What would the result of Midway attack be if kept secret?

[fbs]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Nevertheless, even if the landing failed, Yamamomomoto's plan would still succeed if the USN sailed into a trap.

If the Japanese don't take Midway, there is no "trap" for the USN to sail into. Indeed, if the Japanese fail to take Midway, and the Japanese CVs loiter in the area waiting for a response, it would have been a death trap to wipe out the Japanese CVs.

Well, in between the signal that the Japs are landing and the conclusion of the landings, quite some time may pass. The great question is whether Nimitz would send his ships out to help Midway during that time. I tend to think that he wouldn't risk sailing into an unknown situation, and would let Midway to fend off by itself.

As for Nagumo loitering around, there is always a risk, but I don't see any unreasonable risk. The advantage of having a moving airfield is that you can move it out of range, so one can strike first (to attempt to neutralize some enemy aircrafts), then move out of range and wait to find the enemy. His target were the USN carriers, so there's no need to keep bombing Midway until everything is destroyed (and he probably didn't have the ammo for that, anyway).

Just my two cents, of course.

Thanks,
fbs

[spence]

Compared to the time to steam at 20 kts from Pearl Harbor to Midway the landing of two battalions would take no time at all. In fact, by the time a TF got steam up (assuming no prior warning) the landing would have been successful (as in snowballs chance in hell) or failed.

[John Lansford]

If the Japanese trap works as expected, then Midway's garrison isn't reinforced as it was IRL.  What was the garrison's strength before the decision was made to send the reinforcements?  Was it just the Marine CD unit plus some engineers?

[spence]

From Hyperwar link "Marines at Midway"

1940
31 May Capt. Samuel G. Taxis was ordered to Midway to perform initial survey and reconnaissance for defenses.
9 July Capt. Kenneth W. Benner ordered to Midway to relieve Captain Taxis and continue survey and reconnaissance.
29 September Midway Detachment, Fleet Marine Force (9 officers and 168 enlisted), under Maj. Harold C. Roberts, arrives Midway and commences installation of 3d Defense Battalion matériel.
1941
14 February Remainder of 3d Defense Battalion (28 officers and 556 enlisted), under Col. Robert H. Pepper, arrives Midway and continues defensive preparations.
1 August Naval Air Station, Midway, goes into commission.
11 September 6th Defense Battalion (Col. Raphael Griffin) relieves 3d Defense Battalion as the atoll's garrison.
19 November 1st Lt. Loren D. Everton, with 60 enlisted, sent forward to Midway as ground echelon from Marine Air Group 21, to prepare for reception of aircraft.
7 December Japanese destroyers Akebono and Ushio bombard Midway, inflicting 14 casualties and considerable damage to structures.
17 December Marine Scout Bombing Squadron 231 (Maj. Clarence J. Chappell) reaches Midway after executing world's record single-engine land-plane massed over-water flight (1,137 miles) from Hickam Field, T.H.
24 December Batteries A and C, 4th Defense Battalion (Capt. Custis Burton, Jr.) arrive from Oahu to reinforce Midway.
25 December Marine Fighting Squadron 221 flies in to Midway from USS Saratoga.
26 December 4th Defense Battalion units and ground echelon of VMF-211 arrive from fruitless attempt to relieve Wake, and are assigned to Midway garrison.
1942
25 January Enemy submarine I-173 bombards Midway.
8 February Enemy submarine bombards Midway.
10 February Enemy submarine bombards Midway.
1 March Marine Air Group 22 is commissioned from squadrons on Midway.
10 March Four-plane section of fighters from VMF-221 shoots down enemy patrol seaplane southwest of Midway.
2 May Admiral Nimitz visits Midway to ascertain its defensive readiness and needs.
20 May Admiral Nimitz warns Captain Simard and Colonel Shannon of impending Japanese attack.
25 May Companies C and D, 2d Raider Battalion (Capt. Donald H. Hastie) and 37-mm battery, 3d Defense Battalion (Capt. Ronald K. Miller), arrive Midway.
26 May USS Kittyhawk arrives at Midway with crucial air and ground reinforcements.

