Modeling of Carrier Battles

[jwilkerson]

ORIGINAL: herwin

<snip>

Hughes, Fleet Tactics ... I think the people working on AE need a copy on their office bookshelf.

<snip>

Hey, if that's all we need, we're in great shape, I've had this on my shelf since the 80s!

(and I love it too - to the consternation of some other members!)

[:D]

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

Also it's only ops losses that should be different (and they already are IIRC) - flying and fighting are the same.

There are over-water navigation skills that need to be developed. The RN used two-seater fighters for long range escort missions so that the aircraft would have a navigator.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: witpqs

Ground crew skills (affects quickness of getting off strike, turn-around time for additional strikes, readiness of aircraft).

Number of lifts/elevators might be a factor - or maybe not as our turns are so long.

Number of catapults (including zero) might affect launch rates in dead calm situations. Particularly if a carrier is moored or anchored. [If we know that]

If the carrier is moored or anchored, its airgroup will be ashore (and available for operations) if there's an airbase available. If an airbase is not available, no air operations.

[herwin]

Finally, it should be said that "British" armored carriers were remarkably hard to damage fatally - and to the extent WITP makes this so - it has it right - rather than wrong.

They were vulnerable to underwater attack, and an hanger-penetrating hit did a lot more damage than to an American CV. A second problem for the RN was that the flight deck was the strength deck, so penetrating hits distorted the hull girder. (The Japanese made a hanger design error similar to that made by the RN, except that their flight decks were unarmoured, making them even more vulnerable. Their hanger decks were the strength deck, making them easier to repair after an attack.) You pays your money and makes your choice.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

ORIGINAL: herwin

<snip>

Hughes, Fleet Tactics ... I think the people working on AE need a copy on their office bookshelf.

<snip>

Hey, if that's all we need, we're in great shape, I've had this on my shelf since the 80s!

(and I love it too - to the consternation of some other members!)

[:D]

See the new edition. It looks at littoral operations.

[spence]

If the Japanese should enjoy greater operational efficiency offensively (at least in 1941 and 1942, and maybe forever since no one else ever organized quite as flexably)

The Japanese operational flexibility on the offense was entirely predicated upon the situation developing according to plan. They wargamed the Battle of Midway before the battle and when the "American" players didn't follow the appropriate script written for them the Japanese players lost half the KB sunk. The umpires had to "refloat" Kaga so that the rest of the game could proceed. A similar situation developed during the battle when the initial raid on Midway failed to suppress the airfield/defenses and Nagumo got all twisted up between arming with bombs and arming with torpedos. The precise reasons that he never got his anti-ship strike off are probably lost in the mists of time but the failure to use torpedo bombers as such had been "rehearsed" a couple of times already in both the DEI and the Indian Ocean when enemy ships were located unexpectedly while KB was preparing to strike a land base.

IF somehow air search efficiencies could be made more reasonable THEN the concept of a "two phase search" (an early war Japanese concept which gave them an advantage when used - and which did not when they failed to use it as at Midway) might then be worth looking at.

The 2 phase search was a later war development for both sides based on the experience gained in the early clashes of carriers. According to "Shattered Sword" the Japanese were loathe to use strike aircraft for search operations. I suspect the gist of this assertion is true. Takagi had used strike aircraft for search (successfully) at Coral Sea but his handling of the battle was widely criticized in the IJN and thus his methods were not likely to have engendered copying. In all the 1942 carrier battles the USN employed fairly large numbers of SBDs for search or armed-search (as at Santa Cruz where Zuiho was put out of action by a search plane).

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: witpqs
Ground crew skills (affects quickness of getting off strike, turn-around time for additional strikes, readiness of aircraft).

That's basically sortie-generation rate, except that CVs can 'surge' (get everyone in the air) since they can move out of range to recover.

I should have been more explicit - meant highly skilled ground crew versus lesser skilled ground crew.

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: witpqs
Also it's only ops losses that should be different (and they already are IIRC) - flying and fighting are the same.

