Zero early war advantage

[Brady]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

setting for max altitude is a good bet, for both CAP and sweeping. Some players are moving away from this as a gamey tactic so depending on your house rules....you may want to discuss it first with your opponent.

I honestly cant say it seams in our games if my Men are well rested that having them at 30K makes much more diferance than having them at 20K.

[Nikademus]

For CAP, yes....but for sweeps, getting the higher alt helps a bit though sweeps in general have a bonus. You should know Herr Brad'ster.....your air ops against me always run like clockwork.....SWEEP.....SWEEP....air attack. SWEEP SWEEP....air attack.

By setting my CAP to max height though in our Burma game though it helped me shoot down a gaggle of your inferior fighters. [:D]

[Brady]

Nates!, they shot themselfs down.[:)]

[Nikademus]

and your inferior Oscars too.

You are doomed. Get out of my country. We Brits came here first.

BURMA FOR THE BRITS!

[Brady]

I am doomed, I cant beleave how badely they have done in game, well I can, I was just hoping for a more realistic model for them, what were those stats you quoted for me, for them in Burma?





O- thats an IJA sight rectile...

[mdiehl]

Losses from 7 August to 15 November in Wildcat-on-Zero combat were 31:25 in favor of Zeros.

Well, there's your problem. It's not even the entirety of the period covered by Lundstrom for Guadalcanal, much less the entire Guadalcanal campaign. Also, that does not include the USN engagements at Coral Sea and Midway, in which the loss ratio in direct A2A was 17:10 Zekes to Wildcats, notwithstanding one of those Wildcats was a "not sure" MIA.

If the question is whether their pilots or planes were better or there was some generally "fearful" attitude among US pilots that somehow the whole "awesomeness" of the Zero's rep led to them doing better, there's no evidence for it. As noted by American pilots at the time, the Zeke had the edge in maneuverability, but there was no period in which F4F drivers had a propensity to get shot down because of that. American pilots, in contrast, tended to get the idea straight away, were superior at deflection shooting, and generally disinclined to give Zero pilots easy shots. In contrast, Zero drivers, even from the days of Coral Sea and Midway, made alot of stupid flying mistakes within range of F4Fs.

Which should not surprise anyone. VF units had a mixture of folks, some with only a few hundred hours of air time, many with thousands of hours of air time. But all of them were much more intensively trained in deflective shooting than their Japanese counterparts. In 1942, the USN had no equals at that particular skill.

The whole "interval of zero supremacy because people did not know how to fight against the Zero" is a completely made up phenomenon that exists only in the minds of JFs.

[Dixie]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

and your inferior Oscars too.

You are doomed. Get out of my country. We Brits came here first.

BURMA FOR THE BRITS!

Damn right. We had a flag so it was only right [:'(]

EDIT: On the original topic, there are stats out there that can 'prove' that both fighters were the best. Really both sets of FBs are as bad as each other. For the most part Japanese airpower was far better than everything the Allies could throw up in the early days and so long as the game roughly approximates this then I'm fine with it.

I grow weary of this same topic with the same arguements from the same people.

[Nikademus]

Via Shores: Burma 1941-early 42 (Ki-27) (fighter vs fighter only)

Nate victories:

3 x Hurricane
5 x Buffalo
17 x P-40

Nate losses:

1 lost to Buffalo
5 lost to Hurricane
17 lost to P-40

exchange 25 kills for 23 losses

Ford paints a slightly different picture (and adds two months to the tail end of the Burma campaign vs. Shores) He tends to give benefit of a doubt to AVG claims and sides with them where both RAF and AVG make competing claims.

Nate victories:

12 x P-40
8 x Buffalo
3 x Hurricane

Nate Losses:

1 lost to Buffalo
1 lost to Hurricane
29 lost to P-40

Total exchange 23 kills for 31 losses


3 x French MS-406 were also downed by Ki-27 during the periods covered by both books (not added to totals)



Ki-43 Burma

Shores

Ki-43 kills

3 x P-40
2 x Buffalo

Ki-43 losses

9 to P-40
1 to Buffalo

total exchange 5 kills for 10 losses

Ford:

Ki-43 kills

5 x P40
2 x Hurricane

Ki-43 losses

10 to P-40

Total exchange 7 kills for 10 losses

Ki-43 vs. AVG/64th squadron affairs were few. Ki-27 mainly fought the campaign.

