Why is holding Burma so hard for Japan?

[bklooste]

ORIGINAL: Fletcher

I think the disagreement between IJA and IJN were very different that British with Americans... British untrust on Chinese wills (i.e. Anakin offensive), but they have no problems with americans (only perhaps with Gen.Stilwell, but he has enough "headache" with chinese leader). But IJA and IJN leaders have a great coordination problem regarding all theaters (IJA considers only CHINA like the main target and Soviet Union like main threat...).
At end of the War, british had no problems to subordinate to CINCPAC for naval operations with RN Pacific Fleet.
Americans had their own problems in the Pacific in the first stage of the war, about that I have some home rules, regarding British-American different interest:

3.8 Restrictions on the Royal Navy

The Royal Navy was vigilant for the interests of the British Empire and its Condominium and its interests in the Pacific were almost nil.

Therefore:
1. - Until September 1942 no high-value (HV) units (consider CV, CVL, BB, BC) will operate in the Pacific (except for repairs, transit to ports in US and return from them).
2. - From January 1943 a single high-value naval unit could operate in the Pacific (as happened with HMS Victorious in the Solomon campaign, which operated alongside the USS Saratoga)
3. - From 1945 onwards the Royal Navy can operate freely in the Pacific (creation of the Pacific Fleet under U.S. command).

Kind Regards
Ramón

IJA and IJN co-operated far more than the US - Japan and IMHO closer to Navy - Marines .. Nearly all major operations were army and Navy cooperation

Shanghai landings
Canton Landings
Hainan Island
Vietnam occupation
Malaya landings
PI landings
DEI
Solomons

The IJN move South stuff is before the war ... ( And IMHO ( controversially) refers to South as in Hainan / Canton and has been over stated by western authors after the war top refer to the DEI ) , once the oil embargo hit in 1940 , securing oil for the economy was a national goal .

The next major conflict of interest was over Ceylon but the IJA was over commited at the time that was scheduled.

[Fletcher]

Hi, Bklooste, I am not agree with you about this.. Yo told about Ceylon Ops, and you are right, but it was not the only problem between Army and Navy... Australia was other major task avoid for the reluctancy of Army leaders to employ a great number of divisions out of China.

In January 1941 Captain Kuroshima from Planning Division of the Operations First Section proposed, during the deliberations on the planning committee chaired by Ugaki, the invasion of Ceylon, who accepted it on the condition that it would be carried out in the framework of a strategic partnership with a German offensive in the Middle East. In February, the war games were held aboard the HIJMS Yamato with the proposal of Kuroshima, which would eventually be accepted by the Naval General Staff as the naval official strategy for phase 2. Was introduced as such at the joint conference of IGHQ in mid-March and immediately rejected by the Army when it became clear that the operation depended on the supply of divisions to make the amphibious assault on Ceylon. The Navy looked for an alternative plan and returned to the first proposal of Ugaki to act in the Eastern Pacific, modified to include the possibility of a veto from the Army. I will not elaborate any further because my intention is not to teach history. After the attack of Doolittle, the final decision was the invasion of Midway along the diversionary operation in the Aleutians, which the Army had not been opposed to due to the small number of troops involved.

There are many reasons to employ H.R. to avoid unhistoricall situations on WITP-AE. Another one is the Burma Theatre.

About restrictions of RN these are absolutely historicall, No british ships steams Pacific until Salomons, when HMS Victorious joined to Salomon Ops. (exceptions of course all R.N. ships repaired in the WC). And after it, only at 1945 with the R.N.Pacific Fleet. The main maritime links between India and Australia to UK must be covered and R.N.Eastern Fleet had to fight with a great threat there (IJN, german submarines and raiders). It´s not logicall that players sent freely british ships to South Pacific with Indian Ocean uncovered.

Of course, only if you are interested in Historical envrioment for AE. I know all H.R. could be improved, but contributions for as many players are needed for it.

Thanks for your post, and best wishes
Ramón

[Andy Mac]

Going back to the original question - its because 20:20 hindsight applies to both sides and as Supreme commander you can over ride Curtin, MacArthur etc and send forces to that theatre and make sure you don't lose others which results in a stonger than  historical India - its the one theatre where the allies probably have more options than history because of thr 2 - 8 Divs plus large amounts of engineering capability that can be transferred intot he theatre
 
e.g. addnl Seabee and EAB BN's make a large difference to infrastructure development, ignoring the Hump frees up logisitc support, not getting Burcorps shredded gives Assam more assistance etc etc .
 
Not pouring ltd replacement devices into doomed units etc etc
 
20:20 hindsifght goes both ways and this theatre is one where IMO 20:20 hindsight favours the allies just as pilot training and industrial optimisation favours japan, SRA starting locations and strengths favour Japan etc etc
 
basically 20:20 hindsight for both sides changes the strategic realty of the War int he pacific - its the nature of tyhe beast and there is no question that SEAC probably favours Allies, SRA favours Japan, NG and SOPAC favours Japan (anyone not take PM ??)
 
etc etc
 
IMO SEAC Attacks into Burma are easier because of 20:20 hindsight, SWPAC probably harder because most allied players will lose PM, SOPAC is harder because Japanese will build mutually supporting AF's rather than depending on LR Support from Rasbaul etc, CENTPAC is a wash probably because of stacking levels
 
Its swings and roundabouts in terms of who gains the most overall.
 
