Rifle Squad Differences?

[Shazman]

Now my head hurts. [:(]

[Central Blue]

Generally, when it comes to weapons I think people overemphasize rate of fire, shell weight, range, etc. One has to look at such 'softer' data as reliability, ease of use, and the doctrine for that use.

Well, at least in theory, if the liability or redeeming feature is idiosyncratic to the weapon rather than the unit as a whole, one would want to adjust the values for that weapon, not for the unit.

I talk about individual weapons and you talk about doctrine and training. I talk about doctrine and training and you talk about individual weapons.

Like, if you are convinced that the H-78 was a piece of crap that burst into flame under rifle fire, then one would units affected to exactly the extent that they were equipped with H-78's. The obvious thing to do is to adjust the values one assigns to the H-78.

Fine, but dragging vehicles into a discussion about squads is apples and oranges unless you think someone here is arguing that they should be evaluated by the same criteria.

I think part of the difference here is my attitude towards design. I always adjust weapon values to whatever I find appropriate to the scenario. It's not like I see this as some kind of radical measure

There's nothing radical about adjusting weapon values to suit whatever it is you are trying to accomplish in a given scenario at a given time and distance scale in a specific time period. The water-cooled .30/.303/7.92 Maxim-type machine gun has not been the standard mmg for some time and may not be the best standard for basing AP on even in the era when they were common. The scenario could be taking place in an environment where some weapons systems under-performed normal operations in a significant way.

Whether you have some method of comparing apples to apples in the world of squad AP value (or other weapons systems) or prefer to rely on your feelings about your opinions on soft "data" like warm fuzzy feelings about a particular squad weapon is entirely your call.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: Central Blue

I talk about individual weapons and you talk about doctrine and training. I talk about doctrine and training and you talk about individual weapons.

Well it's all part of the same question. At the end of the day you want units that perform appropriately. How you get there is not especially important.

[Central Blue]

Well it's all part of the same question.

A point that is not in dispute. Decisions are being made about individual weapons for the squad for some reason -- whether its a coherent doctrine or a sop to the local arms industry. That doesn't mean that there can't be some systematic method of evaluating the various types of weapons that make sense in the world of this game. Nor does it mean that individual squad weapons are a trivial factor.

The fact that Germans decided to form squad doctrine around the LMG doesn't mean jack if that LMG is the M1919. You can read the British army and US Army talking about a base of fire for the squad in WWII. The Germans did something about it. The Marines did something entirely different with what was available.

How you get there is not especially important.

Perhaps not. But I like to have something that I could easily explain to others if I ever finish and post a scenario. Vahauser and Lemay have a system that can easily be understood within the context of the game as it is written. Heck, it could even be the desire to make the unit values mimic your favorite old Avalon Hill board game. But if you're adding and subtracting numbers because they feel right according to your opinion about squad doctrine based on who knows what criteria, then I am skeptical.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: Central Blue

...prefer to rely on your feelings about your opinions on soft "data" like warm fuzzy feelings about a particular squad weapon is entirely your call.

The implication here is that intangibles like 'soft' data are inherently less important than nice, specific numbers like muzzle velocity, etc.

That's not a valid approach at all. Take two aircraft with similar values for 'hard' data -- say the Westland Whirlwind and the Bf-110.

About the same? Not at all. The Bf-110 was decidedly a disappointment -- but remained valuable in certain roles and under certain circumstances. The Westland Whirlwind was completely useless.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: Central Blue

Perhaps not. But I like to have something that I could easily explain to others if I ever finish and post a scenario. Vahauser and Lemay have a system that can easily be understood within the context of the game as it is written. Heck, it could even be the desire to make the unit values mimic your favorite old Avalon Hill board game. But if you're adding and subtracting numbers because they feel right according to your opinion about squad doctrine based on who knows what criteria, then I am skeptical.

This would work if the goal was to produce a scenario with values that could be clearly defended in a short argument.

It's not -- or at least it isn't for me. The goal is to produce a scenario that models the situation as accurately as possible. Whether or not Curtis LeMay can score rhetorical points off it if he feels so inclined is a decidedly secondary consideration -- and I imagine Curtis feels the same way.

When he makes a design decision he doesn't ask -- 'Can Colin make this look stupid?' I assume he asks 'does this accurately model what was going on?'

If -- say -- I am deciding what values to assign to a 'Home Guard Rifle Squad' for my Seelowe scenario, I don't look up Lewis gun rates of fire and try to work out whether the Springfield was a better rifle than the Enfield. No -- I think about who was in the Home Guard, what I think their attitude would have been, and how common military experience was in the population. Plus maybe considerations as to the physical fitness of the average British forty five year old.

