Reread Glantz

[Berkut]

My beef with the historical winter is not that it is too harsh, or not harsh enough, or that the Germans get pushed back too far, or not far enough.

It is that everyone KNOWS there is going to be this unusually brutal winter. The winter of '41-42 was the coldest of the entire war. That means that a sane German player is not going to push too hard, because he knows what is coming. That is a huge advantage for the Germans, since if the winter was not incredibly cold, it would be foolish to act as if it was going to be - and there is a similar advantage for the Soviet player. He KNOWS that the winter is going to come and save him, which allows him to take risks he cannot otherwise take.

I think people really underestimate the importance of risk evaluation. Everyone commonly derides the Germans for being fools for not preparing better for winter. I don't buy it - spending resource to prepare for a unlikely occurrence rather than dealing with the likely occurence is foolish. Just because you roll the dice and get snake-eyes doesn't mean that you made a mistake. It's not like the Germans had plenty of supplies to go around, and didn't prepare just because they didn't think it mattered.

Indeed, once it was clear that the USSR was not going to collapse like the predicted house of cards, I think the German High Command had a very clear idea how much trouble they were in, and knew that they HAD to try to end the war, and end it soon. That meant prioritizing short term gains over long term risk.

It didn't work out so great for them, of course...

[Commanderski]

The Germans, at least OKH, did have an idea that their campaign would be going into the Winter months. As early as August they were starting to stock up on Winter clothes. They were sort of prepared for Winter but not to the extreme that the cold and snow turned out to be.

And I think you're right about the risk taking. I'm playing a campaign against the AI in normal and I'm thinking how far I should try to go before Winter. I'm in early Sept and may just change my attitude about that and just see how far I can go.

[kswanson1]

[font="times new roman"]

So even before the Soviet conteroffensive the TOE was at 1/3 -1/2 and AGC had 50 tanks....only Hilter's threats stopped a rout all the way back to Germany; and standing fast in these blizzard circumstances should cause grievous losses. I am not convinced that the blizzard is unrealistic: gamers are mesmerized and attempt to geographically overexploit the summer and fall offensives, they fail to bag and destroy enough Soviet forces, and often end the fall offensive at low TOE. It is correct that the Axis player often finishes the fall with a TOE which is high - but that is because most Axis players would not push their forces to the extent that OKH did. To mitigate losses, the Axis should really fall back and give up much territory - any thing else should cause the huge losses we see.

[/font]
 
[font="times new roman"]I don't disagree.  But you switch from historical justifications of various Soviet approaches to game management -- than switch to "German players aren’t pocketing enough Reds in 1941".  Why aren’t the Germans pocketing more Soviet units in 1941?  Is there something systematic that requires tweaking within the game to allow the Axis player to do what they were historically doing in 1941 -- i.e. bagging large pockets of Soviet units?  You cite the Minsk pocket and the inability of the Germans to properly cordon off the pocket.  However they still bagged close to a half million soldiers and presumably captured equipment and weapons that could have equipped what -- another 1/2 million men.  A 1/2 million man pocket even in game terms is not insignificant by any stretch.[/font]
 
[font="times new roman"]How many more were bagged at Kiev?  650,000 to 700,000 or some such thing?  How many were bagged in front of Moscow in the Bryansk and Vyazma Pockets – another 600,000?  I agree that what’s at issue is that the German aren't bagging large pockets of Soviets in-game – the reality of sieve like cordons ala Minsk or not.  [/font]
 
[font="times new roman"]I agree that perhaps over emphasis within the forum is focused upon the 1941 blizzard effects.  The true focus should be upon Germans being unable to pocket and destroy large numbers of Soviet troops during the summer and Fall campaign.  Some of this will invariably be player related – lack of aggressiveness or too much aggressiveness.  [/font]
 
[font="times new roman"]From my own head-to-head game observations I'd attribute some if not all of the in-game “Pocket Problems” to the following factors:   [/font]
 