Looks like there were 2 Marine Defense Battalions substantially in place before the buildup; in place by late December, 41. Wake only had half of a battalion or so. IJ landing force was in for a real tough go even before the buildup. Garrison probably lacked the infantry and tank reserves but was still substantial.

[John 3rd]

Could the planned Japanese Force have taken on the 2nd Defense Bat?  These were pretty tough units (as the Japanese found out at Wake).
 

[Nikademus]

rule of thumb is one needs a 5:1 edge in numbers when conducting a contested amphibious landing. If you don't have it, regardless of skill levels, your risking defeat. (This as a side note of interest became a serious issue of contention during the planning of Olympic.....when it was realized by intel sources that US forces would initially be landing with almost 1:1 ratio vs. the defenders!)

[TulliusDetritus]

To answer the starter of this thread (although I sort of dislike the what ifs [:)]):

Two goals, objectives in Midway. Invasion of the Island and destruction of the American carriers. The latter being the big, decisive objective.

As for the invasion of the island itself, I guess others have already said it: maybe it would not have worked.

As for the destruction of the American carriers (the big prize that is), I suspect the Japanese would have sunk all the enemy carriers... They would have won the battle that is.

Just think about these Japanese ace pilots. The damage they caused to enemy fleets until the carrier battles in the Solomons...

Remember specially the damage caused by the few pilots, planes of the last surviving Japanese carrier in Midway (Hiryu)...

I can only deduce that perhaps only a miracle would have saved the American fleet. My opinion, of course [:)]

[Shark7]

Chances are they'd have been Midway'ed elsewhere. The Japanese had a penchant for making incredibly complicated battle plans. Hence the raid on Dutch Harbor to draw attention away from Midway. What if all 6 fleet carriers and the jeep carriers had been at Midway? We'll never really know.

[Dili]

The USN may have actually found itself in a better position on the 6th than they did on they 4th.

Yes, USN didn't take almost any advantage of US 4th Carrier aka Midway and risked being wiped or getting same level of damage of Japanese.

[fbs]

ORIGINAL: Shark7

Chances are they'd have been Midway'ed elsewhere. The Japanese had a penchant for making incredibly complicated battle plans. Hence the raid on Dutch Harbor to draw attention away from Midway.

I usually hear that Midway was too complicated, but I'm not really sure about that. It had one diversionary attack (what is usually considered good practice), one fast striking force (with all available fast units, no jeopardy for that) and a slower covering force (good practice again to have as big a backup as you can gather). That's the same thing that the USN did over and over through 44-45.

The difference is that the USN knew of the Japanese plan, and then the simplest plan would have gone awry too. I wonder if the IJN had broken the USN code how many battles in 44-45 could have gone the other way around (or at least wouldn't have been such complete losses for Japan). After all, carrier battles resemble a knife fight in the dark -- whoever hits the the other first has a huge advantage.

Thanks,
fbs

[Nikademus]

The plan was complex, but as the SS authors pointed out.....if viewed in the context of what the plan was trying to achieve....setting a trap for a US Pacific Fleet that was assumed would not come out to play unless forced too, Yamamotto's dispositions made more sense to the reader. His assumption was that suprise would be on his side, and that the USN would be unaware of his goals and dispositions but instead would react (as expected). As such he was wary of 'tipping his hand' too soon by having his Main Body on the scene early, hence the move towards dispersion in order to faciliate "deception." It must be stressed that this deception was a priority because Combined Fleet assumed the USN was beaten and demoralized and had to be enticed out of it's lair. Nagumo was supposed to have had a free hand to deal with Midway on the first hand before turning to the task of approaching USN carriers (of which it was assumed Yorktown would be absent.....sunk at Coral Sea) Of course what happened instead was that the US was waiting for Nagumo in the best ambush spot, with Yamamotto's forces hopelessly spread out and unable to mutually support. Even the sub picket which might have warned the Japanese was deployed too late.