Now, my choices on all of these would be far harder to defend than some decision about how Lewis Guns compared to Bren Guns. That doesn't make me inclined to base my decision primarily on how Lewis Guns compared to Bren Guns.

When Guderian became Inspector of Armored Troops in 1943, one of his more important decisions was to insist that Mark IV production be continued even though the Panther was available -- and he was very proud that he did this.

Weird, isn't it? The Panther was twice as good as the Mark IV. Except that the early Panther was very unreliable, whereas the Mark IV was a well-tested design with all the bugs worked out. Except that virtually all Wehrmacht tank mechanics were very familiar with the Mark IV but few had seen a Panther.

Etc. All those fuzzy intangibles, in other words. They matter. In fact, I suspect that they can be more important than the tangibles.

[ColinWright]

Let's take the British 25 pounder. This weapon serves to illustrate a couple of points quite nicely.

Consider it as an AT weapon. Would it have the same values as some other artillery piece with the same shell weight, muzzle velocity, rate of fire, size and weight, etc?

Not at all. First off, the 25 pounder was designed as a dual purpose piece. It was able to rotate quickly, AP ammunition was routinely issued for it, and its crews were trained to use it as an AT gun.

Okay -- so it has a considerable AT value. Is that value always the same?

No -- it changed. The 25 pounder -- unlike a single-purpose AT gun -- did not have a particularly high muzzle velocity. That meant it was only effective as an AT piece at fairly short range.

At first, when German panzers encountered it in the AT role, they would try to close the range and kill the crews. Say in 1941.

By 1942, they had learned different. Just stay outside its range and shell it with the 75 mm gun on the Mark IV.

The AT value drops. Same gun, same crews, same shells, even the same targets. But one of those 'soft' factors has changed -- in this case, how the enemy treats the weapon. This completely changes the appropriate AT value for the piece.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: L`zard

Considering that there are 'Editors' available to scenario designers, where-in they can change almost all the numbers to make a sqd work as they please, all I can say to you is that 'IT DEPENDS'.........

I would only slightly take issue with this. While there is the equipment file that can be changed as you please, when it comes to squads, there's not as much latitude as you might think. That's because the system uses integers instead of reals. The realistic range for squad AP values is about 2, 3, 4, 5, & 6. You can't set it to 3.78 or 5.14, etc. And, no, the x8 values aren't used. The system uses the rounded /8 values. That's why I still use the method I listed above. There isn't enough fine control to properly distinguish between an 8-man squad vs. a 14 man squad, for example, using the range available.

Now, one can re-jigger the entire system to use much higher values for everything. That would give you finer control. But that requires recalulating every peice of equipment in the inventory. And I'm not sure how the system would handle it.

[Central Blue]

The goal is to produce a scenario that models the situation as accurately as possible.

So long as you don't have to describe your criteria in a way that any potential player could evaluate your model, your accuracy, or whether they should put any effort into playing your scenario. Your criteria works well enough if your only goal is to have the scenario mostly come to the same result as the historical action or campaign regardless of what the player on the losing side brings to the game.

Let's take the British 25 pounder. This weapon serves to illustrate a couple of points quite nicely.

Consider it as an AT weapon.

It's all very well to talk about the AT value of the 25 pounder, but it doesn't have one in the game Norm wrote. Some people prefer to look up the available data and others have feelings based on whatever.

Would it have the same values as some other artillery piece with the same shell weight, muzzle velocity, rate of fire, size and weight, etc?

Who else had an 88mm field gun and bothered to develop an AP shot for it? But to try to take your question seriously, I am having a hard time understanding why identical guns would have different results under the same conditions unless it was some matter of the people employiog the gun.

No -- it changed. The 25 pounder -- unlike a single-purpose AT gun -- did not have a particularly high muzzle velocity. That meant it was only effective as an AT piece at fairly short range.

Nothing changed but the thickness of the armor on the approaching vehicles and the range at which the opposing weapons engage each other. The other possible change was the availability of alternative weapons systems that allowed the 25 pounder to mostly return to its original purpose -- so long range AT shots aren't that important if they are screened by six pounders or seventeen pounders.

At 500 or 2000 meters the 25 pounder is piercing X amount of armor so long as it is firing the same projectile from the same tube with the same charge -- otherwise it is a different weapon with the ACOW editor and the game that Norm wrote.

A person so inclined could look up the numbers and types of models of PZ IV in North Africa, how to rate their armor, and then whether they were routinely and effectively blazing away at the 25 pounders in 1942 without fear of counter fire.