[font="times new roman"]1) Soviet Operational Mobility even after being pocketed.  The Russian player will inevitably launch a very concerted and well coordinated effort by just about the entire encircled mass toward breakout and/or cordon ooze.  Granted there is a simultaneity aspect to reactionary movements that can’t be effectively addressed.  However the initiative is clearly in the hands of the Germans at this early stage of the war.   I therefore don’t view formation of pockets as something that requires a non-turn based approach to allow one or the other player to be able to react to closing pincers.  [/font]
 
[font="times new roman"]2)  As a result of the way in which "hex control" and supply is calculated within the current game model, a pocket formed by the  Axis player usually result in no ill effects upon the bagged Soviet units for at least one to two turns (or even more) following the pocket creation.  This ties into #1 above in that it allows the Soviet Player to rapidly and very coherently collapse pockets toward the cordon of Axis Mechanized units.  Soviet units then begin to ooze through gaps or conduct low odds counterattacks. And the Russian (+1) “thingy” on the CRT invariably means an Axis Retreat and the opening of the cordon.  This exacerbates hex control issues for the Axis as the Pocketed Russians can easily keep supply routes open to themselves while at the same time instantly closing supply to the Axis cordon units (i.e. the Axis units suffer the supply effects from lack of "hex control", in their next phase).  The only way around this is to create "solid" cordon pockets where every hex within the cordon is occupied by an Axis unit.  Unfortunately the latter approach can usually only be conducted against limited sized pockets -- at least from my in-game experiences.  There are never enough Axis Mechanized units to go around, and regimental breakdown is somewhat ineffective as they do not the influence oh so very critical hex control in adjacent hexes. Regiments are not typically robust enough in defense to fend off the inevitable low odds pocket opening counterattacks.  Hex-to-hex cordons mean the Axis player is having to satisfy himself with constantly nibbling away at Soviet defenses and creating smaller tactical or operational level pockets (division and corps sized encirclements) rather than large strategic level pockets in which Armies or multiple armies can be successfully bagged and subsequently destroyed.[/font]
 
[font="times new roman"]3) In the Axis phase following creation of a larger pocket, many of the units forming the cordon are typically in an isolated status do to hex control and pending hex control issues and limited rail net\rail heads for tracing Axis supply.  Units forming a cordon will typically have both very-very limited C.V. and very-very limited movement rates the turn after they have created a pocket.   Yet the Soviet units within the pocket -- because of the extensive friendly rail net and close proximity of rail heads and their ability to trace supply through contested hexes and zones of control are typically not faced with the same issues with CV or movement rates as long as they can continue some form of cordon oozing or low odds pocket opening counterattacks.  Effectively closing such pockets can take weeks of very precious good weather turns.  So while I am perfectly in tune with the supply effects on Axis cordon units, I have to ask should Soviet units within freshly formed pockets always have the ability to instantly rush for the encircling cordon the moment a pocket is formed?  Moreover, should there be an instantaneous command and control issue associated with loss of a valid line of communications?  Should pocketed Soviet Units be able to react in the sort of coherent manner we see in-game?  Does the current hex control and hex contestment model require refinement -- at least for 1941.   [/font]
 
[font="times new roman"]I keep hearing it said that players wont make the same mistakes as their historical counterparts and therefore wont allow themselves to be pocketd.  Well perhaps there historical counterparts were not provided the level of operational freedom we currently see from pocketed units.  One might also look at it from the perspective of: “If you give players unrealistic command and control capability than they will not repeat the mistakes of their historical counterparts.   [/font]
 
[font="times new roman"]I can only speak from my own gaming experiences, but what I am seeing is the Soviet side of the coin is given the sort of operational and strategic flexibility I would associate with the Red Army of mid to late 1942 to early 1943 – rather than early 1941.  On the other hand, the WiTE designers have (IMHO) done a wonderful job of replicating the realistic constraints in terms of supply limitations & logistical\administrative halts of large mechanized thrusts.  I feel like a very concerted effort was put into properly modeling all the potential pitfalls of big mechanized pushes across large expanses of ground in a country with a very primitive road net.  Where I think the model falls short is in the Soviets command & control issues associated with pocketed units -- particularly in 1941.   Put Soviet command and control constraints for the 1941 Campaign on track and I think you begin to see formation large pockets like Minsk pocket, Kiev pocket, Bryansk pocket, Vyazma pocket, Izyum etc etc.  [/font]
 
[font="times new roman"]Or you can just blame the blizzard…[/font]

[mmarquo]

There are way too many subtle features; I have only just scratched the surface of comprehension. Much of the C/C issues you allude to are dealt with by hundreds of die rolls going on under the hood - I think the Soviets are probably pretty much screwed by these rolls in 1941.
 