[crsutton]

I think historians have pretty much given up on the myth of zero superiorty. The Allies were outfought by superior numbers and better pilots in the early months of the war. This combined with serious morale issues and poor supply created the problems in the air more than any quality edge that the zero was supposed to possess. In spite of countless debate in this forum, in game terms the zero vs the P40 or wildcat are about even. The real advantage is the overall quality of the Japnanese pilot pool at the start of the game and that is as it should be.

I also think that the zero and oscar have a distinct early advantage in that they can fly higher and when used for sweeps at maximum altitudes (especially with superior pilots) they can gain some pretty hefty results due to the overpowering effect of the dive in the game. Many players have altitude CAPs as a house rule. We have a maximum ceiling CAP of 29,000 ft in my game and that really tends to equal out the air to air combat. By late 1942, the P40k combined with a much better pilot situation for the Allied player tends to gain a slight edge over the zero and pretty much owns the oscar. (The tojo is another issue [X(])

[Nomad]

My understanding is that some of the problem was that Allied pilots held their Japanese counterparts in some comtempt as to their abilities and that the Japanese aircraft could not be very good. So some or many Allied pilots went into battle with the idea that they would be vastly superior and they found that they were wrong and that the Japanese aircraft and pilots were a combination that was at least nearly as good as them. This was a surprise to many Allied pilots and cost some number of lives.

[Nomad]

I have three games as Allies going, one with no house rule, one with the house rule that no fighter aircraft can go above their second best manouver band, and the last that only sweeping aircraft are restricted to their second best manouver band. I cant hardly tell the difference in results. My greates success has been with no house rules and using P-39s at 19000 feet while my opponet was flying at 36000+ feet. I have found varing altitudes, using levels of fighters, etc all seem to work for me. I rarely see any number of dive messages.

[mdiehl]

Well, the Zeke was the only design that had any historical record of consistent success against any Allied type, and their advantage was chiefly over F2A3s and Hurricanes. There's no particular evidence that their pilots were particularly better than Allied pilots. Many of those early victories came about fighting Allied a.c. that were landing or taking off.

The Zeke had ONE advantage that mattered, and it wasn't maneuverability or pilots. It was long range. The RAF/RAAF and ABDA commands learned the hard way that Zekes could show up over your base from places that were a LONG way away, and therefore unanticipated.

No one-size fits all explanation exists though. For ex the PI air force under USAAFFE was pretty much wiped out on the ground, and that which was not was surrounded by Japanese bases manned with good numbers of well-supplied fighting units. Explaining it all way to "pilot quality" is both historically inaccurate, and ignores the credit due to early war Japanese operational planning.

The Japanese days of success happened where they had interior lines and logistical pipelines were short, and when the Allies were operating on logistical shoestrings, often from poorly provisioned or even strategically isolated bases. The instant the Japanese came up against regularly supplied opposition in India, Burma/China, Australia, or the Solomons, their success vanished like smoke in wind.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: Nomad

My understanding is that some of the problem was that Allied pilots held their Japanese counterparts in some comtempt as to their abilities and that the Japanese aircraft could not be very good. So some or many Allied pilots went into battle with the idea that they would be vastly superior and they found that they were wrong and that the Japanese aircraft and pilots were a combination that was at least nearly as good as them. This was a surprise to many Allied pilots and cost some number of lives.

This was part of the problem. Shores commented that the actual myth created around the A6m (That it was an unbeatable plane) was due to the shock of having been defeated by pilots they had been taught to disdain. It was psychologically easier to attribute this defeat to the machine and not the man.