Or you could have feelings about your opinions, and lots of warm fuzzys and soft data, and expect the player evaluating whether to play your scenario will go along for the ride.

[vahauser]

Over a year ago, I designed a spreadsheet based on the hard data used in Steel Panthers to derive WW2 equipment ratings for TOAW III.  After months and months of messing around with that spreadsheet (based on tactical combat data), I've come up with numbers that make sense to me.  To me.  To anybody else?  Maybe not.

However, and here is the point, the spreadsheet is internally consistent.  This means that the numbers are not simply arbitrary and have had a lot of calibration and fine tuning applied to them.  How does this apply to rifle squads?  Well, I "count rifles", too, like pretty much everybody else (including Norm) who uses the BioEd.  It's how the game was developed.  It's how the game works.

Here is how I differentiate between rifle squads in battalions:
Step 1:  I use battalions (not companies or regiments) as the fundamental building block.
Step 2:  I total the number of men in the battalion (say, 600 or 800, etc.)
Step 3:  I determine how many rifle squads are in the battalion.
Step 4:  I determine how many crewed weapons are in the battalion (this includes squad LMGs).
Step 5:  I do an approximation of how many combat troops are used by the rifle squads + crewed weapons in the battalion.  For example, a Soviet rifle battalion might have 600 men and approximately the same number of rifle squads + crewed weapons as a German rifle battalion that has 800 men.  So, what does this mean?  This means that the German battalion has higher levels of support (communications, medical, supply, etc.).  Thus, both battalions might have 27 squads + approximately the same number of crewed weapons, but the German battalion will get higher ratings for proficiency, supply, readiness than the Soviet battalion, all other factors being equal.

In terms of the actual "counting rifles" approach to rifle squads, Curtis is more correct than Colin.  TOAW III is all about counting rifles.  It's how Norm designed the game.  Colin's "intangible" approach might sound nifty, but his approach is a square peg trying to fit into a triangular hole.  Golden Delicious is also correct in that all the men in the battalion must be accounted for somehow, even if they aren't all combat troops in the rifle squads and crewed weapons. [EDIT: Note to Golden Delicious, all those extra men in the Polish rifle battalions (and squads) made for a very cumbersome command situation that was nowhere near as lean and efficient as the German organization (which was not very lean and efficient itself (by later-war standards)).]

In terms of actually assigning combat values to rifle squads using the BioEd, I recommend that you don't do it unless your numbers are internally consistent from top to bottom.  I use 27 as my baseline combat value in my WW2 equipment spreadsheet.  Why 27?  27 is the value that Norm assigned to the HMG.  27 is also a good "midrange" baseline number to work from (meaning that 27 has a variety of equipments both weaker and stronger to compare it to).  Thus, all of my spreadsheet values are normalized to the 27 baseline value I've chosen.  This results in a rifle having a combat value of around 2 (depending on the kind of rifle).  So, a German rifle squad of 10 men (this is historically convenient because most German rifle squads throughout most of the war had 10 men) has 7 rifles + 1 LMG + 1 squad leader (who I assign a combat value of 1, half a rifle, because he should be leading and managing and directing his squad instead of firing his weapon).  This results in a 1943 German rifle squad having a combat value of around 27 (funny how that works out). 14 for the 7 rifles + 12 for the LMG42 + 1 for the squad leader = 27.

Now here is the rub.  The standard LMG works out to a combat value of 10 in my spreadsheet.  This means that most other rifle squads have a combat value of 25 (14 for 7 rifles + 10 for a standard LMG + 1 for the squad leader) instead of the 27 that I gave the Germans (since the Germans have an LMG42).  How can I account for the difference without having to create a whole new equipment in the BioEd for 'German 1943 rifle squad' (which opens a big can of worms since it implies an overwhelming plethora of differentiated rifle squads by nationality and date and equipment, ugh! and I really don't want to do that)?  Well, I can use the heavy rifle squads to make up for the difference.  27 basic rifle squads (at 25 per squad) is 675 and 27 rifle squads using LMG42s (at 27 per squad) is 729.  The difference is 54.  A standard heavy rifle squad is 31 in my spreadsheet (5 rifles (10) + 2 LMGs (20) + 1 squad leader (1) = 31).  Hence the difference between a standard rifle squad (25) and a standard heavy rifle squad (31) is 6.  And 6 times 9 equals 54.  Voila.  So, I can account for the superior LMG42 without having to create a whole mess of new equipment slots in the BioEd by simply using heavy rifle squads to account for the difference in performance.  Thus, a German battalion would have 18 standard + 9 heavy rifle squads in 1943 to account for the LMG42s.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: Central Blue

The goal is to produce a scenario that models the situation as accurately as possible.