 
For me there is a huge learning curve; in my second campaign against the AI I pushed as far east as possible in the south to decimate units and population centers and pretty much left Moscow and Leningrad alone. At the start of the blizzard there was a 1:1 ratio of Axis/Soviets - about 2,800,000 to each side - and this blizzard is really without much teeth at all. The Soviet AI is so depleted that it can't effectively really attack - it loses about 1/3 of it's attacks and I can even counter attack. So I am hopeful.
 
Marquo [:)]

[Tarhunnas]

On the other hand, the WiTE designers have (IMHO) done a wonderful job of replicating the realistic constraints in terms of supply limitations & logistical\administrative halts of large mechanized thrusts.

I would say yes and no. I think the model in the game works well for the Germans in 1941. On the other hand, in my experience, I don't think Soviet mechanised thrusts in 1942 are sufficiently hampered by supply difficulties.

[marty_01]

1. Gamers complain about the Soviet RR capability, however: "During 1918 and 1919, V.I. Lenin and and his commissar for military affairs, L.D. Trotsky, used the railroad lines to shuttle their limited reserves from place to place, staving off defeat time after time. This became known as echelon war, in which large forces were shifted by railroad (echelon) to reinforce successivley threatened fronts." The use of strategic reserves, echelon and railroad mvt was integral to Soviet strategy; the game is realistic in this regard.

I must admit it's been sometime since I have done any reading on the Russian Civil War, but my recollection is that the Reds were moving around a handful of Naval Brigades or handful of Infantry divisions by rail and using them to plug gaps or conduct localized counterattacks. Railing around multiple Armies as in what occurs in WiTE is an entirely different order of magnitude. What I am seeing in WiTE in terms of Soviet strategic movement is entire armies being winged around Russia by rail. These are than plugging holes created in the Soviet lines that are hundreds of kilometers wide at what feels like lightening speeds. It is not unusual for me when playing the Axis to create a large penetration in a Soviet line, only to see a new 200-kilometer wide hole plugged with completely new armies with reserve positions created during the Soviet Movement phase. This is being done exclusively via strategic rail movement. At the end of my turn there is nothing but ether in front of me. Following the Soviet turn there are now 20 to 30 new divisions in front of me -- along with reserve positions. And this isn't a single or atypical game occurrence. It's a routine Soviet Player approach to their operational planning.

Is this ability accurate? I can only say that it doesn’t "feel" accurate -- certainly not at the magnitudes of troop movement and redployments I am routinely seeing. This isn’t a couple of Naval Brigades being winged around on one of Trotsky's armored trains. I would like to see a few historical examples of the Soviets railing multiple armies about and re-establishing entire fronts over the course of days. If there is indeed historical references to these sorts of events and the speed with which such rapid shifting of armies was occuring from Glantz or Erickson or whomever, then I'd gladly accept that this as being very "realistic".

I personally think the movement costs for entraining and detraining are excessively light. And I am willing to bet that developing accurate assessments of time required to entrain and detrain large formations is easily researched. I suspect we can eaily point to some example of a division or regiment being wisked into a battle front and rapidly detraining and marching right to the front -- but did it have its heavy equipment? And can we point to multiple examples of 20 or 30 divisions doing the like? In the past, wargame designs have typically (or traditionally) applied significant movement penalties to units entraining and detraining. ANd maybe these past designers had it all wrong. But than again maybe there was a method to their madness. Some of this old school approach to strategic movement was doubtless abstraction, but in retrospect, and considering what I am seeing being routinely done in WiTE with strategic movement, I wonder if perhaps these past game designs via play testing realized the potential impact rail movement had on game flow and tweaked rail movement accordingly. I'm not for castrating the Soviets ability to employ rail movement as part of strategic planning and strategic reshuffling. But I am also not for strategic rail movement being provided to Soviet players as a crutch for weak operational planning. The current system -- at least in regards to rail movement is mish-mashing a strategic level asset into an operational level asset (i.e. what am I doing over the entire front over the next month or two months vs. what am I doing this turn). I would vote for increasing entraining and detraining movement costs -- or don't allow units to employ both rail movement and normal movement in the same turn -- Or; don't allow units to use rail movement and normal movement in the same turn unless the player (German or Soviet) expend some number of admin points -- or something along these lines.