Still....he also credits the plane's positive virtues as integral to the Japanese success. At the time it was a formdiable machine and it and the Ki-43 incurred a remarkable record of achievement during the first half of 42, combined with well trained pilots. The overall ratio was similar to that experienced by the Germans during Barbarossa. Suprise, superior training and organization of the pilots was a primary cause but the 109's virtues also helped it as well. (roughly 5:1 in the Luftwaffe's favor)

Once the Allies got their wind back, they were able to more successfully fight along conventional exchange rates that one finds in most campaigns (under 3:1 or even 2:1 for tactical) Only on the Eastern front did a major disperity in exchange rates be held for some time with a notable exception during July of 42 when Case Blau started and the Luftwaffe initially found themselves exchanging at near 1:1.

Another notable exception was Burma in regards Ki-43 vs. Hurricane which saw the former maintain a 5:1 ratio.

[mdiehl]

My understanding is that some of the problem was that Allied pilots held their Japanese counterparts in some comtempt as to their abilities and that the Japanese aircraft could not be very good.

Hard to sort that out. It may be that both with the IJNAF and the RAF, previous combat experience was counterproductive. IIRC, many of the RAF units in the Malay Peninsula and early Burma campaign were BoB veterens for whom foxing the ME-109 in a Hurricane was a matter of turning. And of course, the F2A3 was just a p.o.s. So if you used a maneuver that worked against the ME-109, you'd discover that it did not work at all against the Zero.

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl
Well, there's your problem. It's not even the entirety of the period covered by Lundstrom for Guadalcanal,

It is. And the total losses of of the covered period: 108 Wildcats, 106 Zeros, page the same. Your argument remains unsupported. And it is outright destroyed once we factor in the inevitable disadvantage of flying attack missions from distant airbases, and that Wildcats weren't even the only American fighters on Guadalcanal.

ORIGINAL: mdiehl
Also, that does not include the USN engagements at Coral Sea and Midway, in which the loss ratio in direct A2A was 17:10 Zekes to Wildcats, notwithstanding one of those Wildcats was a "not sure" MIA.

Don't you think, that it's your turn provide page or quote (well, besides the fact, that excluding Bufallos from Allied losses is not really honest)?

ORIGINAL: mdiehl
American pilots, in contrast, tended to get the idea straight away, were superior at deflection shooting,

Deflection shooting was basically a gamble (against low odds) anyway. For example, Perry Dahl, a P-38 ace was acidically contemptous of it (you can read his interview in "Fire in the Sky p. 479-480) as of good only at warning the enemy about your presence. And his plane had a way more accurate armament. He's far from the only ace, who considered that the true way of getting kills (unless you're confident that your plane is overwhelmingly better suited to survive a head-on pass, or something) is to approach the enemy fighter unseen and to open fire from directly or almost directly behind at very low distance. In fact, it is much harder to find other opinions.

ORIGINAL: mdiehl
The whole "interval of zero supremacy because people did not know how to fight against the Zero" is a completely made up phenomenon that exists only in the minds of JFs.

No, there was interval of Zero supremacy thanks to Zero's mostly superior performance and mostly superior pilots.

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

Hi FatR,

You might be interested in Gamble's new book on Rabaul which provided good detail on the initial skirmishes with No75 RAAF squadron flying the P-40. In the two month running battle mid 42 they suffered a 3.1:1 loss ratio in favor of the A6M.

Thanks for pointing this book to me, I'll look for it. There are not enough books that cover individual tactical episodes in detail.

[mdiehl]

It is. And the total losses of of the covered period: 108 Wildcats, 106 Zeros, page the same. Your argument remains unsupported. And it is outright destroyed once we factor in the inevitable disadvantage of flying attack missions from distant airbases, and that Wildcats weren't even the only American fighters on Guadalcanal.

Again, you actually have to read Lundstrom before you start putting words in his mouth. And you have to look at the engagements in detail to see what mattered. Nowhere is there any evidence in 1942 of any general superiority of IJN pilots over USN pilots, nor of the Zero over the F4F. It's 17:10 favoring the wildcats in CV vs CV engagements. That alone should tell you that when the best IJN aviators fought the best USN aviators, the USN won. And it should also tell you about how well the two assets -- the pilot+plane combination -- fared against each other when BOTH were well supplied and maintained. As a rule, CVs did not operate in logistical isolation. They fough with fresh pilots using well-maintained a.c. at relatively close range. Any thinking person with an eye for facts and logic, rather than fallacy and ideology, would recognize that "fatigue" does not explain IJN consistent losses.

