torps were never launched.
You would expect the various authors would have at least reviewed the same combat reports before making their analysis (they normally do).
One would hope so. Did they? Since we're on the subject of Japanese records, did they review the tactical records of movement for all of the vessels in the actions?
Fatigue - definitely agree that it was a factor that should be represented. However, I don't think it should impact fighting effectiveness once the battle is joined. IMO, its main effect on pre-battle alertness and initial reaction/decision making.
It's a strategic game (not mine, already written). The combat system is, well, "abstract."
That said, ones ability to perform duties is impaired by fatigue. One can be both highly adrenalated and suffering fatigue effects. Generally speaking, once a person has been awake for 18 hours, they perform in the same fashion as a person with a blood alcohol content of .05%. There is a rather large cumulative adverse effect that kicks in after 18 hours, such that a person behaves progressively mroe and more like a drunk. Mind you, these are abstractions of human behavior. Surely some people suffer fatigue effects with fewer consequences.
Surprise - you covered some critical factors like pre-battle intel/recon. I do think that you can seperate surprise into strategic and tactical. Strategic is when one side (or even both) are not expecting specific contact. Tactical is when you don't realise the enemy is present. Strategic does not automatically translate into tactical but having both occur is really stacking the odds against you.
I can't think of a mechanism for abstracting "strategic surprise" in a face-to-face boardgame.
"Did you expect me to be capable of responding in this theater?"
"Well, no James, I did not, so you should just go ahead and claim that favorable DRM. It's likely to cost me the
Kirishima. C'est la guerre."
Confusion - I think this is an important factor. You described night combat after a surprise round as a "wild melee". Generally accurate but I still think there were defining factors that dictated how the "wild melee" played out. These factors are -
a) Leadership/command - the ability to minimise the chaos of night combat. A solid action plan helps as well.
b) TF familiarity - whether individual ships have trained/operated together under similar circumstances. Do they all use the same drills?
c) "Who goes there?" - friend or foe identification at night. Are there known but seperate friendly forces like transport TFs operating in the same vicinity. Have the DDs broken off from the main body to operate independantly? The hesitation in reaction caused from this factor played a big role (IMO). This particular factor fits mainly into the pre-melee (or your "surprise") phase but it also occured during battle.
I agree. But those sorts of things aren't abstractable at the level of PTO or even Uncommon Valor. As you know, at Savo one major problem was that the Southern and Northern covering forces were given patrol areas and patterns that were not well known to each other. Unless the game forces players to designate patrol areas for individual ships or task groups, some of this stuff goes in the wash in re game mechanics. But that does not mean that in designing the game, one should mistake the Savo debacle as a consequence of "superior night fighting" (wtf that really means) on the part of the Japanese, rather than fatigue and poor command (which IMO obviously are the real culprits there).
Torpedos - Historically, they should be factored into both the "surprise" AND "gunfire" phases with possibly differing hit probablities. You may have felt this just didn't need to be mentioned.
I didn't think it needed to be mentioned.
Gun doctrine TFs - You suggested that USN DDs belonging to these TFs should effectively have their torpedo attacks halved. I would also add that Gun doctrine TFs will be have a higher probability of being hit by torpedo attacks (long, line ahead formations). This increased chance would not be major. Countering that is that they should suffer less from confusion related to friend or foe identification (unless an entirely seperate friendly TF should be in the area).
Can't agree on this one, since the length and formation seem to have been very dependent on the skipper in charge. And surely the Washington and SoDak represent the ultimate in gun doctrine. Of the 34 (IIRC, or was it 40?) Japanese Type 93a torpedoes launched at these 800+foot long huge draft behemoths, NONE hit.
Since it's your model, I've deliberately left out the factoring in of superior IJN night ability.
Yeah. And I've left out the FInal COuntdown effect. In re what actually happened in WW2, I think "superior IJN night ability" and a preemptive strike on Kido Butai by the USS Stenitz or whatever are equally valid.
It's only when opinions are pushed as indisputable FACTS that the bitch fight starts. Mind you, I have a sneaking suspicion you enjoy those.
Not really. It's just that I have little tolerance for people who respond with "Sakai was a real man so you can't question him" and "The Japs were badasses this I know because Aristotle told me so" forms of argumentation. The casual ease with which factual information is dismissed by Chiteng and Nikademus -- instantly and snydely dismissed -- definitely sets me off. These guys know which button to push and when they push it I oblige by telling them how much abdominal surgery is required for them to see daylight. And the lengths and depths to which these guys will go to dismiss Allied information sources whilst treating Axis sources as sacrosanct and error free is one of the reasons why they're on my ignore list.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
