MarkShot's CAW/CCAW tips and lots of historic discussion!

Carriers At War is Strategic Studies Group famed simulation of Fleet Carrier Air and Naval Operations in the Pacific from 1941 - 1945.

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RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips?

Post by Adam Parker »

ORIGINAL: MarkShot

So, your point is that the deep strategy that sometimes drives me to write 100 pages doesn't exist here in this game. It's like playing DefCon, but with aircraft carriers. :(

I think you should take it a bit easy on yourself as the whole DOS Box thing seems to have brought you down a bit [:D]
ORIGINAL: MarkShot

...I like rich and layered systems.

You couldn't tell this from having just 3 ship icons at your command at Midway? The fourth has to be tethered at French Frigate Shoals to do anything!
ORIGINAL: MarkShot
Then, I the only thing left to ask myself if it is a basically a simple game, is it still fun and worth the time?

Yeah it seems [:)]. This isn't AH's Midway where folks wrote and sold a strategy guide. Nor is it Flat Top. Nor thankfully is it a Grigsby game with 300 pages of interface how-to's.

This game will be superb vs the AI for beer and pretzels play once SSG adds randomness and more scenarios. And then some scenarios actually tuned to MP [:'(]

But it is a beer and prezels game. Search, click and hunt.

If it wasn't for such easy wheel-scrollable time compression and the ability to select when you want the clock to stop automatically for you, this game would be horrible. But these extremely user-friendly, interface design decisions make it an enjoyable 30 minute-1 hour abstraction in my gaming life. And the AI has balls.
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RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips?

Post by MarkShot »

First post tips updated - I'll try to add to the list as things occur to me - no spoilers.
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RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips?

Post by Baskaatje »

MarkShot, I have exactly the same feeling about the game: a very nicely done 'light' wargame about search, guess, decide-strike and wait for the results. No deep strategy here.
My main critisism is not in the game itself (very sleek and well organised) but in the lack of a campaign in which long term goals are your main focus. No logistics, no real need to capture certain islands or harbors/capes other than VP reasons, no need for preservation of your forces to fight another day if you can sink the scenario designated enemy TF.

Because of all this, I remembered my all time favourite game (1995 I think), QQP's "Battles of the South Pacific" and bought a (used, but as new) copy from Chris Dean at NWS and having a world of fun with it again (despite it being a DOS game). In this game you have the whole South-Pacific theater to play in (eastern New-Guinea, Rabaul, Truk, the Solomons, New Caledonia and the Australian coastline). In the long campaign (june 1942 - june 1943) you need to plan ahead, train your pilots and squadrons, decide which bases to expand or even build new bases, send convoys with supplies, send out subs, manage your landbased squadrons and even deploy army units.
It is not a Grigsby game (so no 300+ page manuals) and the GUI is very intuitive. TF's can be formed at will (up to 15 ships per TF), CAP and LR-CAP designated (yes!! LR-CAP too!) both with land- and carrierbased squadrons. Because the campaign runs for months and the Allies are getting more and more reinforcements (and better quality as time goes), the Japanese player needs to make some descicions fast and well thought out too. Capturing Guadalcanal and building it into a major bomberbase from which you can harras all US supply convoys? Or focus on New-Guinea and Pt Moresby and try an invasion of Australia?
In the early campaign the Japanese have an advantage in carriers, it then swings to the US to go back to the Japs in 6 - 8 weeks time. How to use this, knowing that more and more US reinforcements will arrive?

The game is of course graphically not as attractive as CAW, but not as bad as I remembered too! Because the main focus is on the map (and TF's are represented by square icons) and the map is not hexed based, the game still plays amazingly well.
For me it has worked out that QQP "BOSP" is a light to learn, deep to play game (and even more so after I had applied the patch V1.2, found at webgrognard) that I prefer to play over CAW! I like to fire up CAW for finding, hitting and sinking a TF (much better graphics) now and then, but for a longer term strategic naval game, I prefer BOSP. Only too bad BOSP is restricted to the South-Pacific and no follow up was ever made for the whole Pacific.......

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RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips?

Post by Prince of Eckmühl »

ORIGINAL: baskreuger

I have exactly the same feeling about the game: a very nicely done 'light' wargame about search, guess, decide-strike and wait for the results. No deep strategy here.

