Opinion: Are Finns over-modelled?

[JJKettunen]

Originally posted by Arto


http://www.winterwar.com/War%27sEnd/casualti.htm [The above table data gives a total death count of 126 875. Krivosheev's study came up with the figure of 264 908 wounded (not including the cases of sickness), thus giving the total number 391 783 Soviet casualties.

/B]

Thanx.

[peter hellman]

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And another thing too. Finland got off incredibly easy with the Soviets, who missed the treatment the Red Army gave to the Germans during their trimuphant march to Moscow. Way, way to easy.
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Sorry to say, GUTB, I miss your point here. Could you...?

And Keke, saturday night going on, I know what you're talking about:D

[Yogi Yohan]

Originally posted by Charles_22
The Finns were good for the type of warfare they found themselves in, but there's no way they were likely to exceed the GE accomplishments in the USSR, quite a different form of warfare indeed, should they have had the same numbers. Nobody till the USSR in '43, had any concept of using tanks and aircraft to advance in anything resembling rapid fashion, except the Germans (with the "early" tactics in NAfrica being an isolated British exception). If the Finns got all the German training/tactics, and then remembered their own, they would've combined really good defense with really good offense, but that's a fairy tale force.

You don't take an exceptional force, and realistically, with the kind of training they had, be able to make a case that they would've been a better force for another job, at which another force was already exceptional at it. Nobody thinks the Germans were better at beach invasion than the US, do they? Or would the Finns be better at beach invasions? Of course not, though the soldiers may had been very high quality, even high quality will probably be average at best when taking on a completely different mindset.

No argument with that, I only quoted what that Soviet officer had said. While I agree totally with your analysis, it does say something about the impression the Finns caused on their Soviet foes, and THAT in turn tells us a lot of the soldierly qualities of the Finns during WW2.

[Charles2222]

Yogi Yohan: Yeah, but of course the Soviet officer had no idea of the difficulties involved in an basically defensive force becoming offensive. More and more, when I see people come up with hypothetical stuff, it you really weigh it in real world terms, you start seeing how something which sounds reasonable is actually pretty far-fetched.

Today was something of a good example. I heard on a sports broadcast that the Yankees lost today's game because they became 'a little too daring' because a runner got thrown out trying to steal with two outs, with their being down only one run. Really? So, suppose they didn't try to steal, would they still lose? It seems, that people, when they see a situation where somebody "loses", automatically assumes what they did was the wrong thing to do. In other words, they claim with hindsight that what happened lost it, but that's coming at it from the angle that something else would have worked, and, of course, people will usually also follow that by saying "this would have worked". But really, isn't it entirely possible, in some cases even likely, that the some or all alternatives would have failed too?

[mogami]

The Finns did well the first time around. The second time they had no choice but to give in. When refering to the Soviets in Finland remember there were 2 different offensives with completly reversed results.



"It wasn't until 1944 could Soviet soldeirs enjoy high levels of training, superior weaponry, mechnizations and their vast artillery and aviation advantage"


By 1944 the Soviets were veterans of many successfull offensive operations. The Soviet Union never changed its pre-war doctrine, it was not till 43 they were able to employ it successfully all the time. But in limited cases they employed it from first to last
vrs Japan 1939
vrs Finland 2nd try
vrs Germans winter 41/42
vrs Germans Stalingrand counter offensive
vrs Italians winter 42 'Little Saturn'
after Kursk in 43 the Germans never prevented a Soviet Offensive from meeting it's operational goal.

The Soviets were able to make good the loss of the First debacle in Finland the Finns could not make good the cost of their victory.

[JJKettunen]

Originally posted by Charles_22
The Finns were good for the type of warfare they found themselves in, but there's no way they were likely to exceed the GE accomplishments in the USSR, quite a different form of warfare indeed, should they have had the same numbers. Nobody till the USSR in '43, had any concept of using tanks and aircraft to advance in anything resembling rapid fashion, except the Germans (with the "early" tactics in NAfrica being an isolated British exception). If the Finns got all the German training/tactics, and then remembered their own, they would've combined really good defense with really good offense, but that's a fairy tale force.

