Fleet assets

[mogami]

Originally posted by Chiteng
Actually he DID reserve his strength at Midway. They were armed with Torps and AP bombs. It is because they were changing
these munitions to attack the airfield that there was a problem.
That and the landing planes.

Hi, Another 15-20 minutes and it would not have mattered. The USN divebombers hit the CV as they were starting to launch.
It was just bad luck for the Japanese. What we are discussing is something completely different. There will be no "Pearl Harbor requires a second strike" message to confuse things. The CV making the port attack will make the attack. The other CV will stand by. When the strike is recovered the TF will retire. If USN CV discovered in range the guard CV attack. There is no chance for "Wait to recover PH strike and rearm"
2 Jobs 2 forces (they just share the same hex and TF number)

[mdiehl]

MO -

Hi, Even your own math is funny. 132 minus two CV (44) equals 88(you say 80) Half of 88 is 44 (you say 40 but the difference here is half as many fighters then you would have up on CAP so I point this out).

Sorry. I was ballpark estimating this and writing fast.

Now I think each CAP CV could maintain 75 percent of assigned fighters (these are long range ac only 2-3 landing every hour would maintain the CAP (That makes 33 in the air).

One could DO that, but ...

Cycling these guys out at a rate of 2-3 per hour gives you an 11-hour CAP rotation for some of these pilots. Totally unrealistic for CAP assignment at the time. It's theoretically doable, but the IJN and USN did not keep individuals on CAP for more than about 2 hours unless emergencies (like an incoming strike) demanded it. The practice of both navies at the time was OF THOSE A/C RESERVED FOR CAP, to have about 1/3 in the air, 1/3 ready, and 1/3 deploying, returning or refueling.

Doing it your way also means that you're CONSTANTLY steaming into the wind and running up to launch speed. No way KN gets to transport 400 miles to the east per your revised battle plan while it is maintaining all these launches.

The number that actually intervened in aircombat can be debated. It would depend on picket ships (or subs of which there are plenty).

??? There were three subs assigned to the area of HI, mostly positioned to intecept US ships entering or exiting PH. KB also did not maintain picket ships for this operation. Iindeed, the strike force was quite streamlined for a "get in get out" operation. One COULD assign ships to picket, but you'd be stripping KB of ASW escorts. I doubt Nagumo would have gone for that.

Allied radio discipline (I'd guess weak on the 2nd day of the war).

You'd guess wrong.

And of course whether or not any allied search planes had been spotted. (KB will be several hundred miles from where it launched the Dec 7 attacks) In WITP the IJN has basically a 1 hex range advantage.

KB won't be several hundred miles away if they're rotating their CAP at a rate of 3 planes per hour.

Your almost convincing me the USN did not need to build all those CV. They can do Midway on Dec 8 with only one.

They can try it. With 1 CV they'd get a "half Midway" assuming that the strike arrived when KB was most vulnerable, IMO. With 2 CVs the USN strike, IMO, sinks at least 3 CV (if it arrives when KB is, for example, recovering Wave 3), or else damages most of KB.

The combined arms attack was important at Midway. The torpedo planes did draw down the Japanese CAP. Here there will be no torpedo attacks (just 36 divebombers minus scouts minus damaged) With little or no escort.

The CAP-vs.TBD thing is a red herring. If the US strike had arrived at Midway COORDINATED, then most of the US TBDs, along with most of the SBDs, and fewer of thr F4Fs would have returned to their launching decks. KB would still have lost 3 CVs straight off, but Japanese fighter cover would be so chewed up that none would have been available for the subsequent retaliation against Yorktown.

(But lets say the USN goes all out and assigns 100 percent escort. AC attack in groups of 4. without any loss from fighter or AA you get 9 bomb runs (possibly more if some of these groups break up).

Midway saw three CVs sunk by three bomb runs from SBDs. We can expect AAA from KB to be even less valuable than it was at Midway, which is going from bad to horrebdous.

I don't see this as winning the battle. The IJN counter strike will be much stronger.

Like the real Japanese, you have envisioned a theoretical set of circumstances in which everything is timed perfectly for the Japanese. That's unlikely. First, KB has to find the attacking CV. Who'se going to mount the effective 360 degree search? Then those 2 IJN interdiction CVs have to be the ones who somehow survive the US strike. Since they're sitting in readiness to attack the US, if a bomb hits one, you get the same ordnance detonation effect as at Midway.