Hi bas,

I don't know if I agree with this or not. Were CaW a board-game, I suspect that we'd all be wowed by it, what with all the considerations which appear to have been factored into its movement, search and combat routines. There might be a need for a "game-master" to handle our moves and search/spotting for us. And it would keep us busy, too, as there would be a ton of die rolling. Does the game seem simple to us, sometimes, because so much of this stuff is automated, or do you want a game with less automation? For example, do you want a game where you handle the movement of a/c through the arm/spot/launch/forming up/on mission/landing/dispersed cycle, drag-n-drop 'em from one box to the next, or do you want the game to do it for you? I dunno, but I would suggest that the seeming "light" nature of the game is related to the degree to which the developer has managed to offload so many chores from the player to the game. Would the program/game be deeper if it were dumber?

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RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips?

Post by Baskaatje »

Hi PoE,

No, that's not what I mean by "light". It is OK (and very wise too) to hand all these details of arming, fueling, take off, landing etc etc of our hands and into that of the capable PC.
It is in the strategic dimensions I find the game "light". What I want to do in a game is making tactical descicions in an operational/strategic environment. And that operational/strategic environment is missing.
And that is what I like so much in "BOSP", making tactical/operational descicions that can have operational/strategic repercussions in the medium and long term.

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RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips?

Post by JSS »

Bas,

What you're commenting on goes beyond what CAW is... its an intermediate complexity operational wargame (Matrix site description)... it also focuses on the carrier aspect of naval warfare.  The game you describe above sounds quite interesting.  Have no idea if SSG would consider morphing CAW into a strategic level game (would certainly beyond the carrier focus of this game).

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RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips?

Post by Adam Parker »

ORIGINAL: JSS

Bas,

What you're commenting on goes beyond what CAW is... its an intermediate complexity operational wargame... Have no idea if SSG would consider morphing CAW into a strategic level game

Actually I think I know what Bas is saying and I agree with him. A game which pits forces in a scenario at such great distances, is strategic. This game is in fact, a wierd blend of operational/tactics in its own schizophrenic way.

But at such great distances players should have much more input into the strategic coming to blows. It could be the hex scale, it could be a bug with TG speed making movement unrealistically fast. There's just not much room for maneuver and not nearly enough planning of the search. Yet how can this be given arenas of such proportions as below? Do we need even bigger maps? [&:]

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RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips?

Post by GoodGuy »

ORIGINAL: baskreuger

No, that's not what I mean by "light". It is OK (and very wise too) to hand all these details of arming, fueling, take off, landing etc etc of our hands and into that of the capable PC.....
Right, I don't expect it to be a clickfest where the commander of a carrier, a TG or a whole theater is supposed to make detailed decisions about the color of the pilots' pants. This can (and should) be abstracted, means handled by the AI/system.
ORIGINAL: baskreuger
It is in the strategic dimensions I find the game "light". What I want to do in a game is making tactical descicions in an operational/strategic environment. And that operational/strategic environment is missing.
ORIGINAL: Adam Parker
Actually I think I know what Bas is saying and I agree with him. A game which pits forces in a scenario at such great distances, is strategic. This game is in fact, a wierd blend of operational/tactics in its own schizophrenic way.
Well, a game like this does not necessarily have to incorporate strategic elements. But the (lemme call it) narrow scope makes me wish there'd be more to it.

It is somewhat schizophrenic, that's true:
It would put you in command of several TGs, while you would still be able to control processes on each carrier (example: you can send a TG's light carriers' torp. bombers to target A, while sending a CV's bombers [along with escorts] to hit target B, leaving the CVLs' fighters for CAP), yet you cannot detach any CV(L) or BB, be it a scenario design parameter or not, although units within a TG were handled way more flexible historically, and yet you cannot coodinate your submarine operations with the tasks of your carrier groups within a given TO. There was quite some cooperation within these 2 arms of the forces, historically, especially since the IJN naval com. could be read/tracked.

Strikes against airbases are completely useless, strikes against vital land-based assets (radar, industry, supply-systems/routes, defense installations) are not even rendered/considered. I understand the idea to focus/narrow things down, if you want to display carrier operations, but there was much more to carrier warfare than just trying to sink enemy ships or to reduce enemy CAP capabilities, so quite some depth is missing.

Example:
Historically, CVLs (Indepence class) were supposed to have 9 fighters, 9 scout bombers and 9 torp planes initially, but were soon changed to around 24 fighter planes and 9 torp planes. So, CVLs had very limited capabilities and suffered of a high amount of aircraft accidents, due to the small size/ low weight of these carriers (bad for landings in rough weather), and a good amount of ammunitions had to be stored in the hangars.