You don't take an exceptional force, and realistically, with the kind of training they had, be able to make a case that they would've been a better force for another job, at which another force was already exceptional at it. Nobody thinks the Germans were better at beach invasion than the US, do they? Or would the Finns be better at beach invasions? Of course not, though the soldiers may had been very high quality, even high quality will probably be average at best when taking on a completely different mindset.

I´m back from the local bars and I´ll cut and paste some piece of information I sent to WarfareHQ´s forum couple of days ago, or something....


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IMHO the Germans were pound for pound the best fighting force of WWII. I'm talking about the major combatants who could field large scale military forces and project them well outside their own borders. Many countries have fine units that are experts at fighting in their own element. The Germans proved they could fight in the steppes, the desert, the mountains, central Europe, etc. The Germans certainly didn't have the best equipment or industrial base. How then did they achieve such remarkable success? Simple. Training and leadership. No doubt about it.
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There was one curious exeption in that German all-around fighting ability during WWII. It was fighting in forested areas. Finnish Army experienced this when fighting together with German divisions in Lappland (northern part of Finland, 1941-44) and finally against them. (1944-45; known as the War of Lappland).

What very often happened was that co-ordinated attacks (usually towards Murmansk rail line) had to be halted when German units were miles behind and sofore exposed Finnish units´ flanks to Russian counter-attacks. Finnish soldiers were amazed by the poor ability of German infantry to scout, move fast and silently, and fight effectively on those vast areas of forests and marshes. German soldiers fe shouted to each other to keep themselves in right direction and that was (and is) a big no-no in forest warfare. It appeared then that German soldiers were suffering some kind of "forest-fright". It was said that when Finnish advanced through forests and stopped when open terrain came, Germans advanced through open terrain and stopped when forests came.

All this was a bit confusing for Finns, because all the training otherwise was based on German doctrines. Guderian, in his memoirs, explained this curiosity by the fact that German landowners were so jealous about their forests, that German Army had absolutely no possibilities to train themselves in woodlands.

[mogami]

"IMHO the Germans were pound for pound the best fighting force of WWII. I'm talking about the major combatants who could field large scale military forces and project them well outside their own borders. Many countries have fine units that are experts at fighting in their own element. The Germans proved they could fight in the steppes, the desert, the mountains, central Europe, etc. The Germans certainly didn't have the best equipment or industrial base. How then did they achieve such remarkable success? Simple. Training and leadership. No doubt about it"


Just on what do you base this remarkable observation. In campaigns where they enjoyed overmatched isolated UN prepared enemies? Or when they fought enemies who were equipped and ready? The great myth of WW2 is the fighting quality of the German Army. If we restrict it to just Panzer/mobile formations I would be more inclined to agree. The avg. German infantry man had no more success then many of his opponents who after being defeated left their homecountry and joined units supplied by the US. German Panzer troops up to 1943 displayed a flair for operations against immobile enemies but after mid 43 their success rate dropped of considerably. Germany suffered defeat astoundingly rapidly if you make DEC 7 1941 your start date. Also they had few victories worth commenting about past this date. They suffered defeats on par with any they had inflicted. The war saw the bulk of their military forces on each front collapse several times. (their recovery after such collapse bears note)
I don't find their period of success that remarkable, much more remarkable is the speed that they lost all their gains once they were unable to war on nations isolated and unready. Their enemies displayed a talent for adapting to combat their style and use it against them with equal skill. Then the real weakness of the German military was revealed. Not enough mobility. The Panzer division numbers were doubled after France but at the cost of reducing their strength by half. After the summer of 41 the Soviet Union built equipped and trained an entire new army that within a year had your vaunted Germans in retreat.
The US entered the war with a brand new army and 18 months later had forced the surrender of over 500k germans. There certainly were German units equal to or better then any but a flat statement refering to pound for pound does not have history to support it. (all IMHO)

[JJKettunen]

Originally posted by Mogami
Just on what do you base this remarkable observation. In campaigns where they enjoyed overmatched isolated UN prepared enemies?