[marty_01]

I would say yes and no. I think the model in the game works well for the Germans in 1941. On the other hand, in my experience, I don't think Soviet mechanised thrusts in 1942 are sufficiently hampered by supply difficulties.

Good point. But I'd extrapolate even further to Offensive action in general and the historical challenges associated with maintaining momentum as a function of supply issues (german or soviet). Presumably the Soviet players would face similar supply issues with deep thrusts as they push well beyond their rail heads -- ala a historical example of post Stalingrad and Mainstein's backhand blow. But not having gone so deep into the GC I'm only speculating on this latter bit.

[mmarquo]

"isolation of 2nd Shock Army"
 
The one mechanic in the game which I beleive really needs attention is that isolated unit are eliminated too quickly. The 2nd Shock Army held out for months IIRC before surrendering; the 6th army held out for over 2 months...this is an issue for the blizzard because many German units held out in cities for quite some time and survived.
 
Marquo 

[Tarhunnas]

ORIGINAL: marty_01

I would say yes and no. I think the model in the game works well for the Germans in 1941. On the other hand, in my experience, I don't think Soviet mechanised thrusts in 1942 are sufficiently hampered by supply difficulties.

Good point. But I'd extrapolate even further to Offensive action in general and the historical challenges associated with maintaining momentum as a function of supply issues (german or soviet). Presumably the Soviet players would face similar supply issues with deep thrusts as they push well beyond their rail heads -- ala a historical example of post Stalingrad and Mainstein's backhand blow. But not having gone so deep into the GC I'm only speculating on this latter bit.

I agree. From my experience, it is possible to sustain offensive operations for far longer in the game than was the case historically. Both sides can literally bleed their units white and both can still continue to attack. This is the case in many wargames, but in one with a complex supply and fatigue model as this game, I would have expected mechanisms to force pauses in operations. For example, fatigue could have a larger negative effect on attack strength, thus necessitating breathing spells.

[runyan99]

Versus the historical result, the Germans have no edge in this game. On the Russian side, they have the material, industrial and manpower edge. Historically, they managed the war very badly for at least 18 months, and yet still could not be defeated. In addition to this, the Soviet wargamer has the additional advantage of hindsight. And against this, what does the German player have? Sure, their units are superior for quite a while, but that is easily offset by the fact that there is far too much for them to do.

As I see it, this makes wargaming the thing problematic. I think this is something that is going to take a lot of post-release time and many new patch versions to address and get to a game that is wide open for both sides.

In my estimation, probably command and control for the early war Soviets should be even more disadvantageous than it already is. Unless the Red Army is paralyzed to some degree, there is no way the war is going to last four years in this game.

[Panama]

ORIGINAL: runyan99

Historically, they managed the war very badly for at least 18 months, and yet still could not be defeated.

Perhaps militarily. In other respects they did an admirable job holding things together. They were highly flexible, ingenious and productive. To say they managed the entire enterprise badly is a show of disrespect to the people who pulled off nothing less than a miracle. Not trying to be harsh towards your comment, just saying they fought the worlds premier military power to a standstill when a Western nation would have folded.

[runyan99]

Ok. Militarily, they managed the war very badly for at least 18 months, yet could not be defeated.

Feel better?