Despite these shortcomings, the lead ship (USS Independence CVL-22) pioneered night carrier operations in August 1944, (Palaus operation, night recon + night CAP) for TF 38. I'd love to see this implemented in the game.
In October, the IJN sent a group to push back the beachhead on Leyte Gulf, and it was the Indepence with its night search planes (second part of the Battle of Leyte Gulf) tracking the IJN carrier group (BB Masashi was already sunk before), with the Indepence and other carriers sending strikes in the morning, sinking all four IJN carriers.
CVLs were vital for providing fighter cover and night fighter protection (pretty successful too) in late 1944 and participated in quite some air-ground strafing/bombing runs in preparation of Allied invasions, supporting beachheads or when attacking japanese airbases and coast lines in China/Vietnam.
I'd love to see night operations being implemented in the game at least, that would be the base for good custom scenarios, as these Ops were the major improvement / element in the development of carrier operations during the war.
ORIGINAL: Adam Parker
But at such great distances players should have much more input into the strategic coming to blows. .... [] There's just not much room for maneuver and not nearly enough planning of the search. Yet how can this be given arenas of such proportions as below? Do we need even bigger maps? [&:]

Yes I agree, the maps are small.... naval operations used to cover larger distances than in any major land battle, but major battles or encounters in the Pacific were still often limited to a certain (rather limited) TO (theater of operation), despite the large distances/proportions .... Midway, Coral Sea, for example. But, by providing this limited arena, the player feels like a hybrid of a commander of the PTO (as he's got several TGs and airforce bases at his disposal) and a skipper of a single TG, with both positions being shortened regarding abilities and scope.
A solution could be to make the land-based strikes fully automatic (fully controlled by AI) - thus limiting the player's control (to control naval units only), then resize the maps, while giving the player the ability to control all or some of the subs and arrange TGs as he likes. Also, the supply system could be changed to a bit more complex system (maybe like the player has to assemble and protect supply convoys, convoys from/to Australia for example).

Last but not least, carriers, along with DDs and light cruisers, covered ASW roles, a vital role not rendered in the game, also, search planes - especially float planes, were equipped with depth charges.

My 2 cents.
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RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips?

Post by Prince of Eckmühl »

Fast carrier task groups could travel about 400 miles OVERNIGHT. Because of this, an enemy never completely knew where they were gonna show up next. This was one of the central conceptual strengths behind their creation. It could move in, strike, and then withdraw. Any SUCCESSFUL operation of the Kido Butai was going to be so conceived. Note that this is an advantage, but the vulnerability of carriers to attack means that it's also a constraint in that they must withdraw before an enemy can recover and deal them a possibly devastating riposte.

Carrier battles in the PTO were defined by the presence of land bases. The battles themselves took place in transitional zones between the combatants search/strike assets, as in the map example above. Midway is somewhat different in this regard, but only in the the IJN search assets are entirely sea-based, and therefore, at a disadvantage. It's also worth noting that Midway PROVED that IJN carrier assets couldn't go on station and fight in effective range of Allied air-bases.

It would appear that the designers have dealt with the above limitations effectively, in that they constrain the free-wheeling nature of the fast carriers by placing the objectives under a land-based, aerial umbrella. One or both sides are assigned missions against a land-base which gives the fighting focus and definition. The situations depicted by the game are historical in nature, albeit with variants. Were the game maps to be quadrupled in size, squared in area, if you will, it wouldn't significantly alter the nature of the fighting, because the fighting should still revolve around the objective(s).

As has been noted previously, what IS needed in the game are exit points, the underlying concept of which is a "safe area" to which units can withdraw, one where pursuing enemy carrier assets could venture only at grave risk, and therefore, are constrained from doing so. In the case of the SW Pacific, "Truk" would be a good example for the Japanese, or, in the Midway scenario, "Hawaii" for the Allied player. I believe that the developer is considering something along these lines. It'd be a good thing, IMO.

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RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips?

Post by MarkShot »

Interestingly, the War Card scripting does allow for the definition of a "safe" area for a TGs. This is where a TG will flee to, but there is nothing within the game itself that really guarantees the safety of said area. So, when I have experienced that when you got the enemy on the ropes, you can basically chase and hound him to the map edge.

Generally, the designer will define land bases as threat areas via War Cards, but I haven't seen land based strike be very effective against naval forces.

---

When you consider the length of some of the scenarios and how far you can move overnight at 33kts and the striking distance, then the maps aren't all that large. In some cases, there is just enough room to withdraw from striking distance of the enemy.
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RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips?