There are over-water navigation skills that need to be developed. The RN used two-seater fighters for long range escort missions so that the aircraft would have a navigator.

That's the same thing as flying from an island base. So it's already covered by the pilot skills ratings. The difference between 'carrier capable' and 'carrier trained' in the game should only be - as far as I can tell - rate of ops losses.

[spence]

Neither sides CVEs should be capable of launching torpedo-armed strikes. The ships were too slow and their flight decks too short to get the planes off the deck so armed. I doubt any of them carried anti-ship torpedos in their magazines although some of the USN CVEs carried the FIDO ASW torpedo. The Mark 13s used by the TAFFY planes off Samar against Adm Kurita's Fleet were apparently obtained from an airstrip on Leyte.

The Japanese CVEs were too slow, too short and apparently even lacked arrestor gear such that they could only operate a very few aircraft simultaneously. They mostly served as aircraft ferries.

[Buck Beach]

ORIGINAL: m10bob

The inability of a player to delegate targets to his planes has never been addressed, by any mod nor by AE.
Nobody questions the fact that IRL identification of ships was poor on occasion, but that should be somehow rated by the experience level of the aircrews, and certainly the naval fliers should have a better chance of ship ID than would army pilots.
The number of times naval fliers could not identify the difference between a carrier and a cruiser are far less than in game, which currently allows a smart carrier player to provide several "escorts" of worthless decoy groups in his general area to soak up some of those enemy attackers.
As in earlier Grigsby games of this genre, I would like to see the ability to search certain compass quadrants, and to specified ranges, with a keen and managed "target-type" for both spotters and attackers.

Till this issue is addressed, the carrier vs carrier type battle will be ever flawed........

Absolutely, and very frustrating. However, the "smart player defense" is almost dictated by the uber search efficiency surfaced earlier in this thread by el cid. It's not just exclusive to carrier battles. I find I have to saturate the sea with single ship TFs to get any survival rate (as in first couple of turns escape run from the Philippines). It's very gamey I know.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

I'm starting this thread in response to some discussion Ron and I were having over in another thread. I think the scope of this discussion could include pretty much anything related to the pros and cons of the US and Japanese carrier forces, especially in 1942 and how these aspects are modeled (or not modeled) in the game(s) (UV/WITP/WPO/AE).

I'll post some more on this topic in a bit.

I assume you've seen my comment on carrier operations. The important thing is that carriers steam into the wind to launch and land. This reduces the rate of advance of air TFs and increases their fuel usage. The Japanese had good reasons to decentralise their air search to the cruisers--it meant the carriers weren't slowed by air operations as much. Also see Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, Naval Institute Press--the 2000 edition. I think the people working on AE need a copy on their office bookshelf. He has a tactical model of carrier warfare on pages 99-108, followed by a discussion of the tactical problems. On page 111, he points out that the Japanese continually sought a night surface action with the American carrier TFs. If they had been able to make contact, it would have been unpleasant for us. He mentions the 200 mile distance that air TFs tried to maintain on page 97. I don't know how to model this in game terms--you know the game engine--but it does mean air TFs should approach spotted enemy TFs during the day and move away during the night. Surface TFs should probably do the opposite.

OTH Adm Cyoningham sought a night AIR action vs Japanese carriers. He believed that radar fitted Swordfish gave him a decisive tactical advantage, that they could lead in other air units, and that his air units could engage at night. In ETO night action vs ships did occur - using flares to make them visible when otherwise not (and sometimes they are visible). This sort of thing should rely big time on die rolls - but it would be nice if possible.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: witpqs

Ground crew skills (affects quickness of getting off strike, turn-around time for additional strikes, readiness of aircraft).

That's basically sortie-generation rate, except that CVs can 'surge' (get everyone in the air) since they can move out of range to recover.

I may be misreading this, but it sounds backwards: CV task groups are tactically tied to their launch point - and do not move out of range - or anywhere else - while the strike group is away. Also, the larger the air group that must form up, the less range can be hit with a cohesive strike - while if non-cohesive is fine - the range does not change - but the squadrons come in separately.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: m10bob

The inability of a player to delegate targets to his planes has never been addressed, by any mod nor by AE.

