The contexts are not well known. He admitted that in his own study. It and your comments also have no context to what JoeW is asking.
The contexts are well known to anyone who'se read about the battles. What more information do you think you must have that you currently don't have?
Show me where I stated that I flat out rejected the analaysis.
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the real irony in the days since has been how this study-post (preserved as an "article" for the warships1 board) has been taken out of context over the years and/or taken as gospel.
Which of your gospels did Big B offend?
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No, the absence of complete data and analysis accompanied by the absence of an actual battle under which the conditions the DB were to be fought means that one can conclude, based on Evans/Peattie that such a result is improbable, but not impossible.
Dwelling on a straw man argument about the absence of complete data and the other straw man argument about the absence of an "actual battle" strikes me as a dismissal of the analysis. You've clearly stated that you don't think the real world battles represent operational realities as they might be encountered in, well, the real world. QED.
Since you keep saying that, however:
No, the absence of complete data
1. The data are thorough and very representative of typical circumstances in which battles of the kind in the Decisive Battle doctrine were fought. One can add more data but they do not seem to improve Japanese successes. I've certainly added data to the results cataloged before but the outcome hasn't gotten better.
If you can find a battle or a sequence of battles that substantially falsify the results of Joe's analysis that he hasn't included, pipe up.
the absence of an actual battle under which the conditions the DB were to be fought
2. All of the battles included by Czarnecki were battles in which the conditions represented conditions that one could expect under the decisive battle doctrine. The suggestion to the contrary makes no sense at all, since the DB doctrine envisioned a campaign consisting of a serious of attritioning battles in which presumed USN numerical superioirty would be whittled down to parity or inferiority prior to one last great decisive battle. The battles included by Czarnecki do a very good job representing what that serious of attritioning battles might look like, and they conclusively demonstrate that Japan was not going to get the desired attrition rate prior to that last great battle.
You *seem to* be relying on a tautology here -- dismissing the relevance of these historical engagements because they're not outcomes favorable to the Japanese as required in the decisive battle doctrine. In effect, the theory is sound because the data are rejected. That is logically an unsound practice. Given the extant data from real world combat, the preponderance of the evidence indicate that the DB doctrine wasn't going to work.
Finally, if you did not mean to reject the analysis as germane to proof testing WitP or UV, why would you accuse Big B of taking it "out of context" or as "gospel?" The data are germane to a discussion of Type 93a torp effectiveness unless you imagine the contexts in which the Type 93a was used were "taken out of context" by the IJN. (Which gets us back to that tautology you keep deploying and then tripping over). Big B posted the Czarnecki analysis without comment. Which gospel did he violate? Clearly, the existence of Czarnecki's analysis violates some sort of gospel to which you are clinging.
Incorrect. I pointed out that I had some issues with how he ultimately interpreted his data.
Same difference from where I sit.
You are also deliberately igorning that I have stated.....twice that ultimately Joe's article can be seen as supporting the conclusion of Evans/Peattie who stated in their book that it was highly improbable that the Japanese plan would work. I have no disagreement with that.
Then why are you here writing off the relevance of the analysis? If you think the basic conclusion is correct what after all is the point of suggesting that the use of the data compiled by Czarnecki seems inappropriate for groundtruthing WitP or UV? Or were you just impressing us all with your lofty dismissal of the analysis (while agreeing in principal with the end result) just as a way of objecting to Big B mentioning them here at all?
A point of context Joe did not attempt to make.
No one other than yourself imagined that he attempted to apply those data to WitP or UV.
Nor can you since you've never played the games in question.
Assumes facts that are in fact not correct. I have played UV and rather extensively. Moreover, there are more than enough AARs available from WitP to make a conclusion. But you already knew both, and that makes you at best a kind of cartoon distortionist playing at discourse.
Except that those battles do not resemble the DB and as Joe admitted, he was unable to completely evaluate the manner in which each battle was fought, including the the number of weapons fired by which ship, range and speed settings, spread type and target. Ultimately he counted launches and hits. Ultimately, as mentioned it can be seen as a supportive argument to Evans/Peattie's comments regarding the DB.
1. The DB doctrine did not require specific statement of torpedo settings vis speed, depth, torpedo spread, or any of these things. Therefore, their exclusion from Joe's analysis does not obviate the applicability of his analysis to an examination of the likely outcome of the DB.
2. For it to obviate applicability to the evaluation of the DB doctrine on account of some imagined scenario in which substantially different settings would be use, one would have to presume that the torpedo speed, depth and spread settings in all of these battles consistently deviated from Japanese doctrine and training. There is no evidence to warrant such presumption.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
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