So long as you don't have to describe your criteria in a way that any potential player could evaluate your model, your accuracy, or whether they should put any effort into playing your scenario....

Not what I said. The rest of your post seems to continue in this vein, too.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: vahauser
In terms of the actual "counting rifles" approach to rifle squads, Curtis is more correct than Colin.  TOAW III is all about counting rifles.  It's how Norm designed the game.  Colin's "intangible" approach might sound nifty, but his approach is a square peg trying to fit into a triangular hole. 

You could just as easily reverse this argument. Norm has given you a more or less reasonable analysis of the 'hard' factors -- so part of your job as the designer is to think about how to weight the 'soft' factors.

Take the Stuka. Using 'hard' factors, an 'early' Stuka is about half as effective as a 'late' Stuka.

Anyone comparing the impact Stukas had on the battlefield in 1939-40 to that they had in 1942-43 will realize that there's a problem here. In fact, there's a problem with the early Stuka's rather modest numbers, period.

So I modify the 'early' Stuka so that it has the bombardment values of the late Stuka -- but not the increased range. I could argue that's part of my job as a designer.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: vahauser

In terms of the actual "counting rifles" approach to rifle squads, Curtis is more correct than Colin.  TOAW III is all about counting rifles.  It's how Norm designed the game...

Maybe. However I recoil from Curtis' approach for two reasons.

The first is admittedly irrational. I prefer that 36 rifle-squad battalions have 36 rifle squads. If I did anything, I'd probably modify the values for the squad rather than add more squads. As I noted earlier, I routinely modify values for each scenario I design, so there's no problem there.

The second reason is somewhat easier to defend. I think that Norm's density values err on the side of being too restrictive. One will be severely penalized if one jams in as many troops into a given area as historically often were jammed in.

I've never worked out what should be done about this. However, in the meantime, following formulas that increase the amount of equipment in each unit will obviously worsen the problem.

[ColinWright]

There's another consideration as well -- something that I've run into.

This may strike some as heresy, but TOAW does not offer a fully comprehensive simulation of warfare. You can do things in it that you can't do in real life.

...Like stick artillery in the front lines and use it to provide ranged fire support.

So you may work out that the _____ field howitzer should have an AT value of 10 and that in the typical unit, there would be the equivalent of one rifle and three light rifles for every actual artillery piece.

However, if you simply apply these conclusions, you may find that you've created a scenario where it pays players to use their artillery in very ahistorical ways.

Maybe not. It would depend on the scenario. This sort of consideration is what inclines me towards scenario-specific design. After all, the notion of a universal engine is not necessarily completely valid. One could argue that it is the designer's job to ameliorate the resulting distortions, not reinforce them.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: vahauser

[EDIT: Note to Golden Delicious, all those extra men in the Polish rifle battalions (and squads) made for a very cumbersome command situation that was nowhere near as lean and efficient as the German organization

Well I just presumed that the Polish army as a whole had a cumbersome command structure- and designed accordingly.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
The second reason is somewhat easier to defend. I think that Norm's density values err on the side of being too restrictive. One will be severely penalized if one jams in as many troops into a given area as historically often were jammed in.

This really comes across in Bo- Curtis' France 1944 scenario. When I tried that, it was virtually impossible to avoid density penalties. See, every unit had about twice as many active defenders as I would have expected.

[vahauser]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

There's another consideration as well -- something that I've run into.

This may strike some as heresy, but TOAW does not offer a fully comprehensive simulation of warfare. You can do things in it that you can't do in real life.

...Like stick artillery in the front lines and use it to provide ranged fire support.

So you may work out that the _____ field howitzer should have an AT value of 10 and that in the typical unit, there would be the equivalent of one rifle and three light rifles for every actual artillery piece.

However, if you simply apply these conclusions, you may find that you've created a scenario where it pays players to use their artillery in very ahistorical ways.

Maybe not. It would depend on the scenario. This sort of consideration is what inclines me towards scenario-specific design. After all, the notion of a universal engine is not necessarily completely valid. One could argue that it is the designer's job to ameliorate the resulting distortions, not reinforce them.

I generally agree that each .eqp file and each scenario should be designed on a scenario-by-scenario basis. This, to me, is the biggest problem with the Directive 21 scenario currently being playtested--it tries to tackle too big a time frame (1941-1945) on a game scale that doesn't quite fit (15km hexes and 1/2-week (or 25km hexes and 1-week) turns would have been better). The unit density issues are very apparent in that scenario, too. [Aside: I started a thread a year or so ago on this very issue of density problems at the smaller hex sizes.]