If these two are hit, they're sunk. Then KB has to land the returning waves and rearm them (whilst the USN lands their returning waves and rearms. After that, it's a stand up fight between KB with 4 operational CVs and depleted air wings, vs. USN with 2 operational CVs and depleted airwings, with the US knowing KB's location and KB possibly knowing the location of the US ones, or then again not.

At that point, as the USN, I'd run. Drang nacht osten baby, or in whichever direction takes one further away from KB.

Akagi Fighters CAP
Vals Port
Kate NI
Kaga Fighters Escort
Vals NI
Kate Port
Zuikaku Fighters Port
Vals Port
Kate NI
etc.

Again, you're talking Game Reality, rather than anything that looks like real Japanese plane handling doctrine. You are also crediting the Japanese with a degree of tactical sophistication that, IMO, they could never have achieved. I'm not disputing that your suggestion is a good idea for UV/WitP.

The Japanese player could even logicaly split his TF during the night and assign one TF to stand off at max range and hit the port while the other TF moved 1 hex in and stands guard.

In no way, however, does this maneuver prevent a Midway type fiasco. It just limits the maximum number of CVs that can be sunk by the first US surprise strike.

2 Jobs 2 forces (they just share the same hex and TF number)

That'd be completely contrary to IJN doctrine and OUGHT to come with a substantial operational burden besides. No way the TF commander simultasks such a diverse set of missions. NO CV TF (Allied or Japanese) was capable of that sort of multitasking until 1943.

[Mike Scholl]

Originally posted by mdiehl
The idea is not that 2 CVs have to get to PH by Dec 8th. It's that 2 CVs have to get to Kido Butai by the time the latter finishes crashing aircraft into drydock gates, or whatever, during waves 3 and 4.

How did December 8th get involved? Historically, the Japanese
had PlENTY of time on the 7th to land their morning strikes,
re-arm and re-feul all the returning aircraft, and launch a third
strike of 180 or so planes by early afternoon---while still retaining
a strike force to meet a US carrier threat. And the cruiser scout
planes which did the AM recconisance of Hawaii had time to be
launched again to search for possible naval targets by noon IF
a 3rd wave was going to be launched.

Enterprise (the only US CV potentially in range to do anything)
could POSSIBLY get into strike range by mid-afternoon---but still
has to FIND Kido Butai WITHOUT Kido Butai finding the Enterprise
first. And to get a "Midway" type advantage has to catch them
at EXACTLY the right time. While all this is theoretically possible
it's not what you would call a "high odds" probability. So why all
the argument?

The only important things are ONE] Does the game make a Jap
3rd wave possible? TWO] Does it allow targeting of anything to
make it worthwhile? THREE] Will search allow the possibility of
either or both sides locating each other? And FOUR] Will the
game permit either or both sides to launch the "Naval Strikes"
against each other. If the game allows it, then players can do
whatever they like, and run whatever risks they feel comfortable
with for whatever goals they think worthwhile. If it doesn't, then
we need to ask Matrix "Why not?" Either way, arguing with each
other doesn't help much.

[Nikademus]

Originally posted by Mike Scholl
How did December 8th get involved? Historically, the Japanese
had PlENTY of time on the 7th to land their morning strikes,
re-arm and re-feul all the returning aircraft, and launch a third
strike of 180 or so planes by early afternoon---while still retaining
a strike force to meet a US carrier threat. And the cruiser scout
planes which did the AM recconisance of Hawaii had time to be
launched again to search for possible naval targets by noon IF
a 3rd wave was going to be launched.

Enterprise (the only US CV potentially in range to do anything)
could POSSIBLY get into strike range by mid-afternoon---but still
has to FIND Kido Butai WITHOUT Kido Butai finding the Enterprise
first. And to get a "Midway" type advantage has to catch them
at EXACTLY the right time. While all this is theoretically possible
it's not what you would call a "high odds" probability. So why all
the argument?

Because it's a convienient vehicle for yet another USA vs Japan thread hijack.