I´m still awake. :p

That stuff between ----- wasn´t my text. I replied with the text following it.

Otherwise, read more war history (especially from the tactical point of view) before you continue with your "we won it - we were superior in all fields of warfare" piece of crap philosophy.

[mogami]

"Otherwise, read more war history (especially from the tactical point of view) before you continue with your "we won it - we were superior in all fields of warfare" piece of crap philosophy"

Hey bud no need to get snippy. I only asked the writer of that comment what he based his rating the Germans pound for pound the best military of WW2 on. If it was not you butt out. I also quite clearly put it was just my opinion if you don't like it thats fine but post an idea why (like I did) Keep your cheesy comments to your self. No doubt your reading material has been mostly written by Germans perhaps? Pound for pound against prepared opponents they do not stack up to where they could be rated the best. They may have had the best single/couple of divisions but then could also be debated. The overall record of the German army in WW2 is not that impressive. once you disregard their opponents from Sept 1 1939 to Dec 7 1941. 1942 saw them advance in Russia while the Soviets rebuilt by the end of that year the Soviets had turned the tables. In North Africa same year same result. I just don't see where they were measurably better then anyone else. I never claimed they were inferiour because we won, I said it because I don't see where they achived anything that their enemies later achived against them.
If it was not your text why are you reponding to my comments I don't see your name in my post. However I wonder how victory can be regarded as anything other then superiorty, to some degree many nations have won wars facing greater odds.

[JJKettunen]

My cheesy comment came out of the fact, that the German `landsers´ were the best all around fighters in the world. The point of the view here is tactical, and somewhat operational. Nobody brought the grand strategical point of view until you did. During both World Wars Germans had the strange admicture of tactical brilliance and strategical stupidity.

Here are couple of interesting quotes. The first one is from Niklas Zetterling´s (Swedish historian) book "Normandy 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness", and the other is from review of that book by Bill Stone.

1. It seems that the Allied numerical superiority in Normandy has not been clear to all authors. Indeed some have not even observed it at all. Stephen E. Ambrose has even written:
Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin relied on overwhelming numbers, and to some extent American-supplied equipment, to fight the Wehrmacht. The British and Americans were going to have to rely on their soldiers outfighting Nazi soldiers, because the numbers of troops on the opposing sides were roughly equal.

This is entirely wrong. When Operation Cobra was launched, the Germans had brought to Normandy about 410,000 men in divisions and non-divisional combat units. If this is multiplied by 1.19 [service and support manpower outside German divisions and non-div units] we arrive at approximately 490,000 soldiers. However, until 23 July, casualties amounted to 116,863, while only 10,078 replacements had arrived. This means that no more than 380,000 soldiers remained in Normandy or supported the fighting in Normandy.
On 25 July there were 812,000 US soldiers and 640,000 British in Normandy. This means that the Allies had a 3.8:1 superiority in manpower. This was better than the superiority enjoyed by the Red Army on the Eastern Front. On 1 June 1944 the Soviets pitted 7.25 million men against 2.62 million Germans.

2. There are far too many books blindly praising the superiority of German arms, worshiping every SS commander as though a god of war incarnate, and sometimes linking combat performance to Nazi racial and political ideology. In an environment where that kind of unhealthy fetishism is distressingly popular, it's no wonder that a cadre of writers such as Ambrose and Mansoor and Doubler and Brown might go a bit overboard in attempting to demonstrate the superiority of American combat performance in Europe, and some have even gone so far as to say not only were the Yanks the best in the business, but only a democratic society could produce soldiers of that quality. (That latter assertion, of course, is not far removed from the belief held in some other quarters that only the Soviet system could have produced armies capable of defeating Hitler.) Such polarization can make it difficult to examine the historical foundations and lessons of the campaign with any impartiality. In this contentious arena, however, Niklas Zetterling is a breath of fresh air. With an array of facts and figures, and analysis as relentlessly apolitical as a spreadsheet, he provides a tremendous amount of invaluable information and draws some rational conclusions.
Given this database of units and manpower and tanks and guns and casualties, one point shines through. German soldiers certainly were not supermen, and they were never invincible, but in Normandy they absolutely managed to do more with considerably less than most historians have previously conceded.