As to Guadalcanal, fatigue worked both ways. For the Japanese it was long air missions, but they flew out of and returned to bases that were safe from significant enemy attack, and that were as well supplied as an air base could be. USN/MC pilots at Guadalcanal flew from a base that was logistically isolated, using a.c. that were difficult to maintain due to lack of supply for much of the critical period you initially mentioned. The USN/MC pilots were subjected to regular bombardment by warships and land based artillery, snipers, infiltrators, and poor supply. So there's no basis for claiming that the Japanese pilots operated under more difficult circumstances than the American ones. Quite the contrary.

Don't you think, that it's your turn provide page or quote?

I thought you said you'd read the Lundstrom volumes. IIRC there are numerous summaries in The First Team. In the second volume, ~ at Guadalcanal, there is a reference back to the Midway/Coral Sea campaigns, on or about p.17. Both volumes, but especially the latter, make not of several direct quotations of USN pilots who stated that the Japanese zero was a marvelously maneuverable a.c., but that superior US deflection shooting and commonplace errors by Japanese pilots caused the loss of Zeros to alert F4F drivers. If you missed those quotations, then you can't really have been paying much attention in the first place.

Deflection shooting was basically a gamble (against low odds) anyway. For example, Perry Dahl, a P-38 ace was acidically contemptous of it (you can read his interview in "Fire in the Sky p. 479-480) as of good only at warning the enemy about your presence.

The USAAF did not emphasize it. The USN and USMC did. So the opinions of their respective pilots would, of course, differ. Driving a P-38 you didn't much need to rely on it, because the P-38 was bustall faster than the Zero and could out accelerate the zero, significantly, at any altitude and in any attitude.

In fact, it is much harder to find other opinions.

Except, of course, in The First Team, and in ~ at Guadalcanal, where if you go back and read same, you will read several direct quotations of USN/USMC pilots about its utility in fighting the zero, and numerous accounts of encounters where the phrase was not used but synoymous language shows that it was a deflection shot... of the "I used my momentum to turn inside the Zero whose pilot seemed surprised, and fired a quick burst into his cockpit" sort. There's alot of that sort of thing in Lundstrom's volume.

No, there was interval of Zero supremacy thanks to Zero's mostly superior performance and mostly superior pilots.

You are utterly, completely, and verifiably incorrect. There was no interval during the war in which Japanese pilots demonstrated either superior ability or the use of superior aircraft against USN pilots, and few instances of such against P-40s. The only examples you can find of Japanese pilots winning against P-40s are circumstances such as the Darwin raid in which most of the P-40s were attacked while taking off. Absence of any kind of warning network will do that. And you can find examples of US raids during the same interval where surprise led to the successful suppression of local land-based air.

[FatR]

Well, and about the game, I feel that A6M2 is somewhat superior to Wildcats/Airacobras/Warhawks, with all else being equal, whether the altitude is restricted to the best MVR band or unrestrectied. But generally inferior to Hurricanes, who enjoy better ceiling, passable MVR (unlike most early Allied planes) and superior durability/armament.

Of course, once Allies start mixing P-38s in, things really start falling apart for Zero. Unless there is altitude restriction, there are not many solutions to combatting these beasts, that do not boil down to fielding more planes and swamping them with sheer numbers. So even if Japanese enjoy greater superiority over earlier Allied planes than they did IRL, I feel Allies are more than compensated for that by their next-generation planes...

[FatR]

Mdiehl, I'm not gonna bother responding to anything you say, until you start providing, at least, exact pages that, you think, contain the information supporting your arguments. And by information I mean numbers.

EDIT: And no, counting the numbers for Coral Sea/Midway by ignoring the fighter loss figures for the type loss figures for which you don't like is not a valid way to count them.

[mdiehl]

So even if Japanese enjoy greater superiority over earlier Allied planes than they did IRL, I feel Allies are more than compensated for that by their next-generation planes...

Possibly so. If what you want is a sim where the early part of the war overrates the Zero in order to make up for the historical fact that later in the war the Zero was vastly outclassed, that's fine. It's not historically accurate but that's a different thing entirely.