Post by MarkShot »

Has anyone noticed that weather fronts seem to move consistently fast in the game? (almost at the top speed of carriers)

Is it my imagination or does all weather move fast? Is that realistic? Doe weather move much faster over the open ocean?

Thanks.
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RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips?

Post by GoodGuy »

ORIGINAL: Prince of Eckmühl

Fast carrier task groups could travel about 400 miles OVERNIGHT.
441.52 miles/12 hrs at 32 knots, to be exact, and 275.95 miles/12 hrs at 20 knots, which used to be the normal (cruise) speed. [:D]

Right, they were fast. But I (and others it seems) think that these task groups don't have much space to manoeuvre on these small maps, one can't use speed (maybe coupled with the enemy's problems to spot the player's assets) as a real advantage, since the cruise speed of enemy TGs always seems to be higher than the historical cruise speeds, and they seem to hit the pedal each time their planes got back. Also, search planes seem to spot enemy TGs most of the time, I can't spot a (working?) algorythm to depict a situation where search planes suffer of technical failures (broken radios) or where they are shot down before they can spot/relay the position of the enemy task force.

I'd still say quite some of the actual historical encounters were limited to a relatively small part of the theater (if you look at the size of the PTO), despite a TG's speed, due to limited (historical) ranges of strike a/c or weapons (in surface battles), due to the US reading vital parts of the IJN communications and due to IJN or USN forces being bound to support ground operations many times.
Also, unlike in the real world, the player is being limited (additionaly) regarding the selection of routes or approaches, either by the map's boundaries or by the low number of supply units, where the latter were able to keep up with a TGs cruise speed (~20 kts), historically, imho.

The "manageable/limited area" thingy was even more valid for battles like the one at Midway:
It was "just" about what direction the japanese Carrier group would choose for their approach/attack, as the strike range was an expected/known constant in this computation. Also, the US had accurate infos about the complete IJN OOB prior to the start of the battle, because the IJN code had been cracked.
It then was only a matter of proper search procedures, and, a certain amount of luck regarding the japanese search planes failing to spot the US TGs at an early stage and having troubles with a failed radio device later on, giving the US the opportunity to assemble at an advance position ("Point Luck") really close to the actual strike range.
It's also worth noting that Midway PROVED that IJN carrier assets couldn't go on station and fight in effective range of Allied air-bases.
Well, no ...... it just proved they couldn't go on station in effective range of 3 US carriers - the equivalent of 1 1/2 IJN carrier divisions (assembling NE of Midway, undetected by the IJN) - AND a landbase. They couldn't bombard 2 targets simultanously, as the different types of targets (airbase in contrast to 3 carriers) called for different a/c armament, plus they made a series of bad and time-consuming reconsiderations (they equipped bomber squads with bombs for a 2nd wave scheduled to head for Midway, just to change their minds a bit later and equip the bombers with torpedos, for example), although their superior amount of aircrafts should have been able to smash the US carriers.
It's a fact that the USN caught the IJN with their pants down. It wasn't a "wild west"-style duel where the guy who pulled his gun first won, ya know :)

Even worse, shortly before the operation, the IJN search planes scheduled to refuel at the French Frigate Shoals (to recon Pearl Harbor - to get infos about the location of the remaining US carriers) could not be deployed, as the shoals were occupied by US warships.
The result was that Nagumo did not know anything about the whereabouts of the US carrier groups, which displayed THE dark horse in his considerations. He still kept sticking to the initial plan, rushed his forces to Midway, although he could have deployed 5 carriers, instead of 4, and diverted vital surface forces in order to execute a simultaneous attack on the Aleutian Islands. So you might want to include hasty/stubborn planning on the IJN side, if you review the Battle of Midway.

I think you over-estimate the impact of strikes launched from Midway's airbase. Allied land-based air-cover (the "umbrella" u were talking about) expanded to its fullest extent in 1943 in the Atlantic Ocean, but did not feature a similar expansion in the Pacific until around 2 years after Midway, except for the temporary advanced umbrellas provided by the US carriers.

The Japanese forces, in turn, did not have long-range/turbo-charged a/c's, unlike the US, so the japanese "umbrellas" were less effective and smaller than you might think. I've read about rare japanese bomber runs that were one-way (note: not kamikaze) missions, as their targets were way off-range, and the bombers' fuel tanks did not hold enough fuel to return.
Also, Japanese bases like Truk and others were left out (regarding invasion -> isle hopping), but were completely neutralized by continous Allied bombing raids.