[Yogi Yohan]

Originally posted by Charles_22
Yogi Yohan: Yeah, but of course the Soviet officer had no idea of the difficulties involved in an basically defensive force becoming offensive. More and more, when I see people come up with hypothetical stuff, it you really weigh it in real world terms, you start seeing how something which sounds reasonable is actually pretty far-fetched.

Today was something of a good example. I heard on a sports broadcast that the Yankees lost today's game because they became 'a little too daring' because a runner got thrown out trying to steal with two outs, with their being down only one run. Really? So, suppose they didn't try to steal, would they still lose? It seems, that people, when they see a situation where somebody "loses", automatically assumes what they did was the wrong thing to do. In other words, they claim with hindsight that what happened lost it, but that's coming at it from the angle that something else would have worked, and, of course, people will usually also follow that by saying "this would have worked". But really, isn't it entirely possible, in some cases even likely, that the some or all alternatives would have failed too?

This is certainly true. About a year ago, I was in a debate at the WiR forum regarding the battle of Kiev in 1941. I tried to defend the position that although it didn't win the war for Germany, the alternative cost for not destroying Buddeny's half-million men and capturing the Donbass industrial region might well have caused a German defeat anyway - even if Moscow was captured instead. We'll never know one way or the other, but at the very least, as you say, there's no guarantee that the alternate course of action would have led to success.

[Charles2222]

Keke:

All this was a bit confusing for Finns, because all the training otherwise was based on German doctrines. Guderian, in his memoirs, explained this curiosity by the fact that German landowners were so jealous about their forests, that German Army had absolutely no possibilities to train themselves in woodlands.

As far as the Soviet officer's comments go, here's some exceptions. Firstly, if the Finns were attacking the USSR with 3,000,000 they wouldn't be attacking a land with nothing but forests, which indeed had very many wide-open spaces. Secondly, the Germans did do very well in two instances of what you might call forest warfare; the Ardennes battles are those. It wasn't like they did very well at thos battles at overwhelming an even or superior force, but that they both times achieved success beyond the scale of what anybody would've imagined.

[Charles2222]

Mogami: In your response to someone else you said among other things:

I don't find their period of success that remarkable, much more remarkable is the speed that they lost all their gains once they were unable to war on nations isolated and unready.

There's nothing that remarkable about the speed at which they lost them, but the speed their offensives often had, was in fact. Compare the invasion of France in '40 from the GE perspective and the Allied perspective in '44. Compare the taking of so much USSR land in 6 months, and then how it took over 3 years to lose it. Also if warring on isolated and unready nations is a disqualifier (and certainly that wasn't the case against France or the USSR) then reverse that thinking. When Germany started losing turf, particularly to the Soviets, and even more so at D-Day, weren't the Germans pretty isolated and unprepared? Still, they took France in no time, against foes larger than themselves (and if 8 months wasn't enough to prepare the French and British, then what was?), and they held that same area against forces maybe 2X their size (not including the very large disadvantage to sea and air) for around 6 months.

(a later add-on) You also said:

I never claimed they were inferiour because we won, I said it because I don't see where they achived anything that their enemies later achived against them.

Fancy wording, but that's saying the same thing as that the Germans were mediocre or awful because they "lost". If you lose the war, you lose everything you gained, and then some. In the case of France, it was the very mediocrity of the Allied forces on that front that prohibited their invading France sooner than they did, and also when compared to the German victory in the same region, it took them so long to take it once invading.

[JJKettunen]

Originally posted by Charles_22
Keke:

As far as the Soviet officer's comments go, here's some exceptions. Firstly, if the Finns were attacking the USSR with 3,000,000 they wouldn't be attacking a land with nothing but forests, which indeed had very many wide-open spaces.

With that I very much agree. Finns were specialists in forest warfare, Germans in mobile armoured warfare.