The only important things are ONE] Does the game make a Jap
3rd wave possible? TWO] Does it allow targeting of anything to
make it worthwhile? THREE] Will search allow the possibility of
either or both sides locating each other? And FOUR] Will the
game permit either or both sides to launch the "Naval Strikes"
against each other. If the game allows it, then players can do
whatever they like, and run whatever risks they feel comfortable
with for whatever goals they think worthwhile. If it doesn't, then
we need to ask Matrix "Why not?" Either way, arguing with each
other doesn't help much. [/B]

1) Currently, no. Yet another reminder....we are at Alpha right now. That means that much of what made UV, UV is in WitP right now. As work progresses, certainly the "WitP" engine will become more distinctive but for now, many things that work the way they do in UV work that way in WitP, hence, at the moment you get two strikes per day on land targets as per UV....one during the AM phase, and one during the PM phase, hence Mogami's talk of an 12/8 strategy. (This does not include 'fragmented raids' that come in singularily, they still represent one overall "raid" during an air phase)

2) Yes

3) Yes

4) Yes

[mdiehl]

How did December 8th get involved? Historically, the Japanese had PlENTY of time on the 7th to land their morning strikes, re-arm and re-feul all the returning aircraft, and launch a third strike of 180 or so planes by early afternoon---while still retaining a strike force to meet a US carrier threat.

I figured some time would be required for BDA and working out target assignments for the subsequent waves.

[Chiteng]

Originally posted by Nikademus
Because it's a convienient vehicle for yet another USA vs Japan thread hijack.


1) Currently, no. Yet another reminder....we are at Alpha right now. That means that much of what made UV, UV is in WitP right now. As work progresses, certainly the "WitP" engine will become more distinctive but for now, many things that work the way they do in UV work that way in WitP, hence, at the moment you get two strikes per day on land targets as per UV....one during the AM phase, and one during the PM phase, hence Mogami's talk of an 12/8 strategy. (This does not include 'fragmented raids' that come in singularily, they still represent one overall "raid" during an air phase)

2) Yes

3) Yes

4) Yes

That sounds lot alike the B-17 have the same invulnerablitity
in WitP that they do in UV.

[TIMJOT]

Mdeihl,

Lets look at it from the other side. First the decision to rearm at Midway was due to the assumption that the USN CVs were not in the area. No such assumption would be made at PH.

Second unlike Midway, PH was a surprise attack destroying most of the bases a/c on the ground, whereas at Midway no planes were caught on the ground and were used on very consequential if not initially successful attacks.

Third, Midway had beefed up recon capability due to foreknowleged of the attack. PHs recon capability had been mostly destroyed.

Fourth, not being able to rely on PH for recon, and not knowing the location of the IJN CVs, Halsey would have deploy his scout wing 24 SBDs in a wide arch. Effectively taking half his DB strength out of any initial attack. Remember he has no idea how many IJN CVs there are or if they are grouped together or operating as seperate TFs. To the contrary pre-war intelligence would imply that the IJN were most likely operating in multiple 2 CV disvions, not in a 6 CV mega TF.

Fifth, with 1/2 his Wildcats needed for CAP, that leaves approximately 8 fighters, 24 DBs and 12 TBDs for an attack. An attack he would be compelled to launch imediately upon locating any IJN CV. He would not have the luxury of "timeing" the attack unless he was extremely fortunate in the timeing of locating the TF. The attack would be facing at the very least 18-24 Zero CAP.

Sixth, History would suggest no better than a 1:1 ratio in CV losses. It took 3 CV attack groups to sink 3 IJN CVs at Midway, then another 1 CV attack to sink the other one. One IJN CV counter strike fatally disable 1 USN CV. At Coral Sea it took a 2 USN CV strike to disable 1 CV and conversely a 2 IJN CV strike to sink and disable 2 USN CVs. At E.Solomons a 2 CV strike to disable 1 USN CV while the USN CVs where unable to strike the IJN CVs at all. At Santa Cruz, 2 IJN CVs sunk 1 USN CV and diabled another. While it took 2 USN CV strike to disable 1 IJN CVL.

The fact is that no time in WWII did a single CV attack, sink or disable more than a single CV. Not at Midway or any other CV battle. Not even the Philipine Sea, or Shibuyan Sea CV battles that were drastically in favor of the USN.

[mdiehl]

Sixth, History would suggest no better than a 1:1 ratio in CV losses. It took 3 CV attack groups to sink 3 IJN CVs at Midway... The fact is that no time in WWII did a single CV attack, sink or disable more than a single CV. Not at Midway or any other CV battle.

1.5 USN CVs sank 3 IJN CVs in one strike at Midway. The SBDs in question were VB6, VS6 (both from Enterprise), and VB-3 (from Yorktown).