The IJN strikes on Darwin (given, RAAF at Darwin had only 11 modern planes) and other bases, and the excursion of a IJN group towards the Indian Ocean, despite some resistance from RAF airbases, rather proves that strikes from Allied airbases were less of a threat during the first 12-18 months of the Pacific War than depicted in some literature/docs, especially the strikes coming from Midway were not much more than a kind of harassment, in terms of forcing the IJN to employ their Zeros more often, just - if at all - raising the chance of them being low on fuel or being in the process of rearming when the real threat (US carrier wings) would appear on the scene. The bombers on Midway didn't hit anything afaik, and only 3 survived the battle, this puts the virtue of airbases into perspective, for the first 12-18 months. for sure.

Some of the Allied airbases (Henderson airfield for example) even didn't have enough aircrafts to seriously counter enemy threats until some units were rushed to the theater.
Except for Port Moresby, and for Saipan and Okinawa later on, Allied airbases mainly employed fighter squadrons to counter IJ bombers/fighters.

It's not surprising, that the final diversion of the IJN fighters in the Battle of Midway was achieved by one of the US carriers' bomber squadrons.
One or both sides are assigned missions against a land-base which gives the fighting focus and definition. The situations depicted by the game are historical in nature, albeit with variants. Were the game maps to be quadrupled in size, squared in area, if you will, it wouldn't significantly alter the nature of the fighting, because the fighting should still revolve around the objective(s).

Well, the objective would not change, right, but there are details which make things less believable in this game. A TG can sit in or right next to an enemy harbor, without getting any fire from coastal artillery (since it's not rendered). As IJN, you can "gut" Pearl Harbor and sink every frickin ship in there.... you can finish off the US TGs inside, if you send in your surface TGs - by completely ignoring the US airbases in the beginning. Such defects in scenario design and game design could be ignored and the game could be more fun, if the player's TGs would have more space to manoeuvre and if 1 or 2 days would be added in terms of a mission's duration. Although the scenarios might be accurate regarding historical duration the short amount of time and limited space make it a piece of very limited enjoyment.
As has been noted previously, what IS needed in the game are exit points
Well, this sounds like a good idea, basically, but it could be exploited in SP and MP if you don't expand map sizes. It will be like "gun and run" most likely, one side might be able to pull off an early strike, just to take advantage of a bad weather front above his TGs (so that enemy strikes would not be able to score substantial hits) and then run home to hide under mommys skirt (Pearl), in order to save the score advantage til the end of the scenario. It might also lead to situations where you chase enemy TGs, with you, after crippling their main assets, not being able to finish off the enemy's main assets, as they reached the exit area.

My 2 cents... err wait... 10 bucks now, sorry [:D]
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RE: MarkShot's CAW/CCAW tips - use at your own risk!

Post by decaro »

I've only played C@W a few weeks, but here are a few tips I've picked-up:

- whenever possible, let the enemy come to you while you are in a wx front.

- sacrifice a small surafce TG as bait by letting the AI target fixate on it, then hit his CVs. I discovered this quite by accident as the Allies in the advanced warning variant of the Pearl Harbor scenario.

- If a strategy worked for you in UV, it will probably work in C@W; same war, same map, same ships.
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RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips?

Post by Adam Parker »

Here's a few questions regarding tactics for those in the know, that fits in with the discussion of recent:

1. Are the game's aircraft ranges accurate - are they too long?

2. Are search planes being launched too frequently - we know strikes can be re-tasked too quickly?

3. Is it historical to place a surface TG in front of an Air TG to use as cannon fodder - we've questioned auxiliaries?

4. What is the measurement of a hex in this game?

5. How far would a TF spread its TG's out?

Finessing any one of these could change the tactical and strategic feel of the game markedly.
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RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips?

Post by Prince of Eckmühl »

Hi Goodguy,

For brevity's sake, I'm not gonna try and dissect your excellent post, particularly the parts about the Midway airbase. What I will assert is that the U.S. had advantages in the battle which transcended its intelligence coup (which really can't be simulated in CaW), or luck (to which their victory is so often attributed). One of the most important of these was its doctrine of dispersal, a key component of which proved to be Midway itself. The Japanese had all their eggs in one basket, the Kido Butai. The U.S. had its air assets divided among Midway and two task forces, the practical impact of which was to reduce the possibility of the IJN inflicting catastrophic losses on the U.S. in one or two strikes, while not suffering a similar fate, to something rather less than improbable.