Secondly, the Germans did do very well in two instances of what you might call forest warfare; the Ardennes battles are those. It wasn't like they did very well at thos battles at overwhelming an even or superior force, but that they both times achieved success beyond the scale of what anybody would've imagined.

Well, Germans learned that from the best. For example: "From Finnish troops, the Germans learned a succesful method of using mortars in woods" - Handbook On German Military Forces (Mar´45), U.S. War Department

[GUTB]

Modern and apolitical historians all pretty much agree that Germany's failure is due to one factor: They couldn't replace their losses.

Now, don't get me wrong. The Germans were loaded with mistakes and inneficiencies. But the one, descisive failure was the fact that Germany was a middle power trying to take on a superpower -- and then later on, TWO superpowers. WW2 had nothing to do with the fight against imperialism as it is often credited as being; it was all about some middle powers trying to defeat the superpowers.

And one last thing: Lend-Lease was the not the decisive factor in the Soviet victory, as the bulk of it arrived after Stanlingrad and Kursk, and only ever amounted to a small percentage of Soviet manufacture (except for locamtives and trucks). What let the Soviets beat the Germans in the end comes down to the fact that the Soviets replaced their losses and got better. The Germans failed to replace their losses, and Soviet strategy and tactics became superior to theirs.

[JJKettunen]

Originally posted by GUTB
Modern and apolitical historians all pretty much agree that Germany's failure is due to one factor: They couldn't replace their losses.

Now, don't get me wrong. The Germans were loaded with mistakes and inneficiencies. But the one, descisive failure was the fact that Germany was a middle power trying to take on a superpower -- and then later on, TWO superpowers. WW2 had nothing to do with the fight against imperialism as it is often credited as being; it was all about some middle powers trying to defeat the superpowers.

And one last thing: Lend-Lease was the not the decisive factor in the Soviet victory, as the bulk of it arrived after Stanlingrad and Kursk, and only ever amounted to a small percentage of Soviet manufacture (except for locamtives and trucks). What let the Soviets beat the Germans in the end comes down to the fact that the Soviets replaced their losses and got better. The Germans failed to replace their losses, and Soviet strategy and tactics became superior to theirs.

That´s all very true, exept Soviet tactics were based on ruthless usage of manpower without any concerns of favourable kill ratios.

[mogami]

Originally posted by Charles_22
Mogami: In your response to someone else you said among other things:

There's nothing that remarkable about the speed at which they lost them, but the speed their offensives often had, was in fact. Compare the invasion of France in '40 from the GE perspective and the Allied perspective in '44. Compare the taking of so much USSR land in 6 months, and then how it took over 3 years to lose it. Also if warring on isolated and unready nations is a disqualifier (and certainly that wasn't the case against France or the USSR) then reverse that thinking. When Germany started losing turf, particularly to the Soviets, and even more so at D-Day, weren't the Germans pretty isolated and unprepared? Still, they took France in no time, against foes larger than themselves (and if 8 months wasn't enough to prepare the French and British, then what was?), and they held that same area against forces maybe 2X their size (not including the very large disadvantage to sea and air) for around 6 months.

