US CV TF Commanders

[Admiral DadMan]

Time for me to eat some crow... ("upon further review...")

Yes JL, Nishimura DID have command of the larger force at Surigao that was wiped out by Oldendorf, with Shima bringing up the rear and retiring before seeing action.

I read that Oldendorf would not have been ready until 13:00 to challenge Kurita @ Leyte, and I believe that Kurita likely still had ammo left (those 18.1" shells would have done a number on the old battlewagons, but he bravely ran away away...)

I must also rat myself out on Kurita's involement in the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. On 12-13 Nov, it was RAdm Abe commanding the 2 BB force that was thwarted by Callaghan/Scott. Then on 13-14 Nov. VAdm Mikawa plastered Henderson w/CA's, and on 14-15 Nov., it was VAdm Kondo vs. Lee's 2 BB's.

Now for the instant replay...
Kurita commanded a 2 BB + CA's etc bombardment force on or about 13 OCTOBER which was attacked by PT boats. No hits on the BB's were recorded, but the PT's were fierce enough to chase off Kurita earlier than he planned.

I really should stop trying to work without a net (as in my books) when I try to show off. There's nothing worse than a know-it-all who knows nowt.

[Ranger-75]

Yes, If Kurita had stayed and gone after the transports, he would likely have been caught either by Olendorf (not likely unless he stayed a long time to really sink some transports) or, more likely he would have been caught by TF 38s aircraft. In neither event would Adm Lee have gotten a chance to engage Kurita. Too bad...

[LargeSlowTarget]

Originally posted by Admiral DadMan


The following may help explain the "unexplainable timidness" of VAdm. Kurita, IJN:

[...]

Wasn't Kurita's flagship (Atago?) sunk by a US sub (Darter or Dace) off Palawan? This experience might have had some impact on his conduct in the Battle of Samar. Getting your ship sunk under your feet by torpedo hits may shake some nerves, I would say.

[Capt. Harlock]

Your memory is correct: Kurita's original flagship was indeed sunk. Kurita transferred to Yamato, and then had the experience of seeing the sister ship to the one he was on sunk by massive air attacks. Finally, during the action off Samar, and American DE fired a spread of torpedoes at long range at the Yamato. The ship was quite manueverable for something that massive, and the Yamato turned away to "comb" the torpedo wakes. At this point, by a remarkable coincidence, it was found that the top speed of the Yamato was just about the same as the long-range setting of the American torpedoes. Kurita thus found himself sailing away at flank speed from the scene of the action, unable to turn because he was escorted by torpedoes to port and starboard. This prevented him from getting a good idea of what was really going on, and he assumed from the ferocious fighting (Three Japanese heavy cruisers went down) that he had run into the US fleet carriers instead of CVE's.

[gdpsnake]

As I undersand, the size of any carrier air attack (whether you get a few planes or a lot) is based heavily on the air rating of the TF CC (Or the HQ CC if the TF CC is "overlooked"). The size of the TF force (3 for Allied CV, 2 for Jap, 1 for CVL) is compared against the rating.
So I think the rating should be considered less a value of competence and more of a "feature" that determines the size of the attack. If you go reducing the values then what will happen? The actual attacks will be downgraded. Nagumo may or may not be competent but that has less effect on the number of planes a carrier can launch-that's based on the experience of the crews and pilots. It's a game tool. Both sides should have some good ones and bad ones so the ability to cram three allied CV's together (9 pts!) or four Jap CV's (8 pts) is evaluated against a smaller force.
Let's face it, everyone always makes two "big" jap CV TF's for effect and every allied CC tries to match with 3.
I rarely see values increase and I've never seen aggressiveness increase. And I've never seen any decrease! Can't a general over four years of war be aggressive/less aggressive. Halsey was very aggressive early on and much reserved later after getting (erroneously) repremanded by Nimitz in a badly coded message which wasn't interpreted correctly.
Also, all the ratings are based on what happened. Whose to say ADM King wouldn't have been the "Hero leader" if things happened a little differently.
So I think of the leaders as just "units" for game function and not real personalities.
I hope the next WITP has a different spin on leadership.
Snake

[Jeremy Pritchard]

I see Air leadership qualities to represent command competence.

When we see number of aircraft launched in a strike, does not necessarily mean (in my mind, that is) that the commander decided not to launch the remaining group...

What I see, is that if the attack is 50%, only 50% of the strike force actually reached the target (since the game goes that all the strike of planes 'launched' reaches the target). Possibly lower commanders will have lower strike levels because they have plotted the attacks poorly, have prepared for action poorly (so less aircraft were ready to be launched), or whatever reason fewer aircraft are either sent, or fewer aircraft actually reach the target.

The US air attacks during Midway were somewhat incompetently launched. It was only due to the expertise of the flight commanders that any ship was sunk. Out of the 3 CV's of carrier bombers, fighters and torpedo planes launched only a segment actually found the Japanese CV TF. Luckilly, for the US, these aircraft were all that was required to sink 3 IJN CV's.

Both Spruance and Fletcher did not have a lot of history leading Carrier TF"s, and their comparatively poor carrier strikes do prove it. They were good enough to win, but better Admirals would have coordinated their strikes better, the Torpedo Planes would probably not have been annihilated by the lack of fighter cover, but this would probably have ruined the suprise gained by the Dive Bomers (which won the battle!). Halsey would have coordinated a better air strike, and so would Mitscher had he commanded more then just the Hornet. So, in my mind, Air values do represent the quality of command, if you see that air strikes launched do not represent ALL aircraft sent out, but ALL aircraft that reach the target.


Aggressiveness more represents personality then their ability in N, L or A. Aggressive leaders will keep their TF's in danger longer, get more PP's, will react their TF's better, etc...). However, all of the 4 factors together serve to create commanders to fulfill roles.

[Admiral DadMan]

I believe it was Halsey's aggressive nature is what got him into hot water in the Leyte Gulf battle by taking ALL his carriers (except TG 38.1) AND Lee's battle line to go wipe out the IJN carriers. He saw them as a bigger threat than they were, and so went after them.

What he most likely should have done (Spruance would have done this) was to place himself between Leyte and Ozawa (as Spruance did to protect Saipan) and let Ozawa come to him, that way if Kurita reversed course (which he did do), Halsey would have been right there and could have plastered Kurita.

As to the Battle of Midway, the main cause for the staggered strike was launching early (@ 0700) from extreme range (TBD's & F4F's had shorter range than SBD's) that ruined any kind of co-ordination of the strike. Yorktown's strike launched later (around 0900) becuase she was waiting to recover her search planes.

One final thought: at Midway, the Japanese expected Halsey to be commanding not Fletcher/Spruance. Wonder if that would have ended differently?

[Ranger-75]

Air naval and land ratings will not decrease, they "may" increase based on experience. you can see an experience value in the editor, but I don't know the rate of increase or the thresholds, etc.

According to the rules manual, and we all know how marvelous that document is, agressiveness will not increase. It's like an innate characteristic of the leader.

Nimitz' message to Halsey (asking where he was) was not in code.

[Admiral DadMan]

On the Nimitz to Halsey message:

WHERE IS REPEAT WHERE IT TF 34? THE WORLD WONDERS.

According to Capt. Samuel Eliot Morison's (USN Ret.), "Two Ocean War" the last line, "THE WORLD WONDERS" was inserted as "padding" to throw off possible enemy decrypters and was not intended to be part of the message.