Andy

[Heeward]

One option is to tie the Allied players hand by having the units which historically reinforced Singapore arrive there instead of starting / arriving elsewhere on map.
A second option is to restrict the air units / land units that start in Malaya in a similar fashion to those that start in the Philippines. (Of course this may not be possible - I have not tried it.

[EUBanana]

...I really don't get this thread at all.

Are we going to force the Japanese player to do everything stupid the real Japanese chose to do in the war as well?

We've already got PoW and Repulse hard coded to sail to their deaths pointlessly, are we adding in multiple British divisions to this rule too?

[8|]

[Wirraway_Ace]

ORIGINAL: EUBanana

...I really don't get this thread at all.

Are we going to force the Japanese player to do everything stupid the real Japanese chose to do in the war as well?

We've already got PoW and Repulse hard coded to sail to their deaths pointlessly, are we adding in multiple British divisions to this rule too?

[8|]

Actually, my original point was the opposite of this intent. Japanese players need to plan for dealing with a much more powerful British Army coming out of India than they historically had to face because the Allied player is not likely to lose 6 divisions in Malaya and Burma. It seems to me players have tended to focus on game mechanic issues around supply in Burma and have not always considered the tremendous difference in forces available if the Allied player does not replicate the truly staggering errors the British made in the first 4 months of the war. I did not fully appreciate the scale of the disaster until I did the math.

[EUBanana]

ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace
It seems to me players have tended to focus on game mechanic issues around supply in Burma

This is still a valid discussion point though, I think. Do people actually bother shipping supplies into Burma via Rangoon in game?

It seems to be unnecessary, when in reality Rangoon was key to any Burmese operations.

and have not always considered the tremendous difference in forces available if the Allied player does not replicate the truly staggering errors the British made in the first 4 months of the war. I did not fully appreciate the scale of the disaster until I did the math.

Well, true enough, but as mentioned, the same applies to the Japanese. In general the Japanese do better in game then they did IRL as it is, and indeed a historical performance seems to be considered to be quite a bad result in game, at least in terms of expansion of the empire.

I guess the Allies have the ability to roar back quicker with competent play though.

[War History]

Maybe you should change the appearance of the units involved from starting on the map elsewhere to appearing in Singapore on the historical dates. Seems to me that would solve the problem. And would likely give Japan something closer to historical kill points for the area as well.

[USS Henrico]

ORIGINAL: War History

Maybe you should change the appearance of the units involved from starting on the map elsewhere to appearing in Singapore on the historical dates. Seems to me that would solve the problem. And would likely give Japan something closer to historical kill points for the area as well.

Nice idea, but I think Japanese player would wait outside Singapore for the last Allied unit to appear before attacking the city, which would be gamey. Although this would ensure that the fall of Singapore doesn't happen much earlier than historical.

The Allied units could have variable entry in Singapore to forestall this to some degree, but then you run into the question of how they are able to arrive once the Japanese have air/naval superiority in the area. One answer: because they're doomed...[:)]

[SuluSea]

ORIGINAL: War History

Maybe you should change the appearance of the units involved from starting on the map elsewhere to appearing in Singapore on the historical dates. Seems to me that would solve the problem. And would likely give Japan something closer to historical kill points for the area as well.

Heck why go thru the trouble. The allied player should not be able to make any decisions, how about hard coding removal of any allied force that has been historically taken prisioner no later than the date the force was lost to the allies and while we're at it if Japan doesn't feel like fighting the 41st Division or 1st Marines how about giving a hard code restriction in Panama. Sounds like a great game where do I sign up to buy two of these. [:'(]

ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace

Actually, my original point was the opposite of this intent. Japanese players need to plan for dealing with a much more powerful British Army coming out of India than they historically had to face because the Allied player is not likely to lose 6 divisions in Malaya and Burma. It seems to me players have tended to focus on game mechanic issues around supply in Burma and have not always considered the tremendous difference in forces available if the Allied player does not replicate the truly staggering errors the British made in the first 4 months of the war. I did not fully appreciate the scale of the disaster until I did the math.

Thanks for taking the time Wirraway and others who have contributed, it changed some of my thinking on Burma, I believed Japan going deeper in SWPAC & SoPac was the main issue of Burma collapsing earlier than historic.

[Lifer]

Another interesting thread!  It seems that everyone wants a more historical feel without forcing a lock step path to the mistakes that both sides made early in the war.  My first thought would be to require the British reinforcements to complete their deployment to Singapore and Rangoon.  After their boots are on the ground, the Allied player can then do what he wants.  Embark them and bring them back to India, Java, Australia or the East Coast for all I care. 
 