As to the rest:

Kido Butai's general location could easily have been known. It's bearing was known to the radar operators who tracked the first wave incoming, and the second wave oubound (when the radar was turned back on). Had a 3rd wave materialized, you can bet for sure that everyone would have known the bearing, because the same radar guys tracked the arrival of other US a/c later in the morning and throughout the day, and provided bearings on all of them. Moreover, PH was not stripped of recon assets, so while the base was seriously crippled, it had at least as many search aircraft as Tone and Chikuma (KB's only scout-ready vessels, unless KB further overtasks her CVs by performing their own scouting functions as well).

True, Midway was different from PH in re US search capability, but then Midway also had a great many more IJN air search assets devoted to the job. So relative to Midway, both the US and IJN will suffer from serious recon handicaps.

[Chiteng]

Originally posted by mdiehl
1.5 USN CVs sank 3 IJN CVs at Midway. The SBDs in question were VB6, VS6 (both from Enterprise), and VB-3 (from Yorktown).

However, that is disingenuous. The Japs faced Midway island
and its attacks also

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by mdiehl
1.5 USN CVs sank 3 IJN CVs in one strike at Midway. The SBDs in question were VB6, VS6 (both from Enterprise), and VB-3 (from Yorktown).

As to the rest:

Kido Butai's general location could easily have been known. It's bearing was known to the radar operators who tracked the first wave incoming, and the second wave oubound (when the radar was turned back on). Had a 3rd wave materialized, you can bet for sure that everyone would have known the bearing, because the same radar guys tracked the arrival of other US a/c later in the morning and throughout the day, and provided bearings on all of them. Moreover, PH was not stripped of recon assets, so while the base was seriously crippled, it had at least as many search aircraft as Tone and Chikuma (KB's only scout-ready vessels, unless KB further overtasks her CVs by performing their own scouting functions as well).


What all the other a/c played no part?

True, Midway was different from PH in re US search capability, but then Midway also had a great many more IJN air search assets devoted to the job. So relative to Midway, both the US and IJN will suffer from serious recon handicaps.

[TIMJOT]

I believe Those same radar operators tracked the Enterprise inbound flight comming from the west and indentified them as a possible incomming strike.

[TIMJOT]

As for the attack it came over PH from all directions after spliting up. They (US) had no idea all the plans came from the initial radar siteing. Certainly a good guess would be at least some of the IJN CVs were NW of Hawaii, but there was no guarantees. At Midway the US had a very good idea where the IJN would be comming from yet had to send their recon on a wide arch to make certain. Even so it wasnt easy to find that TF.

[TIMJOT]

Really? Both Tone scout CAs where there and both BBs where there.

[denisonh]

Originally posted by Chiteng
That sounds lot alike the B-17 have the same invulnerablitity
in WitP that they do in UV.

Not a thread hijacking attempt I hope, as this opinion has been covered in detail elsewhere.

[TIMJOT]

I apologize for the disjointed post, I was replying when I ment to quote.

[Chiteng]

Originally posted by denisonh
Not a thread hijacking attempt I hope, as this opinion has been covered in detail elsewhere.

Tell me, who again started this thread? So do NOT accuse me
of hijacking it =)

My statement was prompted by the poster I quoted.
If I am wrong, and I DO hope I am wrong, no one will be happier than me.

Possibly Nik will deign to enlighten us.

[mogami]

Hi, When I say the IJN TF will have moved I mean during the night of the 7-8th. CAP will not hinder this since it will not be flying during the night. I still think the whole issue is mute since no USN CV can get in range.

[Chiteng]

Originally posted by Mogami
Hi, When I say the IJN TF will have moved I mean during the night of the 7-8th. CAP will not hinder this since it will not be flying during the night. I still think the whole issue is mute since no USN CV can get in range.

Personally I think hanging around PH would be courting disaster
for Kido Butai.

Too many variables, too many unknowns. No possible support
if something happens.

Also there were two 'waves' not strikes at PH
There was only one strike.

I think a 10% loss in an attack where you get total surprise
kinda shows which way the wind is blowing, if you get my drift.

[mogami]

Hi, I agree. I don't think it is worth the loss of the pilots. I'll be leaving on the night of the 7th (recover strike and run for home)

[TIMJOT]

I think both historically speaking an game wise. The mission of Kido Bhutai should be and should have been to hunt for those missing USN CVs rather than wasteing effort in a 2nd strike. The best use of carrier a/c is to sink ships preferably other CVs. Nagumo knew at the very least that the Pacific fleet had only 3 CVs so the worse case scenerio he had 2:1 odds in his favor. He had just destroyed the Battlefleet and PH airforce. The only other possible threat was from submarines. There was no mission more important than sinking those CVs, with or without hindsite.