Yamamotto can be forgiven up to a point, and he can't be faulted for not knowing his mail was being read, but in the end he was still guilty of dispersing his forces, wielding an overly complex battle plan dependant on assumed and timely reactions by the enemy and perhaps worst of all....underestimating said opponent by embracing best case scenario - fighting a beaten and demoralized enemy. The assumption even impacted KB's deployment whose strength was at low ebb from Dec 7 to June 42 in terms of aircraft strength....which was weaker than USN aircraft strength. Personally, though, to me his worst sin would be repeating his error in subsequent battles.....something Professor Dull blasted him with at the conclusion of his famous tome on the IJN. If all that wasn't enough, AI was only one part of the overall operation....and included the Aleutians operation which further diluted his strength.

[spence]

Read "Shattered Sword". The Aleutians project was a favorite of the IJA. Yamamoto agreed to it to get Army assent to try his "Decisive Battle Scenario" at Midway. What'd he get? One measly assault battalion with no supporting arms and some REMFs to occupy the island afterward. Great deal that.

The Aleutian Op diverted some of the decisive arm (carrier air) from the decisive battle and constituted a waste of force. The Americans brought more planes than the Japanese to the battle. Letting the other guy outnumber you is generally not a favored approach to winning. Of course the Americans were so inconsiderate by crashing the party before their invitation specified.

Yamamoto's other (gun) supporting forces were completely out of position and unable to intervene in the course of the battle for more than 24 hours AFTER the KB was effectively destroyed (morning of 5 June earliest). Imagine the disaster for the IJN if the 175 odd strike planes launched at the KB before the Japanese even knew they were there had accomplished what the Americans had hoped. The better part of the Combined Fleet would have been subject to defeat in detail. The Japanese were lucky the USN balled up their strikes so badly.

[fbs]

What else could Yamamamamoto do? He got all the heavy carriers he had together; he didn't add the light carriers, don't know for what reason, but light carriers are not exactly suited for fleet action. Having them attacking somewhere else to split the enemy doesn't seem such a bad idea. It only became a wasted effort because the Americans knew where the main axis was.

Also, one can argue that he should have added more BBs and CAs with the heavy carriers, but I don't think it would have made much difference, as Japanese AA was not exactly impressive.

The way I see it, Midway was not a bad plan at all. The decisive factors on it were things Yamomamoto couldn't influence: the unavailability of Shokaku and Zuikaku, and the breaking of his code. It's true that he could have guessed that his radio communications were not secure, but then again does the US Army today refrain from sending tactical orders through radio because they assume the code is broken?

Just my two cents, thanks,
fbs

[spence]

Yamomamoto couldn't influence: the unavailability of Shokaku and Zuikaku,

Couldn't is a pretty strong word. Contrast Nimitz and the seriously damaged Yorktown with Yamamoto and Zuikaku. It might have been inconvenient to transfer the unemployed flyboys on Shokaku over to Zuikaku but it was not impossible for someone who was serious about having "THE" decisive battle.

Seems kinda ridiculous to leave a flight deck and 60 planes behind because a couple of guys owed a bill for sake at the ship's store.

[fbs]

ORIGINAL: spence

Yamomamoto couldn't influence: the unavailability of Shokaku and Zuikaku,

Couldn't is a pretty strong word. Contrast Nimitz and the seriously damaged Yorktown with Yamamoto and Zuikaku. It might have been inconvenient to transfer the unemployed flyboys on Shokaku over to Zuikaku but it was not impossible for someone who was serious about having "THE" decisive battle.

Seems kinda ridiculous to leave a flight deck and 60 planes behind because a couple of guys owed a bill for sake at the ship's store.

That's a fair point.