I would rather see a trade off in the set up for the scenario.  What I have read in the other threads is that PDU on benefits the Japanese.  For the Allied player, if the Japanese want PDU On, I want the option to redeploy the reinforcements where I choose.  Stated from the Japanese position, I will take PDU Off but the Allied player must send the reinforcements to their historical destinations initially.  Don't know if that would offset the advantage of PDU On but it does provide a starting point for discussion.

[PaxMondo]

I agree, quite interesting read.  And definitely informative.  I do think that supply movement is still a bit too easy between Burma and India.  BUT, I now beleive that is the minor issue.  The real issue, as pointed out above by several, is the much stronger british forces.
 
 
Thanks to all for an informative discussion.  Something to consider seriously for both sides.

[Wirraway_Ace]

ORIGINAL: aspqrz

ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace

ORIGINAL: Q-Ball

To me it's all logistics. The India/Burma border is just much much easier to move supplies accross than IRL. The Arakan Offensive failed mostly because of logistics, and that was a shoestring operation of an understrength Corps, not the 10-division invasion the Allies can launch in 1943 in AE.

Not sure how to model it, but that's really the problem to me.

My take is that 1st Arakan failed to due to an inept tactical plan executed by inexperience troops against a very competent enemy.

Having just read Slim's "Defeat into Victory" I wouldn't be quite so harsh ... it was probably more inept upper level commanders (i.e. not Slim) who kept interfering with operational parameters and in actual operations ... but certainly, yes, the Japanese were tactically competent ... much more so than the British in many ways. Of course, they took huge risks and, if less unrealistic constraints had been put on the British forces these risks may not have paid off (of course, if less constraints had been put on the Brits they may not have undertaken the campaign until they had a larger force available).

Oh, btw, thanks to those posters on other threads who recommended to all and sundry to read "Defeat into Victory" ... an excellent insight into the campaign!

Phil

Phil,

sorry, just catching up.

Defeat into Victory should be required reading for any young office in any Army. However, while Slim is very objective about his own performance, he was careful about the reputation of others (except the Japanese whom he hated). He was VERY careful about the reputation of British soldiers. I recommend reading Allen's Burma, the Longest War in parallel with Defeat into Victory. Allen's is the better history, while Slim's is the finest account of how to be a successful wartime leader I have read.

[Andy Mac]

I would also recommend Pheonix from the Ashes by Dan Marston it covers the development and tactics of individual bns throughout the war.
 
 
 
 

[Wirraway_Ace]

ORIGINAL: Lifer

Another interesting thread!  It seems that everyone wants a more historical feel without forcing a lock step path to the mistakes that both sides made early in the war.  My first thought would be to require the British reinforcements to complete their deployment to Singapore and Rangoon.  After their boots are on the ground, the Allied player can then do what he wants.  Embark them and bring them back to India, Java, Australia or the East Coast for all I care. 

I would rather see a trade off in the set up for the scenario.  What I have read in the other threads is that PDU on benefits the Japanese.  For the Allied player, if the Japanese want PDU On, I want the option to redeploy the reinforcements where I choose.  Stated from the Japanese position, I will take PDU Off but the Allied player must send the reinforcements to their historical destinations initially.  Don't know if that would offset the advantage of PDU On but it does provide a starting point for discussion.

While I am not advocating for tying the Allied hands to replicate a series of disasterous British (mostly Churchill's) strategic and operational decisions, for those who want more of the historical political feel, a house rule could be used that requires the Allied player to pay to change the HQ of III Indian Corps reinforcements if they want to send them anywhere other than Singers.

[Wirraway_Ace]

ORIGINAL: Andy Mac

I would also recommend Pheonix from the Ashes by Dan Marston it covers the development and tactics of individual bns throughout the war.

Andy,

do you have an opinion on Allen or my take on Slim? From our previous discussions, you have a much better feel for the campaign than I.

[Andy Mac]

Allen is a great book of the campaign its fairly blunt about the positions the British high command put themselves into especially the over estimation of the capability of troops
 
The forces were undertrained, under equipped, and had no air cover
 
Bdes were adhoc attached to Divs, no command and control and delusions as to capability which over estimated their ability to stand and fight.
 
Slim is outstanding but he is very polite about some of his peers - Irwin was a menace, Hutton he is very kind to as well.
 

[vonTirpitz]

Does the supply flow between Burma and Indochina (primarily from the standpoint of the Japanese player) in relatively the same fashion as they do from India in the case of an Allied player?

[Andy Mac]

No its far harder to get supply into Burma from India

[rtrapasso]

ORIGINAL: Andy Mac

Hutton he is very kind to as well.

Willmott credits Hutton for twice saving the British bacon in the 1942 Burma campaign, first when he ordered most of the supplies in Rangoon sent to Mandalay (which was accomplished, and saved the British forces during their retreat(s)), and second for ordering the evacuation of Rangoon... of course Wavell countermanded this order (and very publicly and nastily dressed down Hutton), but Alexander quietly reinstated the orders and manage to complete the retreat.