REPLY: IF you will tell us HOW a mod can address it - it will be so addressed - within a few hours.


Nobody questions the fact that IRL identification of ships was poor on occasion, but that should be somehow rated by the experience level of the aircrews, and certainly the naval fliers should have a better chance of ship ID than would army pilots.

REPLY: Especially the latter. But even naval fliers had horrible problems. Neosho was attacked because she was reported to be an enemy carrier. In the same battle (Coral Sea) a US air strike went in on coral reefs - which were reported to be an enemy carrier!

The number of times naval fliers could not identify the difference between a carrier and a cruiser are far less than in game, which currently allows a smart carrier player to provide several "escorts" of worthless decoy groups in his general area to soak up some of those enemy attackers.

REPLY: Depends on the battle: probably not for Coral Sea. Perhaps that can change over time? And/or as a function of the number and quality of recon reporting?

As in earlier Grigsby games of this genre, I would like to see the ability to search certain compass quadrants, and to specified ranges, with a keen and managed "target-type" for both spotters and attackers.

Till this issue is addressed, the carrier vs carrier type battle will be ever flawed........

Instead of "compass quadrants" it should be "compass sectors" - probably 120 degree sectors - numbered 1 to 6 - rotating from 12 o-clock being 1. 1 = North and North East. 2 = NE and SE. 3 = SE and S. 4 = S and SW. 5 = SW and NW. 6 = NW and N. There might also be 180 degree sectors - defined similarly. In such a system, a 360 degree search would require 3 planes searching per hex of range, a 180 degree search would require 3 planes searching for every 2 hexes of range, a 120 degree search would require 3 planes for every 3 hexes of range limit on the search. That sort of thing.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: witpqs

Ground crew skills (affects quickness of getting off strike, turn-around time for additional strikes, readiness of aircraft).

Number of lifts/elevators might be a factor - or maybe not as our turns are so long.

Number of catapults (including zero) might affect launch rates in dead calm situations. Particularly if a carrier is moored or anchored. [If we know that]

If the carrier is moored or anchored, its airgroup will be ashore (and available for operations) if there's an airbase available. If an airbase is not available, no air operations.

Boy is that wrong. Really wrong - as in maybe a reason not to buy the game. One of the big points of a catapult is it permits a zero wind launch. And there are lots of reasons a carrier would launch while in port - or even more likely - an anchorage. You need eyes out there in dangerous waters. You may want some CAP as well. And an ASW patrol is nice. Please reconsider.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: spence

If the Japanese should enjoy greater operational efficiency offensively (at least in 1941 and 1942, and maybe forever since no one else ever organized quite as flexably)

The Japanese operational flexibility on the offense was entirely predicated upon the situation developing according to plan.

Which plan could be very sophisticated. At PH they had six different options - because they planned for all (or at least most) possible contingencies. At Midway - they "cheated" - ignored the results of their gaming - and proceeded on the basis of assumptions - which one Admiral (Hosogawa I think) pointed out at conference. Morison says they "violated every one of the principles of war." Wether or not one agrees with that, they certainly violated the principle of concentration of force, something passionately insisted on by both staff and Yamamoto for PH. Indeed, IRL the KB NEVER acted as a unit again, in spite of doctrine: should players be forced to break up KB - or should be able to fight as it was trained to fight?

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Buck Beach

ORIGINAL: m10bob

The inability of a player to delegate targets to his planes has never been addressed, by any mod nor by AE.
Nobody questions the fact that IRL identification of ships was poor on occasion, but that should be somehow rated by the experience level of the aircrews, and certainly the naval fliers should have a better chance of ship ID than would army pilots.
The number of times naval fliers could not identify the difference between a carrier and a cruiser are far less than in game, which currently allows a smart carrier player to provide several "escorts" of worthless decoy groups in his general area to soak up some of those enemy attackers.
As in earlier Grigsby games of this genre, I would like to see the ability to search certain compass quadrants, and to specified ranges, with a keen and managed "target-type" for both spotters and attackers.

