The "appeal to authority" is faulty logic.
I thought you were talking abotut my response. Sorry. Claiming that someone is an actual authority is generally considered fallacious if done to add credence to something outside their "range of authority" to say a doctor should be heeded when giving medical advice is not a fallacious appeal to authority. It would be if you used his being a doctor to enhance the credibility of stock advice (since he is a doctor and is rich) THAT is fallacious appeal to authority.
I didn't ask how or why the mix we have is correct, I asked if it is correct.
The problem with the question is it focuses on the single context of Iraq in a vaccum of all the possible other uses Army units could be put to.
You don't deploy a "vehicle mix" you deploy "units". IF your question is "Should the Army have changed its organization to have units available whose equipment is a better match to the conditions in Iraq?" then that is something that can be debated - though the nature of the post war conditions as "unexpected" (despite the edirials of the Editor Generals) meant that a requirement to change the organizatio was not foreseen.
The question "is the vehicle mix correct" is really "Is the Army Unit organization and TO&E correct" for the situation we are facing. There is no subtantive change in "vehicel mix" without a change in Unit organization and TO&E to prvide it.
The introduction of the Stryker was indicative of an inkling, but the FCS organization has not fully taken the lessons on-board yet. The GAO in particular vehomently disagreed that the Stryker was either requied, or suitable if you granted the requirement. Its success in the situation we are facing is indicative of some in the Army "getting it" despite being lampooned by many in the Army, the GAO and a phalanx of Editor Generals.
The question of "is the vehicle mix correct" is moot (or at best acadenic) if there is (or was) no way to change it in any substantive way. (The uparmoring of the HUMVEEs was an immense task and the Stryker was nearly DOA. The scope of teh Truck fleet revamp is indicative of the time and cost of an ancillary task to yours reagarding "the correct mix of Humvee, uparmored Humvee, Cougar, Stryker, Bradley, and Abrams" any significant change in which, requires a change in the service support fleet as well.)
Since when is the entire global military statistic one command "zone of operation of this size" (PACOM, CENTCOM, ...)? Not only did you use a dissimilar size database, you didn't even use a database within the requirements of the premise.
Because the data is not parsed to the "zone of operation" level so your question, with its arbitrary limitations, is unanswerable and arbitraily constrained. The context of the initial statment that our 'cost in blood' of the war in Iraq has been of comparable orders to periods when with few exceptions our military casualties were non-hostile in nature. The chacterization of the NUMBER of casualties as "unacceptable" flys in the face of the NUMBER of casualties we suffered in comparable periods of "peacetime" with a high tempo of operations.
You can put arbitrary limits and parsing on the data, but if you take the NUMBERS of casualties in "real wars" and the number of casualties in "peace time" the number of casualties per year in Iraq is FAR closer to the peacetime norm, than the wartime norm.
The question, as proposed, was a simple question.
Well, unless you have some understanding of the context of the question, like how the force mix might be changed and over what timeframe and at what cost (and legally with what money - NOT supplementals) its as irrelvant as asking if it would be better to have had transporters and phasers.
Did the Germans have the right force mix when entering into Operation Barbarossa?"
The answer such question is invariably "no", since we connote the "right force mix" with "a better one". But the answer is based on information that WE have in hindsight (like the number of T-34s) that the Germans didn't have. given that hinsight we would have taken at least more 88s, if not a Nashorn like SP version in considerable numbers, and ramped up the economy earlier, and had at least MIVhs if not Tigers for the opening invasion.
In hinddsight we can ALWAYS "do better". The more relevant question is "whcih of the decisions regarding the development of the Barbarossa force mix were "mistakes" resulting in a less effective force than they should have had - GIVEN THE REALISTIC CONSTRAINTS ON ITS DEVELOPMENT.
In the absence of those constraints which us would not have plucked our magic twanger and invaded with an all Panther force preceded by Pumas and Lynxs, supported by Wespes and Hummels covered in the air by a dark cloud of JU-87D-3 and Hs 129s?
SO to answer the question "did we have the right vehicle mix" you need to constrain the answer to the set of teh possible, which means you have to understand the constraints on the problem (about which I tried to educate you).
It was my belief that this board had grognards that could add some insight to the question. Instead, I read a bunch of ad hominem attacks and red herrings. The logic is abysmal.
I'm currently working in support of the Navy POM FY10 submission, (yes, the budget 2 and half years hence is being cast in wet cement this year - tat is sort of time delay OCngress demands) so it is not a fallacious appeal to authorty" to claim that I have some idea of what those constraints are".
I would be interested to see where I made any ad hominen attack on you and hope I've demonstrated that far from pelting you fish, I've endeavored to educate you on the constraints surrounding a relevant answer to your question. The very sort of "insight" you desire.