The existance of the Midway air garrison created a situation such that the Allied force actually had a numerical superiority in strike a/c. And while many of these assets were outdated and/or flown by inexperienced aircrew, this superiority dramatically improved the possibility that the U.S. could place some semblance of a saturation strike over the Kido Butai, one that the vaunted Japanese force was simply incapable of repelling. And if you examine the record carefully, it's hard not to be amazed at how the U.S. forces seemed for half the morning to do all in their power to FAIL at this task, the operational miscues were just that pronounced. Still, when high-noon arrived, and enough aircraft appeared overhead, the KB succumbed, as I believed it was so destined.

The air forces based at Midway may not have scored the hits that won the battle, but they kept the KB's strike aircraft hangared so long as the carriers were cycling their CAP and the island absorbed the blow of the ENTIRE OTHER HALF of the formation's Kates and Vals, aircraft that would have otherwise been hunting down any U.S. ships that might have been spotted. That Midway's airbase and it's several squadrons of aircraft took this option off the table until USN dive-bombers finally set three of four Japanese carriers ablaze, I believe, is irrefutable.

That Kido Butai was in fact a raiding force, rather than one that could successfully engage in a struggle with powerful land and sea-based air assets, is equally unquestionable. In evidence, I have only to offer history, and the simple fact that it was NEVER able to do so, not once in the course of the war in the Pacific. This was not the fleet that came to stay, it wasn't designed as such, and when Yamamoto attempted to so transform it, he got his proverbial clock cleaned.

Thanks for your comments, [:)]

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RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips?

Post by MarkShot »

Adam,

In response to your questions:

#4 - a game hex is 20nm

#5 - the manual says that a leading or trailing TG maintains a 40nm distance from the TG command unit. However, the CCAW manual notes one important provision that the speed of the trailing or leading unit should be set to exceed the command unit by 5-10kts such that it can maneuver as needed relative to the command unit.
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RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips?

Post by GoodGuy »

ORIGINAL: Prince of Eckmühl

The existance of the Midway air garrison created a situation such that the Allied force actually had a numerical superiority in strike a/c. And while many of these assets were outdated and/or flown by inexperienced aircrew, this superiority dramatically improved the possibility that the U.S. could place some semblance of a saturation strike over the Kido Butai, one that the vaunted Japanese force was simply incapable of repelling.
Sorry, but I have to disagree [:)]. The Zero was the superior fighter in 1942.

http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/shi ... idway.html

"Ens. George H. Gay, USNR, the only surviving pilot, reached the surface as his plane sunk. He hid under a rubber seat cushion to avoid strafing and witness the greatest carrier battle in history. Of 41 torpedo planes launched by the American carriers, only six returned. Their sacrifices drew enemy fighters away from dive bombers of Enterprise and Yorktown which sank three of the four Japanese carriers (Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu) with an assist from submarine USS Nautilus (SS 168). The fourth Japanese carrier, Hiryu, was sunk the following day."

If the japanese Zeros would have provided close cover for the carriers, instead of focusing on a group of US a/c's aloof from their carriers, the US dive bombers would have been less successful, for sure. The "superiority" of US planes had been pretty much "adjusted" by the first wave that had been sent to Midway already, which you can check yourself in the ONI review (1947) linked below. It contains the official Japanese action report, and you can see, although many parts are based on estimations or enthusiastic (therefor partially incorrect) reports regarding the US carriers, that the a/c groups at Midway got ripped apart. A second wave would have trashed Midway completely, most likely. The total number of US a/c doesn't tell the whole story.
It was the lack of coordination of the Zeros and a question of (missing) proper guidance for the japanese fighters.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/I ... html#III-3
Still, when high-noon arrived, and enough aircraft appeared overhead, the KB succumbed, as I believed it was so destined.
Yes, destiny might have been the main trigger there. [:D]
Again, the final blow might have had less of an impact if the japanese fighter cover wouldn't have turned by this particular carrier squadron.
The air forces based at Midway may not have scored the hits that won the battle, but they kept the KB's strike aircraft hangared
They didn't hit anything, except for 2 cruisers (both were sunk) that got (too) close to Midway, because they were ordered to bombard Midway's installations - at least one cruiser bombarded Midway all through the night afaik -, they did not score any (substantial) hits on any of the carrier groups' ships.
[].....the island absorbed the blow of the ENTIRE OTHER HALF of the formation's Kates and Vals, aircraft that would have otherwise been hunting down any U.S. ships that might have been spotted.
I have to disagree again. It was the reconsideration (2 choices: send a 2nd wave to Midway or rearm and ready up for the US carriers?) and late feedback from the search planes that got them in trouble, it wasn't a question of Midway keeping the KB (too) busy.
Also, Nagumo decided to start the operation at Midway, although there was no intelligence about the whereabouts of the remaining US carriers, and, even worse, he decided to do without his 5th carrier (where he would have had to postpone the Midway operation).