I hardly know where to begin. I get the impression (I hope incorrectly) that you argue for the sake of arguing. To compare Normandy to France 1940 and look at it honestly you would not include the period from landing and buildup. But from the start of the breakout (Cobra) You say they held the area for 6 months. The Allies landed in June the German Army in France collapsed (Much like the French army had-only the German's had the room to retreat.) in Sept (4 Months) The Germans had the winter of 1939-40 to move troops and supplies to the West. I would think it apparent the Western Allies required sometime to do the same before attempting a breakthrough. From June to July is not overly long period. (which means the Western Allies caused the collapse of an enemy who had over 3 years to prepare) in 2 months (about the same amount of time the Germans needed to defeat France) Then again in Russia you start in June 41 saying the Soviets took longer to recapture what they lost. How do you count the same periods twice? The first Soviet Offensive was in the winter of 41-42 it was aimed at pushing the front back from Moscow this it did. The first Soviet Offensive with an objective of destroying an Axis army and leading to the recapture of Russian territory Was in Dec 42. (this group of Operations destroyed several axis armies (6th German 8th Italian among others)
Berlin fell aprox 29 months later (close enough to 3 years for me not to quibble) but I will point out the Soviet Army that defeated the Axis on the Eastern Front required 29 months to recapture what the Germans needed 19 months to capture. You would lead me to believe that 10 months is some amazing length of time. The claim is the better German soldier lost to the inferior Russian in only 30% more time? And the German army the Soviets pushed back was the better equipped. And had the benifit of their 19 months combat experiance.
(I know I know it was shear numbers and that stupid Hitler)
8 months seems like a long time to dig in (France 1940) however it is not enough time to prepare an unprepared army.
Wars are won or lost before the first battle is fought. The Germans were excellent at fighting Campaigns. They first isolated the target politicaly (Poland-via Soviet-Axis non-aggression pact) And then because they were already mobilized attacked. I do not dispute the effectiness of their tactics.
Germany lost the war because they did not know how (or had not prepared) to fight a war. All their plans counted on the enemy being defeated within 6 weeks to 6 months. And then they selected a new target and prepared before attacking again. (Poland/Norway/France & LowCountries/Yugoslavia/Greece/Russia 41
Everyone is entitled to have their favorite choice of 'best army'
best infantry' etc. I was mainly trying (unsuccessfully it appears)
to point out that there is very little difference between soldiers of the major combatants of WW2. They were all equally as brave.
They all contained soldiers who knew what they were doing.
Objective reasoning is dangerous since everything is not equal
The Russian expert infantryman did not first enter combat as a well trained soldier. He had to relie on actual battle field experiance. The German of 39-41 had a good deal of training
and by this measure it could be argued he was the best around.
But he did not keep this distinction. My point is that in order for him to be defeated a level of skill not generally acknowledged would have to be aquired by those who did defeat him. (bad soldiers in any amount still lose battles.-they simply don't (knowhow)fight. In combat you would be amazed at the true number of soldiers who fight (they may fire their weapon and not run but they don't fight) One of the draw backs to 'elite' units made up of combat troops from other units is the weakness they leave in the unit they are recruited from. Italian units that after Sept 43 changed sides and were re-equipped and supplied by the US demonstrated a dramatic improvment in their combat preformance. (like wise all the defeated countries that raised formations using US equippment)
I do not mean to subtract from the German soldiers reputation. Indeed an honest understanding of my points could only enhance it. To state that His opponents ultimatly proved to be at least his equal would imply he was not defeated by inferiour troops. (which is the paradox all those who think he was head and shoulders above everyone else impose on their logic) Put another way, I am not lowering him at all he was a great soldier his opponents were also great soldiers.


(a later add-on) You also said:Fancy wording, but that's saying the same thing as that the Germans were mediocre or awful because they "lost". If you lose the war, you lose everything you gained, and then some. In the case of France, it was the very mediocrity of the Allied forces on that front that prohibited their invading France sooner than they did, and also when compared to the German victory in the same region, it took them so long to take it once invading.

No it is nothing of the kind. It is simply what it says. If the German is measured by his accomplishments then his adversarys should be as well. And all I said was they did the same thing. The French troop was not mediocre, if you keep the leadership but place the two armies in opposite roles. The French army would have defeated a German Army lead by Gamelin. As pointed out above the Western Allies recaptured the ground in Approx the same time. The big differance was Gamelin was not Supreme Commader.

[Mikimoto]

Hi.

I always felt that the Allies won a War of Attrition that Germans could never win. Quantity has a Quality on his own...

[JJKettunen]

Originally posted by Mogami
The French army would have defeated a German Army lead by Gamelin. As pointed out above the Western Allies recaptured the ground in Approx the same time. The big differance was Gamelin was not Supreme Commader.

Gamelin was commander in Chief of the French and British Armies on the western front, and when the Germans broke through in May 1940, he was removed from command...

[Penetrator]

Originally posted by Mogami

The French army would have defeated a German Army lead by Gamelin.

So the differences between the two armies boil down to a single person? I suppose air superiority had nothing to do with it? I beg to differ...