[mmarquo]

Panama,

I used to think, but no longer agree, that the Axis was the world's premier military power at the time. Afterall, the Germans spent most of the war trying to catch up to Soviet technologies - they initally had inferior tanks, inferior tactical bombers, etc. Also the most important military asset, intelligence, was woefully if not criminally inept. OKH ran into whole reserve armies they knew nothing about at Smolensk; etc. And the upper echelon Axis leadership was pathetic - they could do little to fix the blunders of the dilitante who was the highest military authority. So all in all, despite the bravey of the boots on the ground and the competent mid and lower officer corps, the Wehrmacht in the east was ill-equipped, ill-supplied, had crap intelligence and led astray and abandoned by it's upper leadership. And to finish off the mess, they deliberately and maliciously alienated a population eager to be freed from Stalin's yoke. They were doomed from the beginning and this was acknowledged by many German officers as of October, 1941.

In terms of the game, I beleive it should be decided in 1945 on the outskirts of Beriln. There is plenty of opportunity for both sides the attack and defend multiple times during the this time span. One simply has to get over the mindset that Russia should fold in 1941; it so much more fun to play the entire map.

Marquo [:)]

[Kel]

ORIGINAL: Marquo

I calculated the distances from the map I uploaded; the point is that Germans were punted backwards for quite some distance.

Right, but a game where a semi-competent russian player (like me) can push back a very decent german player all the way west of the Dnepr in two months time of a continuous, uninterrupted, frontline-long winter offensive (more than 20 hexes in front of Moscow) is somewhat unbalanced. Never IRL, not even in 1944-1945, did the Red Army perform the kind of achievements that many players routinely observe in pbem campaign games.

[Angelo]

ORIGINAL: Marquo

Panama,

I used to think, but no longer agree, that the Axis was the world's premier military power at the time. Afterall, the Germans spent most of the war trying to catch up to Soviet technologies - they initally had inferior tanks, inferior tactical bombers, etc. Also the most important military asset, intelligence, was woefully if not criminally inept. OKH ran into whole reserve armies they knew nothing about at Smolensk; etc. And the upper echelon Axis leadership was pathetic - they could do little to fix the blunders of the dilitante who was the highest military authority. So all in all, despite the bravey of the boots on the ground and the competent mid and lower officer corps, the Wehrmacht in the east was ill-equipped, ill-supplied, had crap intelligence and led astray and abandoned by it's upper leadership. And to finish off the mess, they deliberately and maliciously alienated a population eager to be freed from Stalin's yoke. They were doomed from the beginning and this was acknowledged by many German officers as of October, 1941.

In terms of the game, I beleive it should be decided in 1945 on the outskirts of Beriln. There is plenty of opportunity for both sides the attack and defend multiple times during the this time span. One simply has to get over the mindset that Russia should fold in 1941; it so much more fun to play the entire map.

Marquo [:)]

Personly what's best is ...

"to crush your enemies, see them driven before you and to hear the lamentation of their women" [:D]

[Skanvak]

Right, but a game where a semi-competent russian player (like me) can push back a very decent german player all the way west of the Dnepr in two months time of a continuous, uninterrupted, frontline-long winter offensive (more than 20 hexes in front of Moscow) is somewhat unbalanced. Never IRL, not even in 1944-1945, did the Red Army perform the kind of achievements that many players routinely observe in pbem campaign games.

I answer Marquo remarks on winter at the begining of the post at the same time. I think the arguement is flawed with a serious logical errors. However good are the historical facts, if the logic is flawed the resulting proposition will be false.

I reckon I agree with Marquo's facts given at in the OP. Then let see the situation before when blizzard strike.

The German is over extended and still on offensive (Moscow). The german has taken heavy lose in soviet counter attack or standing defense (Smolensk, Leningrad).

The Soviet have taken HUGE loses in counter attack and pockets (Kiev).

What do we see in the game according to AAR :

The German have an easier time as the soviet keep withdrawing. The German use hindsight to stop offensive earlier and prepare for winter (ie save manpower, do not extend, I am not saying he is reading to the harsh winter, just that it save people to die during this period). There fore the German is in far better situation than historically => every thing equal they shoudl do better than historically.

The soviet, have consistently withdraw and avoid being pocketed. Therefore the soviet army have lost less men and material. There fore the Soviet is in far better situation than historically => every thing equal they shoudl do better than historically.

Which mean that the German should be better off fighting soviet counter-attack but at the same time, the Soviet can very well mount lot more of those counter attack. The winter is flawed become only the 2nd happen and not the first. Why?