During the actual battle, quite contrary, the Yorktown absorbed 1 and a half strikes, saving the rest of the US carrier fleet unintentionally, tempting the IJN to think they sunk 2 carriers.
Nagumo was too cautious, as he kept parts of his wings in reserve. If he would have committed all bombers for the strike on the US carriers, things would have turned out differently, I'm pretty sure.
The reconsiderations caused a situation where the IJN carriers were served to the US bombers on a silver plate, since flight decks were packed with ordnance and a/c's being rearmed/refueled on deck, while IJN fighters were low on fuel and ammo, as the busy flight decks hampered efforts to resupply them.
That Kido Butai was in fact a raiding force, rather than one that could successfully engage in a struggle with powerful land and sea-based air assets, is equally unquestionable.
It was a capable force, capable of trashing 3 US carriers, especially since one of these carriers wasn't fully repaired (and rushed to Midway after only 72 hrs of nonstop-repairs). The IJN had a massive amount of bad luck, coupled with poor decision-making, knocking out the IJN backbone eventually. The IJN had veteran pilots, superior fighters, and 4 carriers, but still failed. Luck and bad luck are both big factors in the history of warfare, influencing outcomes on and off.
While it took the IJN 3 yrs (until early 1945) to replace the lost carriers one by one, the US ordered 32 carriers, light carriers and escort carriers, but, since the CV program clearly could not complete CVs before 1944, the USN focused on building CVLs, with their shipyards spilling these "baby" carriers all through the following years, a wise decision in retrospect.

I tend to think that the US forces (this goes for Europe and for the PTO as well), besides them commencing bold amphibious invasions during their "isle-hopping"-tour, including the invasion in Normandy, and besides them fighting some attritious campaigns on some of these islands, won because of superior numbers (personnel, materiél, industry production), while they managed to cripple the industry and cut the supply lines of their opponents (Germany and Japan).

The IJN could have succeeded at Midway, since the basic idea to conquer this advanced outpost at Midway wasn't a suicide run, but it seems like "destiny" had another layout ready. [:D]
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December 22nd, 1944
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RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips?

Post by decaro »

Just a few observations on all this:

... The Zero was the superior fighter in 1942.

In retrospect, many considered the Zero to be over rated. Like the samurai, it was all offense w/little in the way of pilot protection, i.e., no shield, no armor/self-sealing tanks. By analogy, Sherman tanks were mechanically superior to Axis ETO armor, which often broke-down. Shermans were as dependable as a US auto, but when hit, they lit up like the 4th of July.

Re Midway: I think the IJN shared a common trait w/it's counterparts in C@W; target fixation. Midway's airfield became a major distraction for the Japanese, who assumed US CVs were heading to Dutch Harbor, as per their overly complicated attack plan. Perhaps if Halsey had been in command, this would have worked in their favor; look what almost happened to the landings @ Leyte when "Bull" charged after an IJ CV fleet sans planes, and left the Allied invasion force (almost) all alone.

Of course, breaking the IJN code and knowing their plans proved more advantageous than any tactical or numerical advantage.
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RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips?

Post by GoodGuy »

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

In retrospect, many considered the Zero to be over rated. Like the samurai, it was all offense w/little in the way of pilot protection, i.e., no shield, no armor/self-sealing tanks.
The Zero was more maneuverable and had a better climb rate. The wildcats could only escape if they performed an emergency dive where a Zero's wings, if it tried to follow, would freeze, rendering it uncontrollable, due to a flaw in wing/airframe design . Except for this then common US tactic, and except for the Zeros' deficits regarding pilot protection, they could outperform any Allied plane in 1942.

Although development started before Pearl Harbor, the Hellcat included designs to outperform the Zeros, which they did in most if not all aspects once they were commissioned eventually, let alone the nightfighter/night-recon capabilities in early 1944. The hellcats turned the tide in aerial warfare in the Pacific, and Navy/Marine Hellcats destroyed 5100+ enemy a/c at a cost of 270 planes (Pacific). There are some sources claiming that the Hellcats accounted for 75% of all aerial victories tracked by the USN in the pacific.
However, wildcats could not put up such a performance, not in the least.

http://www.historynet.com/air_sea/aeria ... wAll=y&c=y

The article linked above accurately describes the reliability of "US autos", US wildcats in this case:

"Early Wildcat guns had a tendency to jam during hard maneuvers; furthermore, if the oil necessary to prevent rust on the guns in the humid sea-level air was not removed before takeoff, it froze at altitude, jamming the actions)."