Till this issue is addressed, the carrier vs carrier type battle will be ever flawed........

Absolutely, and very frustrating. However, the "smart player defense" is almost dictated by the uber search efficiency surfaced earlier in this thread by el cid. It's not just exclusive to carrier battles. I find I have to saturate the sea with single ship TFs to get any survival rate (as in first couple of turns escape run from the Philippines). It's very gamey I know.

But you can play with a house rule range limiting searches in proportion to the number of aircraft searching.

[Buck Beach]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: Buck Beach

ORIGINAL: m10bob

The inability of a player to delegate targets to his planes has never been addressed, by any mod nor by AE.
Nobody questions the fact that IRL identification of ships was poor on occasion, but that should be somehow rated by the experience level of the aircrews, and certainly the naval fliers should have a better chance of ship ID than would army pilots.
The number of times naval fliers could not identify the difference between a carrier and a cruiser are far less than in game, which currently allows a smart carrier player to provide several "escorts" of worthless decoy groups in his general area to soak up some of those enemy attackers.
As in earlier Grigsby games of this genre, I would like to see the ability to search certain compass quadrants, and to specified ranges, with a keen and managed "target-type" for both spotters and attackers.

Till this issue is addressed, the carrier vs carrier type battle will be ever flawed........

Absolutely, and very frustrating. However, the "smart player defense" is almost dictated by the uber search efficiency surfaced earlier in this thread by el cid. It's not just exclusive to carrier battles. I find I have to saturate the sea with single ship TFs to get any survival rate (as in first couple of turns escape run from the Philippines). It's very gamey I know.

But you can play with a house rule range limiting searches in proportion to the number of aircraft searching.

No in house rules for me Sid, I'm a hard fast AI player.

[spence]

Which plan could be very sophisticated. At PH they had six different options - because they planned for all (or at least most) possible contingencies

Sophisticated is one word. Overly intricate are two more words that have been repeatedly applied to many Japanese plans. By 0700 or so on Dec 7th 1941 the Japanese would have had more plans than planes available to hit an unexpectedly discovered American carrier. Frankly their strike on PH was masterfully executed but it was a risky one if surprise was not achieved (far more so than WitP mechanics would indicate).

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: spence

Neither sides CVEs should be capable of launching torpedo-armed strikes. The ships were too slow and their flight decks too short to get the planes off the deck so armed. I doubt any of them carried anti-ship torpedos in their magazines although some of the USN CVEs carried the FIDO ASW torpedo. The Mark 13s used by the TAFFY planes off Samar against Adm Kurita's Fleet were apparently obtained from an airstrip on Leyte.

The Japanese CVEs were too slow, too short and apparently even lacked arrestor gear such that they could only operate a very few aircraft simultaneously. They mostly served as aircraft ferries.

With the word 'mostly' in there that statement is very wrong. CVE's did plenty of ASW and land attack work. They did ferry aircraft, but that was by far the minority of what they did, even as important as it was. The very Taffy carriers you mention were all there to perform land strikes, not be ferries.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Buck Beach

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: Buck Beach



Absolutely, and very frustrating. However, the "smart player defense" is almost dictated by the uber search efficiency surfaced earlier in this thread by el cid. It's not just exclusive to carrier battles. I find I have to saturate the sea with single ship TFs to get any survival rate (as in first couple of turns escape run from the Philippines). It's very gamey I know.

But you can play with a house rule range limiting searches in proportion to the number of aircraft searching.

No in house rules for me Sid, I'm a hard fast AI player.

I see. Well - the best AI is you on the other side. Lots of problems - not just this one - if AI bosses anything. It will waste abotu 80% of your shipping capacity for example - something Japan cannot afford. Nor will it upgrade air units intelligently, modify production with any sense of strategic priority for THIS war (which must be different than the real one). The list is endless.

But it would be nice if this could be fixed. I just think it takes hard code to do it - that the charge "no mod has done it" is somewhat unfair - how can we? [Please tell me I am dumb and you have a way] Not that you made that remark - I think Spence did.