ORIGINAL: Marty A
ORIGINAL: Tomcat
We're not talking about 1 history, we're talking about all historians, including yours, agreeing that the planes were destroyed on the ground. When MacArthur was asked by his subordinate for permission to attack the Japanese planes on Formosa he refused. This was several hours before the Japanese attacked the Philippines, and it was in defiance of the standing war plan to attack Formosa immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities. You keep using examples to illustrate a lack of CAP, so how can you also argue that he did anything useful? The facts that historians agree on seem to indicate that he refused permission to bomb Formosa, he did not take that action himself, he and his subordinates failed to organize proper CAP and search operations, he failed to adequately protect the planes on the ground, and the US air forces were destroyed in about 2 days. Even if it were true that "all" US planes were in the air "immediately", isn't that rather stupid? Planes do run out of fuel and unless you have strong reason to beleive that they are airborne when the attack is coming this is a big mistake, even if it is true, and I haven't seen any historian that believes it is true. I don't accept a Google search as legitimate scholarship. Anybody can put anything on the internet and much of it is simply rubbish.
The sky is what color in your world? i say planes destroyed on ground. you say i said not? i never read anything where mac ordered no attack. state source please. if all planes were not in air in morning if attack had come you would say that not having them in air was stupid also no? i read in books long ago that planes in air at dawn not on internet. i do 1 quick google search that took 5 seconds to say what i saw years ago. maybe you should do research before you talk. who are your history writers that say no planes flew in am of dec 8? i would like to read this because i never have. i do more looking since you write and i still see nothing on no attack order. and i certainly not defend mac. but then us holdout at bataan last longer than it should so maybe did some things right. imagine how long they could hold if they were ready.
There seems to be a real breakdown in communication here. The original argument is whether or not MacArthur took action to prevent the US planes from being destroyed on the ground. You seem to agree that many or most of the US planes were destroyed on the ground. So I guess the question is A) what did MacArthur do (as opposed to his subordinates); and B) what is the meaning of "nothing" - does it mean "no steps" or "ineffective steps". While Wikipedia is not known to be a reliable source of information, for the purposes of ending this discussion which has become heated and useless, let me just paste in a section of Wikipedia from Battle of the Philippines and hope it makes everybody happy.
Far East Air Force controversy
After news reached the Philippines that an attack on Pearl Harbor was in progress at around 03:00 a.m. on December 7, 1941,[23] FEAF interceptors had already conducted an air search for incoming aircraft reported shortly after midnight, but these had been Japanese scout planes reporting weather conditions.[24]
At 05:00 a.m. FEAF commander Gen. Brereton reported to USAFFE headquarters where he attempted to see MacArthur without success. He recommended to MacArthur's chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Richard Sutherland, that FEAF launch bombing missions against Formosa in accordance with Rainbow 5 war plan directives that Japanese territory from which an attack was likely to come be attacked. Authorization was withheld, but shortly afterward, in response to a telegram from General George C. Marshall instructing MacArthur to implement Rainbow 5, Brereton was ordered to have a strike in readiness for later approval.[25]
Through a series of disputed discussions and decisions, authorization for the first raid was not approved until 11:00 a.m. local time for an attack just before sunset, with a followup raid at dawn the next day. In the meantime Japanese plans to bomb FEAF's main bases was delayed by fog at its Formosa bases, so that only a small scale mission attacked targets in the northern tip of Luzon. At 08:00 a.m. Brereton received a telephone call from General Henry H. Arnold warning him not to allow his aircraft to be attacked while still on the ground. FEAF launched fighter patrols and all of its bombers on Luzon between 08:00 and 09:00 a.m. as a precautionary move. However several confusing and false reports of air attacks culminated in an all-clear being announced at 11:00, at which time the bombers were ordered to land and prepare for the afternoon raid on Formosa. The squadron of defending P-40 fighters patrolling the area also landed at Clark Field to refuel.
At 11:20 a.m., the radar post at Iba Field detected the incoming raid while it was still 130 miles out. It alerted FEAF headquarters and the command post at Clark Field, a warning which apparently reached only the pursuit group commander, with no further action taken to safeguard the air forces.[25]
When the Japanese pilots of the 11th Air Fleet attacked Clark Field at 12:30 p.m., they caught two squadrons of B-17s dispersed on the ground and its squadron of P-40 interceptors just preparing to taxi. The first wave of twenty-seven Japanese twin-engine bombers achieved complete tactical surprise, striking the P-40s as they taxied. A second bomber attack was supported by Zero fighters strafing the field that destroyed 12 of the 17 American heavy bombers present and seriously damaged three others.[26] Only three P-40s managed to take off. A simultaneous attack on the auxiliary field at Iba to the northwest was also successful: all but two of the 3rd Pursuit Squadron's P-40s, short on fuel, were destroyed in combat or from lack of gasoline when the attack caught them in their landing pattern. The Far East Air Force lost fully half its planes in the first attack, and was all but destroyed over the next few days.
No formal investigation took place regarding this failure as occurred in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor. After the war Brereton and Sutherland in effect blamed each other for FEAF being surprised on the ground, and MacArthur released a statement claiming that he had no knowledge of any recommendation to attack Formosa with B-17s.
(what else could it have been).