This was caused by a flaw in the design of the Wildcat's installations. Well, that would be like a teethless cat roaming through the air, right? [:D] Furthermore, the Wildcat's climb rate was extremely low, especially after it received more primitive superchargers (F4F-3A in 1942 I think), due to a shortage of two-step superchargers. If looking at these details, one can imagine why Wildcats weren't that successful, despite their robustness.

Another example for flawed US weapon design would be the torpedos' ignition system, resulting in a high number of duds, hampering efforts of the airforce branch and the submarine branch of the USN in the Pacific.
By analogy, Sherman tanks were mechanically superior to Axis ETO armor, which often broke-down. Shermans were as dependable as a US auto, but when hit, they lit up like the 4th of July.
Seriously now, I don't see an analogy there, and it's a pretty plain generalization to brand all German tanks as unreliable. The Tiger was unreliable because of the problems with its clutch, especially the first series (of 250 tanks) which was underpowered. The problems with the clutch never got solved completely for the duration of the Tiger's production. Additionally some german tanks had problems with the transmission.

The successor, the KingTiger had somewhat less problems with these parts of the engine, but problems, due to some crews' careless handling and due to the weight, still came up. The real problem for the KingTiger was that it got the late Tiger I's engine - KingTigers were absolutely underpowered, so the engine had to run at full power just to start moving. Many breakdowns were in fact engines that blew up. Testing phases for Tiger I and Tiger II had been shortened or even canceled in order to quickly deploy them on the frontlines.

Late PzIV models and especially the Panthers in turn did not have as many problems, and captured Panthers were very popular among Russian tank crews, as the Panthers used to be reliable and their guns effective, plus they did not feature the problems of T-38/85 or JS-II tanks. Pz I to III were pre-war models that shared technical/engineering problems with their Allied pendants.
On a sidenote, the Zeros were pretty reliable, as far as I know.
Re Midway: I think the IJN shared a common trait w/it's counterparts in C@W; target fixation. Midway's airfield became a major distraction for the Japanese

Well, fixation, not sure..... May I quote one of your older posts? [:)] I'll paste your statement from last year regarding a tutorial scenario for the game COTA, a tactical exercise:
ORIGINAL: Joe 98
ORIGINAL: GoodGuy
No, It's relatively easy to sneak around that front guard unit at night, as you can see on the screenshots.

No body in their right mind would leave an enemy unit of unknown strength in their rear.
While your assessment of this particular situation in that scenario was wrong, the statement would be valid for Nagumo's situation, and could be adjusted as follows: "No body in his right mind would leave an enemy carrier group of unknown strength in his rear". The actual objective would have been to find/screen and decimate the US carrier group, before even attempting a bombardment on Midway, let alone an invasion. It was rather undecidedness than fixation, since Nagumo seemed to listen to subordinates each time, with them suggesting a 2nd wave on Midway at first - although intel about the US carrier fleet was missing - but with them suggesting a strike on the carriers (along with changing the bombers' armament) eventually. Bad leadership imho.

However, the Midway airbase turned out to be the lesser threat, imho.
"Aw Nuts"
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December 22nd, 1944
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RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips?

Post by Prince of Eckmühl »

Goodguy, I'm out of pocket at the moment, and can't begin to keep up with you volume wise.

I do want to challenge you to update your sources, however.  I'm not suggesting that you buy a bunch of books, or anything. Perhaps you could access some titles that are more contemporary to ourselves at your local library,  ones that delve into modern Japanese interpretations of the battle. The problem with works that rely on postwar Japanese accounts from the 40's and 50' is that the principal figures were in full-bore, damage control mode and trying to salvage their reputations, Fuchida, foremost among them. Failure and shame are inextricably linked in Japanese culture, and the stakes in rehabiltating ones image were something of a life and death matter. And it was his collection of fables about the fighting that were among the cheif sources of information, not only for conventional, postwar authors, but also service-produced accounts like the one that you cite above.That Fuchida has come to be recognized as such a shameless liar is not a product Western revisionists but of Japanese historians who have pored over the logs of the Kido Butai's airgroups, and proven as much.

Respectfully, can we dispense with Fuchida's account(s) of the Battle of Midway?

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