This is because the first winter should be set to bring the historical german army before the blizzard to its historcial level after and not, as it is now, the "game as it is played" (gamey) german army before the blizzard to its historcial level after.

This is a very important logical statement. Think about it carefully, and you should see where the problem is.

This is too the only way to offer possibility to explore alternative strategy. Thought I do think that 80% of the game will finish near Berlin than the other way round, the game should be balance to get this result (I hate balance, this is an heresy. Unkwon quote to support that : "if you enter a fair battle, you made a mistake somewhere").

[alfonso]

ORIGINAL: Skanvak


Which mean that the German should be better off fighting soviet counter-attack but at the same time, the Soviet can very well mount lot more of those counter attack. The winter is flawed become only the 2nd happen and not the first. Why?

I would say: Which mean that the German should be better off fighting soviet counter-attack but at the same time, the Soviet can very well mount lot more of those successful counter attacks. The winter is flawed become only the 2nd happen and not the first. Why?

And then perhaps I could think that it is not possible for both sides to simultaneously perform better than historical.

Said differently: if the Germans are 10% better, but the Soviets are 90% better (imaginary numbers, obviously), the Germans probably will perform worse than in history

[delatbabel]

I think that any Axis player of a game of the Second World War has to accept the fact that they are going to lose (the war that is, not the game).

Germany declared war on the USSR in June of 1941, and subsequent to the bombing of Pearl Harbour, declared war on the USA in January 1942.  Even without the advantage of hindsight, any person (and indeed even my cat) knows that no nation of the size of Germany will defeat the USA and the USSR, combined, in any long war of attrition.

The challenge for the gamer is to accept that fact and, as the Axis player, do better than the Germans did in the 1941 - 1945 period (if you want a game that Germany can win, go play "Case White" and stop there).  The challenge for the game designer is two fold -- one to design a game where the Axis player(s) can "win" the game by doing better than the historical result (and no, that doesn't include suing for surrender earlier as they probably should have done), and second to make that a fun game to play.

Admittedly, it won't be fun for everyone, but it can be made fun and there is no little joy in watching the allied player (in one example -- World in Flames) simply fail to make the last needed die roll to take the required territory back from the Germans to result in an allied victory before the game closing date, and leave the game, if not the war, in Axis hands.

[mmarquo]

"This is because the first winter should be set to bring the historical german army before the blizzard to its historcial level and not, as it is now, the "game as it is played" (gamey) german army before the blizzard to its historcial level. This is a very important logical statement. Think about it carefully, and you should see where the problem is."

Here is an alternate and very logical POV: historically the the TOE of most German units was at 30 - 40% before the blizzard; OKH pushed too hard trying to, "win" before the winter. It is not wise to adjust weather effects to, "bring the historical german army before the blizzard to its historcial level." If the player wants to grind his Army down to that level, so be it.

Think about this as an Axis strategy, which I may very well try:

Knowing that Soviet Rifle, MTZ and Tank divisions destroyed before Nov 1941 simply return as reinforcements, what if:

1. The Axis player takes care not to destroy any Soviet units until Nov 1941? No pockets, just pound the crap out of them and inflict maximum losses? Since they will come back anyway, why knock them off the board until after November? The Axis player then would have 4 moves until the winter blizzard to pocket and destroy as many Soviet units as possible knowing that they will never return.

2. Absolutely minimize Axis losses as a priority.

3. Retreat west as far as needed during the 1st blizzard, and then start Barbarossa in earnest in 1942.

Marquo [:)]

[Q-Ball]

The reason you want to surround and destroy Soviet units in 1941, though, isn't so much to kill-off the units themselves (which grow back as you point out prior to November), but rather all the guys and equipment IN the unit. The majority of battle casualties are Disabled, which come back (slowly). POWs don't come back. Units that surrender will also lose you nearly all equipment. THAT'S why you need to kill Soviet units, to kill all the guys and guns inside the unit.

It is also a more efficient way to kill Reds without getting your own Germans guys killed. You can achieve 10-1 kill ratios only by taking POWs. In just combat, the ratio will probably be closer to 3-1, which is not really in the Germans favor.

Pocketing troops in 1941 is essential to the Axis for these reasons