But, to return to the topic at hand, how designers decide to handle representing rifle squads within their scenario can vary greatly. This is amply shown by the variety of replies in this thread. I prefer the Golden Delicious/Curtis Lemay approach but also using an .eqp file of my own design for each scenario.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: vahauser

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

There's another consideration as well -- something that I've run into.

This may strike some as heresy, but TOAW does not offer a fully comprehensive simulation of warfare. You can do things in it that you can't do in real life.

...Like stick artillery in the front lines and use it to provide ranged fire support.

So you may work out that the _____ field howitzer should have an AT value of 10 and that in the typical unit, there would be the equivalent of one rifle and three light rifles for every actual artillery piece.

However, if you simply apply these conclusions, you may find that you've created a scenario where it pays players to use their artillery in very ahistorical ways.

Maybe not. It would depend on the scenario. This sort of consideration is what inclines me towards scenario-specific design. After all, the notion of a universal engine is not necessarily completely valid. One could argue that it is the designer's job to ameliorate the resulting distortions, not reinforce them.

I generally agree that each .eqp file and each scenario should be designed on a scenario-by-scenario basis. This, to me, is the biggest problem with the Directive 21 scenario currently being playtested--it tries to tackle too big a time frame (1941-1945) on a game scale that doesn't quite fit (15km hexes and 1/2-week (or 25km hexes and 1-week) turns would have been better). The unit density issues are very apparent in that scenario, too. [Aside: I started a thread a year or so ago on this very issue of density problems at the smaller hex sizes.]

But, to return to the topic at hand, how designers decide to handle representing rifle squads within their scenario can vary greatly. This is amply shown by the variety of replies in this thread. I prefer the Golden Delicious/Curtis Lemay approach but also using an .eqp file of my own design for each scenario.

Yeah. I'm sure it's already on the wishlist, but density penalties and when they apply really should be designer controlled. Aside from the question of whether Norm's values really do represent some kind of median -- I think they're too severe -- it would also eliminate the problem noted with the approach used by Curtis and others, where for one reason or another, they've upped the weapon count from what others might employ.

Parenthetically, one thought that occurred to me when reading about Russian mass attacks -- and mass attacks in general -- is that some armies probably didn't really have a choice.

The traditional eighteenth-nineteenth century model of soldiers packed in like sardines offers one obvious advantage. People are much braver -- and much easier to control -- if they have their fellows right alongside them. I was in riots in the Sixties as a kid, and this is true. If you're part of a mass, you'll do things you'd never have the nerve to do if you felt isolated. Like fling rocks at heavily armed cops and then charge them. I remember the thoughts going through my head. Pack people tightly enough together, and you just don't feel a sense of personal danger -- at least so long as the crowd in general doesn't panic.

For this reason, armies have generally been as densely packed as the firepower of the era will permit -- and sometimes will past the era. Armies that had well-motivated material and could afford the luxury of extensive infantry training -- the German army of World War II, the Americans, the British -- could launch attacks with the soldiers widely dispersed.

Other armies -- the Russians of 1941-43, the Chinese of 1950-53 -- did not. They probably could not. To maintain control, to keep everyone advancing required a dense mass. As to what that meant one machine gun could do -- well, that just had to be accepted.

It's interesting. Now, how completely valid this is, and how to reflect it in design, I don't know. More generally, the whole topic of morale, and 'proficiency' -- which are often two very different things -- could do with a more refined treatment in TOAW.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious


...Bo- Curtis'...

Bokurt? CurtCross? That last is a little less mystifying.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

ORIGINAL: vahauser
In terms of the actual "counting rifles" approach to rifle squads, Curtis is more correct than Colin.  TOAW III is all about counting rifles.  It's how Norm designed the game.  Colin's "intangible" approach might sound nifty, but his approach is a square peg trying to fit into a triangular hole. 

You could just as easily reverse this argument. Norm has given you a more or less reasonable analysis of the 'hard' factors -- so part of your job as the designer is to think about how to weight the 'soft' factors.

Take the Stuka. Using 'hard' factors, an 'early' Stuka is about half as effective as a 'late' Stuka.

Anyone comparing the impact Stukas had on the battlefield in 1939-40 to that they had in 1942-43 will realize that there's a problem here. In fact, there's a problem with the early Stuka's rather modest numbers, period.

So I modify the 'early' Stuka so that it has the bombardment values of the late Stuka -- but not the increased range. I could argue that's part of my job as a designer.

I don't know how I'm getting dragged into this issue. I have no problem with using soft factors for equipment values - or any other factors, for that matter.